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Chapter 1 Introduction
Large rivers have two faces. On the one hand, they fill people with dread because of the 
risks they pose; on the other hand, they are attractive because they provide a living and 
are a source of enjoyment. Living in the delta of three large rivers, the Scheldt, Meuse 
and Rhine, the Dutch are used to living with water. For centuries they limited the risks 
by building dams, dikes, drainage systems and sluices to regulate the rivers. In return, 
they benefited from rich soils for arable and dairy farming, river-related resources, such 
as sand and clay extraction, the latter used for brick making, and fishing. The rivers are 
also important transport arteries, for goods as well as people, and a source of enjoyment 
and a recreational resource: swimming in summer, skating during periods of ice in 
winter, sailing, rowing and strolling along the river dike or quayside. In addition, the 
continually changing face of the rivers make them  a source of inspiration and 
contemplation. Over the centuries, many functions of the rivers have changed and there 
are now fewer river-related economic activities, the emphasis being on the 
maximisation of bulk transport. But although living near the river is no longer a 
necessity because people have other sources of income, they remain attractive for living 
and recreation.
Both faces of the rivers have made them a source of dispute between government 
authorities and citizens as well as a basis for collaborative relationships between these 
parties. In the past, disputes have been about things like disagreements over a new canal 
for year-round transport or payment for dike repair. Today, disputes are often about 
government plans to reduce flood risks, which are not welcomed by lower-tier 
authorities or the local population, and if local residents come up with their own plan 
this may also be a source of discord between government authorities and citizens and 
between government authorities. In the past, government authorities and landowners 
were convinced that the water would always win unless they collaborated; the 
landowners provided labour and resources in exchange for a say in decisions about the 
nature and execution of public works (Blockmans, 2009), although this did not prevent 
floods occurring. For centuries polder boards provided a structure within which water 
problems could be discussed. The general public, however, did not have any influence 
over decision-making on water management issues, although they were often affected 
most when floods occurred. Today, after centuries of infrastructure works, government 
authorities and citizens are heavily divided about measures to increase flood safety. This 
is mainly due to the change in the position of citizens. While government authorities
9
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still govern, the public are no longer passively ‘governed’, but have become self­
confident, assertive and active citizens. At the same time, the scale at which decisions 
are taken is different. Whereas decisions on water management measures, such as dikes 
and sluices, used to be made locally, in the polder, nowadays the state is an im portant 
actor, particularly when large infrastructure works are concerned. This means that 
decision-making often takes place at the national level. As floods are no longer common 
occurrences, government authorities and citizens do not see each other as a natural ally 
in the field of water management. This study will show how conflict and collaboration 
become apparent in the interaction between government authorities and citizens in 
today’s Dutch river landscape planning.
1.1 Rationale
The rationale of this study derives from the effects of a changing world on the 
relationship between government authorities and citizens in Dutch river landscape 
planning. Society faces numerous challenges, including climate change, overpopulation, 
urbanisation, rural depopulation, pollution, scarcity of natural resources and 
globalisation, some of which have a direct impact on river landscape planning. Climate 
change is expected to lead to higher river discharges, requiring drastic measures, while 
increasing urbanisation puts pressure on government authorities to act, since the Dutch 
rivers are confined to the main channel between ever higher dikes, preventing outward 
expansion into the flood plain to accommodate periods of increased discharge.
Another phenom enon that has become apparent during recent decades is the 
problematic relationship between government authorities and citizens. In our risk 
society (Beck, 1992), citizens have to deal with various risks that can radically affect 
their lives, particularly large projects like those in the Room for the River (Ruimte voor 
de Rivier) programme, within the context of a shifting balance of power between the 
state, society and the market. The Dutch government has responded to the 
transform ations in the economy and society over the last twenty to th irty  years by 
moving from a state-centred towards a less-state centred model of governance, which 
in turn  has made it more dependent on regional and local support (Peters & Pierre, 
2001). In this model, national government has to deal with lower-tier authorities, civil 
society organisations and citizens. This transform ation, which is also referred to as 
multilevel governance,1 denotes a vertical ‘layering’ of governance processes at different 
tiers of government. It involves two processes. The first is a shift in the division of tasks 
between institutions at different levels of government, which has opened up 
opportunities for negotiated arrangements either to complement or replace legalistic- 
hierarchical institutional relationships. The second is a decentralisation of 
responsibilities that has created a system in which institutions at one level can enter 
into exchanges with institutions at any other level that are characterised more by 
dialogue and negotiation than command and control (Peters & Pierre, 2001). For the
10
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government department in charge of water management, Rijkswaterstaat, this meant 
becoming an executive agency, focusing on regional services. A sizeable chunk of the 
flood defence budget went to the provincial authorities and the responsibility for 
operating and maintaining many defences was transferred to the water boards (Warner 
et al., 2008a). In practice, this implied that Rijkswaterstaat delegated the design and 
implementation of most river projects to other government authorities. This was seen 
as a logical development because water management is now closely related to land use 
planning and design, which is largely a responsibility of lower-tier authorities. At the 
same time, it complicated the planning process because regional and local interests also 
have to be met. On the other hand, the fact that lower-tier authorities are closer to 
citizens may be an incentive for a change in the relationship between government and 
the public.
1.2 Aim
Government-citizen interaction in Dutch river landscape planning has a history that 
goes back for centuries, as described in later chapters. Although this study focuses on 
the period since 2000, policy developments that emerged before this date have had 
considerable impact on what is the main theme of this study: the interaction between 
government authorities and citizens in river landscape planning. In 1996, the Dutch 
government published the Room for the River policy in the wake of two periods of 
high water levels in 1993 and in January 1995, when 200,000 people had to be evacuated 
from their homes for safety reasons. Growing concern about climate change also 
contributed to the idea that it was time to act. The Room for the River policy implied 
a shift of focus in water management: rather than taking measures outside the main 
river dikes, such as lowering groynes, the emphasis shifted to measures inside the dikes, 
such as dike relocations, bypasses and ‘green’ side channels. However, an emergency 
Major Rivers Delta Plan (Deltaplan Grote Rivieren) to build better defences along the 
Rhine and the Meuse had to be implemented first. This plan was based on dike 
reinforcements planned decades ago but cancelled as a result of fierce public protest. It 
proved to be a temporary blip in the trend towards a new water policy (Warner et al., 
2008a). In 2000 the state secretary for water management presented the Room for the 
River White Paper, a policy programme with 39 river projects scattered along the rivers 
Rhine and Meuse to improve flood safety. Additionally, emergency water storage was 
planned to prevent situations arising in which residents would have to be evacuated in 
a hurry. As it seemed sensible to designate in advance which areas would be eligible for 
emergency flood storage in extreme events, the official policy document included a 
map with ‘search areas’ showing which polders were provisionally set aside for these 
functions. Instead of classifying the calamity plan as confidential, the state secretary 
decided to widely publicise it (Warner et al., 2008). The launch of Room for the River, 
with the inclusion of 39 river projects and the ‘search areas’ for emergency flood storage, 
caused much unrest among government decision-makers and the public. A few people,
11
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for example in Overdiep Polder, however, made a virtue out of necessity and made their 
own plan, first with the help of farmers’ organisation ZLTO, and later, the plan was 
elaborated with the help of water experts and a financial contribution of the provincial 
government.
Against this background, the relationship between government authorities and citizens 
was influenced by certain other trends, such as the emerging lack of trust between 
government and citizens, changing ideas about how to deal with risks, which impinge 
more on peoples private lives, and the changing institutional setting. These form the 
starting point for this study, which set out to improve our understanding of cross-scale 
interaction in Dutch river landscape planning and whether this leads to conflict or 
collaboration.
1.3 Questions
The central question in this study is what factors and mechanisms influence cross-scale 
interaction in Dutch river landscape planning. The following sub-questions were 
formulated:
- What does cross-scale interaction in Dutch river landscape planning mean?
- How do citizens organise themselves to make their voice heard?
- How do government authorities interact with citizens and other governmental 
agencies?
- How does cross-scale interaction in Dutch river landscape planning proceed?
- What are the outcomes of cross-scale interaction in Dutch river landscape planning?
The first question, about the meaning of cross-scale interaction, implies an investigation 
of the properties of social interaction, which then have to be placed into a coherent 
scheme. While government can be divided into national, regional/provincial2 and local 
authorities, the unit of analysis for citizens is the local group. To address the second 
question, an inventory has to be made of how people organised themselves and which 
strategies they chose to get their opinions across. The third question, about the way 
government authorities relate to citizens and other government agencies, can be 
answered by applying the analytical framework developed to answer the first question. 
Here, empirical data from three case studies are used (see below). The same analytical 
framework was also used to obtain answers to the fourth question, about the process 
of interaction between government authorities and citizens, and the final question 
about outcomes. The answers to these five questions can be used to identify factors and
12
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mechanisms that influence cross-scale interaction in Dutch river landscape planning.
1.4 Approach
The above questions guided the approach taken in this study, a combination of a 
framework-led method and multiple case studies. The framework developed in this 
study is an operationalisation of social interaction, the central theme of this research. 
The properties of social interaction identified at the beginning of the study were used 
to construct a basic framework, which then evolved interactively during the course of 
the study using the results of the inductive analysis of empirical data from the three 
cases. Deductive analysis of the developed concepts was then used to give the framework 
its final shape, the CSI framework for cross-scale interaction.
The case studies which form the empirical basis of this study are the Dike Relocation 
in Lent, Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder and the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder 
(see Figure 1.1).
Figure  1.1 Locations of the  th re e  case studies
The Dike Relocation in Lent case study concerns a government plan to relocate the dike 
some 350 metres land inwards and excavate a side channel in the floodplain to relieve 
a bottleneck in the river Waal between the village of Lent on the north bank and the city 
of Nijmegen on the south bank. The plan was designed to accommodate a river 
discharge of 18,000 m 3/s in the Rhine, which was set by the national government. The 
Department of Water Management, for which Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act, 
and the municipality of Nijmegen were involved, as well as the inhabitants of Lent, 
represented by three local groups.
The Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder case study concerns a government plan to
13
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prepare the polder to accommodate excess river water during periods of unusually high 
river discharges. It includes an inlet and an outlet in the polder and a dike surrounding 
the main villages. The main actors were the Department of Water Management, for 
which Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act, Gelderland provincial government, the 
municipality of Ubbergen and the residents of Ooijpolder, represented by the local 
group High Water Platform (Hoogwater Platform).
The Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study is an initiative by local people to redesign 
their polder to create a retention area with nine terps (raised m ounds for the 
construction of dwellings and farm buildings and as places of refuge during flooding) 
for nine of the 17 families originally living in the polder. The main actors involved were 
the Department of Water Management, for which Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to 
act, Noord-Brabant provincial government and the residents, represented in the 
Overdiepse Polder Interest Group (Vereniging Belangengroep Overdiepse polder). The 
plan provides for a lowering of the water level in the river Meuse of about 30 cm.
1.5 Structure of this thesis
This thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2 the subject of this study, cross-scale 
conflict and collaboration in Dutch river landscape planning, is set against the 
background of European and Dutch water management policy. Recent developments 
in water management policy and the resulting tensions are discussed and the interaction 
between government authorities and citizens is looked at from a historical perspective. 
Chapter 3 starts with a description of the perspective taken to study cross-scale social 
interaction, followed by a description of the development of the framework for cross­
scale interaction (CSI). The presentation of the CSI framework includes the 
introduction of the various properties of social interaction: the government authorities’ 
and local groups’ potential to act, their power building, their interaction strategies and 
the interaction outcomes. In addition, the organisational culture and traditions of the 
government authorities, the culture and traditions of the local groups and the impacts 
of these on their actions are described. Chapter 4 explains the methodology used in 
this study, including a discussion of the research question and design, followed by the 
research methods and process. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are the empirical chapters in which 
the case studies are described. The subject of Chapter 5 is the Dike Relocation in Lent. 
A case narrative takes the story from the start of the project to the final decision by the 
national government. The case is then analysed by describing the properties of the 
framework, starting with the interaction between the government authorities and the 
local groups, their interaction strategies, their power building, potentials to act, and 
finally their cultural background and the impact on their actions. The other cases, the 
Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder and Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder, are dealt 
with in the same way in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. The CSI framework and the research 
results are discussed in Chapter 8, which also includes suggestions for further research. 
In Chapter 9 conclusions are drawn linking the findings to the research questions.
14
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Chapter 2 Setting the scene
This chapter sets the scene within which the interaction between the government 
authorities and citizens took place. It examines recent developments in Dutch and 
European water management policy and the changing roles of government and citizens 
in river landscape planning against the background of developments in society during 
recent decades.
2.1 Dutch and European w ater management policy
The high water events in the rivers Rhine and Meuse and near floods of 1993 and 1995 
precipitated a breakthrough in Dutch water policy (van Stokkom et al., 2005), forcing 
the advocators of dike reinforcement to reconsider their arguments. The occurrence of 
two high water events in quick succession seemed to confirm the relationship between 
climate change and flooding, a connection that opponents of dike reinforcement had 
made earlier. It was an im portant reason for the advocators of dike reinforcement to 
abandon their approach and look at another paradigm, opening the way for an 
alternative flood protection strategy. In the latter half of the 1990s a flood risk 
management policy based on the ‘Room for the River’ concept was developed and 
formally adopted in legislation in 2000 (van Heezik, 2007). This shift cannot be seen in 
isolation from developments in water management policy in neighbouring countries in 
northwestern Europe.
As in the Netherlands, water policy in other European countries had been undergoing 
a change in approach during the 1990s. The traditional focus on building flood defences 
was gradually replaced by a focus on managing flood risks (de Bruijn et al., 2007). 
Generally, the nature of flood risk management in different countries depends on their 
legislative and administrative systems, their cultural context, the types of floods that 
they experience (ibid.) and their history in the field of river management. For example, 
in the UK (particularly in England and Wales) the Making Space for Water policy covers 
all sources of flooding and contains an integrated portfolio of approaches. It highlights 
the importance of spatial planning (Samuels et al., 2006). In the Dutch Room for the 
River policy, spatial planning is also key to water management (Wolsink, 2006), which 
includes taking measures outside the dikes, such as excavating flood plains, as well as 
inside the dikes, such as relocating dikes and creating bypasses and (green) side channels.
15
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Besides raising dikes and creating retention areas, the German approach includes flood 
prevention measures like prom oting sm art adaptation in and around houses 
(Steenhuisen et al., 2007). In France improvements in flood risk management address 
land use management in floodplain areas (Gilard & Givone, 1997) and, more recently, 
flood prevention measures (Établissement Public Loire, 2008).
This re-examination of the risks of flooding were provoked mainly by the severe floods 
and high water periods during the 1990s and early 2000s. Other factors were the 
anticipated rise in sea levels and increasing river discharges resulting from climate 
change (Mitchell, 2003), the consequent increase in potential damage to residential and 
commercial properties, and the need to provide a wider portfolio of risk management 
options, such as flood warnings and awareness raising, spatial planning, home-owner 
adaptations, insurance, and emergency planning (Johnson et al., 2007).
Flood risk management is defined as the combination of all activities that aim to 
maintain or improve the ability of a region to cope with peak discharges or extreme 
rainfall events (de Bruijn et al., 2007). It has to be considered within the context of 
sustainable water management. The principles of sustainable water management were 
set out in the Dublin declaration in 1992 and have subsequently been further developed 
and expanded in the form of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM). Central 
to IWRM is the need to manage all aspects of water and water use in a systematic 
manner and to manage both water and land across the catchment as a whole, also called 
the ‘river basin approach’. From the wider sustainable development perspective, IWRM 
has to be integrated with other aspects of development, including rural-urban 
development (ibid.).
As they faced the threats of flooding, most European countries became aware that water 
problems cannot be solved nationally and require an international approach. The major 
challenge for international flood risk policy is to overcome the dependence of 
downstream countries on upstream countries not shifting their problems downstream. 
Solidarity between upstream and downstream countries is considered crucial. Examples 
are the cooperation within the International Commission on the Protection of the 
Rhine (ICPR), the political agreement on a m utual approach between the German 
federal state of Nordrhein-Westfalen and the provincial government of Gelderland and 
Rijkswaterstaat (van Stokkom et al., 2005), and the EU Floods Directive. In the case of 
the Rhine, the Netherlands depends on the flood risk policy of Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
while both countries are attempting to achieve an acceptable level of safety based on the 
probability of flood occurrence. In the Netherlands, general safety standards are fixed 
by law and imposed by national government, whereas in Germany standards can differ 
locally depending on historical water levels and local implementation of river measures. 
Solidarity is im portant because the effects of German flood policy can improve or 
worsen the situation in the Netherlands. Higher dikes in Germany can increase the 
amount of water flowing across the border, whereas retaining the water in areas along
16
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the river in Germany can reduce the volume of water in the river entering the 
Netherlands. Incidentally, the Netherlands has contributed financially to flood 
protection measures in Germany. Germany depends on Dutch flood policy to a much 
smaller extent. Flooding in the Netherlands near the German border may flow behind 
the dikes via the hinterland back into Germany. In turn, the federal state of Nordrhein­
Westfalen depends on the cooperation of other German federal states upstream as their 
flood risk policies have downstream effects. Apart from solidarity, international 
cooperation also provides for coordination of information, exchange of best practices 
and connecting different policy fields that contribute to flood protection. In addition, 
involvement of the European Union opens up possibilities for access to European funds 
(Steenhuisen et al., 2007) for river-widening measures.
2.2 Government-citizen interaction in Dutch river
landscape planning from a historical perspective
Current relations between government authorities and citizens in Dutch river landscape 
planning have to be viewed in the context of public protests against dike reinforcements, 
which started in Brakel in the 1970s. This section therefore takes a historical perspective 
and explores the following questions: Who are the government authorities and who 
are the citizens, what are their views, and where do they derive their strength from? To 
understand the context of government-citizen interaction in Dutch river landscape 
planning we first examine the key developments in society.
As Dutch river landscape planning and the actors involved are part of Dutch society it 
is useful to briefly describe some general societal processes. Booher’s (2004) breakdown 
of key developments in today’s society provides a useful framework to illustrate this. It 
sheds light on new spaces for governance processes and the awareness of 
interdependency, the increasing uncertainty among citizens, a more cultural diverse 
society with many languages, values, perspectives and styles, and the changing role of 
trust in government practices.
First, the government is increasingly aware that policy success depends mainly on the 
involvement of other actors, such as non-governmental organisations and other societal 
groups, which creates new arenas for governance processes.3 Booher (2004) describes 
the emergence of new arenas for action, including collaboration between government 
agencies and institutions outside the political realm. Like many governments in Europe, 
the Dutch government recognised these changes in society and reconsidered its role, 
tasks and approach, which led to a rethinking of the government-citizen relationship. 
The ‘Modernising Government’ programme that the Dutch government adopted at the 
beginning of 2000 aims to improve public services, develop a new governmental 
steering philosophy that balances central and decentralised steering, develop plans for
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reorganising and restructuring national government, and improve ‘external 
management’, including developing new forms of cooperation and a more service- 
oriented attitude. In this programme citizens are seen as active participants (van den 
Brink, 2009). It reminds citizens of their own responsibilities and government 
departm ents and lower-tier authorities of their responsibilities. For example, 
municipalities cannot keep planning new developments outside the dikes and expect 
Rijkswaterstaat, the Dutch executive agency for water management4 to protect them 
with structural defences (Warner et al., 2008a). The construction of urban extensions 
in the flood plains in recent decades has exposed the limited competences of 
Rijkswaterstaat, as it could not prevent these developments going ahead. At the same 
time they have shown that flood risk problems have to be solved by cooperation 
between government agencies, civil society organisations and citizens. Whereas at first 
the challenge was to collaborate with other national government departments 
responsible for agriculture and nature conservation (Disco, 2000; van Hemert, 1999), 
since 2000 the emphasis has shifted to delegating river projects to lower-tier authorities, 
the provinces, municipalities and water boards. This also m eant the transfer of 
responsibilities for public consultation and participation, the idea being that these 
authorities are closer to citizens and more open to public participation. However, new 
opportunities for citizen involvement in the work of lower-tier authorities proved to be 
rare (Verhoeven, 2006) and seemed to remain stuck in the experimental stage (Hajer & 
Zonneveld, 2000). Some, like Edelenbos and Klijn (2005), suggest that public 
involvement needs to embedded more firmly in institutional processes to prevent 
interactive processes becoming meaningless and useless in formal decision-making.
Second, citizens are increasingly uncertain about the processes and outcomes of 
government decision-making, for example regarding potential natural or other 
disasters, about the capabilities of traditional government agencies, prom pted, for 
example, by the unintended and sometimes negative effects of infrastructure works, 
and about the limits to centralised hierarchical control by government agencies (Booher, 
2004). People know that life is full of uncertainties. Most people have learned to live with 
day-to-day uncertainties by adopting certain cognitive heuristics and strategies, using 
technical devices such as smoke detectors, and relying on institutions, emergency 
services and insurance to accommodate or compensate for the effects of uncertainty. 
However, there are different views on the acceptability of risks and their consequences 
(Leach et al., 2002). In public discussions, policy analysis and decision-making, it 
appears as if the world is fully understandable and can be predicted. Among politicians, 
recognition is growing that policies that ignore uncertainty about technology and about 
the physical world often lead in the long run  to unsatisfactorily technical, social and 
political outcomes (Granger Morgan et al., 1990). Until recently, Rijkswaterstaat 
pretended to know everything in detail (van Hemert, 1999), whereas within the 
organisation experts and policy makers used to openly discuss the uncertainties of flood 
risk management.5 Although uncertainty is now a standard issue in reports and studies, 
it remains a difficult subject, particularly to explain to the public. A case in point is the
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flood safety standard for dikes of a probability of a flood occurring once every 1,250 
years, which proved to be hard to comprehend for citizens because such a flood could 
occur three times in a short time period, or in ten, twenty or thirty years time. Moreover, 
people do not take account of the risks posed by rivers, as is shown by their attitudes 
after the various high water episodes in the 1990s. For a while those who lived near the 
rivers were more aware of the risks, but soon picked up their daily routines and carried 
on as before (Benning et al., 1995). However, the newly adopted Room for the River 
policy, which focuses on expanding river capacity rather than dike reinforcement, made 
people aware that reducing flood risks implies the sacrifice of land, houses or freedom.
Third, today’s society is becoming more culturally diverse, which means that decision­
makers have to address a range of societal groups in their own languages and taking 
account of their values, perspectives, cognitive styles and world views. The inclusion of 
different stakeholders and creating mutual understanding through deliberation and 
dialogue are important if solutions are to be found for complex and controversial policy 
problems (Booher, 2004). Government agencies like Rijkswaterstaat have to deal with 
people’s desire to be involved in the development of government plans, while trying to 
increase the legitimacy of those plans. In practice, public involvement has still been 
arranged in traditional ways (Verhoeven, 2006; Wiering & Immink, 2006), such as 
information meetings and consultation, while legitimacy is gained largely through the 
support of lower-tier authorities (see Chapter 5).
Fourth, the trust component in government-citizen relationship is changing (Booher, 
2004). Formerly an inherent component of traditional government practices, nowadays 
building trust is not self-evident in governance processes. In the past, people had 
confidence in constitutionally embedded institutions or derived trust from these 
structures. In the current network society, characterised by various interacting networks 
in which actors have to collaborate by transcending institutional boundaries, trust 
cannot be assumed (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003). Putnam  (2000) shows in his book 
Bowling Alone that trust in society is disappearing, how we have become increasingly 
disconnected from one another, and how social structures, whether they be the church 
or political parties, have disintegrated. As a result, social capital is declining. Critical 
scholars, such as Wuthnow (1998), argue that trust is not declining, but that the form 
trust takes is changing. As far as uncertainty in the field of flood risk management is 
concerned, trust is a key factor in the extent to which citizens rely on the government. 
Trust is becoming increasingly im portant as greater emphasis is placed on horizontal 
forms of governance (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007). Other scholars, such as Maloney et al. 
(2000), state that the role played by government authorities in the creation or 
maintenance of social capital is neglected. In addition, the implications for governance 
cannot simply be read off from associational activity and ‘stocks’ of social capital. 
Booher (2004) argues that it is a government’s task to work with others to find solutions, 
but also to create trust during this process. For Rijkswaterstaat, this proved to be difficult 
to achieve. Despite the decentralisation of its main tasks, it still operates in a largely
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top-down manner (Roth et al., 2006a; Wiering & Immink, 2006). This traditional 
approach stems from its mission statement, which includes ‘to work on protecting the 
country against flooding’.6 In the Netherlands, water is considered to be a national 
security issue and security is a matter of defence, in this case defence against the water, 
for which Rijkswaterstaat is responsible (Roth et al., 2006a). A cooperative process does 
not fit easily into the national security discourse, which is the main reason why finding 
joint solutions and creating trust are still rather noncom m ittal activities in river 
landscape planning. As a former MP said: ‘I do hope that the attitude of Rijkswaterstaat 
towards the region changes from doing something for the people to doing something 
with the people’.7 This would imply a shift in the organisation’s practices and thus a 
shift in its organisational culture. However, the citizen’s role in this regard is not 
unequivocal. Although people expect total security against flooding, which reflects a 
passive attitude, they also want to have a say in government plans to reduce flood risks 
and behave as active citizens. This leads inevitably to interaction between government 
and citizens. Based on these developments arising from the network society, this section 
has shown that government-citizen interaction is shaping governance practices in the 
Netherlands. The next section describes how government authorities and citizens have 
interacted in Dutch river landscape planning since the 1960s. The changing role of 
government and citizens are described as two different contexts.
Changing role of government
Various scholars argue that Dutch spatial development has become deadlocked (de 
Swaan, 2008; Hajer & Zonneveld, 2000), partly due to the government’s 
unresponsiveness to developments arising from society. For example, spatial 
development increasingly depends on an integrated approach, but the Dutch 
government continues to tackle problems in a sectoral way despite various attempts to 
develop a more integrated approach. A close look at the field of river management 
demonstrates that in the last thirty  or so years Rijkswaterstaat has been forced to 
respond to actual developments, including the effort to adopt a more inclusive 
approach. However, as the case studies described in Chapters 5 to 7 show, this proved 
hard to achieve. This is illustrated in the following brief historical overview of the 
changing role of Rijkswaterstaat.
For more than 200 years Rijkswaterstaat exercised responsibility for Dutch river 
management through technocratically devised, state-controlled projects (e.g. Nieuwe 
Merwede and Bergsche Maas at the end of the 19th century, the canalisation of the river 
Meuse after the 1926 flood, and various dike reinforcements after the 1926 flood and 
the 1953 flood in the southwest of the Netherlands). This changed after the 1970s. 
Projects became more flexible and integrative as nature conservation started to play an 
im portant role and power shifted towards civil society, local authorities and 
international bodies (van der Werff, 2004). During the 1970s Rijkswaterstaat’s approach 
came under attack from fierce environmental opposition and public protests. The 
controversy with environmentalists concerned the final element in the Delta coastal
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defence works, the closure of the Oosterschelde, the original plans for which were 
changed from a dam into a storm-surge barrier that only fully closes in event of a storm 
driven by northwesterly winds. Public protests were directed at dike reinforcements, 
which were considered harmful to the river landscape, and the demolition of historic 
dike houses in the village of Brakel. They objected to Rijkswaterstaat putting 
engineering objectives first rather than attempting to integrate measures into the 
landscape. Environmental groups adopted the critique and put the preservation of 
cultural and historical m onuments and ecological values in the river landscape onto 
the political agenda (van Eeten, 1999; Wiering & Driessen, 2001; Wolsink, 2003). This 
resulted in the establishment of two advisory commissions, a common Dutch approach 
to resolving political and policy controversies. In 1977 the Becht Commission 
(Commissie Becht) recommended reducing the flood protection standard for dikes from 
a probability of flooding of once in 3,000 years to once in 1,250 years. Consequently, 
part of the proposed dike reinforcement was cancelled (van Hemert, 1999). However, 
due to a new calculation m ethod the dikes had to be much higher than had been 
foreseen, resulting in a renewal of protest actions (Wiering & Driessen, 2001). In 1993, 
the report of the Commission for Assessing the Principles of River Dike Reinforcement 
(Commissie Toetsing Uitgangspunten Rivierdijkversterking), chaired by Kees Boertien, 
opened a policy window for implementing the necessary raising and strengthening of 
the dikes in a way that preserved the landscape. In the following year the adoption of 
the Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Act made EIA obligatory for all proposed 
dike reinforcement works (Wiering & Driessen, 2001; Wolsink, 2003), which implied 
that conservation of landscape qualities had become standard policy. As a result, the 
policy controversy over the need for dike reinforcement in which the advocates of 
raising the dikes stood diametrically opposed to the opponents faded into the 
background. As van Eeten (1999:144-145) states: ‘Though the dike improvement 
critique used valid arguments through a point-by-point rebuttal of the dike 
improvement argument through an accurate exposure of the uncertainties underlying 
it, the critique fails to offer an alternative’.
The reorientation that came into being within Rijkswaterstaat was elaborated in various 
projects, such as Infraplan, Ketenbenadering (Chain Approach) and, Besturen via de 
Spiegel (Governing via the Mirror). The new ‘open planning process’ (openplanproces) 
showed that policy making was considered an activity that had to be implemented with 
broad public involvement (Pestman & van Tatenhove, 1998). Learning from 
infrastructure planning practice, in the second half of the 1990s Rijkswaterstaat started 
an experiment called InfraLab, which led to the development of Infraplan, a 
methodology for improving the development and decision-making processes of 
projects and broadening the support base (van Enthoven, 1996; Wolsink, 2003). During 
the same period, the ‘need and purpose’ (n u ten noodzaak) debate emerged as a planning 
instrument designed to ensure a more smoothly running process. As part of the ‘funnel 
procedure’ in which each subsequent step reduced the margins for choice, this 
instrument was mainly used to speed up the planning cycle, allowing only a few months
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for discussion after which the debate was closed (Wolsink, 2003). The instrum ent met 
with much criticism and proved to be ineffective. These experiments did not therefore 
result in a change in the organisation’s approach. A 1999 report by the Scientific Council 
for Government Policy (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, WRR) 
concluded that institutional changes (‘stakeholder planning’) were needed to achieve 
high levels of governance. This report played a major part in the shift in the approach 
taken by Rijkswaterstaat and condemned the practice by government of unilaterally 
imposing projects as an obstacle to legitimacy. Furthermore, as the decision-making 
procedures were not designed to generate public support, the outcome was often the 
creation of resistance (Wolsink, 2003).
Meanwhile, the tendency to decentralise and outsource im portant government tasks 
did not pass Rijkswaterstaat by. In the early 1990s Rijkswaterstaat became an executive 
agency focusing on regional services, which included the transfer of a considerable part 
of the flood defences budget to the provinces and responsibility for maintaining the 
dikes to the water boards (Warner et al., 2008). The high water events in 1993 and 1995 
interrupted this decentralisation exercise. An emergency Major Rivers Delta Plan 
(Deltaplan Grote Rivieren) to reinforce weak dikes and build emergency defences along 
the rivers was drafted and passed at lightning speed. But this plan proved to be a 
tem porary revival of the traditional approach within a trend towards greater public 
involvement (ibid.).
Although the Room for the River policy of 1996 remained heavily dominated by 
national government (van der Werff, 2004; Wiering & Immink, 2006), it opened up 
some opportunities for Rijkswaterstaat to take a more receptive attitude to other 
stakeholders (Roth et al., 2006a). The policy required a style of governance based on 
reaching negotiated solutions with local inhabitants, government agencies at various 
levels, ministries and others. It required a new approach based on coordination and 
integration, negotiation, participatory design and implementation, and stakeholder 
involvement (Roth & Winnubst, 2009).
To summarise, while the command and control approach has persisted (Wiering & 
Driessen, 2001), it has been regularly pushed into the background by attempts to adopt 
a more adaptive approach. The inclusion of other interests and objectives has put a 
severe strain on the adaptability of Rijkswaterstaat. In the new configuration of state and 
civil society Rijkswaterstaat’s new role as a governance actor has turned out to be more 
or less successful. As the focus of this thesis is on government-citizen interaction, the 
next chapter presents an analytical framework which focuses, among other aspects, on 
how government authorities are equipped for their task of acting with other 
stakeholders, especially citizens.
Changing role of citizens
During the last few decades the part played by the public in Dutch river management
22
- Q -
Madelinde PHD zonder afbrekingen:Opmaak 1 15- -2011 14:44 Pagina 23
has changed from a ‘passive’ role in which people are consulted at a late stage of the 
planning process to an ‘active’ role of engagement in the process. This active citizenship 
encompasses different forms of collective protest, initiated in the 1970s by residents in 
Brakel, who put black flags on the dikes to express their disapproval of dike 
reinforcements. This later developed into resistance against government authorities’ 
spatial claims (e.g. emergency water storage in Ooijpolder; see Chapter 6), cooption 
into an advisory group of a project organisation (e.g. dike relocation in Lent; see 
Chapter 5) and taking the initiative to make their own plan (e.g. terps plan in Overdiep 
polder; see Chapter 7). The case studies are examples of citizens organising themselves 
to oppose government plans or take the initiative in planning their environment. They 
took action because they felt their views were insufficiently reflected in government 
plans (Chapter 5 and 6) or they did not trust the government to include their views in 
government plans (Chapter 7).
Today, citizens are well aware that their actions will not be judged as simply NIMBY (not 
in my backyard) protests. They come up with alternatives and know how to couch the 
issue more in terms of the national interest. The farmers in Overdiep polder intended 
to transform their polder into a water retention area with a flood probability of once 
in 25 years. In doing so they combined the public interest with a viable economic 
perspective for their farming operations.
Others, like the High Water Platform, established by citizens in Ooijpolder opposing the 
plan for emergency water storage, avoided the NIMBY label by stating that they ‘would 
basically be willing to make sacrifices for the interest of national security, if argued on 
solid grounds’.8 Another characteristic is that the local groups in Overdiep Polder and 
Ooijpolder adopted more easily than the local groups in Lent, the relevant policy 
discourse to show their ability to speak in terms familiar to experts and were able to use 
specialised knowledge (Pellizzoni, 2003).
Whereas in the past opposition by citizens was mainly based on rejection of government 
decisions which did not meet, or inadequately met, their wishes, nowadays it mostly 
starts with non-reconciliation, but changes into a constructive approach in which 
alternatives are proposed and attempts are made to start a dialogue. Today, citizen 
protests take a communicative approach and display strategies that include research, as 
recent studies of citizen protest groups show (Roth et al., 2006a; van Dijk & van der 
Wulp, 2009). This recognises the agency of citizens as ‘makers and shapers’ who set 
agendas rather than as ‘users and choosers’ of interventions or services designed by 
others (Cornwall & Gaventa, 2000). As ‘makers and shapers’ citizens may be aware of 
the fact that government authorities consist of people who have different views and 
values. As such, government authorities are not considered impersonal, internally 
consistent, m onolithic and single-minded organisations. This means that the 
development and implementation of policy is a ‘messier’ process that is also more 
susceptible to outside influences. Citizens may see themselves as one of many actors
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that may influence policy making and decision-making. The active citizenship fits in 
with the new model of the Dutch government in which citizens are seen as active 
participants (Ossewaarde, 2007).
Citizens who form local groups to oppose government plans to reduce flood risks can 
theoretically be viewed as social movements. Fraser (1997) considers social movements 
to be an essential element of the democratic process because of their capacity to 
formulate oppositional views. Social movements imply a widening of discursive 
contestation. This political-process approach allows us to explore the ways in which 
citizens mobilise political and sociocultural contexts, ‘frame’ issues and develop 
‘repertoires of contention’, including novel tactics to appeal to supporters as well as to 
put forward their arguments to decision-makers and the wider public. These insights 
contribute to an understanding of the phases of the movement, or ‘cycles of contention’ 
(Mayo, 2005). As participants in government-citizen interaction, citizens are viewed 
here as active and organised in local groups.
24
é -
Madelinde PHD zonder afbrekingen:Opmaak 1 15- -2011 14:44 Pagina 25
Chapter 3 A framework for analysing 
cross-scale interaction
The case studies in this thesis will be analysed within a conceptual framework of cross­
scale social interaction: the CSI framework. This chapter is devoted to this framework. 
First, the foundation will be laid by a literature overview, before turning to the 
framework proper, followed by the embeddedness of the framework in current 
literature.
3.1 Towards the CSI framework: 
A process view of cross-scale social interaction
As described in Chapter 1, the aim of this study is to understand the relationships 
between government authorities9 and local groups in river landscape planning and 
whether this leads to conflict, debate, negotiation, dialogue or collaboration. The 
essence of these relationships is their social interaction, which is the main theme of this 
study. Before explaining the framework for cross-scale interaction (CSI), this section 
discusses a process view of cross-scale interaction.
Social interaction has been discussed by many European theorists, including Weber, 
Parson, Simmel, and later in the works of Habermas, Bourdieu and Foucault, to name 
a few. The concept of social interaction used to be limited to the fields of social 
psychology (Aguinis et al., 1996; Tajfel, 1982), sociology (Elster, 1989; Etzioni, 1968; 
Giddens, 1976; Hare et al., 1965) and anthropology (Wolf, 1982). Later it also became 
a theme in other disciplines, like sociolinguistics (Tannen, 1995; van Dijk, 1997), 
planning (Forester, 1994; Healey, 1997; Innes, 1995) and ecological economics (Rudd,
2000). Drawing on these disciplines, the aim of the present section is to develop a 
process view of cross-scale social interaction as the first step towards comprehending 
the interactions between government authorities and local groups in Dutch river 
landscape planning.
This approach implies a cross-disciplinary study rather than viewing a particular aspect 
of social interaction from a specific discipline. It seeks to provide an overview of social 
interaction and its properties rather than a substantive investigation of what is at issue 
in the social interaction. It offers the opportunity to understand the conditions within
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which social interaction takes place, how the actors actually behave, and how social 
interaction proceeds to an outcome. In other words, it reveals the relationship between 
government authorities and local groups by placing the properties of their social 
interaction within a coherent scheme.
As social interaction is about action which occurs between two actors, Elster (1989:13) 
can be taken as a point of departure, especially his statement that the elementary unit 
of social life is the individual hum an action. To explain social institutions and social 
change is to show how they arise as the result of the action and interaction of 
individuals.
From Elster’s perspective, an action can be explained by seeing it as the end result of two 
successive filtering operations. The first filter is made up of all the physical, economic, 
legal and psychological constraints on the individual. The actions consistent with these 
constraints form his opportunity set. The second filter determines which action within 
the opportunity set will actually be carried out and consists of the actor’s motivations 
(which may be outcome-oriented, as in rational choice theory, or not outcome- 
oriented, as in social norms).
Etzioni (1968) takes a slightly different view of social interaction. He is particularly 
interested in what he describes as ‘potential capacity to act’10 of ‘collectivities’, which 
can be members of a social category that has a set of shared values in common rather 
than only interests. Collectivities have a ‘potential capacity to act by drawing on a set of 
normative bonds which tie its members’ (ibid.:98,99). This capacity to act can be 
referred to the ability, motivation and support necessary for people to take action.
The capacity to act can be found in the work of scholars that have studied the concept 
of social capital. In the literature, the term  refers to social networks, norm s and 
sanctions that facilitate cooperative action among individuals and communities 
(Halpern, 2005). Putnam (2000:20) argues that networks involve mutual obligations; 
they foster norms of reciprocity: I’ll do this for you now, in the expectation that you (or 
someone else) will return the favour. Sanctions are the result of non-reciprocity: ‘if you 
don’t go to somebody’s funeral, they won’t come to yours’. Reciprocity, however, only 
functions well if people are trustworthy, if people take responsibility for their conduct 
and obligations. Putnam emphasises the importance of trust: ‘a society characterised by 
generalised reciprocity is more efficient than a distrustful society’ (ibid.:21).u This 
means that trust is an important factor for social capital. According to Stoker (1998:23) 
the actors’ capacity to act also consist of resources, which can be described as skills, 
money and land. In addition, whether an actor is an individual or group, identity is 
always a factor. Castells (1997:7) states that in today’s world, the search for identity 
(collective or individual, ascribed or constructed) has become the fundamental source 
of social meaning. Social identity is therefore part of the actor’s capacity to act.
26
- Q -
Madelinde PHD zonder afbrekingen:Opmaak 1 15- -2011 14:44 Pagina 27
To summarise, social interaction occurs between two actors, which can be either 
individuals or social groups. When an actor is a group, as in this study, its capacity to 
act can be considered to be composed of trust, resources and social identity, and a 
motivation to act based on rationality and social norm s (for further elaboration, see 
section 3.2.1). An actor’s capacity to act and motivation to act give insight into its 
potential to act.
The actors’ basis for action further consists of varying combinations of both cohesive 
relations and control networks (Etzioni, 1968). The former refer to maintaining social 
relations and the latter have to do with building power to control.
To understand how actors maintain social relations, the concept of framing may be 
useful for interpreting collective and organisational processes (Steinberg, 1998). In the 
literature there are two distinct interpretations of frames. The first views frames as 
mental orientations that organise perception and interpretation. This interpretation 
focuses on the way people experience, interpret, process or represent issues, 
relationships and interactions in conflict setting. The second interpretation sees frames 
as interactional co-construction by focusing on how parties negotiate meaning in 
interactions (Dewulf et al., 2009). In this study, the concept of framing is interpreted 
and used mainly in the sense of mental representation, with less attention to the 
discursive aspect of frames. Frames are used to give meaning to the actors’ position in 
their interaction with others through the use of various frame types.
Etzioni’s concept of ‘control networks’ is based on the assumption that the realisation 
of most societal goals requires the application of power. He defines power as ‘a capacity 
to overcome part or all of the resistance, to introduce changes in the face of opposition’ 
(Etzioni, 1968:314). As such, power is a property of social interaction (Emerson, 
1962:32), or, as Wrong (1968:673) argues, ‘people exercise mutual influence and control 
over one another’s behaviour in all social interaction’. In the literature, power is 
considered to be an im portant resource for ‘getting things done’ and appearing 
powerless can have far-reaching negative consequences for one’s ability to perform 
effectively. Power is related to the control of critical resources. Powerful actors are those 
who have access to people, information, expertise or other resources that are critical 
and in short supply. Power is also inversely related to dependence. In an asymmetric 
power relationship, the person with less power is more dependent on the person with 
more power for valued resources. In other words, the more dependent people are on 
others, the less powerful they are considered to be (Lee & Tiedens, 2001). Power can 
therefore be viewed as relational and relative. Actors are not powerful or weak in 
themselves, but may be powerful in relation to other actors in some respects and weak 
in relation to other actors in other respects (Etzioni, 1968:314; Wrong, 1968:673-674). 
Giddens’ (1976) term  ‘dialectic of control’ expresses the idea that the ‘power-full’ are 
never fully independent of the ‘power-less’, which implies that the ‘power-less’ always 
have some power and hence some control over the ‘power-full’ (Oliga, 1996:89-90).
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Following Giddens, Healey (2003:113) argues that just as social relations operate on 
several levels at once, so power relations are expressed in the dynamics of interaction 
between actors. The dynamics of power relations, however, are difficult to manifest as 
they are continually in a dialectic and ‘restless’ flux due to struggles in various arenas 
at various levels at once. Social interaction can thus be viewed as a multilayered process 
with a power dimension. As Lukes argues in Power: A Radical View (1974), the visible 
power of formal government decision-making arenas is always complemented by the 
informal and less visible ways in which power and influence is mobilised (Healey, 
1997:59). Power, Lukes suggests, may be understood as having three dimensions. The 
first is based on the traditional pluralists’ approach, the second is essentially put forward 
by Bachrach and Baratz (1970) in their consideration of power’s second face, and the 
third is developed by Lukes (Gaventa, 1980:4).
Lukes’ three dimensions of power consists of a one-dimensional view, a two­
dimensional view and a three-dimensional view.12 The one-dimensional view, also 
characterised as ‘visible power’, includes the visible and definable aspects of political 
power -  the formal rules, structures, government authorities, institutions and 
procedures of decision-making (Veneklasen & Miller, 2007). This means that contest 
over interests are assumed to be visible, which in tu rn  are presumed to be relatively 
open (Gaventa, 2006). It emphasises the exercise of power through decision-making 
and observable behaviour. Robert Dahl, a proponent of this view, defines power as 
occurring in a situation where ‘A has power over B to the extent he can get B to do 
something that B would not otherwise do’ (Dahl as cited in Lukes, 1974:11). A’s power, 
therefore, is defined in terms of B; the extent to which A prevails is determined by its 
higher ratio of ‘successes’ and ‘defeats’ over B. Observable behaviour then becomes a key 
factor in the pluralist approach to power. Dahl’s Who Governs? (2005) expresses the 
pluralist belief that the political arena is an open system in which everyone may 
participate and express grievances, which in turn  leads to decision-making. Those who 
propose alternatives and initiate issues which contribute to the decision-making process 
are demonstrating observable influence and control over those who failed to express any 
interest in the political process. The pluralist approach assumes that in an open system, 
all people, not just the elite, would participate in decision-making if they felt strongly 
enough about an issue and wanted their values to be expressed and represented. Non­
participation is thought to express a lack of grievances and agreement with the way the 
leaders are already handling the system. Political inaction is not a problem within the 
one-dimensional system; it merely reflects the apathy of ordinary citizens with little 
interest in or knowledge of political matters and their acceptance of the existing system, 
which they see as being of common benefit to society. While pluralists consider politics 
to be primarily a concern of the elite, ordinary people can have a say if they become 
organised, and everyone has indirect influence through their right to vote in the 
electoral process. Pluralism recognises a heterogeneous society composed of people 
belonging to various groups with differing and competing interests. Conflict is also 
recognised as not only an expected result, but as a necessary instrument which enables
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the determination of a ruling class in terms of who the winner is.
The two-dimensional view of power, also described as ‘hidden power’, is less obvious 
and more difficult to engage (Veneklasen & Miller, 2007). The entry of certain interests 
and actors is privileged over others through a prevailing ‘mobilisation of bias’ or rules 
of the game (Gaventa, 2006). It sees a monopolistic system of inequalities created and 
maintained by the dominant power. The elite have the means and the political resources 
to prevent political actions that would not benefit them and to push forward those that 
would. The elite determine the agenda of both decision-making and non-decision­
making and in so doing establish their dominance and the subordinance and 
compliance of those at the bottom  of the power hierarchy. The two-dimensional view 
of power also involves analyses of potential issues, grievances, non-decision-making 
and non-participation. It stresses both overt and/or covert conflict. Barach and Baratz 
(as cited in Lukes, 1974:19) state that if ‘there is no conflict, overt or covert, the 
presumption must be that there is consensus on the prevailing allocation of values, in 
which case non-decision-making is impossible’.
The three-dimensional view of power, also characterized as ‘invisible power’, is about 
shaping meaning (Veneklasen & Miller, 2007). It adopts the consideration of hidden 
social forces and conflict, which exercise influence by shaping the consciousness of the 
individual or organisation, through internalisation of powerlessness, and/or through 
dom ination ideologies, values and forms of behaviour (Gaventa, 2006). As well as 
decisions and non-decisions, this view incorporates other ways to control the political 
agenda which are not made deliberately by the choice of individuals or groups. This 
third view of power seeks to identify ‘the means through which power influences, shapes 
or determines conceptions of necessities, possibilities, and strategies of challenge in 
situations of conflict’ (Gaventa, 1980:15). In other words, it involves specifying how A 
gets B to believe and choose to act in a way that reinforces the bias of the system, 
advancing the cause of A and impairing that of B, usually in the form of compliance. 
Passive acceptance of situations or circumstances that are in conflict with one’s interests 
occur even when the subordinated realise they are being repressed. They submit quietly 
because they fear sanctions, but also because they have gone through a ‘psychological 
adaptation to the state of being w ithout power’ (Gaventa, 1980:16). They recognise 
their powerlessness and see no possibility to reverse it, and therefore submit to their 
hopeless situation with lethargic acceptance.
Rather than analysing the dynamics or dimensions of power, or how much power is 
given to actors, the objective of this study is to manifest what forms of power actors are 
building in the relationship between government authorities and local groups; in other 
words, the actual exercise of power (see also Newman, 2001). A potentially useful angle 
to analyse power in this way comes from French and Raven (1959), who developed a 
model based on social power that has been applied in numerous situations of social 
interaction. It consists of five power bases: coercion, reward, legitimacy, expert and
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reference. This model -  with some alterations -  also seems applicable to social 
interactions in a river landscape setting.
To summarise, social interaction has been differentiated into the actors’ potential to 
act, which comprises their capacity and motivation to act, their interaction strategies 
and their power building.
We now turn  to the outcomes of social interaction. Etzioni (1968:483) argues that in 
capitalist democratic societies there is a tendency to build consensus before 
implementing a policy. This is in line with Habermas’ communicative action theory, in 
which action is geared to reaching m utual understanding. Communicative action is 
motivated by the need to arrive at a rational consensus. For Habermas the structures of 
communicative rationality are to be found in the formal structures of speech; rational 
principles of deliberation are implicit in the structure of ordinary linguistic 
communication: language, reason and action are inherently intermeshed. The 
participants in communicative action are assumed to be prepared to reach a mutual 
understanding, that is, their attitude is communicative rather than strategic (oriented 
towards achieving their own ends). As such, they are assumed to be accountable, capable 
of justifying their actions and expressions. When ‘the consensus underlying smoothly 
functioning communicative interaction breaks down’, discourse comes in. Through 
discourse the actors seek to attain a rational consensus, the ideal speech situation 
through which agreement can be achieved. Speakers seek to justify the claims they are 
making or to show by their actions that they are sincere, but this does not happen in 
cases of distorted communication that stem from conflicts (Habermas, 2002:xiv-xv). 
According to Habermas, conflicts cannot be entirely suppressed, but must not become 
openly manifest, because they threaten the identity or self-understanding of one or 
more actors. In Habermas’ view, the outcomes of interaction are ‘discourse’ or ‘rational 
consensus’. As a communicative action theorist, Forester (1982:447) acknowledges that 
conflict is a possible outcome of social interaction, but it is not an ideal situation since 
it ‘often yields little new understanding or dialogue, and even less negotiated agreement 
on public action’. He therefore focuses on moving a conflict into debate (with the help 
of a m oderator), negotiation (helped by a mediator) or dialogue (assisted by a 
facilitator). Drawing on Forester’s view, we can place the outcomes of social interaction 
along a continuum , with conflict at one end and collaboration at the other end. 
Whether one believes conflict to be a part of human nature or contingent upon social 
learning or social influence (Tidwell, 1998:4), conflict is always present. Collaboration 
in the sense of a joint operation or action is assumed to be the most effective way of joint 
action. Hence, in our framework, conflict, debate, negotiation, dialogue and 
collaboration are viewed as possible outcomes of social interaction.
Social interaction can be distinguished in many ways (Etzioni, 1968). For this study it 
is limited to direct and indirect interactions. Members of a group may interact directly 
with members of another group, indirectly through institutional or organisational
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umbrella organisations, or via elected members of the municipal council, provincial 
council or members of parliament. Another option is interaction via the media.
Studying social interaction w ithout taking the actors’ culture and traditions into 
account would imply the exclusion of an im portant source of action, because culture 
is an explicit or implicit element in the way people act. Rather than viewing actors as 
driven by instrumental rationality, in which social action is reduced to self-interest, and 
to divorce their assumed goal of maximising personal gains from the social and cultural 
contexts, they are seen here as representatives of different meaning systems (Poncelet, 
2001). As Bourdieu (1977:2-5) notes in his ‘theory of practice’, these meaning systems 
are founded in the social interactions that take place in the different settings actors live 
in. They are informed by various forms of social and cultural knowledge, values and 
beliefs and have various aims and purposes. As these meaning systems are renewed and 
reproduced by actors who themselves also change over time, history is part of this 
approach to analysing the actors’ culture and traditions.
To summarise, social interaction depends on the actors involved, the context and the 
form it takes. Additional important factors are how actors articulate their values during 
social interaction and how these become embedded in discourses and practices. These 
can be revealed by taking a process view of social interaction. This starts with the 
properties of social interaction, which are conceptualised in the actors’ potential to act 
(comprising their capacity and motivation to act), their power building, their 
interaction strategies and the outcomes of their interaction. In addition, the actors’ 
culture and traditions and the impacts of these on their actions are analysed.
The basic analytical tool in this study describes what the actors said. The main reason 
for this is that social interaction involves communication. Much of the thinking of 
ordinary people does not follow the patterns of inference, abstractions and 
generalisations that science itself characterises. People do learn and store a great deal of 
information about their lives (Baumeister & Newman, 1994:676-677). One means of 
understanding these patterns of thought and interpretation is the study of dialogues. 
Dialogues may bring people together but it may also divide them, depending on what 
is communicated and how (Tidwell, 1998:87). In people’s communication emotions 
play a central role. In some social interactions actors abandon emotions as much as 
possible while in others emotions are prevalent. Generally, the actors’ cognitive and 
emotional states are interwoven. The cognitive states of actors include the ways in which 
statements, stories and descriptions are designed and received in conversation (Maynard 
& Perakyla, 2003); the emotional states of actors are those qualities that are manifested 
in mental, bodily or behavioural symptoms (Gerrod Parrott, 2001). Actors seek to 
achieve a situation in which their emotions are accepted by others and feel secure and 
feel free to express themselves. This study examines how people’s everyday 
understanding of the world is related to their actions in the government-citizen 
relationship. The key objects of the analysis of social interaction are fragments of talks,
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discussions and writings. Besides the content of the actors’ communication (e.g. 
arguments, motivations, opinions), the focus of the analysis is on how they 
communicate with each other in order to understand what they try  to achieve with 
specific expressions.
Cross-scale social interaction
In the commons literature, cross-scale interaction refers to linking institutions both 
horizontally (across space) and vertically (across levels of organisations) (Berkes, 2002), 
or to an interplay between social organisations (Young, 2002). In this study, cross-scale 
interaction is interpreted primarily as vertical social interaction (across hierarchical 
organisational tiers and with local groups). Practice has shown that these cross-scale 
social interactions in the field of water management usually occur with the help of a 
water expert. Horizontal social interaction (across space) is not an issue in this study 
because local groups operate locally to achieve local objectives. Vertical cross-scale social 
interaction, between government and civil society13 and between government agencies, 
is not a new phenomenon. For centuries citizens, usually landowners and farmers, have 
been represented in water boards that operate at the regional level (see also Chapter 1) 
and Dutch government has a history of accommodating social interests (Pierre & 
Peters, 2000).
Young (2002) locates the central concern within the realm of vertical institutional 
interplay or interactions between institutions operating at different levels of social 
organisation. He particularly draws attention to the functional interdependencies of 
institutions. Recognising that ‘functional interdependencies arise when substantive 
problems of activities that two or more institutions address are linked in specific terms’ 
(Young, 2002:264), functional interdependencies between government authorities and 
citizens in river landscape planning may arise when land-use and water management 
problems are at stake. The question that Young poses may also be relevant here: ‘Are 
there ways to manage cross-scale interactions to minimise conflicts of interest or to 
maximise efficiency in the pursuit of common goals?’
From state-centred to less-state centred
The change from a state-centred model towards a less-state centred model of governing 
that has taken place in recent decades, in the literature also referred to as government 
versus governance,14 implies that government is dependent on regional and local 
support for its policy, not only from lower-tier authorities but also from local groups 
trying to get their voice heard. New forms of governance will affect the relationship 
between state and society. As can be concluded from this study, the creation of a more 
participatory style of governing does not mean that government is in fact less powerful, 
but it does mean that state and society are bound together in the process of governance. 
If anything, the state may actually be strengthened through its interactions with society. 
As Fischer (2000:217) puts it: ‘Citizen involvement in both defining a problem and 
searching for its solutions is an im portant factor in building legitimacy required to
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implement policy effectively.’ The state may have to abdicate some aspects of its nominal 
control over policy, especially in the policy formulation stage. On the other hand, it tends 
to gain substantial control at the implementation stage by having in essence co-opted 
social interests that might otherwise oppose its actions (Pierre & Peters, 2000:49).
There is a chance that governance fails as result of difficulties in establishing long-term 
coalitions and the limits to the various techniques for government steering (Stoker, 2000). 
Jessop (1998:38) puts this in perspective as he argues that markets, states and governance 
all fail. Failure is a central feature of all social relations. Stoker (2000:104-107) identifies 
four reasons to expect governance failure. Although these were based on an urban setting, 
they also seem applicable to river landscape planning.
The first reason for governance failure may be the absence of a process of engagement 
and re-engagement of partners. At a lower tier of governance, this may be due to the 
absence or breakdown of a continuous process of dialogue and negotiation. At a higher 
tier of governance there must be some social purpose, and a capacity to produce more 
effective long-term  outcomes than could have been produced by the market or 
imperative coordination by the state. In the field of Dutch river landscape planning, the 
absence or breakdown of a process of dialogue and negotiation may occur at all levels of 
government, national, regional or local. In addition, it may be presumed that instead of 
a social purpose at a higher tier of government, a combination of restructuring of 
government services and maintaining imperative coordination may be an underlying 
cause of governance failure.
The second reason for governance failure may be the occurrence of a specific type of 
conflict. While recognising that social conflicts are endemic (Hirschman, 1995), they 
should not automatically be seen as undermining governance as they can provide the 
energy and drive for governance. Stoker (2000:105) distinguishes two types of conflicts, 
divisible and indivisible. The former includes a never-ending series of conflicts, which is 
characteristic of market societies, and these conflicts can be managed as long as they are 
divisible, which means that the subject of the dispute can be reduced or increased in size 
or effect. Such conflicts lend themselves to compromise and the art of bargaining, but 
they are never resolved entirely and so the scene is always set for the next round of 
negotiation. The cumulative experience of muddling through numerous such conflicts 
is at the heart of an effective governance system (see also Healey, 2003). Indivisible 
conflicts hamper or disable governance. Conflicts which are driven by matters of religion, 
language or ideology and which have an either/or character present considerable 
difficulties to governance. They are not inherently irresolvable, but in so far as they figure 
strongly they are likely to make the compromise and messiness central to governance 
appear inadequate. Conflicts in Dutch river landscape planning are divisible rather than 
indivisible. However, if one views place attachment in the Dutch river landscape as a 
type of ‘cultural religion’ in which people feel their living environment to be an intrinsic 
part of their identity, this implies that indivisible conflicts also occur.
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The third reason to expect governance failure has to do with government authorities 
operating in an increasingly globalised world and in the context of a complex 
architecture of government agencies. Governance therefore involves making links 
between different spatial scales. The perception of appropriate timescales may also vary 
between these levels. Effective action at the local level may depend on decisions taken 
at a higher level. Some actors may enter the governance relationship with a very localist 
perspective, whereas for others the boundary is regional or national. Reconciling these 
different spatial perspectives is complicated. In the same way, what to some people is a 
short-term timescale may appear to be an eternity to others. Governance arrangements 
generally work to a longer-term horizon, but groups of citizens and politicians are likely 
to interpret ‘long term ’ to such varying degrees that governance failure may result. 
Dutch river landscape planning involves both spatial and timescale problems between 
the various actors. The extent to which these problems occur will be considered in the 
case studies described in this study.
A fourth reason for governance failure is the tension between two conceptions of ‘good’ 
government. One, the ‘overhead’ conception of democracy, relies on a range of new 
management techniques to enable government decision-makers to understand public 
wishes and oversee government, and in turn be held to account by the public. Another, 
which might be called the ‘stakeholder model’, argues that effective governance requires 
the direct involvement of various interests, both in the making and the implementing 
of policy. The latter downplays the role of the formal electoral processes and the 
representatives it produces. The tension between these two models and their competing 
claims for legitimacy can be a source of governance failure. In Dutch river landscape 
planning, the tension between these two models is felt by all actors involved. In the case 
studies it will be made clear to what extent this disables governance practices.
Public demand versus government responsiveness
In the changing relationships between the state and society, Pierre and Peters (2000) 
identify a fundamental paradox: on the one hand the public appears still to demand that 
government exert some control over the processes and outcomes of governing (and 
appears weak or indecisive when it does not meet the public demand), and on the other 
hand the public appears to resist control from government. This can be explained in two 
ways. First, this resistance may be to do with evasive and overt resistance or, more 
positively, the role of the public as a source of policy ideas and the need for broader 
citizen engagement in making policy. The question that arises is whether this paradox 
is an issue in this study and, if so, whether it has a negative or positive implication.
The literature on public administration shows that a bureaucracy tends to be selective 
in its response to pressures from interest groups and citizens. Albrow (1970:118), for 
example, notes that ‘the public speaks, yet it is the official who chooses when to listen, 
to whom, and with what degree of attention’. As Etzioni-Halevy (1985:52) puts it: ‘The 
bureaucracy displays a distinct tendency to be more responsive to the better established,
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the more articulated, the more powerful among the interest groups’. Whether this holds 
for today’s government authorities will be considered in the case studies described in 
this study.
Multilevel governance
Cross-scale social interaction also includes a form of multilevel governance, which 
generally refers to negotiated, non-hierarchical exchanges between institutions at the 
transnational, national, regional and local levels. It denotes a vertical ‘layering’ of 
governance processes at these different levels (Peters & Pierre, 2001). According to Peters 
and Pierre (ibid.: 132), an im portant incentive that propelled the emergence of 
multilevel governance is the changing division of labour between institutions at 
different levels of government over the past couple of decades. This has opened up 
opportunities for negotiated arrangements, either to complement or to replace the 
legalistic, hierarchical institutional relationship. Another development is recent 
administrative reform in which a ‘new public management’ style reform divides the 
political-democratic element of government from the managerial-service producing 
sector of government. Decentralisation has reshuffled institutional relationships and 
created a system in which institutions at one level can enter into exchanges with 
institutions at any other level and in which the nature of the exchange is characterised 
more by dialogue and negotiation than command and control. This point about 
multilevel governance raised by Peters and Pierre also arises in this study. Whether this 
tends more towards dialogue and negotiation or towards command and control will be 
described in the three case studies.
Knowledge, hindering and framing
Some aspects of social interaction need special attention: the role of knowledge, the 
use of hindering, and the concept of framing.
Knowledge
Knowledge can be considered to be a societal property or an asset (Etzioni, 1968:135). 
As well as existing in the minds of individuals, knowledge is stored in collective facilities 
(from libraries to servers), is made available for collective action (e.g. when an 
organisation retains experts), and is shifted from the service of one societal goal to the 
service of another (e.g. laboratory employees who are transferred from one government 
service to another) (ibid.:135-136). In this study the focus is primarily on knowledge 
made available for collective action.
Today’s Dutch river landscape planning draws largely on technical/scientific knowledge 
rather than public knowledge, which is grounded in day-to-day practice. This makes it 
relevant to address the relationship between experts and citizens here. Beck’s Risk 
Society (1992) and Giddens’ (1990) work present an overly instrumental-calculative 
interpretation of the citizens’ cognitive orientation in this relationship (Fischer, 
2000:61). In this view, citizens make deliberate choices between recognised alternatives
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when seeking the assistance of experts. Wynne (1996) argues that underlying this 
perspective is an overly rationalistic conception of the citizen-expert relationship. What 
is required is a more cultural and constructivist analysis of this relationship. In fact, the 
public’s relationship to expert systems is more complex, as exemplified by public 
perceptions of the uncertainties of physical risks. Based on studies such as the research 
into the opposition to nuclear power by Welsh (1993), Wynne (1996) shows that dissent 
among experts is frequently generated and supported by the existence of a public 
backdrop of doubt and disaffection. At critical moments, dissent in the expert 
community may well follow the lead of dissent by citizens (Fischer, 2000:64). Even when 
citizens do believe in experts, this faith is much more conditional and more fragile than 
standard interpretations reflect. Lay people are often more sceptical of, more ambivalent 
to, and more alienated from expert institutions than is generally recognised. This 
implies that a better understanding is required of the kinds of knowledge that lay people 
bring to the task of assessing risks (Irwin, 1995). Studies of public risk perception reveal 
the neglect by experts of two basic dimensions of risk perception. The first concerns the 
social context in which risks are embedded: Is the risk imposed by distant or unknown 
officials? Is it engaged in voluntarily? Is it irreversible? Second, experts make 
assumptions about the character of the risk situation that are quite removed from the 
experiences of those at the actual site (Fischer, 2000:65). Relating the role of experts in 
their field of study to their role in today’s society, Fischer (2009:299-300) states that 
experts are used to working in a top-down manner. Instead of a top-down flow of 
knowledge, there is a need to interconnect the top and the bottom. In other words: what 
is needed are democratic spaces for citizens to deliberate empirical outcomes, contextual 
assumptions and the social meaning of conclusions. Whether this demand is an issue 
in this study will be addressed in the case studies.
Hindering
From the literature we can conclude that hindering is a common tactic in social 
interaction between government authorities and citizens. Government authorities may 
be strongly motivated to obstruct a planning process if this is felt to be necessary. In the 
planning literature this behaviour is often linked to a NIMTOO (not in my term of 
office) approach to decision-making. Worried about highly controversial decisions that 
may affect their careers, politicians or bureaucrats may refuse to pass laws and delay 
the implementation of existing regulations (White, 1993). Also, competition between 
political principals and bureaucrats may make the administrative apparatus a resource 
worth competing for in an effort to influence programmatic control over public policy 
and its elaboration, and thus the planning process. Political principals may opt for 
stringent control over the administrative apparatus in order to assure compliance with 
their goals (Aberbach & Rockman, 1988). As officials have a crucial role in the 
formulation as well as the elaboration of public policy, it will be difficult to exert this 
control. This raises questions about how well politicians know what is actually 
happening and the extent to which non-compliance by officials will hamper 
government action.
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In the social movement literature, citizen protest encompasses a wide variety of actions 
ranging from conventional strategies of political persuasion, such as lobbying, voting 
and petitioning, to confrontational tactics, including marches, strikes and 
demonstrations that disrupt day-to-day life of a community. Whereas conventional 
strategies are usually directed at influencing decision-making to stop or hinder progress 
with a specific project or plan by adopting the same means of political expression used 
by political parties and interest groups, confrontational tactics aim to obstruct daily 
life to draw attention to a particular goal. Less visible forms of protest are also possible. 
These are often attributed to ordinary people, as described in Scott’s Weapons of the 
Weak (1987). In situations of close surveillance people find other ways to resist. For 
example, in feudal Europe, peasants and slaves worked very slowly or poorly when doing 
tasks for their lord or master. They did the wrong thing and ‘played dum b’ when 
confronted by their bosses. They craftily sabotaged constructions or told jokes or spread 
gossip about their superiors. Today’s citizen protests may, for instance, have a NIMBY 
(not in my back yard) character. Following Dear (1992), the NIMBY syndrome can be 
recognised by the expression of three concerns: the perceived threat to property values, 
personal security, and neighbourhood amenity. NIMBY conflicts seem to follow a three- 
stage cycle (ibid.). The first stage is Youth: news of the proposal breaks, lighting the fuse 
of conflict. Opposition tends to be confined to a small vocal group residing very near 
to the proposed development. NIMBY sentiments are usually expressed in the rawest, 
bluntest of terms, often reflecting an irrational, unthinking response by opponents. The 
second stage is Maturity: battle lines are solidified as the two sides assemble ranks of 
supporters. The debate moves away from private complaints and into a public forum. 
As a consequence, the rhetoric of opposition becomes more rational and objective. 
More measured voices express concerns about property value decline, increased traffic 
volumes, and the like. The final stage is Old Age: the period of conflict resolution is 
often long and drawn-out, and sometimes inconclusive. Victory tends to go to those 
with the persistence and stamina to last the course. Typically, at this stage, some kind 
of arbitration process is adopted, using professional or political resources. Both sides 
make concessions. If positions become sufficiently entrenched, a stalemate may ensue, 
victory again falling to those with staying power. However, as Welsh (1993) and Wolsink 
(1994) have argued, it is a mistake to interpret num erous expressions of localised 
interests as being based purely on parochial concerns. They may represent a form of 
collective public rejection of a specific development in particular, and the relationship 
between science and society in general. W hether the above-mentioned forms of 
hindering by government authorities and citizens are at issue in this study will be 
described in the case studies.
Framing
Framing is inherently present in social interaction. Actors may use a single frame or 
several frames. In this study the following four frames are prominent: a power frame, 
an identity frame, a conflict management frame and a collaborative frame.
The emergence of a power frame depends on the way actors talk and behave in their
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interaction. From Gray’s (2003) list of nine categories of power frames, four were 
identified as relevant: authority/positional, resources, expertise and personal. The first 
refers to the actual ability to make decisions on the basis of a formal role assignment. 
The second category concerns power derived from possessing resources (e.g. time, 
money, staff) that others do not possess. The third is about possessing relevant or 
unique knowledge and experience that others do not have. In the fourth frame an 
individual interpersonal style grants credibility and power in interaction (e.g. charisma, 
competent communication skills, negotiation experience).
An identity frame is based on how people view themselves in relation to the other, or 
‘them’. In general, as Gray (2003:21) puts it, people think of themselves as belonging to 
certain social categories that have given characteristics, such as being a Dutchman, a 
policeman and a rock fan. A social identity can be considered as a self-image that is 
created through membership of a social category. These social categories or group 
characteristics then become part of the definition of who that individual is; they become 
a part of the person’s self-identity. Identity, then, is shaping and being shaped by the 
individual’s social and cultural experiences and memberships. The identities of social 
groups are constructed through processes of comparison with other groups and often 
in opposition to the identity of another group. When people compare the group they 
belong to with others they usually pay attention to the differences between the groups 
and the similarities within the own group. When people’s identities are threatened, this 
implies that people’s beliefs and values are called into question, which inevitably leads 
to conflict.
Gray (2003) identifies five possible sources of identity frames. The first is the core 
identity of the group, like minority or ethnic status, birth  or affiliation with a racial or 
cultural structure, or identity linked to a subculture or subgroup. The second is the 
societal role of the group, such as gender, defender, victim, activist, etc. The third is 
place. For example, a family may feel rooted in the soil: this is ‘our’ village, this country 
is my home. The fourth emphasises an institutional, representative role within an 
agency, organisation, or association, or identification with a profession or occupation, 
such as a federal employee, logger or politician. The fifth source of identity is interest- 
based; it refers to particular concerns or issues, to a non-geographic community or 
interest group promoting particular causes or shared values. Whereas in the literature 
identity frames are particularly related to what people say about themselves, in this 
study hardly any respondents characterised themselves according to Gray’s typology. 
Instead, interviewees used Gray’s characterisation frame when making statements about 
how they perceive someone else (Gray,2003:23-24). For practical reasons, the 
characterisation of others is therefore also viewed as part of the identity frame.
A conflict management frame is a category that deals with the actor’s preferences for 
managing or dealing with a conflict. Gray’s (2003) nine types of conflict management 
frames can be ranged along a spectrum, from the least active (avoidance, passivity) to
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the most active (struggle, sabotage and violence), with a ‘middle’ category of fact-finding, 
joint problem-solving, and authority decides based on expertise. The fact-finding frame 
encompasses a wide range of studies or any type of research or investigation. The joint 
problem-solving frame comprises com m unity or joint action, common ground, 
mediation, conciliation and collective processes. The authority decides based on 
expertise frame includes government authorities or institutions that make the decision 
because they have the technical knowledge and expertise. As this study investigates social 
interaction by active local groups, the focus is on the ‘active’ or ‘middle’ category frames 
(struggle, sabotage, violence, fact-finding, joint problem solving) and authority decides 
based on expertise rather than the ‘least active’ frames (avoidance and passivity).
Actors who collaborate jointly against their opponents use a collaborative frame. Gray 
(1989:10-17) argues that when parties engage in multi-organisational partnerships or 
alliances, they do so for two distinct purposes: to capitalise on a shared sense of purpose 
among the potential partners, or to attempt to resolve conflicting purposes. Another 
motivation to collaborate may be the recognition that parties depend on each other to 
achieve a shared aim. Which motivations are applicable in this study will be made clear 
later.
3.2 Framework for analysing cross-scale interaction (CSI)
In this section, the theoretical findings are assembled into a framework for the analysis 
of cross-scale social interaction, the CSI framework. Following an explanation of the 
relevance of culture, the properties of social interaction, the government authorities’ 
potential to act,[15] comprising their capacity and motivation to act, the local group’s 
potential to act, comprising their capacity and motivation to act, the government 
authorities’ and local group’s power building, interaction strategies and the outcomes of 
interaction are defined.
The framework is represented in Figure 3.1. In the vertical dimension, the figure depicts 
the two actors, the government authorities and the local group, and the interaction 
between them. In the horizontal dimension, the figure depicts a causal flow from the 
most ‘underlying’ phenom ena such as culture and resources to the most ‘emergent’ 
phenom ena such as conflict or collaboration. In this section, the framework will be 
described in the downstream direction of the causal flow, starting with the culture 
concept. In the chapters analysing the case studies the framework will be applied in the 
reverse order, starting with the phenom ena of interactions. This is the direction of 
explanation, of repeatedly asking the why question (or variants of this question, such as 
‘Where does this come from?’ or ‘What are the underlying factors?’). This is in line with 
the ‘progressive contextualisation’ methodology proposed by Vayda (1983), which 
amounts to starting out from the directly relevant observed phenomenon and putting 
it in its explanatory context in space and time.
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Figur e  3.1 F ra m e w o rk  fo r c ro ss -scale  in terac tion  (SCI)
- e
3.2.1 The importance of the cultural context
Within anthropology there are two distinct views of culture. On the one hand, there are 
scholars who explain everything that happens in the world in cultural terms: how we 
behave, how we interact, how we get things done, the groups we belong to, the organisation 
we are part of, the country we live in, the period in which we live, the things we think are 
important and the conflicts we have. The overall idea is that culture explains everything. 
Adherents of this theory are known as ‘culturalists’. At the other extreme are the 
‘constructivists’, who assert that people freely assemble their own culture. Young people 
who grow up in cities are partly influenced by their parents, MTV, their friends, their 
football team, school, etc. This implies that youngsters are not raised in one culture, but live 
in a multiethnic society. The new ethnic is dynamic and heterogenic and results in 
‘culturally hybrid’ people (Volkskrant, 2009).
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This study assumes that the ‘cultural’ truth lies somewhere in the middle (Sahlins, 1976). 
Social interaction cannot be understood without taking the culture of actors into account. 
People, groups and organisations often have, and self-consciously cultivate, an internal 
culture that is different from the culture in which they are embedded. In other words, actors 
often share beliefs, norms, ways of working together, forms of decision-making, etc. that are 
distinct from others. This implies that the cultural embedding, or ‘the situatedness, the 
social and cultural contexts from which actors are interacting, is an important factor in 
understanding and interpreting cross-scale interaction’ (Healey, 2003:62-65).
As culture is a factor in people’s lives and behaviour, history can provide insight into the 
evolution of culture. The analysis of social interaction will therefore include a historical 
analysis of the organisational culture16 and traditions of the government authorities 
involved in Dutch river landscape planning and the historical background and traditions 
of the people -  organised in local groups -  living in the case study areas.
3.2.2 Authorities' and local group's potential to act
This section describes the authorities’ and local group’s potential to act.
Authorities’ potential to act
The authorities’ potential to act gives insight into their possibilities to interact with others, 
and the factors and mechanisms that influence them. The authorities’ action potential 
comprises their capacity to act and motivation to act. The term ‘authorities’ refers to 
government in the sense of public administration, which is linked to pursuing the public 
good through the creation of civil society and social justice.
Authorities’ capacity to act
Drawing on Nelissen et al. (2000), who use the term ‘governance17 capacity’, and Hajer and 
Wagenaar (2003), who use ‘institutional capacity’, in this study the term ‘authorities’ 
capacity to act’ will be used. The authorities’ capacity to act can be defined as their mandate 
(legal responsibilities), resources (budget and people), coordinating mechanisms (i.e. 
contracts, hierarchies, bureaucratic rules, and agreements) and consistency (including a 
harmonious uniformity of narratives within different governmental bodies) based on 
political organisation, authority and legitimacy.
Mandate
Before authorities are legitimated to act they need a mandate, the commission that is given 
to a governmental body to work on a certain subject.
Resources
The main resources of authorities that enable them to act are power and influence through
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policy-making, including the allocation of public money and decision-making (Hajer and 
Wagenaar, 2003). In this study resources include budget and people.
Coordinating mechanisms
Although in the public policy literature coordinating mechanisms generally refer to an 
intervention system as a mode of governing interaction between the state and its citizens, 
groups and organisations, the most common being either laws or policies (Kooijman, 
2000:151), this study follows the interpretation of Fukuyama (2001:10), who states that 
important coordinating mechanisms are contracts, hierarchies and bureaucratic rules. 
Instead of positioning coordinating mechanisms under the economic function of social 
capital, as Fukuyama does, in this study they are considered to be one of the properties of 
the authorities’ capacity to act.
Consistency
Since authorities in this study are different governmental bodies, it is also important to 
achieve a consistency between the various governmental narratives. Consistency refers to 
the congruency between governmental agencies’ articulated beliefs, claims and actions. 
Thus, inconsistency can manifest itself in two ways: in terms of apparent contradictions 
between beliefs or claims, and in terms of perceived contradictions between framings and 
tactical actions (between what the government agency says and what it does) (Benford & 
Snow, 2000).
Authorities’ motivation to act
The authorities’ motivation to act consists of the following properties: political priority, 
organisational ambition and personal vision.
Political priority
The normal run of government policy falls between two extremes. At one extreme is the 
situation in which advice by government officers is neither solicited nor accepted by the 
political heads of the government; at the other extreme, legislation or policy measures are 
conceived, prepared and executed by civil servants without the intervention of their 
political chiefs. In general, politicians are likely to get their way on measures important to 
them and officials are likely to get their way on many others (Etzioni-Halevy, 1985:56). As 
politicians have primacy in the government of democratic societies, their priorities are 
considered a major driving force behind the motivation of government authorities.
Organisational ambition
Bureaucratic organisations provide arenas for the interplay of contending internal factions 
(see Aberbach & Rockman, 1988), a situation in which interest groups also play a part. 
Within these organisations, groups compete with each other to promote their own interests. 
At the same time, to meet their policy ends bureaucratic organisations must seek mutual 
adjustments with each other, usually by forming internal alliances, exchanging favours, 
persuasion, threats or manipulation (see Etzioni-Halevy, 1985:44). As the playing field of
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politicians and officials, bureaucratic organisations therefore have their own priorities: the 
organisational ambition.
Personal vision
In the traditional view, an official was seen as an instrument for the efficient pursuit of 
predetermined political goals. In classical rules of bureaucracy, neutrality was a virtue 
because moral or political preconceptions could distract officials from loyal adherence to 
their organisation. Technical competence was regarded as essential for effective public 
administration, but professional values were not supposed to replace legal or organisational 
imperatives. Later, increasing importance was placed on a sense of personal responsibility 
in public service. In recent years, the intention is to ensure that the normative orientation 
of officials falls within the parameters of the accepted values of politicians (see Lui & 
Cooper, 1997). In our framework, we simply accept that, besides political and bureaucratic 
priorities, the personal opinions of officials play a role in governmental motivations. 
Individual actors within organisations may think that a certain decision would be unwise 
in the long term or that a certain plan is particularly innovative or deserves support, and 
let these opinions influence their actions.
Local group’s potential to act
The potential to act of a local group is an indication of whether there is a sufficient basis 
for collective action and what factors and mechanisms influence this. A local group’s action 
potential comprises its capacity to act and its motivation to act.
Local group’s capacity to act
In this study knowledge about social capital will be applied to get insight into the local 
group’s capacity to act. Based on Granovetter (1985), Ostrom (1999) and Putnam (2000), 
social capital is defined as the common resources of a group that facilitate collective action 
for the benefit of the group. The central interest of the social capital perspective is to explore 
the elements and processes in the production and maintenance of the collective asset (Lin 
et al., 2006). De Groot and Tadepally (2008) call this phenomenon ‘collective social capital’ 
to distinguish it from private social capital, which is a resource held by individuals rather 
than groups. To analyse the collective social capital of a local group, this concept is broken 
down into three elements: resources, trust and collective identity. Resources are important 
for collective action. Their value is enhanced by trust and collective identity, which are the 
two main prerequisites for efficiency in collective action. Trust ensures low transaction 
costs, allows the group to maintain peaceful and stable social relations and avoids its 
members becoming imprisoned in endless mutual checks. Collective identity allows people 
to quickly agree on one narrative.
Resources
Resources are defined as those goods that are valued in a society (Lin, 2001). Hence, 
resources are intrinsically related to power in the sense that resources have to be mobilised 
to be able to act (Arts & Van Tatenhove, 2004). Drawing on Arts and van Tatenhove (ibid.)
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and Putnam (2002), we can say that the resources held by the members of a group make 
up their dispositional force (the money, knowledge, skills, land and time individuals have), 
bonding force (the capacity to act as a group), bridging force (the capacity to connect to 
other groups) and linking force (the capacity to be heard and to influence).
Trust
Trust is directly related to social capital (Putnam, 2000; Herreros, 2004). There is broad 
agreement that effective social networks and pervasive interpersonal trust enhance 
efficiency in social relations. Trust is generally viewed as a critical constituent of all human 
relationships and comes into play when there is confidence in the other actor, despite other 
uncertainties, risks and the possibility for them to act opportunistically (Gambetta, 1988; 
Mitzal, 1996). This study recognises two types of trust. The first is confidence in the course 
and the outcome of a collective action (i.e. the expected benefits), also referred to as process 
trust (Eshuis & van Woerkum, 2003). The second is faith in other people, or relational 
trust. Regarding the former, the gains from cooperation are an important motivation to act 
collectively (Elster, 1989). Regarding the latter, trust is largely a product of the social 
relations in groups and the obligations they imply (Granovetter, 1985). In other words: 
personal ties in a group are an important factor in building trust. These ties tend to arise 
with repeated interaction over time and are akin to an irredeemable investment in the 
group (Hechter, 1987:47). People will then have solidarity ties to their partners. In the short 
term, people may have some interest in misusing the trust of their partners -  for example, 
some people may think they have little impact on the outcome of collective action, which 
is a strong inducement to free ride (Elster’s free riders problem) -  but this would result in 
the loss of possible cooperative gains and in the distrust of uncooperative partners (Mitzal, 
1996:63). Trust is not obvious, because actors are always conscious of the possibilities of 
distrust. It is related to the specific circumstances in which individuals consciously 
contemplate alternative courses of action (ibid.:74-75).
Fukuyama’s theory may be useful for studying relational trust. He suggests that levels of 
spontaneous interaction differ between cultures and so people in different cultures exhibit 
different levels of trust and trustworthiness to various members of society. He defines this 
phenomenon as the capability to form new associations and to cooperate within the terms 
of reference they establish (Buchan & Croson, 2004). The question that arises in this study 
is whether local groups that have a high ability to interact spontaneously carry more weight 
in their relationship with the authorities than those that have a low ability to do so.
Social identity
As social identity is at issue when groups are involved, this is considered a component of 
social capital. Social identity is a social construction, a result of categorising by others. As 
social interaction influences how identities are shaped, they are altered from time to time. 
Social identities play an essential role in helping people make sense of their world by 
providing some measure of predictability and control. Following Northrup (1989), social 
identity is regarded as a dynamic, ongoing process in which people, alone and in groups,
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attempt to establish, maintain and protect a sense of self-meaning, predictability and 
purpose. People have a multiplicity of overlapping ‘subject positions’, each more or less 
contingent. The boundaries of any social group necessarily serve to identify outsiders as well 
as insiders. Within the group there is an awareness of ‘us’ in contradistinction to ‘them’, 
who are not a part of ‘us’ (Crow, 2002). Group action thus draws upon particular identities 
at particular moments and group processes can dissolve and reform identities (Leach & 
Scoones, 2007).
In this study, identity is relevant for collective action: a new collective identity is constructed 
to create and mobilise a constituency. In other words, some sort of identity is necessary to 
translate individual into group interests and individual into collective action. This 
dimension of identity is not necessarily a consciously chosen strategy, although it is a 
precursor to collective action (Bernstein, 2003). It can evolve more or less spontaneously, 
but then more work must be done to build the organisation and recruit active members.
Here, the identity construction is studied by outsiders, including the researcher.
Local group’s motivation to act
A local group’s collective action will have several motives that coexist and reinforce each 
other (Elster, 1989). The motivation for collective action is inspired to a large extent by the 
rational choices people make. According to Lin (2001), a local group takes action for two 
main reasons: to protect existing valued resources and to gain additional ones. In this view, 
collective action only occurs when resources are at stake, but there are surely other 
motivations than purely economic ones. Tarrow (1994:4-6) identifies four properties of 
motivations for collective action: collective challenges, common purpose, solidarity and 
sustaining collective action. This study recognises two motivations of collective action: 
common purpose and solidarity.
Common purpose
An important reason for people to act collectively is common purpose. People may band 
together in collective action to prosecute common claims against opponents, authorities or 
elites. If accepted, such a claim can be considered as an expected benefit, something gained 
by collective action. Expected benefits are one of the motives for deciding to act collectively. 
Whether people decide to join a collective action or not depends on the available 
information to the individual concerning the benefits that are expected to accrue from an 
alternative set of rules compared with the benefits likely to be gained from continued use 
of status quo rules (Ostrom, 1990). A further consideration is the possibility of the collective 
action delivering the desired results.
Solidarity
Another motivating factor for a local group to take collective action is solidarity.18 Kabeer 
(2005:7) describes solidarity as the capacity to identify with others and to act in unity with 
them to achieve their aims. Crow (2002:121-128) emphasises that people have values in
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common which provide a shared basis for their collective endeavour. Solidarity means that 
people give up personal gain for the benefit of others. Affective ties, such as social 
relationships based on friendship or family, may strengthen solidarity, not only through 
recruiting people to become members of the local group but also by helping to keep people 
in a group once they have joined (Hirsch, 2003). The form that solidarity takes varies 
according to the ‘included’ or ‘excluded’ status of particular individuals and groups and to 
the degree to which they hope to transcend their excluded status. Solidarity may therefore 
take different forms for those who are more and those who are less excluded (Kabeer, 
2005:7-8).
3.2.3 Power building by authorities and local group
The application of power is a principal way to get things done. Most societal actors, 
however, do not face a choice between getting things done voluntarily or through the 
exercise of power, or between exercising power or not getting things done, but rather 
between varying degrees and kinds of power to apply (Etzioni, 1968:321). Drawing on the 
social power model of French and Raven (Raven, 1992) and Nesler et al. (1993), this study 
recognises seven types of power used by actors: coercion, legitimacy, reward, hindering, 
knowledge, media exposure and sociability.
Coercion
Coercion means compulsion by force of authority for the purpose of achieving the actor’s 
aim. Coercion denotes a real physical threat, or the threat of being fired or fined. It can be 
considered as an integral part of state authority (Etzioni, 1975:5). Friedman (1973:152­
154) states that government is an organisation of legitimised coercion. The special 
characteristic that distinguishes government from other coercive organisations (such as 
criminal gangs) is that most people accept government coercion as normal and proper. 
Government will coerce legitimately by coercing only to the extent that its citizens have 
agreed to be coerced (McChesney, 2003:231). Although coercion is probably the only 
effective power for authorities when they are confronted with highly alienated lower-tier 
authorities and other actors, it is likely that it reduces effectiveness because of its adverse 
affect on social interaction (Etzioni, 1975:13). For this study a distinction is made between 
direct and indirect coercive power.
Direct coercive power
Modern states fulfil Weber’s criterion of having a legitimate monopoly on the use of force 
(Cooper, 2000:15), which can be differentiated into three forms: warfare, policing and 
punishment (Steinert, 2003). While the government will exercise restraint in using war, 
policing and punishment are common means to ensure the efficacy of regulatory 
mechanisms. The abstract availability of physical violence and the possibility of a penalty 
are considered the last resort of government to be effective. The order provided by the 
government is vital for survival, but the state cannot exert overwhelming strength because
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this will prevent society from functioning properly. This is the delicate equilibrium between 
government and civil society (Cooper, 2000:15-16). In this study exerting force is defined as 
direct coercive power which may be exercised in the form of police work and imposing 
penalties when people do not comply with the law. For example, if someone does not pay 
their taxes the government will send in the bailiffs, or ultimately a jail sentence will be 
imposed; or if a proprietor does not move after the government has repeatedly issued notice 
of expropriation, the owner’s property may compulsorily purchased. This type of power is 
relevant to this study for situations in which citizen protests exceed the limits considered 
acceptable by law.
Indirect coercive power
Coercion can also be exercised in an indirect fashion (Giddens, 1987:169), which is here 
referred to as indirect coercive power. It is mainly exercised via the law, contracts, rules, 
procedures and hierarchical relationships, or more implicitly through a high turnover of 
officials by frequently moving staff members to different positions. The threat of indirect 
coercive power may also be effective. Whether this threat is considered realistic depends on 
the authority’s credibility to match words with deeds. Threats are used to get the other actor 
to change their position against their own will, which implies an indirect form of coercion.
Legitimacy
In all cases, the notion of legitimacy involves some sort of code or standard accepted by the 
individual by virtue of which an actor can assert his power. Although there are various 
grounds for legitimacy, acceptance of the social structure or other social norms is the point 
of departure in this study. If actors accept the legitimacy of the social structure of their 
group, organisation, or society, especially the social structure involving a hierarchy of 
authority, they will accept the legitimate authority of other actors who occupy a superior 
office in the hierarchy (French & Raven, 2001). The same applies to the social norms of 
reciprocity, equity and responsibility (Raven, 1992).
Legitimate power
The use of terms like ‘I have a right to’, ‘should’, ‘ought’, ‘required to’ may indicate that 
legitimacy is at issue. A particular result ought to be accepted because it is fair, because the 
law requires it, because it is consistent with precedent or sound policy considerations, or 
because it is legitimate as measured by some (other) objective standard (French & Raven, 
2001). Legitimate power is most obvious when it is based on some formal structure, also 
referred to as ‘authority pressure’. Apart from position, there are forms of legitimate power 
which draw on other social norms: reciprocity (e.g. give and take mechanisms), equity (‘I 
have worked hard and suffered, so I have a right to ask you to do something to make up for 
it’), and responsibility (we have the obligation to help others who cannot help themselves, 
or others who are dependent upon us) (Raven, 1992).
Reward
Emerson (1976:347) defines reward as a positive reinforcement, but with the added
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connotation of being socially administered. A reward is based on the belief that the actor 
has the ability to provide him or her with desired tangible or intangible benefits (Aguinis 
et al., 1996). Rewards (and costs) fit into the utilitarian perspective of social exchange, 
broadly defined as underlying relations between groups as well as between individuals 
(Blau, 1964; 1986:4). Utilitarianism generally looks forward: actors are viewed as acting in 
terms of anticipated rewards that benefit them and they tend to choose that alternative 
course of action that maximises benefit (and minimises cost) (Cook & Rice, 2003).
Reward power
Reward power is the ability to provide rewards to achieve the actor’s aim. It signifies that 
an actor is rewarded in a material way, for example in the form of money or goods, or in 
an immaterial way, through an honourable mention, a decoration or an appointment to 
honorary member.
Hindering
Hindering implies that an action or progress has been hindered or prevented by obstruction 
or by slowing it down.
Hindering power
Hindering power by authorities in river landscape planning may be revealed as an 
unwillingness to undertake action, withholding information and other tactics, such as not 
showing up at meetings, not reading project documents or reacting to email messages. 
Hindering power by local groups may be exerted through protest actions, presenting 
alternative plans or going to court.
Knowledge
Knowledge can be viewed as a societal asset (Etzioni, 1968:197,198). The distribution of this 
asset can significantly affect the position of actors in their interaction with others. When 
actors interact, the most knowledgeable unit -  all other things being equal -  will be the 
most effective. However, actors may overinvest in the production of knowledge, neglecting 
other functional needs and thus undermine their goals, the advancement of which depends 
on balancing the servicing of the various needs.
Knowledge power
Knowledge power can be broken down into various subtypes of power, such as scientific 
or technical knowledge (the domain of experts), political and administrative knowledge 
(the field of expertise of government decision-makers and government officials in 
particular) and public knowledge (particularly citizens’ expertise), in the literature also 
referred to as local knowledge. The first focuses mainly on the technical/scientific field, the 
second concentrates on politics and public administration, and in the third the emphasis 
is on everyday knowledge of the local situation. Knowledge power can be built by using one 
or more of these types of power. It may also be manifested in a numerical superiority of 
experts or officials in meetings (which relays signals to other actors that things are serious)
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and references to the experts’ credibility (e.g. a report from a well-known consultancy may 
be considered more trustworthy than a report from an individual outsider).
Media exposure
The media exposure of actors is a relevant factor in their interactions with others. Events do 
not speak for themselves, but must be woven into some larger storyline. The media play an 
important part in social interaction by giving meaning to and interpreting the values held 
by actors. Media power is analysed in this study to get insight into the media involvement 
of actors.
Media power
Making a conflict more public offers an opportunity for actors to improve their power 
position relative to that of their antagonist, and mass media coverage is a vehicle for this 
(Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993). However, while local groups have free access to the media to 
influence the power balance in such a way that they achieve a more powerful position, this 
is usually not an option for government authorities due to strict media procedures 
surrounding decision-making processes. Here, a distinction can be made between the roles 
of the national government and lower-tier authorities in national decision-making processes. 
Whereas national government is strictly bound to specific rules regarding media exposure, 
lower-tier authorities have more leeway to profile themselves in public debate.
Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) identified three reasons why local groups may need to use 
the media: mobilisation, validation and scope enlargement. To reach their constituency most 
local groups have to mobilise some form of pubic discourse via various forums, including 
publications and meetings. The media validates the fact that the local group is an important 
player. Additionally, local groups need the media to broaden the scope of conflict. If this is 
narrow, the weaker party has much to gain and little to lose by broadening the scope.
Sociability
In the literature, credibility is mentioned as a likely important power basis (Nesler et al., 
1993). Due to the various definitions, which often overlap with other power bases, such as 
indirect coercive power and knowledge power, a limited interpretation is used here, focusing 
only on sociability as one of five elements of credibility: competency, character, sociability, 
composure and extraversion (McCroskey & Jenson, 1975). Sociability is one of the most 
immanent goods that groups provide (Hechter, 1987:47). It can be seen as a source of power 
because it tends to call forth reciprocity -  it is proper to give something back to a person who 
has always been helpful, a good listener and so on -  or it may be a motivation for getting 
favours from others.
3.2.4 Interaction strategies of authorities and local group
The ability of government authorities and the local group to act depends on their action
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potential. How government authorities and the local group deal with each other depends, 
among other things, on their use of frames and buffering and bridging strategies, which are 
termed ‘interaction strategies’.
Framing
Authorities and the local group use framing in their relationships. Like everyone, they frame 
their environment in a way they can live with. Framing involves shaping, focusing and 
organising the world around us. Framing and reframing is a continuous activity. 
Expectations about objects, people, settings, ways to interact and anything else in the world 
are continually checked against experiences and revised (Tannen & Wallat, 1987). Frames 
are viewed as dynamic rather than static, and they are multidimensional rather than one­
dimensional (Aarts & van Woerkum, 2008).
This study uses four frames, drawing on Gray (2003), Benford and Snow (2000) and Pellow 
(1999), to analyse social interaction between authorities and the local group: a power frame, 
an identity frame, a conflict management frame, and a collaborative frame (see also 3.1).
When actors change their frame, they develop a new way of interpreting or understanding 
the issues in a dispute, or a new way of appraising one or other parties in a conflict. To 
reframe their understanding of a conflict or debate, actors have to change their perspective 
(Gray, 2003). Actors may change frames for example when engaged in a dialogue or 
collaborating with others, shifting from a collaborative to an identity frame. Techniques for 
reframing include shifting from specific interests to more general ones (in case of dispute 
or conflict), or the other way round (when engaged in a dialogue or collaboration), 
narrowing the issues or breaking them down into smaller parts, translating disputes about 
values into interests, identifying superordinate (or overarching) goals, and agreeing to 
disagree (the latter four may occur if disputes and conflicts are at issue). When actors 
remain stuck in their view of a specific situation, in the literature referred to as frozen 
frames (Gray, 2003), reframing will be difficult (Aarts & van Woerkum, 2008).
Buffering and bridging strategies
Another interaction strategy used by authorities and the local group in their social 
interaction is to buffer and bridge. Bridging and buffering strategies are developed in every 
relationships. Mesnar and Nigh (1995) argue that these strategies occur between members 
of an organisation and external relations when ‘boundary spanning’, which can be described 
as adjusting to constraints and contingencies not controlled by the organisation. Boundary 
spanning serves two purposes. First, it ‘buffers’ or protects the organisation from the 
external environment by resisting a change or trying to control it. Second, it acts as a ‘bridge’ 
to the external environment, promoting internal adaptation to changing external 
circumstances. As such, they may contribute to reframing.
Bridging and buffering activities are not exclusive. In their efforts to maintain legitimacy, 
some organisations may emphasise one type of activity over the other, other organisations 
may do little of either, and still others may try to do both (Mesnar & Nigh, 1995). With
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respect to the local group and their social interaction with authorities, the hypothesis is that 
they use both strategies.
3.2.5 Interaction between authorities and local group
Social interaction between authorities and the local group can lead to the following outcomes. 
Conflict
Conflict occurs when one or more parties hold incompatible goals and perceive interference 
from the other in their desire to obtain their goal (Kriesberg, 2007). Kriesberg (ibid.) identifies 
two kinds of matters that lead to contention: interests and values. Adversaries may quarrel 
about control of resources, such as land, money, oil and water, or prestige. Tensions arise 
when each side holds different values, which may become matters of contention when one 
side insists on manifesting particular values that another party finds objectionable, such as 
the right to abortion. Value differences can also be attributed to different knowledge or 
understanding. Groups may use different theories, models, assumptions and information 
(Mitchell, 2002). Conflicts may also have other causes, such as power inequalities, a lack of 
communication, a sense of collective identity (Coy & Woehrle, 2000) or historical mistrust 
(Gray, 2004).
Conflicts can be seen as the result of distorted social interaction and may be constructive or 
destructive. Constructive conflicts may lead to positive effects (e.g. openings to start conflict 
resolution); destructive conflicts may result in negative effects (e.g. a hardening of the 
conflict). However, negative effects do not have to endure. According to Tannen (1998) there 
are times when people need to disagree, criticise, oppose and attack, but this does not have 
to be forever.
In this study conflict is defined as a state of opposition between individuals or groups about 
values, interests or resources.
Debate
Debate can defined as a disputation or dispute about negotiable interests. Tidwell (1998:9) 
views disputes as less intense over time and they have a greater degree of negotiability, whereas 
conflicts are more intense over time and are less negotiable. Conflicts usually arise from 
unsatisfied needs, whereas disputes do not possess the same level of dissatisfaction. A key 
aspect is that all parties recognise the existence of a dispute, and are able to agree upon the 
components or dimensions of the problem (Mitchell, 2002).
Instead of dispute Yankolovich (1999) uses the word debate. It assumes there is a right answer 
and you have it. Debate is combative: participants attempt to prove their point. Debate is 
about winning; it is listening to find flaws and make counterarguments, and it is defending 
assumptions as truth, critiquing the other side’s position and defending one’s own views
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against those of others. The purpose of debate, which can be considered the opposite of 
dialogue, is to win an argument, to vanquish an opponent. The main characteristics of a 
debate are the occurrence of subtle coercive influences, overt or indirect, like arm-twisting, 
pulling of rank, and a hint of sanctions for holding politically incorrect attitudes, and 
approaching others without empathy, such as exchanging ideas and opinions without 
making assumptions known, which fosters unresolved tensions (Yankolovich, 1999).
In this study, debate is interpreted as a dispute in which actors have the idea that they can 
win based on argument.
Negotiation
Negotiation, in its broadest sense, is seen as an alternative to conflict. Negotiation is involved 
when two or more parties are communicating to influence the others. The successful 
negotiation is one that achieves the best agreement -  not just any agreement, but an 
agreement that ensures both parties meet their objectives and will live up to their 
commitments. Negotiation is thus a problem-solving vehicle (Asherman & Asherman,
2001). Although in the literature negotiation refers to an approach normally considered to 
comprise alternative dispute resolution (Mitchell, 2002), in this study it is a collective term 
for solving disputes.
The negotiation literature describes many approaches to negotiation. The ‘principled 
approach’ and the ‘positional approach’ deserve attention here. The ‘principled approach’, 
developed by Fisher and Ury (1981, 1991), stresses working with other parties to develop 
a creative solution that will meet most people’s needs. The main characteristics are (1) 
separate the people from the problem; (2) focus on interests, not positions; (3) invent 
options for mutual gain; and (4) insist on explicit, ‘objective’ criteria to guide decisions. In 
the ‘positional approach’ parties arrive for negotiations having already decided on a 
desirable solution, and attempt to persuade or coerce the others to accept their terms and 
solution. They arrive with a ‘position’, and their goal is to achieve it. Such an approach tends 
to constrain flexibility and a willingness to be open-minded about alternative solutions 
(Mitchell, 2002). The negotiation process relies upon the intellectual and communicative 
skills of all parties, the willingness of those involved to resolve the conflict, and the general 
congruence of events which may influence the course of the resolution (Tidwell, 1998).
Negotiation is defined here as coming to terms, communicating to achieve the best 
agreement for both parties.
Dialogue
Dialogue is an outcome of social interaction in which actors converse with each other 
without entering into collaboration. It can promote understanding, mutual trust and 
respect between parties, beginning the work of building relationships (Forester, 2006). The 
word dialogue derives from two Greek words: dia, meaning ‘through’, and logos, signifying 
‘word’ or ‘meaning’. Emphatically, dialogue is not confined to conversations between two
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people; it can also be carried out in groups ranging from about a dozen to two dozen people. 
In contrast to debate, it would be inconceivable to say that someone ‘wins’ or ‘looses’ a 
dialogue. In a dialogue, all participants win or lose together. The process excludes winning 
at the expense of others in favour of reaching mutual understanding. Three distinctive 
features of dialogue differentiate it from debate. When all three are present, conversation is 
transformed into dialogue. If one or more of the three features are absent, it is a debate or 
some other form of talk, but it is not dialogue. The first feature of dialogue is equality and 
the absence of coercive influences. All participants must be treated as equals. Outside the 
context of the dialogue, they may have widely differing status, but in the dialogue itself they 
are considered equal. In genuine dialogue, there is no arm-twisting, no pulling of rank, no 
hint of sanctions for holding politically incorrect attitudes, no coercive influences of any 
sort, whether overt or direct. Dialogue becomes possible only after trust has been built and 
higher-ranking people participate as true equals. The second feature is that actors need to 
have empathy towards others and approach them with an open mind. It is considered 
essential that participants have the ability to respond with unreserved empathy to the views 
of others. The third feature of dialogue is that participants are encouraged to examine their 
own assumptions and those of other participants. And once these assumptions are in the 
open, they are not to be dismissed out of hand, but considered with respect, even when 
participants disagree with them (Yankolovich, 1999).
Although the government-citizen relationship in this study is in essence not an equal 
relationship, the definition of dialogue by Yankolovich seems useful. The essential aspect of 
dialogue in this study is the intention of the partners to respect each other, and that both 
are willing to converse with each other without conditions. Dialogue is considered to occur 
when two or more people are in a conversation based on equality, empathy and respect of 
the other’s opinion.
Collaboration
Collaboration can be defined as a ‘process through which parties who see different aspects 
of a problem can constructively explore their differences and search for solutions that go 
beyond their own limited vision of what is possible’ (Gray, 1989:5). Through interacting 
with each other they search for consensus. The focus of their interaction is directed at the 
long-term gain rather than short-term benefit.19 Both parties then have a more tightly 
organised relationship characterised by concerted decision-making. One of the most 
important dynamics in collaboration is the process by which reciprocity is developed 
informally in the absence of rules (ibid.). Byrum-Robinson (2001) states that the 
collaborative ethic assumes that both parties have good will and desire to achieve the best 
possible outcome. However, even the most honourable intentions may be derailed as parties 
examine their differences. In other words, collaboration does not mean that dispute is 
absent. As Tannen (1998) puts it, ‘collaboration is more the management of conflict than 
the absence of conflict’. In this study, collaboration can be distinguished within the local 
group and between the authorities and the local group.
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Here, two issues are relevant. The first is boundary definitions that are crucial for local 
group’s interaction with authorities. The basic functions of boundary maintenance are 
keeping insiders in and outsiders out (Sommerville, 2000). The second refers to the 
conditions that have to be achieved for collaboration: (a) an ‘authentic’ dialogue has to 
take place (including a shared perception of interdependence between the actors involved 
and rules for discussion); (b) all interests need to be engaged in the discourse; and (c) only 
recognised representatives of an interest group participate (Innes & Booher, 2003). Partners 
involved in collaboration, referred to as alliances or partnerships, have well-developed 
interactions among themselves as well as links to outside groups. They share both 
understandings of problems and recognition of their shared or reciprocal interests. 
Effective alliances engage diverse interests and allow their decisions to be informed by the 
knowledge of these differing stakeholders. As a result, they produce more robust and 
legitimate strategies. They have both depth and breadth in their leadership, with diverse 
participants willing to take responsibility and initiative as needed. They have roots in their 
communities and can mobilise players to get results. They produce innovative solutions to 
problems that have seemed intractable. They can respond in a timely way to new challenges, 
whether they are threats or opportunities. The most effective alliances build their own 
capacity by tracking outcomes they are producing and by providing this information back 
to participants to enhance their learning process. They continually reassess their directions 
and strategies (ibid.).
Collaboration is defined here as the act of working jointly, based on an authentic dialogue 
between all paties to bring the goal closer.
The concepts described here together form the analytical frame for studying social 
interaction between authorities and the local group in river landscape planning. The three 
case studies will be analysed using this frame.
3.3 Embeddedness of the CSI framework
This section focuses on the relation between the CSI framework and current theories.
Basically, the CSI framework is consonant with the work of social theorists like Habermas 
(1984) who emphasise the process of social interaction. Taking the interaction outcomes 
into consideration, the framework partially matches Habermas’ communicative action 
theory, which pays attention to the middle range of interaction outcomes: debate, 
negotiation and dialogue. The framework thus includes Habermas’ criteria for an ‘ideal 
speech situation’ (comprehensibility, sincerity, legitimacy and truth), providing a 
vocabulary to critique dialogical practices and to highlight communicative ‘distortions’ of 
one-sided conversations in which the exchange of knowledge and understanding and of 
claims for attention does not take place. With these ideas, he aims to reconstitute the public 
realm through open, public debate (Healey, 1997:49,265). As result of the inclusion of both
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extremes of the interaction outcomes -  conflict and collaboration -  the framework is 
broader than Habermas’ communicative action theory with regard to interaction outcomes.
The CSI framework also fits into Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory. This theory includes 
that we make history not just by acts of conscious resistance, but in our day-to-day 
decisions, as we work out how to share a house, how to get on in an office, how to make a 
production line work, how to make a recommendation on a planning issue, how to organise 
a protest. This implies that we live through culturally-bound structures of rules and 
resource flows, but our continually inventive human nature remakes them in each instance, 
and in remaking the systems of structuring forces, we also change ourselves and our 
cultures. Structures are ‘shaped’ by agency, just as they in turn ‘shape’ agency (Healey, 
1997:47). With regard to the framework, Giddens recognises the relevance of actors’ 
potential to act and the role of power in social interaction. Giddens views power as an 
elementary concept, but it is not more essential than any other: ‘Power is one of several 
primary concepts of social science, all clustered around the relations of action and structure. 
Power is the means to get things done and, as such, directly implied in human action’ 
(Giddens, 1984:281-283). In the framework, the actors’ power building is situated between 
their potential to act and their execution of frames. Its location in the causal chain from 
potential to act via building social power and interaction strategies to interaction outcomes 
shows that power is central.
Of the three dimensions of power relations derived from Lukes (1974), two are present in 
the CSI framework: the ‘visible power’ or formal level of decision-making (first dimensional 
view) and the ‘hidden power’ or behind the scenes level (second dimensional view) in which 
agendas are set. What is lacking in the framework is the ‘invisible power’ or embedded 
dimension of power, Lukes’ third dimension of power that shapes and modifies people’s 
desires and beliefs (Lukes, 1986:10) and is found in the fine grain of people’s daily routines, 
policy discourses and governance practices (Healey, 2003:85). In this study the one 
dimensional view has been made manifest through the actors’ use of social power in social 
interaction. The second dimensional view is shown by the way actors’ determine which are 
the ‘key’ issues and which issues come up for decision, and exclude those which threaten 
the interests of the powerful.
The CSI framework is largely consonant with Geertz’ (1973) view of the cultural 
embeddedness of social life. The framework incorporates a more limited understanding of 
culture, namely culture as an attribute of a social group, the ‘organisational culture and 
traditions’ of authorities and the ‘culture and traditions’ of local groups. Both are located 
on the most basic level of the framework, which allows the analysis to identify culture as 
an influence on all other more emergent levels. The CSI framework reflects Geertz’ idea of 
local knowledge as a mixture of systematised, formulised and calculated knowledge that is 
acquired through social interchange and experience, a ‘common sense’ and a ‘practical 
reason’, a store of proverbs and metaphors, and of practical skills and routines (Geertz, 
1983:12). In Dutch river landscape planning local knowledge does not a play a significant
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role except for cases in which authorities and local groups are involved in collaborative 
spatial design.
The CSI framework is basically consistent with Healey’s (1997) concept of collaborative 
planning. Collaborative interactive planning processes are, through their focus on process 
and what she calls ‘substance’, the specific content of issues, offering the possibility of both 
mediating between the concerns of multiple and diverse stakeholders and building place- 
based institutional capacity. Collaborative planning is a social process built up from the 
particular social relations of a place. Those involved identify matters of collective concern, 
define problems, draw on knowledge resources, articulate solutions and develop ideas about 
how to put the solutions into practice. It is a dynamic process. The activity of thinking 
about what the issues are and what to do about them itself changes the situation, as people 
learn about what is at stake and what their own values and interests are (Healey, 1997:85­
87). Although the framework focuses on process, substance is also present, particularly in 
the concept of social power and the case studies. Further, the framework gives insight into 
the various aspects of the social and dynamic process of the case studies.
The CSI framework fits into Putnam’s (1996, 2000) concept of social capital. By social 
capital Putnam means ‘features of social life -  networks, norms and trust -  that enable 
participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives’ (Putnam, 1996:34). 
These features of social life, network, norms and trust, are included in the local group’s 
potential to act. Network, norms and trust are also included in the local group’s capacity to 
act. Resources are operationalised through bonding force and bridging force, norms are 
included in social identity, and trust is differentiated into personal trust and process trust. 
What differs is the aim of the study. Putnam’s study of social capital includes analyses of 
people’s attitudes and behaviour, ranging from drinking coffee with neighbours to active 
political participation -  which are viewed not just as recreational channels but as sustainers 
of the wider ‘social fabric’ (Schuller et al., 2000). Putnam sought to reveal America’s 
changing behaviour and the disintegration of social structures. This study tries to find keys 
to civic participation in river landscape planning.
Like Habermas, the CSI framework partially reflects Forester’s (2006) view of interaction 
outcomes. As Habermas is a source of inspiration for Forester, he also focuses on the mid 
range of interaction outcomes: debate, negotiation and dialogue. The CSI framework, 
however, also includes both extremes of the continuum: conflict and collaboration. Another 
point of interest in Forester’s work is the relevance of a third party, such as facilitators (who 
help debate), mediators (who arbitrate in disputes) and moderators (who stimulate 
dialogue) in planning processes. As the framework is based on a rather strict dichotomy of 
authorities versus local groups, it does not easily accommodate Forester’s view on this point.
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Chapter 4 Methodology
The basic methodological steps followed in this research were the following: deciding 
on the research question and research design; choosing the best methods to obtain the 
required data; and data analysis and interpretation. The research question and design 
will be described first, followed by the research methods and process.
4.1 Research question and design
Based on the theoretical approach laid down in Chapter 3, which focused on a process 
view of cross-scale interaction, the following research question was formulated:
What factors and mechanisms influence cross-scale interaction in Dutch river landscape 
planning?
-9-
As mentioned earlier, this study was framework-led and based on data from three case 
studies. The research framework evolved during the research process in a continual 
intertrade between concepts and data. The movement ‘from the data up’ was inductive, 
while the improved concepts were in turn  used deductively to shape the next round of 
analysis (see Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
4.2 Research methods and process
Case study approach -  a justification
The case study approach (Yin, 1984) is a commonly used research strategy to allow 
complex issues to be explored in depth from a holistic perspective. It attempts to 
examine a contem porary phenom enon in its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin, 1981). The 
case study approach allows the researcher to answer ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions, that is, 
to understand the nature and complexity of the processes taking place. This study first 
addresses the ‘how’ questions, such as how the main actors interacted and how the social 
interaction between these actors proceeded to a certain outcome. ‘Why’ questions are 
addressed in the conclusions. The analysis of the case studies provides the answers to 
these questions, such as why a certain social interaction leads to a certain outcome, and
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why sometimes a certain social interaction will lead to a specific outcome, while in 
another occasion this will not be the case. An im portant advantage of the case study 
approach is that it can uncover insightful inform ation about how these projects 
proceed. The type of case study used here was explorative and descriptive rather than 
explanatory. In an exploratory case study data collection is undertaken prior to the final 
definition of the research question, allowing the research to pursue intuitive paths. The 
goal may justifiably be to develop the analytical framework by directly observing the 
research subject (Yin, 2003). Descriptive research describes data on and characteristics 
of a phenomenon being studied. Descriptive research answers the questions who, what, 
where, when and how. Although the data description is factual, accurate and systematic, 
the research cannot describe what caused a situation. Thus, descriptive research cannot 
be used to create a causal relationship, in which one variable affects another. An 
explanatory study is research conducted in order to explain any behaviour.
As this study was framework-led, it was desirable to include several case studies in the 
research design. A variety of cases was needed to be able to deduce answers to the 
research question and sub-questions (Yin, 2003). This multiple-case design raised issues 
about the selection process and the variety of data that would come out of the case 
studies. The case studies in this study were selected according to specific criteria. First, 
the expected outcomes of the social interaction between government authorities and 
citizens in river projects should represent outcomes at both extremes of the continuum. 
This implies selecting a river project in which actors tended to collaborate with one 
another, and a project in which actors stood diametrically opposed one another. Second, 
the way citizens organised themselves in local groups to achieve their objective must be 
incorporated, which meant that a variety of local groups was needed, including a 
homogeneous group of citizens, a group of citizens with a heterogeneous constitution 
and various local groups pursuing their own interests. Third, the case studies should 
include diverse government agencies. Based on these criteria, the following case studies 
were selected: the Dike Relocation in Lent (various local groups, the involvement of 
national and local government, and government authorities and citizens in opposition 
to one another); the Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder (heterogeneous group of 
citizens, inclusion of national, provincial and local governments, interaction based on 
conflict); and the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder (homogeneous group of citizens, 
national and provincial governments were involved, and government authorities and 
citizens intended to collaborate).
All types of case studies, whether they are exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory, face 
the problem of the context being part of the study, which means there will always be too 
many ‘variables’ for the number of observations to be made (Yin, 1981). This therefore 
required a strong focus on the key issues during the research process.
Data collection methods
The case studies relied solely on qualitative data, for which interviews and a desk study
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were the main research methods. The data gathered from these methods were 
consolidated to provide evidence that can be used to answer the research question.
Interviews
The interviews were in depth, semi-structured and open-ended. The interview guide 
was designed to elicit naturally occurring speech on a range of topics. The design of the 
interview guide began with some preliminary thoughts about the research. Although at 
first glance the questionnaire appeared to be somewhat rough and ready, it went 
through a continuous process of redesign and fine-tuning in the light of new findings. 
Questions were modified to test emerging ideas. The main issues raised in the interviews 
included personal and organisational background information, personal views on 
specific events that occurred in the planning process, the interviewee’s interactions with 
other stakeholders, particularly government authorities, and the outcomes of these 
interactions. This approach ensured that when the data gathering exercise came to an 
end, sufficient material was available to answer the research question.
Given the nature of the actors, two interview guides were prepared: one for the 
government authorities and another for the citizens. The questions in the interview 
guide for representatives of the government authorities covered their political 
involvement, organisational perspective, their personal view on specific subjects like 
public criticism, how they deal with comments by citizens, the history and 
implementation of the planning process, and their motivation to collaborate with other 
government authorities or their reasons for not doing so. The questions for the citizens 
included whether they have a history of protest, whether they were involved in previous 
government plans, how they got involved this time, how they organised themselves, 
what their strategy was, and how they managed to get their message across.
Sampling
For the case studies nonprobability samples were used (Russell Bernard, 2006). This 
type of sampling is appropriate for labour-intensive, in depth studies of a few cases, as 
in this study. Snowball sampling was used in one of the three case studies, the 
Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder case study. In the snowball technique, key 
informants are used to locate one or two people in the population. During the interview 
the interviewer asks those people to list others in the population and recommend 
someone from the list to interview. The sampling frame therefore grows with each 
interview. A list of criteria was made to identify suitable interviewees from the people 
suggested by the respondents. The main criteria for the government authorities 
included the position of the participants in the planning process and their affiliation 
with a government agency or other organisation. This required a multilevel approach 
as the key people worked at different levels across various government authorities and 
related organisations. The criteria for the citizens consisted of their position in the 
residents’ group, their position in a specific local organisation (farmer or political 
organisation), their social position in the polder, and simply being resident in an area
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where the government has plans for a specific measure. Although the gender and age 
of the interviewees were also taken into account, it proved hard to get a well-balanced 
distribution of respondents, because women and young people were underrepresented. 
The majority of the respondents turned out to be white middle-aged men.
The total num ber of interviewees from government authorities and citizens in the 
Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder case study was 47. Of these, 24 interviewees 
worked for government authorities (including the M inistry of the Interior, the 
Directorate-General for Water Affairs, Rijkswaterstaat,20 Rijkswaterstaat East 
Netherlands regional office, Gelderland provincial government, the municipality of 
Ubbergen, experts from a technical departm ent of Rijkswaterstaat (RIZA), and the 
Technical Advisory Commission on Flood Defence ( Technische Adviescommissie voor 
de Waterkering, TAW). Six interviewees, with two MPs, a representative of an 
environmental organisation and three consultants, were related to the government plan. 
Seventeen interviewees were held with residents. The chair of the residents’ organisation 
High Water Platform (Hoogwaterplatform) was interviewed three times, including one 
which involved reflecting on key issues of the planning process with a member of the 
residents’ organisation. Conversations with the Room for the River project manager at 
Gelderland provincial government and two members of a historical association were 
not included in the list of respondents. All but one of the interviews were held in the 
period from 2005 to 2009.
Due to the limited number of participants involved in the other two case studies, the 
Dike Relocation in Lent and the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder, a sampling method did 
not prove necessary. Furthermore, access to information on the case studies was highly 
dependent on one or a few people. Data gathering for the Dike Relocation in Lent case 
study was contingent upon the approval of the project manager, while research material 
for the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study had to be obtained from a farmer 
representative and the project manager.
For the Dike Relocation in Lent case study the interviewees and the time period in 
which the interviews could be held were selected beforehand. Sixty interviews were 
held. The prim ary data collection occurred in the period from January to March 2005, 
when 18 interviews were held with members of the project organisation, which was 
established for the environmental impact assessment (EIA) procedure. Additionally, 32 
‘street’ interviews with citizens were carried out. Later, 10 interviews were held with 
key people who were not included in the list of interviewees at the project organisation. 
The interviewees at the project organisation included members of the steering group 
(government decision-makers), the project group (staff members) and the advisory 
group (citizens and other societal groups) were interviewed. The list of interviewees 
was compiled in cooperation with the project manager and included three members of 
the steering group, the executive councillor concerned with spatial planning at the 
municipality of Nijmegen, the director for water management at Rijkswaterstaat East 
Netherlands regional office and the dike reeve (chair) of Rivierenland water board. Six
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members of the project group were interviewed: a staff member of the planning 
department of the municipality of Nijmegen, three Rijkswaterstaat officials, one official 
from Rivierenland water board, and one from Gelderland provincial government. Nine 
members of the advisory group were selected for an interview, including a 
representative from a historical association, two members of the association of 
entrepreneurs, representatives of three local groups, a representative from an 
environmental organisation, a member of a residents’ association from the new 
Waalsprong housing development, and the chair. In addition, during the research 
period, 2004 to 2009, ten supplementary interviews were held, three of which were with 
a staff member of the municipality of Nijmegen, a chair of a residents’ group, who was 
interviewed twice, and a water expert who supported the residents. Five interviews were 
held with representatives from Rijkswaterstaat. Among the interviewees was the project 
manager, the director, a legal affairs officer, and the former director for water 
management, all from the East Netherlands regional office, and the head of water 
infrastructure at the head office. Two interviews were held with a consultant and a 
resident to reflect on specific issues of the planning process. In addition, several 
conversations with the project manager, which were not included in the list of 
interviews, provided useful insights into the actions of national government.
The street interviews were held to get the opinions of the residents of the village of Lent 
about the government plan for a dike relocation. These interviews were held to 
determine whether the common-sense feeling of Rijkswaterstaat officials were borne 
out by the facts. They presumed that a minority of the population of the village of Lent 
would be against the government plan, particularly those who supported the residents’ 
groups, while a majority would be in favour but did not voice their opinion -  the ‘silent 
majority’. As too few street interviewees were held to make up a representative sample 
of the residents of the village of Lent, the results are only indicative. The interviewees 
were chosen at random  by stopping people on the street, including local businesspeople 
(a hairdresser, a garage owner, a market gardener), pedestrians and citizens who were 
at home. Most of the interviewees were anonymous and the form of the interview was 
different from the in depth semi-structured questionnaire prepared for the selected 
interviewees of the project organisation. The street interviews were based on a short 
semi-structured questionnaire with a few topics about the government plan for a dike 
relocation.
The data collection for the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study was different from 
the other case studies. On the side of the government authorities, only a few staff 
members and government decision-makers were involved, and the population of the 
polder was a homogenous group of 17 farming families and the owner of a marina. 
Fifteen interviews were held, 13 with representatives of the government authorities and 
one each with the chair and vice-chair of the residents’ organisation, the Overdiepse 
Polder Interest Group (Vereniging Belangengroep Overdiepse polder). These interviews 
proved sufficient to collect the required data. The 13 interviews with representatives
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from the government authorities included six from national government and four from 
provincial government. At the national level, the Room for the River programme 
manager (Project Directie Ruimte voor de Rivier, PDR) was interviewed once and the 
river branch manager (riviertak manager) for the downstream stretch was interviewed 
twice. Four representatives from Rijkswaterstaat were also interviewed, one of whom 
was the chair of the Technical Advisory Commission on Flood Defence, another was 
head of water infrastructure at the national office, and two were working at the East 
Netherlands regional office. The interviewees from provincial government were two 
provincial delegates (members of Noord-Brabant provincial executive, one of whom 
had just become a member of parliament when the interview was held, and two project 
managers, the first was interviewed once and his successor was interviewed three times. 
The vice-chair was interviewed regularly, two or three times a year. In addition, 
interviews were held with a representative from the Government Service for Land and 
Water Management (Dienst Landelijk Gebied, DLG), a water expert, and the deputy 
director of Habiforum, a non-governmental organisation for multifuctional land use. 
Two conversations with provincial government officials were not included in the list of 
interviewees. The interviews with both the government authorities and the two farmers 
took place in the period from 2005 to 2009.
A number of respondents were in a position to reflect on two or three case studies, or 
their statements could be used in different case studies. The interviews with these 
respondents were therefore included in the analysis of all the relevant cases. The 
respondents appear two or three times in the list of interviewees (see Appendix).
Recording
Some of the interviews were recorded and some were not. Interviews for the Dike 
Relocation in Lent case study were recorded, while notes were taken during interviews 
about the Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder case study and the Terps Plan in 
Overdiep Polder case study. The interviews that were carried out jointly were not 
recorded as there was always one interviewer who could take notes while the other asked 
questions. The tape recorded interviews were transcribed. The notes made during the 
other interviews were written out in full. The second interviewer then carefully reviewed 
the interview report and sometimes added additional information from m emory or 
his own notes.
Desk study
A documentation search was conducted to find out whether this research topic had 
already been reported in the scientific literature, and then to search for specific concepts 
and im portant themes for inclusion in the analytical framework. Secondary sources 
were also used for the analysis of the case studies, including project documentation, 
government reports, policy documents and print media like articles in newspapers, 
magazines and on the internet. The printed media turned out to be a significant source 
of information on the three case studies. The am ount of media coverage varied per 
case. While the Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder project provided a continuous
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flow of articles, particularly in the regional newspaper, the Dike Relocation in Lent 
project generated much smaller media attention, and the Terps Plan in Overdiep polder 
project even less. This proved to be part of the media power built by the local groups, 
as explained in Chapter 5, 6 and 7.
Process
The roots of this research lie in the European Freude am Fluss project (Enjoying the 
River) which ran from 2004 to 2009. The focus of the project was river landscape 
planning: making room  for the river by bringing various interests together, such as 
housing development, nature conservation, recreation and economy. The idea behind 
combining land uses was to put together a total package people would embrace and 
assume a ‘please in my backyard’ (PIMBY) attitude instead of a NIMBY (not in my 
backyard) one. One of the research topics was ‘communication’, which covered a broad 
field from communicating the river and communication between experts and citizens 
as lay people, to communication between stakeholders in river projects. As the project 
planning of the Freude am Fluss project was consistent with the Dutch Room for the 
River policy, for which 39 projects will be realised by 2015, there was a broad range of 
practical cases available as data sources for all these topics. The choice for the 
government-citizen relationship was partly based on the experiences with Room for the 
River projects until then. As the first Room for the River projects started in 2000, the 
preliminary results of these projects became available when the choice for the research 
subject had to be made. The fact that some projects did not run at all, while others were 
considered successful triggered the choice for studying the government-citizen 
relationship, which is also close to my own knowledge and experience. The first 
questions to arise were why some projects lead to conflict while others to collaboration, 
and what conflict and collaboration mean. While formulating these questions the main 
theme of this study emerged naturally: the social interaction between government 
authorities and local groups.
At the beginning of the research all three river projects which were selected for the case 
study were at an advanced stage, which meant that data gathering began with a relatively 
meagre theoretical (e.g. framework) input. Nevertheless, the research was organised 
around specific key propositions, questions and activities. Some key propositions were, 
for instance, that history is an im portant factor in today’s government-citizen 
relationship, that citizens who form several residents’ groups are less influential than 
those who are organised in a single residents’ group, and that a governmental top-down 
approach, once set in motion, can hardly be changed. Key questions included how the 
project proceeded, the history of the project, which position the actors had in the 
project, how the actors interacted, and what means they used to influence decision­
making. The focus was on the various activities government authorities and citizens 
undertook to influence decision-making in their direction. This initial phase of the 
study was flexible enough to allow these topics to be modified as the analysis progressed 
(see Yin, 1981).
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Getting access to information on the cases selected for this study demanded persuasive 
qualities, perseverance, dedication, and communicative abilities. It proved relatively 
easy to get the information needed for two case studies, the Dike Relocation in Lent 
and the Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder. The project manager of the first was 
involved in the Freude am Fluss project, under which this research was initiated, the 
second was part of a study21 for which two researchers at Wageningen University had 
already collected information. Access to information on the Terps Plan in Overdiep 
Polder case study proved harder to come by. The reticence of the water expert who had 
a key position in the project and the guarded reaction of the project manager to a 
request for information, an attitude that in literature is referred to as ‘gatekeepers’ (Fleck 
et al., 2004), meant that it took more than a year to gain access. An opportunity finally 
arose to show a scale model of the terps plan during a Freude am Fluss conference in 
the municipality of Nijmegen in spring 2005. As the model had been made by children 
who lived in the Overdiep polder, it had to be taken back to its owners. This was my best 
chance to get directly in touch with the farmers of Overdiep polder. The farmer I 
returned the model to was highly surprised by the attitude of both the water expert 
and the project manager. In contrast to them, he viewed contacts with outsiders as his 
‘societal’ task, a consequence of being involved in a plan that serves both a public aim, 
to reduce the risk of flooding, and the farmers’ interests in an economically viable 
future.
Development of the analytical framework
The first data gathering from interviews, a literature review, and the conversations with 
practitioners, colleagues and supervisors allowed me to elaborate key conceptual topics 
of social interaction. The analytical framework was given initial shape by putting the 
actors in a logical position in relation to the outcomes of their social interaction. The 
authorities and citizens were located on one side of the analytical framework, and the 
outcomes of their interaction on the other. However, it took time to get a clear picture 
of the relevant concepts for analysing social interaction, the process from actors to 
outcome. Analytical induction provided these concepts, first the concept of framing 
and later the concept of social power. Empirical data from the three cases contributed 
inductively to modifications of the analytical framework, such as the addition of a type 
of social power and merging two types already included. Deductive analysis also led to 
alteration of the framework. Examples were the addition of the organisational culture 
of the authorities and the cultural background of the residents, and putting the bridging 
and buffering strategies on an equal footing. A major alteration was changing the 
interaction outcomes from ‘conflict, evasion, reconciliation and collaboration’ to 
‘conflict, debate, negotiation, dialogue and collaboration’. The analytical framework 
thus acquired its final shape and covers various concepts and properties of social 
interaction.
The analysis of the properties of social interaction would only be useful if they could 
be evaluated. But to estimate the properties meant that they have to be comparable, 
which they were not. Despite the fact that the properties are in essence incomparable,
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it was decided that the evaluation would be based on the principle of taking the 
minimum evaluation as the norm. This meant that a ±  (plus minus or weak value) 
against a + +  (plus plus or strong value) will result in a ±  (plus minus or weak value). 
It will not be averaged to a +  (plus or moderate value). This evaluation method meant 
that authorities may have a weak or moderate score while the local group has a strong 
score. These outcomes, however, are relative. Authorities may have a relatively weak 
action potential in comparison to the local group, which may turn out strong.
Analysis
The data were analysed in two steps. First, a within-case analysis of the three case studies 
was made based on a hybrid method of grounded theory and a responsive interviewing 
model (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). The grounded theory method argues that coding, 
recognising key concepts and themes are part of one integrated process, and concepts 
and themes must emerge from the data without the literature. The working method is 
therefore to go through the transcripts of the interviews and identify potential analytic 
categories, which are coded. By contrast, in the responsive interviewing model the 
phases of work are more distinct and analysis is made more efficient by developing a 
separate list of concepts and themes derived from the literature and other sources, which 
is applied to the interviews. As the research progressed the interviews became more 
focused, for which an open coding process is best. Using this hybrid model, part way 
between the grounded theory model and the responsive interviewing model, it was not 
necessary to code every passage or term in the transcribed interviews, but to select only 
those concepts and themes that were most closely related to the research question, such 
as the actors’ potential to act, their use of social power and framing, and bridging and 
buffering strategies, and the outcomes of interaction. The phrases of the interviews that 
covered these concepts were similarly coded. The coded phrases of the key concepts 
were then put together. Second, a search for cross-case patterns was made by analysing 
the emerging outcomes of the case studies. To complete the analysis, the research 
question was answered and broader implications were drawn.
The analysis of the case studies was based mainly on the quotes of interviewees. The 
main reasons for using statements by the interviewees was to reflect their perspectives, 
which not only clarified what they communicated (key issues which they considered 
important) but also how they communicated (their choice of words can reveal their 
attitude towards others, by their directness of speech, for example, or use of suggestive 
language, putting names to specific feelings). Apart from the fact that this method of 
analysis proved to be quite time-consuming, it became clear that the context of the 
quotations was often largely lost, which introduced an element of uncertainty into the 
interpretation of the remarks made by the interviewees. Nevertheless, the advantage of 
using quotes was considered important, and many of them have been retained in the 
final descriptions.
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Case description
As a social anthropologist I used Geertz’ (1973) ‘thick’ description as a source of 
inspiration for describing the case studies. As this type of case description is usually 
based on participant observation, which was not the case here, it was not directly 
applicable. The reason for choosing this type of case description was to unravel the 
multiple layers of meaning expressed by the actors to build a comprehensive and 
insightful picture of what was going on in river projects. Thick description, with its 
wealth of information, relates to the conceptual system of what is being investigated 
(‘emic analysis’) (Fleck et al., 2004). In the literature, ‘emic’ refers to culturally based 
perspectives, interpretations and categories used by members of a group under study 
to conceptualise and encode knowledge and to guide their behaviour. Emic terms, 
concepts and categories are therefore functionally relevant to the behaviour of the 
people being studied.
An analysis built on emic concepts incorporates the participants’ perspectives and 
interpretations of behaviour, events and situations, and does so in the descriptive 
language they themselves use (Watson-Gegeo, 1988). Sometimes the etic view gave a 
different insight in the process than the emic view as was the case in Chapter 5. For that 
reason, it was included in the recommendations for further study (see also Chapter 8). 
An adapted version of ‘thick’ description was followed in which two steps can be 
distinguished. The first step of the case description was making a brief portrait of the 
key issues that occurred during the planning process according to the government 
authorities’ and local group’s point of view. This was based on the researcher’s 
interpretation and a historical perspective on the government-citizen relationship. In 
the second step, a description was drawn up from the actor’s point of view, one from 
the standpoint of the government authorities, and another from the local group’s 
viewpoint. This yielded quite different interpretations of what occurred in the projects. 
It meant that texts and arguments at two levels of description (the viewpoints of the 
government authorities and of the local group) could be juxtaposed in such a way that 
they could be compared and contrasted with each other (see Fleck et al., 2004). 
Individual interpretations were not seen as right or wrong in themselves, but rather as 
different slants on what happened, slants that the researcher puts together to construct 
his or her understanding of what has occurred (Rubin & Rubin, 2005).
Each case description, therefore, started with a summary, followed by a historical 
overview of the main events in the area, the relationship between place and 
neighbourhood, specific characteristics of the residents and their relationship with the 
government authorities. Next, a description was made of the case narrative from the 
viewpoint of the government authorities and the residents, which was organised around 
specific topics arising from what occurred in the case study. Evidence for most topics 
was obtained from different data sources, interviews and document analysis (see Yin, 
1981). Each case study chapter begins with the narrative case description before the 
framework-led case analysis.
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Chapter 5 Dike Relocation in Lent case study
The plan for a dike relocation in Lent was a state initiative to reduce flood risk by 
widening the bottleneck in the river Waal between the village of Lent and the city of 
Nijmegen (see Figure 5.1). The Dike Relocation in Lent case study covers the period 
from the launch of the plan in February 2000 to the final decision in December 2006 
to proceed with implementation.
This case description draws on 60 interviews, 18 of which were in-depth, semi­
structured interviews held with members of the project organisation: the steering group 
(3), project group (7) and advisory group (8). In addition, 32 street interviews were 
held with people chosen at random by walking through the village. Among the 
interviewees were local businesspeople, such as a garage owner, hairdresser and market 
gardener, as well as a local fire brigade volunteer and an active member of the residents’ 
group ‘dikers’, whose houses would be along the new dike. These residents lived in 
various parts of the village of Lent and the newly built Waalsprong urban extension. Ten 
further interviews with key people were held, three of which were carried out after the 
final decision-making and reflected on crucial moments in the process. Among the 
interviewees was the chair of a residents’ group and a consultant who was responsible 
for the environmental impact assessment (EIA) and initiated a mediation action. This 
case description also draws on various conversations with the project manager which 
are not included in the list of interviewees.
5.1 Case narrative
The case narrative for Dike Relocation in Lent includes a brief review, a historical 
perspective that sketches in broad lines what happened prior to the launch of the 
government plan, and the descriptions of the case from the government’s point of view 
and the local groups’ position.
Dike relocation in Lent in brief
On 28 February 2000 at Loevestein castle22 the Dutch state secretary for water 
management presented the White Paper on Room for the River and showed a sketch of 
the plan for a dike relocation. Contrary to former policy, which relied on raising the 
dikes, the new policy proposes a package of structural spatial (and infrastructure)
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measures to increase protection against flooding, including dike relocations and 
excavating flood plains and side channels (Roth & Winnubst, 2009). It should prepare 
the Dutch rivers to withstand floods to a design discharge of 16,000 m3/s by 2015, and 
ultimately a design discharge of 18,000 m3/s.23 A bottleneck that needed to be solved was 
in the river Waal near Lent. The state secretary showed a sketch of a dike relocation as 
an illustration of measures that could be taken (see Figure 5.1).
Figure 5.1 Bottleneck in the river Waal near Lent and proposed dike relocation
The state secretary’s speech was picked up by national television. Government officials 
were upset when they saw the eight o’clock national news. Local politicians had not 
been officially informed about the possibility of a dike relocation. The responsible 
executive councillor of Nijmegen24 was taken aback by the national government 
decision to relocate a dike in the same area as the Waalsprong housing development 
which just been approved. For officials of Rijkswaterstaat25 it was a different situation. 
Although they knew about the ideas for resolving the bottleneck in the river, they had 
not been told about the use of ‘their’ design for the dike relocation.
Shortly after the state secretary’s presentation, the executive councillor decided that 
cooperation with the state was the most likely option. At the insistence of the 
municipality of Nijmegen, the state secretary commissioned a Quick Scan study to 
compare two by-pass alternatives (with routes through the northern and middle parts 
of Lent) and the proposed dike relocation. The outcomes showed that the measure for 
a dike relocation performed best on safety and cost, and it would have less impact on 
the Waalsprong housing development. This outcome allowed the municipality of 
Nijmegen to reconcile itself to the situation and negotiate with the state for 
compensation for the homes that now could not be built and a contribution to the 
‘accessibility of the city’, a second bridge over the river Waal. With this information the 
executive councillor organised an information meeting for the residents of Lent, most 
of whom did not know of the government plan beforehand. The executive councillor’s 
message ‘the Waalsprong will go ahead’ stirred the residents into action. They viewed
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the government plan as a second government intervention after the annexation of their 
village by the municipality of Nijmegen in January 1998, which meant the development 
of a new suburb, the Waalsprong, for 30,000 inhabitants. Like the annexation, they 
considered the proposed dike relocation a threat. As they had not been able to prevent 
the annexation, they intended to organise strong resistance to the dike relocation, 
arguing that they may live at a bottleneck in the river, they never feel insecure. Their 
main strategy was to question the premises of the measure. They did not believe the 
government’s assumptions behind the need to reduce the flood risk. ‘Even during the 
last flood of 1926 the discharge capacity was limited to 12,600 m3/s, and if so, Germany 
will flood first,’ they said.
With the help of a retired professor of water management, van Ellen, they launched an 
alternative plan, ‘Lentse Warande’, based on the legal design discharge of 16,000 m3/s. 
This plan provided for (1) excavating the flood plain, including a ‘green’ side channel 
separated from the main channel by a longitudinal dam with concrete block, and (2) a 
land reservation for a dike relocation in future (see Figure 5.2).
In the autumn of 2000, the state secretary decided to install an advisory commission 
chaired by former minister Gerrit Brokx (referred to as the Brokx Advisory 
Commission) to develop the government plan, which resulted in ‘Plan Brokx’ (see 
Figure 5.3). With the outcomes of the Quick Scan and the Commission’s report, the 
state secretary reasoned that ‘the dike relocation was the best possible solution for the 
bottleneck in the river Waal’. Acting on the Commission’s advice she negotiated with the 
executive councillor of the municipality of Nijmegen about damage compensation, 
including the construction of a second bridge over the Waal. These were laid down in 
two voluntary agreements, one concerning damage compensation for the dike 
relocation and the housing development, the other for a financial contribution to the 
second Waal bridge. In earlier negotiations, it had been agreed that as well as the 
government plan (Plan Brokx) the residents’ alternative (Lentse Warande) would be 
studied in the environment impact assessment (EIA), an obligatory step in the planning 
of infrastructure and planning application procedure. A project organisation was set up 
comprising a steering group with government decision-makers from the authorities 
involved, a project group with government officers from the same organisations and an 
advisory group, which included residents of Lent.
By mid 2004 the planning process was delegated from the state to a regional office of 
Rijkswaterstaat for the execution of the EIA. The appointed project manager began 
discussions with key people, including professor van Ellen, whose previous attempts to 
open a dialogue with the authorities had been disregarded. Having gained a picture of 
the various stakeholders, the project manager set up a project organisation, which 
included an advisory group, for which he invited the residents’ groups. Meanwhile, the 
state secretary provisionally adopted the government plan in the national planning 
instrument Spatial Planning Key Decision (SPKD) Room for the River.
69
-Q-
Madelinde PHD zonder afbrekingen:Opmaak 1 15- -2011 14:44 Pagina 70
Although the role of the advisory group was to give advice during the execution of EIA 
studies, the meetings were characterised by discussions on the government 
requirements for river plans, the necessity of Plan Brokx and the lack of studies of 
alternatives, which did not lead to much agreement. The residents finally decided to 
put their efforts behind getting their alternative approved. With support of the local 
government and Rijkswaterstaat, it was developed into a full alternative to the 
government plan in the EIA. In the end, both plans scored roughly the same, but the 
residents’ plan turned out to be the most environmentally favourable alternative. While 
the residents considered their plan to be the best alternative as it met the legal design 
discharge of 16,000 m3/s for the Rhine, the project group was convinced of the utility 
of the government plan because it was best able to satisfy the policy requirements by 
meeting the future forecast of 18,000 m3/s for the Rhine. The steering group finally 
chose the government plan because of its ‘robustness’; it would solve the bottleneck in 
one go and meet the safety requirements best. The residents reacted furiously. The state 
secretary decided on the government plan in December 2005 and it was adopted by 
Parliament in June and December 2006
Figure 5.2 The residents' alternative 'Lentse Warande', which consists of a side channel in the flood 
plain (1), a dam with opening on the west side (2), a land reservation for a possible dike relocation 
in future (3), housing development Waalsprong (4) and the former fortress Knotsenburg (5)
Figure 5.3 The government plan, 'Plan Brokx', including a dike relocation (1) 350 m land inwards, a 
side channel (2), housing development Waalsprong (3), an island Veur-Lent (4) and the former 
fortress Knotsenburg (5)
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Table 5.1 shows a process outline with the different stages that can be distinguished in 
the Dike Relocation in Lent case study.
Table 5.1 Process outline of Dike Relocation in Lent
Process stage Date Method Participants
Preparatory stage (February 2000 -April 2002)
Launch of 
government plan
28 February 2000 Presentation studies 
and W hite Paper 
on Room for the River
Ministry
Quick scan March - August 2000 Inventory of 
alternatives
Ministry, municipality 
of Nijmegen, water 
board
Brokx Advisory 
Commission
November 2000 - 
February 2001
Studying consequences 
and feasibility of plan 
for a dike relocation 
(later called Plan 
Brokx)
Ministry, province, 
municipality of 
Nijmegen, water board
Voluntary agreements April 2002 Signing of two  
agreements: one 
agreement on 
compensation for dike 
relocation, a second on 
contributing to the 
cost of the second 
bridge over the Waal 
river.
Ministry and 
municipality of 
Nijmegen
Development stage (May 2002 - February 2005)
Environmental 
Impact Assessment
January 2003 - 
January 2005
Studying various 
consequences of two  
plans: dike relocation 
(Plan Brokx) and 
resident alternative 
(Lentse Warande).
Rijkswaterstaat, 
province, water board, 
citizens,
non-governmental 
organisations and mu­
nicipality of Nijmegen
Preparation of 
decision-making
October 2004 - 
February 2005
Advisory group, pro­
ject group and steering 
group make prefe­
rence public concer­
ning dike relocation or 
residents' alternative 
Lentse Warande. 
Drawing up 
final document for 
decision-making.
Province, municipality 
of Nijmegen, water 
board, citizens and 
non-governmental 
organisations
Decision-making stage (March 2005 - December 2006)
State secretary October 2005 State secretary's 
decision
State secretary
Government December 2005 Government decision Cabinet
House of 
Representatives
Ju ly 2006 House of
Representative's
decision
Members of House 
of Representatives
Senate December 2006 Senate's decision Members of Senate
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Historical perspective
This section sketches in broad lines what happened prior to the launch of the 
government plan.
Split village
The village of Lent26 is situated on the north bank of the river Waal. Opposite the village 
on the southern bank of the river lies the municipality of Nijmegen.
Since the construction of the Grift canal the village of Lent has been split in a western 
and eastern part. In 1310 Reinald I, Duke of Gelre, prepared plans to build a canal 
through the Overbetuwe area for travel and shipping between the cities of Arnhem and 
Nijmegen. It was not until 1608 that the first sod for the canal was cut. The municipality 
of Nijmegen paid three-quarters, the city of Arnhem the rest. Several bridges over the 
canal linked the eastern and western parts of the village of Lent. To make the Grift 
suitable for transport a road was built along the canal. In 1610 the first boat, carrying 
cattle, fish and peat, sailed through the canal. Two horses on the canalside road pulled 
the boat. Travellers used the track boat service. In the 17th century each day forty foot 
passengers, ten horses and five cart horses went by track boat between the cities of 
Arnhem and Nijmegen. From Lent the travellers were ferried across the river Waal in 
rowing boats and scows (Jansen, 1986). Often this was not an easy passage because of 
the weather or the long wait, and in 1648 a bridge was seriously considered. This plan 
was dropped when Hendrik Heuck, a resident of Nijmegen, presented his plan for a 
chain ferry or ‘flying bridge’. It was built and opened in 1657 (Gemeente Nijmegen en 
Elst, 1998). The bridge consisted of a deck resting on two barges which were yawed on 
a cable connected to quay via seven boats. The river current provided the force to get 
the chain ferry across (Gemeente Nijmegen en Elst, 1998). In the 18th century the road 
along the canal deteriorated, as did the Grift, which was not making a profit, especially 
after the construction of the Pannerdens Kanaal in 1709, which provided a faster 
connection between the cities of Nijmegen and Arnhem. In the winter of 1740-1741 the 
dike was breached near Elden, sand filled the Grift and the canal lost its function for 
shipping.
A new means of transport was introduced in 1873 when Parliament decided to build a 
railway between Arnhem and Nijmegen. In 1875 the construction of the railway bridge 
started and in 1879 the first train arrived in Nijmegen. A dike had been built through 
the western part of Lent to access the bridge, cutting off this area from the centre of the 
village. Since then Lent has been split into three parts: a western part to the west of the 
railway, a middle part between the railway and the Grift canal, and an eastern part to 
the east of the canal. In 1882 Lent got a railway halt and in 1914 a station was built. 
However, the residents of Lent did not take the train, unless the floating bridge was out 
of service because of drift ice or high water.
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The rise of the car led to increasing traffic and the floating bridge became a constraint 
on crossing the river. The establishment of the Stichting Nijmeegsche Burgerij-Commissie 
voor Waaloverbrugging in 1906 brought the building of a bridge over the Waal a step 
closer, but the First World War thwarted this plan. The discussion about a bridge began 
again in 1927 when the national government presented a national highway scheme. In 
the same year the chain ferry was replaced by a motor ferry. Discussions arose about the 
location of the bridge, near the existing railway bridge or to the east, the Belvédère plan. 
The residents of Lent supported a bridge next to the railway bridge (‘it provides a 
connection to the new industrial site near the Meuse-Waal canal’, ‘it prevents expensive 
expropriation’ and ‘there is a lot of space available for easy slantwise banks’), which had 
the most backers, it was the bourgeoisie in Nijmegen who proved to be an important 
voice in the final decision-making. The main proponent of the Waal bridge near the 
Belvédère was the well known photographer C.A.P. Ivens. He made a brochure entitled 
‘The missing link’ in which influential persons like architect H.P. Berlage, painter Jan 
Toorop and former city architect J.J.H. Weve came out openly in favour of the Belvédère 
plan. Like the municipality of Nijmegen they preferred a road past the city centre 
because of future revenues. On 24 February 1928 the government adopted the Belvédère 
plan.
Two years later the Grift canal was filled in and turned into a major road between 
Arnhem and Nijmegen (Jansen, 1986; Gemeente Nijmegen en Elst, 1998), definitively 
dividing Lent into three parts. This was made complete when the Waal bridge was 
completed in 1936.
Theatre for warring parties
Through the centuries the village of Lent and its surroundings has regularly seen 
conflict. Among others, the Spanish, the French and the Germans have fought in or 
near Lent. Being situated just across from Nijmegen, Lent became a front line. The 
Overbetuwe region, of which the village of Lent is part, was often a disputed border 
zone, and defensive works from various centuries are reminders of the strategic value 
of the region. The river proves to be a difficult barrier and armies can be prevented 
from crossing.
In 1585, for example, the Spanish had ousted the States Army from Nijmegen, making 
the city a threat for the northern Netherlands. In response a new entrenchment was 
built in Lent. For the Spanish troops it proved easy to oust the States Army, but in 1590 
Prince Maurits came to Lent and built fortress called Knodsenburg. The Spanish lost 
in 1591. The Duke of Parma wanted to expand his influence with a breakout over the 
river Waal, but this expedition failed and the fortifications remained standing. Later, in 
1672, the French threatened the north of the Netherlands. Their plan was first to invade 
the Overbetuwe, and from there attack the city of Nijmegen. In June the water level in 
the Waal near Lobith was very low and the French could cross the river without 
problem. The States Army troops could not withstand the enemy and had to surrender.
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The city of Nijmegen also capitulated. However, the French invasion was stopped at 
the Hollandse Waterlinie, a line of water defences and fortifications from Amsterdam 
to Gorinchem. From 1674 the States Army reinstated the rule in Lent and in Nijmegen. 
The French came back, inspired by the revolution in 1789, and in the summer of 1794 
they captured the south of the Netherlands. In the autumn the Overbetuwe was 
mobilised for an offensive. Although the French seized the city of Nijmegen they did not 
manage to get across the Waal. This changed on 10 January 1795 when the French 
passed the frozen river and in a few days they captured Overbetuwe. They went on to 
rule the Netherlands until 1815.
In the mid 19th century, the fortress town of Nijmegen wanted to strengthen its 
position. As fort Knodsenburg in Lent could not fulfil any role of significance three 
new defensive works around the village of Lent were planned two of which were 
realised: fortress Boven-Lent, also called Sprokkelenburg, and fortress Beneden-Lent, or 
Nieuw-Knodsenburg. The first was built in 1862, the second a year after. Although most 
of the fortresses were dismantled after the abolition of fortress Nijmegen in 1874, both 
fortresses in Lent were preserved. During World War II in September 1944 the German 
used fortress Beneden-Lent to open fire on the Americans on both banks of the Waal. 
The Americans finally won, but lost 200 men (Schenkels, 1985-2005).
At the end of the 20th century a new battle arose. This time it was not an armed battle 
but one of words. The municipality of Nijmegen intended to annex Lent for housing 
development. The municipality to which the village of Lent belonged did not agree and 
tried to convince the government and the regional authorities. Lent finally became part 
of the municipality of Nijmegen in January 1998. Since then Lent has been transformed 
from a village of 3200 inhabitants (Gemeente Nijmegen en Elst, 1998) into a suburb of 
the municipality of Nijmegen including the Waalsprong housing development for
30,000 inhabitants, on which building started in the late 1990s.
Bottleneck in the river Waal
In the past the Waal was a broad, shallow meandering river with channels, many islands, 
sand shallows, and a low discharge capacity. This changed in the 13 th century when 
main dikes (bandijken) and groynes were built to stabilise the river in the main channel. 
Since then the Waal has been flowing in the same channel between the city of Nijmegen 
and the village of Lent. At this place the river was forced to burrow deeper and deeper 
as it is constrained by the glacial ridge on which the city of Nijmegen is built on one side 
and on the other side the main dikes that were built to protect the Overbetuwe region. 
These narrowed the space for the river to 400 meters. Through the centuries this 
channel has narrowed to 90 metres by the building of embankments in the flood plain 
outside the dikes (Mulder et al., 2001).
The inhabitants of both places used to cross the river regularly. People from Nijmegen 
during a Sunday walk, the residents of Lent to sell their merchandise. During severe
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winters when the river was frozen the latter could easily walk across the Waal to where 
people were gathered. For such occasions the bakeries in Lent baked a special biscuit, 
Lentse pleske, a treat for the villagers as well as the city dwellers.
The festive mood disappeared soon when the thaw set in. People knew very well that 
drifting ice or weak dike sections caused floods. Ice floes floated with the current, but 
the natural discharge of the melting ice was blocked by sand shallows, islands and curves 
in the river. The outside bend was particularly threatened by the drifting ice floes and 
mounting ice dams. These dams held up the water, causing levels to rise. Sometimes a 
dike was breached, but often the water and ice overtopped the dikes. For centuries Lent, 
like other places along the river, was threatened by dike collapses. It was not only the 
dike near Lent the residents were afraid of, but also dikes in the neighbourhood, because 
the result was the same: generally the whole area was flooded. For example, in 1634 
high ice floes caused a breach in the main dike near Lent and washed away everything, 
including the solid sluice gates of the Grift canal. A dam was then built in front of the 
restored sluices, which blocked the direct connection with the river Waal (Jaarboek 
Stichting Batavorum, 2008).
Breaches in the dike were repaired as soon as possible, but the maintenance of dike 
parcels proved a severe problem. This was enforced on those who had a ‘dike duty’ 
(dijkplichtigen), owners of land that bordered the main dike. Also, the dike enforcements 
that had to be carried out periodically as a result of the increasing water level had to be 
paid by them. This was a source of recurring conflict between the dike chair (dijkstoel) 
and the owners (dijkgeslaagden), as the burden was divided among the land owners, 
which often resulted in bankruptcy (van de Ven, 1995).
In addition, seepage water was considered a problem. The water came up through many 
old river beds in lower layers containing rough sand and gravel. From the 15th century 
a system of seepage dikes were built to counter the pressure against the dikes, although 
this raised the seepage water a bit. A seepage dike consists of clay and is about 50 
centimetres high. Seepage dikes do not have deep foundations and let seepage water 
through after a while. In the 18th and 19th century the seepage water system was 
developed and put under the supervision of the dike chair. Other measures to dam up 
the seepage water included the reservation of a parcel of land along the dikes around 
Lent, which can be seen today because houses were mostly built beyond this seepage 
water zone.
Until about 1825 dike overflows, dike breaches and ice floes were regular occurrences 
in Lent, for example in 1784, 1799, 1809 and 1820. Most occurred upstream (towards 
the east in the direction of Doornik and Bemmel) or downstream (towards the west 
near Oosterhout). The main dike near Lent often held firm, for example during the 
high water of 1926 but also during the high water periods of 1993 and 1995. Because 
of this, and despite the evacuation of over 200,000 people in January 1995, many
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residents of Lent did not see the need for the dike relocation that was launched in 
2000.27 However, a few had a different opinion, such as a member of the voluntary fire 
brigade28 who inspected the dikes during the last high water periods and prevented a 
dike breach upstream near Bemmel.
The high water periods in 1993 and 1995 led to various studies (Bestuurlijke 
Begeleidingsgroep Integrale Verkenning Benedenrivieren, 2000; Ministerie van Verkeer 
en Waterstaat, 2000a) on how to reduce flood risk in the Netherlands. These studies 
made it clear that higher water discharges from the rivers during periods with high sea 
water levels have to be taken into account. It further showed that it might turn out to 
be very effective to solve the bottlenecks in the Dutch river system. At Lent the river is 
narrowed by a sheet piling on the south bank (city of Nijmegen) and a dike with a small 
flood plain on the north bank (village of Lent). This bottleneck in the river system may 
obstruct the water discharge and may lead to a higher flood risk. These studies did not 
go unnoticed in The Hague. The high water events had put water management high on 
the political agenda. Apart from the Major Rivers Delta Plan (Deltaplan Grote Rivieren) 
to speed up execution of the dike reinforcement before 2001, the Water Management 
department launched the Room for the River policy (Ministerie van Verkeer en 
Waterstaat, 2000b). Discussions about climate change and a possible resulting 
increasing water discharge spurred the state secretary to act and broadened the 
legitimacy of widening the narrow part of the river Waal near Lent.
Small village against big city
For centuries the city of Nijmegen was dependent on the village of Lent for the 
transport of goods, first through the Grift canal, later via the N325 trunk road to 
Arnhem. Furthermore, as a horticultural centre, Lent turned out to be an important 
supplier of vegetables, fruit, tobacco, and later flowers for the citizenry of Nijmegen. 
For most residents of Lent the city of Nijmegen was for a long time their main source 
of income.
At the end of the 20th century the municipality of Nijmegen annexed Lent and moved 
to the north across the river Waal. After years of struggle between the authorities, the 
residents of Lent realised they could not defeat this threat -  but would it be the last 
threat they had to accept?
Government perspective
In this part the dike relocation in Lent is described from the government’s point of 
view.
Loevestein meeting: launch of plan for dike relocation in Lent
On 28 February 2000 state secretary Monique de Vries for Water Management officially
76
- Q -
Madelinde PHD zonder afbrekingen:Opmaak 1 15- 2011 14:44 Pagina 77
received the advisory reports on two studies29 into dealing with flood risk. During the 
meeting she proclaimed that the Room for the River policy30 was the spearhead of her 
policy. The key concept was ‘sustainable water safety’, which she explained by addressing 
three questions: What are we doing now to achieve the required safety level? How are 
we dealing with future developments, for example climate change and the related effects 
of higher water discharges? How are we administering residual risk, a situation that will 
occur if the design discharge is exceeded? In her attempt to present a decisive image 
she used a sketch of a dike relocation in Lent to illustrate the measures that could be 
taken.31 ‘Near the city of Nijmegen’, she explained, ‘is a bottleneck. And this is precisely 
where a new urban extension will be built.’ She questioned whether this was a shrewd 
plan, knowing that the water discharge of the river Waal may increase over the coming 
decades. She predicted tough negotiations with the municipality of Nijmegen.32, 33 The 
meeting attracted the attention of the press; it was broadcast as a news item during the
20.00 o’clock news and the following current affairs programme NOVA.
The state secretary’s performance had the desired effect: it caused a wave of publicity. 
She positioned herself in the middle of the political arena and put the water question 
high on the political agenda (Roth et al., 2006a). Officials and government decision­
makers were shocked. Rijkswaterstaat officials did know, but they were not informed 
about the use of their preliminary maps.34, 35 Paul Depla, executive councillor at the 
municipality of Nijmegen, did not officially know that the dike relocation was a possible 
measure. Although he had previously received signals about the preparation of a Room 
for the River programme that may affect ‘his’ Waalsprong, it suddenly became reality 
when broadcast to the nation.36 The executive councillor was not surprised by the 
increasing problem of flood safety -  the memories of the high water events in 1993 and 
1995 were still alive. After the recent dike raising there was growing awareness of the 
national interest in river widening as a possible measure. But the location for the dike 
just near Nijmegen was difficult to accept as the executive councillor intended to build 
the Waalsprong urban extension. With the approval of national and provincial 
government, the municipality of Nijmegen had just started building the Waalsprong 
housing development37 and the proposed dike relocation might affect the edges of this 
plan.
Not everyone in Lent watched television on that day. Most residents got the information 
during the first information meeting that the executive councillor organised in 
September 2000. After the annexation of their village by the municipality of Nijmegen 
for the development of a new suburb for 30,000 residents, the residents considered the 
proposed dike relocation as a second government intervention in a short time.
Safeguarding the Waalsprong housing development
Soon after his first reaction of disbelief and denial, executive councillor Paul Depla 
decided that cooperation with the national government would be the best option. 
‘Although many local governments would choose a different position,’ he explained, ‘it
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is a government plan and complying with national policy is our legitimate role in Dutch 
governance’.38 Apart from the loss of revenue from the houses that could not be built, 
an important argument for the councillor’s position was the former financial position 
of the municipality of Nijmegen.39 Collaboration would provide opportunities to 
negotiate for compensation, including a second bridge over the Waal.40 A second bridge 
was needed, but the budget and financial situation of the municipality of Nijmegen 
would not allow this. The local government was banking on plans being made for a 
bridge in the region for which it would not have to pay.41
A condition demanded by the municipality of Nijmegen in negotiations with the state 
secretary was to stick to the original plan for 12,000 homes in the Waalsprong urban 
extension. In an attempt to influence the state secretary’s opinion, the municipal 
executive of Nijmegen invited the state secretary to visit Lent before holding an official 
meeting. She looked at the dike and was not shocked: ‘I am not saying that I find [the 
proposed dike relocation] awful, no. I find it less terrible than a noise barrier’.42 At the 
insistence of the municipality of Nijmegen the state secretary decided to carry out a 
Quick Scan study from March to August 200043 in close cooperation with 
Rijkswaterstaat, the municipality of Nijmegen and other authorities. The Quick Scan 
addressed alternative options for solving the bottleneck in the river Waal to safely meet 
a design river discharge of 18,000 m3/s for the Rhine near Lobith.44 Based on the 
outcomes of the Quick Scan, the state secretary decided to develop the dike relocation 
as a preferred option as it performed best on safety (the main condition of the Room 
for the River policy) and cost. Furthermore, it could have less impact on the 
development of the Waalsprong housing development,45 a condition of the municipality 
of Nijmegen.
Dealing with two loyalties
In the morning of 20 September 2000 state secretary Monique de Vries informed the 
Nijmegen municipal executive that ‘the Waalsprong will go ahead’.46 The municipality 
of Nijmegen accepted the state secretary’s choice for a dike relocation under the 
following conditions: (1) the national government to cover all claims for damages; (2) 
implementation of the dike relocation; (3) settlement of the legal procedures; (4) 
securing the Waalsprong housing development; and (4) cooperation in all necessary 
activities to guarantee the accessibility and development of the Waalsprong urban 
extension. These were summarised in a press release in which the municipality of 
Nijmegen also invited residents to attend an information meeting on Saturday 23 
September at 10.30 a.m. in a local hall.47
The dike reeve was also present and found it to be a peculiar meeting. ‘I was in time, but 
I saw that about 200 people had already come instead of the expected 150. The hall was 
too small, so we moved to the gym instead, which happened to be empty. There was a 
microphone, but no chairs. The crowd grew to several hundred people, who had to 
remain standing. Executive councillor Paul Depla had to stand on a table to get the
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attention of the audience. His intention was to explain the situation from the beginning 
to the end, but the atmosphere was not congenial. Residents asked him about the selling 
of their houses, and some had just bought a new house and wanted to know what to do 
now.’48 The first information meeting did not meet the local government’s or the 
residents’ expectations. Paul Depla felt very uncomfortable. ‘The municipality of 
Nijmegen has tried to communicate openly and directly with the people of Lent, 
explaining the policy intentions of the national government. As a result, not the state 
secretary but the municipality of Nijmegen was the bearer of bad news. The residents 
did not thank us for that. We are firmly of the opinion that we are serving the public 
interest.’49 In the village of Lent the information meeting went down badly. The 
municipality of Nijmegen was accused of having the plans already made. From an 
urban development perspective the government plan would be an enormous facelift 
for the local government. Until then the Waalsprong had been planned with its back to 
the river. The dike relocation the municipality of Nijmegen would open a possibility to 
be connected with the river, which made it seem an opportunity for the municipality 
of Nijmegen.
The local government did not reject the dike relocation.50 Instead, in a meeting with the 
state secretary on 13 October 2000, it emphasised the conditions for collaboration.51
Late in the afternoon of 21 December 2000 the Nijmegen municipal executive received 
a response from the state secretary to two letters. One included the City Council’s 
concern about the lack of a thorough study of alternatives, such as professor van Ellen’s 
side channel (Van Ellen-geul) which involves excavating the flood plain. The side 
channel would be separated from the main channel by a longitudinal dam of concrete 
blocks. The state secretary’s reply stated that alternatives might be considered and 
compared in an environmental impact assessment (EIA) procedure 
(milieueffectrapportage). During a closed doors meeting for the affected residents held 
the same day, Paul Depla explained the position of the municipality of Nijmegen and 
the relationship with the state secretary. He regretted the fact that the state secretary was 
not willing to take alternative plans into consideration, and said he intended to 
commission a study to compare variants of the Van Ellen side channel52 and the 
government plan.53 The residents, however, blamed the city for working with a double
agenda.54
Institutionalising the government plan
As a follow-up to the Quick Scan, in November 2000 state secretary Monique de Vries 
established an administrative task force chaired by former minister Gerrit Brokx55 (also 
referred to as the Brokx Advisory Commission) to study the consequences and the 
feasibility of a dike relocation in the area of the Waalsprong housing development.56, 57
The establishment of the Commission prompted questions in the House of 
Representatives. According to one MP, the residents’ alternative was rejected too easily.
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In her response the state secretary recognised some aspects of value in the residents’ 
alternative, including the decrease in the water level, but she did not feel like 
withdrawing the plan for a dike relocation. She promised that if the Commission 
advised in favour of the government plan, the residents’ alternative would get a second 
chance during the EIA.58> 59 Meanwhile, the state secretary included the preferred 
option for a dike relocation in the Government’s decision of 15 December 2000, which 
was prompted by the report of the Commission on Water Management for the 21st 
Century (Commissie Tielrooij), published in August 2000.60
The publication of the Brokx Advisory Commission’s report was delayed.61 It took 
time before the Commission got the ministry’s approval of the findings. It appeared 
that the chair had a limited mandate. He did not have the authority to decide.62 On 
20 February 2001 the Commission presented its report. The main conclusions were 
that a dike relocation might offer sufficient flexibility for accommodating a design 
discharge of 18,000 m3/s for the Rhine in future. Furthermore, the Commission 
proposed relocating the current river dike 350 meters land inward and digging a side 
channel. The loss of housing could be limited by building a quay with apartments 
instead of a dike. Realisation of the plan would mean the demolition of 55 houses in 
Lent. As he could count on regional support for this plan, Brokx proposed to make an 
agreement with the parties involved. From then on, the dike relocation was called 
‘Plan Brokx’. The Commission’s report included an ‘expert judgement’, which was 
commissioned by the municipality of Nijmegen.63 The outcome of this study endorsed 
the executive councillor’s opinion that no more energy should be invested in 
developing alternatives.64 The state secretary’s reaction was that the dike relocation 
would be the most robust measure. The residents of Lent, however, were not amused.
State secretary Monique de Vries followed the advice of the Brokx Advisory 
Commission. Her main argument was that if the Waalsprong were built as planned, 
there would be less room for a dike relocation to resolve the bottleneck in the Waal.65 
‘A small widening of the bottleneck near Lent would have a relatively big result in 
terms of discharge capacity near the city of Nijmegen as well as upstream. Moreover, 
it would increase the effectiveness of measures taken downstream from Nijmegen.’66 
Negotiations then began between the national government (Department of Water 
Management) and the municipality of Nijmegen about compensation for losses 
resulting from realising the government plan.
Negotiating compensation measures
From mid May 2001 until April 2002 the authorities negotiated the compensation 
measures, with a breakthrough in November 2001 when the state agreed to provide 
compensation for the ‘limited accessibility’ of the city. The municipality of Nijmegen 
and the state secretary finally agreed to the proposed two voluntary agreements,67 
which were signed on 23 April 2002.68 The first concerned the plan preparation, 
execution, financing and damage compensation, and the financial arrangements for
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compensating the residents, the municipality of Nijmegen and private actors. The 
parties agreed to start planning procedures, including the EIA, and a project 
organisation consisting of a steering group, a project group and an advisory group 
with ‘a wide ranged composition’. The name of the project was quite explicit: ‘dike 
relocation Lent’. The second included a budget (M € 90,756)69 for the continuation of 
the access to the city during the construction of the dike relocation. According to an 
official it was ‘the final offer’.70 Next, the ministry delegated the planning to the 
regional office of Rijkswaterstaat situated in Arnhem near Lent.
Disputed aims and premises
After the voluntary agreements were signed a Rijkswaterstaat project manager began 
the Dike Relocation in Lent project. His assignment included taking the government 
plan through the EIA procedures and studying the residents’ alternative, Lentse 
Warande, which included the Van Ellen side channel. At the beginning it was clear that 
a double track was followed: the dike relocation as the most promising solution and 
the residents’ alternatives as second best.71
The project manager’s first action was to meet key stakeholders, including Professor 
van Ellen, who proposed a side channel in the flood plain near Lent. He hoped these 
conversations would ‘reinstate the relationship with the surroundings’.72 He admitted 
that during the start the government paid little attention to van Ellen’s ideas. ‘It was 
rejected with the wrong arguments which provided for residents’ distrust against the 
government’ (van der Graaf, 2007). In line with the voluntary agreement he Q
established a project organisation consisting of a steering group of government 
decision-makers, including the executive councillor of the municipality of Nijmegen, 
the dike reeve, the director for water management of the Rijkswaterstaat regional 
office and the provincial delegate, from the authorities involved, a project group 
consisting of officials from the same organisations, and an advisory group that 
represented all other stakeholders73 and chaired by an independent chairman. Because 
of the difficulty of finding a chair, the advisory group only started work on 20 January 
2003.74
The initial work of the advisory group was dominated by discussions about the 
objective of the project, for example whether the problem at stake was a river 
management problem. Its view was that it was a river management problem for which 
a river management solution would have to be found. As a consequence, hydraulic 
engineering might have to be the leading consideration and not urban development. 
The residents feared the construction of a ‘Manhattan on the Waal’ under the pretext 
of the necessity of solving a river management problem. They wanted to keep the 
two separate,75 but agreed on the project manager’s formulation that ‘spatial planning 
is more than a criterion; it will be considered during the planning process but it is not 
the main objective, it is following’.76 Concerning the water security objective, the 
condition was that the plan had to meet the conditions of flood safety and time
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(realisation before 2015). The budget77 and the environment78, 79 were also part of the 
assessment, but the advisory group were not informed of these.
Residents’ plan as a full alternative
The EIA procedure included the writing of a Notification of Intent (Startnotitie), which 
describes the subjects for study, in this case a comparison of the government plan (Plan 
Brokx) and the residents’ alternative, Lentse Warande. The consultation for the 
Notification of Intent resulted in 27 reactions,80 most of which referred to the date of 
the final decision, whether they would have to move and disagreement with the 
government plan. All were dismissed (niet ontvankelijk verklaard)81 as the residents’ 
reaction was limited to what might have to be studied. The Notification of Intent was 
approved in November 2003.82 The comparison of the two plans was based on a range 
of criteria, from flood safety to nature and social aspects,83 and so various studies were 
carried out, for example in the field of hydraulic engineering, morphology and 
residents’ perceptions of values in the area.84
During the finalisation of the Notification of Intent a dispute emerged about the 
consultants contracted to carry out the EIA. The residents had reservations because 
they did not agree with the results of the firm’s study at the beginning of 2001 
commisioned by the municipality of Nijmegen. They demanded that they be given all 
the relevant documents on the tendering procedure, appealing to the Government 
Information (Public Access) Act (Wet openbaarheid van bestuur), and threatened to 
resign from the advisory group if they did not receive them.85 It took a lot of time and 
energy to resolve this question,86 but the consultancy was awarded the contract.
Another dispute arose about the details of the residents’ alternative. The advisory group 
was convinced that without a detailed alternative the state secretary would automatically 
choose the government plan. Although the municipality of Nijmegen had promised to 
cover the costs, the agreed designs were not included in the draft EIA. The residents 
resolved this by presenting preliminary designs for the land reservation87 to allow a 
comparison of the alternative plans and speed up delivery of the final designs.88 Finally, 
the details of the residents’ alternative were drawn up with the support of 
Rijkswaterstaat (impact studies) and the municipality of Nijmegen (urban development 
plan).
Also disputed was the purpose of the land reservation that was part of the residents’ 
alternative. Four possible development plans were drawn up: an option that maintains 
the status quo; a green-blue option with nature and water for recreation; an urban 
extension for temporary buildings (50-80 years), such as rented houses and student 
housing, and an urban extension with a permanent character, including buildings on 
terps.89 Unlike these four options,90 there were also stories in which three options 
emerged. The first option included a park, which was the residents’ preference, but it 
was not the local government’s favourite as it did not support the desire to connect the
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housing development with the river. In the second option the emphasis was on 
temporarily facilities, such as parking, a camp site and fairs. The third option consisted 
of the construction of houses on terps, which means that the only works involved are 
to breach the dike.91 The municipality of Nijmegen appeared to be in favour of this last 
option.92
The dike reeve, the chair of the water board, admitted that one of these variants with a 
‘green’ side channel and a design for early completion came close to the government 
plan (Plan Brokx). Both needed a damming dike, an important condition according to 
him. But like the province, he had problems with the temporary uses of the land 
reservation. He proposed various legal constraints, including measures under the Spatial 
Planning Act, that might limit them to a maximum of 10 years, and moving the budget 
for the costs to the reserve.93 The commotion surrounding the plans was finally settled 
by the promise that the final designs would be made after the state secretary’s decision.94
The conditional design discharge was also disputed as both plans were designed for 
different standards, which proved difficult for comparison. Soon after the approval of 
the Notification of Intent, the advisory group expressed its disappointment about this 
condition.95 The government plan (Plan Brokx) was designed for 16,000 m3/s, but could 
also meet the design discharge of 18,000 m3/s, while the residents’ alternative would 
withstand at most a design discharge of 16,700 m3/s.96 This issue was solved by taking 
the land reservation into account, which meant that the residents’ alternative also meets 
the discharge standard of 18,000 m3/s.
Time consuming activity
Reading the topic reports of the EIA was a time consuming activity for the residents and 
they asked for a postponement of their final judgement of four months.97 The residents 
had considerable knowledge of the area and pointed out a number of mistakes in the 
reports.98 The discussions were therefore mainly about the small details of each study, 
for example the correctness of the observation of the little owl. The project manager: 
‘The residents tended to favour all the details that might make their alternative more 
attractive, rather than details that favoured the government plan. It was difficult to get 
all this down on paper to the required level of detail’.99 This view was supported by 
executive councillor Paul Depla: ‘The outcome of the EIA does not make the dike 
relocation a fact, but a ‘proposed fact’ [it was not yet decided on]. The advisory group 
tried to do everything it could to get the principal question of ‘dike relocation’ off the 
table. At the same time, the residents knew that it might go ahead and that they could 
only influence the decision-making process. This ambiguous stance by the advisory 
group meant the participation process did not always go smoothly.100
During the reporting, the authors changed the names of the two plans, from 
government plan into ‘dike relocation’ and the residents’ alternative into ‘dike 
maintenance’.101 The two plans turned out to be comparable on various points,102 but a
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dispute then arose about the meaning of the word ‘comparable’. To executive councillor 
Paul Depla, comparable meant ‘equal’, but this was not the view of Rijkswaterstaat: ‘The 
alternatives are not equal, but they are elaborated equally. Both alternatives offer a 
solution’.103 For an overview see Table 5.2.
Table 5.2 Impact matrix of the environmental impact assessment (EIA) Dike Relocation in Lent 
(published without cost estimate)
Criteria Short term DT DH
Long term 
DT DH
Total 
DT DH
River +++ + 0 ++ +++ +++
Spatial quality + + 0 0 + +
Nature + 0 0 - + -
Landscape, cultural heritage, archaeology . . . - 0 - —  -
Destruction and permanent nuisance - - 0 - -  --
Soil and water 0 + 0 0 0 +
Nuisance (building activities) - - 0 - ...................
Accessibility surrounding - - 0 - - -
DT = dike relocation DH = dike maintenance + = positive - = negative 0 = neutral
Source: News Bulletin Room for the Waal, Room for Safety (Ruimte voor de Waal, ruimte voor veiligheid), no. 4, 
December 2004
The advisory group did not agree with the outcome of the EIA and the estimated costs 
of both plans. From the residents’ point of view, the impacts of the dike relocation were 
underestimated and the impacts of the dike maintenance alternative on existing 
buildings were overestimated.104 They found considerable defects, formulated in 13 
points, from editorial to detailed comments.105 One of the major points for discussion 
concerned seepage water, a sincere concern to them. According to the project manager 
this would be solved technically with sheet piling, but the residents doubted this 
solution.106 Finally, it was decided to edit it without changing the content of the report.
On 22 October 2004 the advisory group made its preference for ‘dike maintenance’ 
public.
At the end of October the project group informed the steering group of its preference 
for ‘a dike relocation’ and added a memo to the advisory report of the advisory group. 
The advisory group was furious, calling this inappropriate.107 For the second time the 
residents considered leaving the advisory group.108
In the meeting of 23 November 2004 the steering group decided on the government 
plan, but the decision was not taken unanimously. Four participants (Rijkswaterstaat,
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Rivierenland water board, province of Gelderland and the Ministry of Housing, Spatial 
Planning and the Environment) were proponents while the municipality of Nijmegen 
and the Arnhem-Nijmegen regional authority (KAN) abstained.109 The municipality 
of Nijmegen accepted both plans under the following conditions: a quick decision by 
the state secretary to give the residents certainty and clarity, rapid settling of the legal 
procedures and implementation of the selected plan, completion of the Waalsprong 
housing development, guaranteeing the accessibility of the city, and compensation for 
all costs and damages.110 Other members of the steering group had tried to convince 
executive councillorPaul Depla to agree to the other parties’ decision by trying to discuss 
the arguments in the open, but that finally did not work.111 Paul Depla: ‘People had 
hoped that we would decide unanimously, but that did not interest me.’112
The dike reeve did not find the decision-making in the steering group to be hard going. 
‘In weighing the pros and cons we had a relatively easy task, because our aim was to put 
flood safety well and truly on the table.’113
Discordant views
During the planning process various disputes emerged between the government 
authorities, for example about the newsletter, the press release about the steering group’s 
advisory report, and a letter to the residents of Lent.114 After going through many 
versions, the text for the fourth newsletter, the press release and the letter were accepted 
by the municipality of Nijmegen.115 In the end, the municipality of Nijmegen agreed to 
the wording of letter, but on condition that the underlying document be disclosed, 
referring to the principle of good governance requiring government to be accountable 
and transparent in its decisions.116 The draft EIA report therefore had to be disclosed.117 
The next question was whether the draft version was legal.118 The project manager 
solved this by putting it on deposit for public inspection in a public venue in the village 
of Lent, but residents had to call the project manager first to obtain a key. Four residents 
called, only one of which had a look at the draft report.119
On 14 December 2004 the advisory group held its penultimate meeting, in which 
subjects like the reaction of the advisory group to the steering group’s advice and the 
involvement of members in a follow-up were discussed. The residents’ group Lentse 
Federatie gave notice of its leave after the last meeting of the advisory group on 25 
January 2005, when the costs of the EIA would be discussed.120 The project manager was 
not pleased by the reactions of the residents,121 who were disappointed with the steering 
group’s decision.
Waiting for the final decision
It was generally expected that the state secretary would take a decision when she chaired 
the meeting of the Room for the River Steering Committee on 24 March 2005. Prior to 
the expected decision, the project manager planned a meeting with the residents of 
Lent in April 2005122 and allowed the project group to develop the government
85
-Q-
Madelinde PHD zonder afbrekingen:Opmaak 1 15- -2011 14:44 Pagina 86
plan.123At the same time, cost estimates of both plans were made for the finalisation of 
the EIA report. Despite the residents’ disapproval of the proposed costs, the steering 
group agreed with them and with the revised version of the EIA (version 3.0), which was 
treated confidentially.124 The project manager then sent the advisory reports on the dike 
relocation to the state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen.125 As in the EIA report, in 
which the two plans were systematically relabelled ‘dike relocation’ (government plan) 
and ‘dike maintenance’ (residents’ alternative), in the advisory report to the state 
secretary the two plans were labelled differently: ‘dike relocation now’ and ‘dike 
relocation not yet’. The advisory reports included an overview of the short-term and 
long-term costs of both plans.126 The long-term costs of the ‘dike relocation now’ option 
were 332 million euros, while the ‘dike relocation not yet’ option would cost 378 million 
euros (with park) and 448 million euros (built area). The question remained was what 
made the ‘dike relocation now’ option cheaper than the ‘dike relocation not yet’ option. 
Relating the costs to the reduction in the water level did not work because the latter 
option was not assessed in this way.127 In addition, Rijkswaterstaat was unwilling to 
clarify how the costs of both plans had been calculated.128
The residents felt disappointed about the way Rijkswaterstaat dealt with their alternative 
and asked for a meeting with state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen. This took 
place on 18 March 2005, just before the meeting of the Room for the River Steering 
Committee129 in which the state secretary was expected to decide on ‘Lent’.130 However, 
she did not state her decision in the meeting, but kept open which plan would be the 
best option and called the residents’ alternative ‘very interesting’.131 As a result, both 
were included in the SPKD Room for the River part 1, published on 15 April 2005.132
In a letter of 25 March 2005 the project manager informed the residents of Lent about 
the procedures, but the next steps were not clear yet, and promised to inform them 
when there was more clarity.133 The state secretary’s decision was expected at least before 
the consultation round on the SPKD Room for the River, which was to start on 1 June 
2005.134 In a letter to the House of Representatives, the state secretary stated her 
intention to take her decision before 1 May 2 0 0 5.135 In the meantime the project 
manager came back on his decision to elaborate the government plan. ‘The decision­
making by the state secretary has overtaken events.’136 Next, on 21 June 2005 the state 
secretary postponed her decision on ‘Lent’ to wait for reactions from the consultation 
round of the SPKD. According to the project manager this would not be expected before 
23 August 2005, the last day of the consultation period. Among ministry officials too 
the approach and the procedure were not clear, which indicated further postponement 
of the final decision.137
Regional advice, dealing with residents and the state secretary’s decision
Meanwhile, the province of Gelderland presented a regional advice which addressed 
the regional preference for measures in the framework of the SPKD. The provincial 
government took the lead while chairing the Upstream Rivers Steering Committee.138
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The region recommended looking beyond 2015, not excluding climate change, which 
could result in higher water discharges than the proposed design discharge of 18,000 
m3/s, and looking into the ‘spatial quality’ of measures rather than technical solutions 
(Stuurgroep Bovenrivieren-Stuurgroep Benedenrivieren, 2005). The province of 
Gelderland proved to be an exponent of robust measures139 and a proponent of the 
government plan.
After the last meeting of the advisory group in January 2005 the project manager was 
concerned about how to deal with the residents. He therefore sought independent 
advice. The consultant suggested disbanding the advisory group and taking a personal 
approach.140 The project manager informed the residents by letter about the main 
topics, including the revised version of the EIA, the costs of both plans and the advice 
to the state secretary.141 The residents, however, had many questions and asked for a 
meeting to discuss these. At first the project manager refused,142 but finally agreed to a 
meeting on 22 June 2005, in which he explained, among other things, how both plans 
relate to the SPKD, and promised to include their comments in the next version of the 
EIA.143
After the consultation period, in the first week of October 2005, the state secretary called 
the chairman of the residents’ group Lentse Federatie in person to inform him about 
her decision to go ahead with the government plan.144 This was incorporated into the 
SPKD part 3, published on 22 December 2005, in which Lent was made a front-runner
project.145
In his role as chair of the National Advisory Council on Water Management, Prince 
Willem Alexander visited Nijmegen and Lent. Based on the state secretary’s decision, he 
delivered a presentation on the different aspects of the problem and the preferred 
solutions, and talked to some residents about their alternative.146
Preparatory steps for final decision-making
On 3 March 2006 some members of the House of Representatives visited Lent prior to 
a debate on the SPKD Room for the River with the state secretary.147 All MPs were in 
favour of the residents’ alternative.148 For the debate in the House the Room for the 
River project organisation drew up a report on the two plans (see Table 5.3).149 In an 
accompanying letter, state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen said that ‘the residents’ 
alternative turned out to be less positive with regard to the design discharge of 18,000 
m3/s and would result in a decrease in the water level of 12 cm, less than half as much 
as in the government plan (27 cm).150 Additional upstream measures would have to be 
taken to meet the 18,000 m3/s discharge standard.’151 The state secretary stated that the 
costs of the plans did not differ much. ‘The costs of the residents’ alternative included 
the construction of the Van Ellen side channel (€212  million) and the purchase and 
planning of the land reservation (€103 million). For additional upstream measures an 
extra €103 million investment would be needed, which implied a total investment of
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€270-373 million. The costs for a dike relocation in future were estimated at some 
hundreds of millions of euros, making a considerable part of the investment of €370 
million ‘for nothing’, because upstream measures would then not be needed, while the 
costs for the government plan were estimated at €304 million in total.152 In the next 
paragraph she qualified this issue by stating that ‘the government plan would be much 
more cost effective than the residents’ alternative. For about the same amount of money 
the largest bottleneck in the river area would be solved in a ‘robust’ way and it 
immediately remove any further doubts’. She emphasised the regional support153 and 
called attention to an agreement between the authorities on government finance for a 
second bridge over the river Waal when the dike relocation goes ahead.154 The report 
entitled ‘Measure at the village of Lent’ to the Water Management Committee of the 
House of Representatives included an overview of the costs of both plans.
Table 5 3 Outcomes report by the Lent project team, Room for the River Upstream Rivers Office
Government 
dike relocation plan 
(Plan Brokx)
Residents' alternative 
Lentse Warande 
(urban option)
Room for the River
- extra surface
- depth
- now 30 ha 
(including island)
- yes
- long term
- yes
Reduction in water level 27 cm 12 cm
Final plan Yes No
Land reservation [in euros] No Yes (103 million; not included in total sum)
Number of houses [to be demolished] 50 15-20
Earth moving 3.7 million m3 4.5 million m3
Short-term costs [in euros] 304 million** 315 million (incl. 212 million Van Ellen channel)
Additional measures well over35 million
58 million (general 
measures)
35 million (for correc­
ting river bends)
Total costs [in euros] 340 million 408 million
Nature* 0 -
Landscape, cultural history and archaeology* - -
Risks Seepage water Land reservation
0 = neutral - = negative
* Derived from the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report Dike Relocation Lent, November 2004. 
** The government contribution to a second bridge over the Waal river is not included.
Source: Measure at the village of Lent - an analysis as a result of public consultation round, 
explanation for the Commission Water Management of the House of Representatives, 16 March 2006.
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In preparation for a debate on the SPKD Room for the River in the House of 
Representatives a hearing was organised about ‘Lent’ on 20 April 2006. Experts, 
government officials and residents were invited to give evidence. The parliamentary 
members of the Water Management Committee listened to the consultees, including a 
resident who commented on the government plan and a consultant involved in the 
EIA, who favoured the government plan.155
After the hearing, the consultant tried to mediate between the residents and the project 
manager, who informed his superiors before confirming any decisions. He viewed this 
cooperative initiative by the residents’ group as forced by political circumstances, but 
after several meetings the project manager stopped further consultation. He judged it 
too dangerous to continue: ‘How could I work on a compromise while the state 
secretary had already determined her position?’ Showing his commitment, he even 
authorised calculations for a minor dike relocation with flood plain excavation. ‘Not the 
best option from the viewpoint of hydraulics’, he commented.156
Discussion backstage before the vote in Parliament
A report of the Investigation and Verification Office of the House of Representatives 
prompted some discussion in the media. On 14 June 2006 an MP asked the state 
secretary to provide additional cost estimations for some projects, including the Dike 
Relocation in Lent. ‘In this project it does not seem to be easy to compare the 
government plan and the residents’ alternative. The choice will probably automatically 
be the state secretary’s preferred variant.’157 However, the subject was not picked up by 
other members. In an email correspondence the residents asked the project manager 
whether there would be ‘some movement’ from the ministry, but he replied that the 
state secretary did not want to negotiate about the measure. She had already determined 
her position in favour of the dike relocation.158
On 27 June 2006 the House of Representatives discussed the SPKD Room for the River, 
agreeing with the dike relocation, but proposed various motions.159 The House adopted 
the SPKD on 7 July 2006.160 The day after the residents of Lent received a letter from the 
municipality of Nijmegen in which the mayor explained the House’s decision. She was 
sorry about the choice of the state secretary and supported the idea that the residents’ 
alternative would also provide sufficient safety during high water, including the 
salvaging of 55 houses. She referred to Rijkswaterstaat, which would provide 
information about the process and the design plan.161 Three days later Rijkswaterstaat 
wrote a letter explaining the procedure and the planning.162 Attached was a package full 
of expert information about the dike relocation.163
In August 2006 the state secretary decided to delegate the planning of the dike relocation 
to the municipality of Nijmegen.164 In a letter to the residents the project manager said 
that ‘the decision of the House of Representatives closes a period of political discussion 
and decision-making’.165 On 17 November 2006, however, the Senate debated the SPKD
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Room for the River. One senator was highly indignant about the project manager’s 
statement about decision-making coming to a close, as if the Senate did not have a voice 
in decision-making. However, the dike relocation in Lent was not discussed and was 
passed by the Senate on 19 December 2006.166
The arguments
State Secretary for Water Management
State secretary Monique de Vries declared that the bottleneck in the river Waal near 
Lent needed to be solved. ‘Climate change, rising river discharges, accelerated sea level 
rise in combination with land subsidence; it is a slow but unavoidable process. The 
threat of the water is always present and in the long term it will even increase. We have 
to be alert and be unafraid of taking radical measures. Planning today implies taking 
into account the situation of tomorrow, let us say 2015, and further....In our current 
river system there is not so much room between the river dikes, which means that you 
have to search for likely measures inside the dikes....Studies have outlined a few 
possibilities, for example a dike relocation,167 while the Quick Scan showed that the 
dike relocation is the preferable option with regard to flood safety for the village of 
Lent, the Waalsprong housing development and the municipality of Nijmegen.’168 Her 
successor state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen threatened to refuse the promised 
contribution to a second bridge over the river Waal if the municipality of Nijmegen 
did not agree to the government plan. She stated that the alternative would meet the 
legal design discharge but not more, while the government plan would meet a higher 
design discharge.169 An unresolved question was the land reservation. The state secretary 
repudiated the proposal to buy that very parcel but did not go into this subject.170 
Finally, she decided for the government plan.171
Rijkswaterstaat
‘The government plan and the residents’ alternative have both been included in the 
SPKD Room for the River. The residents’ alternative will therefore be seriously 
considered’, stated Bert Keijts, director-general of Rijkswaterstaat. ‘The point of 
departure is relocating the dike in the short term, including a side channel inside the 
dikes. This would offer opportunities for recreation. But the residents’ alternative with 
terps for housing development would provide money. We have to look seriously at this 
plan to see whether it deserves a chance.’172
The director of the Rijkswaterstaat regional office felt uncomfortable with the 
government plan, as the housing development had just been approved by all authorities 
involved. According to him ‘it was an extremely politically sensitive question’.173
The director for water management of the same office was a proponent of relocating 
the dike. ‘The conditions were time, budget, security and the environment. The
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residents’ alternative did not meet the first three conditions very well, and on the 
environment it did better than the government plan. This is logical: the measure is not 
very large, so it would be better for the environment. But what counts heavily is 
important, and I think flood safety counts very heavily, and for the long term a dike 
relocation will also meet these conditions. Who can say that we will achieve this [dike 
relocation] later?’ She was clear about whose opinion might count heavily: ‘Those who 
are responsible for flood safety, Rivierenland water board and province of Gelderland. 
The mayor [in his role as responsible for calamity management] has to take over in the 
event of a disaster, but before this is at issue, [flood safety] is the responsibility of the 
water managers [in other words, Rijkswaterstaat].’174
Province of Gelderland
Provincial delegate Harry Keereweer of province of Gelderland explained his preference 
as follows. ‘Broadening the river near Lent is necessary. A solution has to be found, not 
only for the short term, but also for sustainable measures that will be effective over the 
long term. The dike relocation provides a structural and sustainable solution that 
responds to the expected increase in the water discharge as a result of climate change. 
A dike relocation now will avoid a second period of construction, something to be 
prevented under the Government’s decision of 2002. A dike relocation will solve the 
bottleneck in the river Waal in one go and increase the discharge capacity of the river 
system. The provincial government states that a dike relocation could lead to 
completion of the Waalsprong housing development and thus remove any uncertainty 
concerning future measures in the area.’175
Rivierenland water board
The dike reeve of Rivierenland water board believes decision-making concerning the 
solving of the bottleneck in the river Waal has to be based on three conditions: time, 
flood safety and budget.176 He argued: ‘The first reason for choosing for a dike relocation 
is the time component. You have to decide for the long term and if you know that your 
decision has consequences for that time period then you must not resist it. Deciding 
now for a robust plan will resolve the situation for a long time. The second reason is the 
knowledge that the 16,000 m3/s safety standard will meet the condition, but probably 
not for the long term.’177
Municipality of Nijmegen
According to executive councillor Paul Depla the question is whether the municipality 
of Nijmegen has to declare openly for or against one of the plans. ‘From my point of 
view you should not do this. Since the start I have said that the dike relocation is a 
decision for the state secretary; we are collaborating under certain conditions. Neither 
the government plan nor the residents’ alternative is my preference. If we declare our 
preference, we imply that the municipality of Nijmegen will determine the decision­
making process. It is not our choice; we are not in charge of that.’ His role in the steering 
group was clear: ‘We are participating in the steering group to take stock of the process.
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Rijkswaterstaat remains responsible.’178 His reflection on the planning process: 
‘Rijkswaterstaat was clearly in favour of the government plan, while the residents chose 
their alternative, arguing it would save homes. The two parties communicated fairly 
with each other, there was a lot of comprehension, but the principal differences of 
opinion remained.’179
Residents' perspective
The residents’ perspective of the plan for a dike relocation is described below.
Residents enter the scene
After the presentation of the state secretary in February 2000, Professor van Ellen, a 
retired professor of water management who lives near Nijmegen, worried about what 
was going on. He published various articles on this subject in the regional newspaper. 
In May 2000 he wrote a letter to the municipality of Nijmegen in which he presented 
his plan for a side channel as an alternative to the government plan, which proposed 
excavating the flood plain and digging a side channel, the so-called ‘Van Ellen side 
channel’ (Van Ellen-geul). When he did not receive a reply, he decided to call. A local 
government official informed him that a commission would be established in June 2000 
for which he would be invited. When nothing happened van Ellen called the official, but 
now he was referred to Rijkswaterstaat, but the government authority referred him back 
to the municipality of Nijmegen.180 Finally, in September 2000 a meeting was arranged 
between the authorities and Professor van Ellen. The municipality of Nijmegen was 
positive about van Ellen’s plan and wanted to investigate it, but the Rijkswaterstaat 
official first had to discuss it with his boss. Through his son, who worked for the 
consultancy firm that made the calculations, van Ellen heard that the results of his plan 
were available. Later Rijkswaterstaat phoned to say his alternative did not meet the 
conditions and had been shelved. Van Ellen had to repeatedly ask for a copy of the 
report, which he dismissed as not being fair.181 He commissioned a new calculation 
with another model at his own expense.182 At that point ‘a conflict was born’.183
Preparing a residents’ alternative
The state secretary informed the municipality of Nijmegen about the outcomes of the 
Quick Scan by telephone on 20 September 2000. Executive councillor Paul Depla then 
planned a meeting behind closed doors for insiders. One of the invitees was the 
chairman of the Village Council. ‘The main message was: “the Waalsprong housing 
development will go ahead”.’184 Later that week, on the morning of Saturday 23 
September 2000, the municipality of Nijmegen organised a meeting for the residents, 
including some people who had recently bought a house in the new suburb. Paul Depla 
declared the same message and informed the audience that the municipality of 
Nijmegen agreed to the government plan and compensation measures, including a 
contribution to the cost of a second bridge over the river Waal. This meeting became
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turbulent. Residents felt enraged by the planned dike relocation and the proposed 
demolition of 55 houses.185 It prompted the residents to organise.
A week later a special meeting was held for the residents of Lent. The chair of the Lent 
Village Council hoped that all residents would come together in one residents’ group, 
but this turned out impossible.186 Three residents’ groups finally emerged: GeWaLent 
(residents affected by the cut-off the bend in the Waal), Flotust (acronym of three streets 
in Lent where the residents would have a view of the new dike) and Veur-Lent (residents 
living in the part of the village near the dike).187 O f the three residents’ groups, 
GeWaLent appeared to be the most active and also addressed the needs of the others. 
The three groups later came together in the Lentse Federatie,188 which also included the 
Lent Village Council. Another active residents’ group, Lent 800, was not part of the 
Lentse Federatie. Although the local groups that were part of the Lentse Federatie agreed 
that for specific objectives all groups would act jointly to prevent them becoming a 
‘plaything’ of the municipality of Nijmegen,189 the opposite often occurred. The Lentse 
Federatie, Lent Village Council and Lent 800 preferred to profile themselves as three 
separate organisations. Apart from the chairs of these residents’ groups, only a few 
residents were involved. As the chair of the Lentse Federatie explained, ‘Everybody was 
acquainted with me, but I knew nobody in the village, [which is the main reason why] 
there were not many people actively involved in the protest actions, so we had to manage 
with the few we had’.190
In autumn of 2000 a few residents contacted Professor van Ellen. With his help they 
prepared an alternative for the dike relocation in which the Van Ellen side channel was 
included. They added a land reservation for a possible dike relocation in future which 
they called ‘Lentse Warande’. The water expert was not amused about the name of the 
plan as his name was not included. ‘I was officially advisor of GeWaLent. They would 
inform me but this went wrong. I did like the fact that they recognised it as my plan.’191 
The residents started a lobby campaign to get their alternative accepted which included 
four or five times a journey to The Hague to meet Members of the House of 
Representatives.192 ‘Our main message was: “We are not against measures, but there 
must be a good overview of the alternatives and one has to decide on the basis of 
arguments”.’ 193 As a consequence, a MP (Socialist Party) asked the state secretary about 
the exclusion of the residents’ alternative.194 Later, the relationship between Professor 
van Ellen and GeWaLent deteriorated. The chair: ‘We were involved heavily in politics 
and van Ellen wanted to discuss substantive details. This did not always go well
together.’195
Getting political attention
On 15 November 2000 the Nijmegen City Council asked for the establishment of a 
working group to conduct a comparative study of the Van Ellen plan and the plan for 
a dike relocation.196 A letter from the municipality of Nijmegen to the state secretary 
demanding this remained unanswered. Instead, the state secretary established the Brokx
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Advisory Commission, whose brief was limited to the government plan. In a press 
meeting the state secretary informed the audience that the residents’ alternative did not 
play a role in the comparison of the available options to solve the bottleneck in the river 
Waal and she emphasised that might still be considered in the EIA.197 In response to the 
state secretary’s refusal to include the residents’ alternative, executive councillor Paul 
Depla commissioned the study.198
In a closed-door meeting for affected residents on 21 December 2000 Paul Depla 
explained the local government’s position towards the state secretary. The audience 
criticised him firmly. ‘The municipality of Nijmegen says it is supporting Lent, but in 
practice it ignores our interest.’ But they had to admit that the municipality of Nijmegen 
did its utmost to make the state secretary aware of the residents’ objections against the 
government plan. However, the residents were not convinced of the willingness of the 
local government to invest in an alternative. The study that was commissioned ‘looks 
better than it is. The budget for the study was €25,000. Would this be comparable with 
the budget for the study by the Brokx Advisory Commission?’ they asked the executive 
councillor.199 He denied that it would be comparable with the quality of studies 
commissioned by the national government.200 Besides, he emphasised that when Van 
Ellen’s side channel was recognised as a full alternative of the dike relocation, he would 
be willing to make a case out of it.201
On 27 December 2000 Professor van Ellen wrote a letter to the project manager of the 
study commissioned by the municipality of Nijmegen in which he attached a new 
proposal for a side channel called ‘Bottleneck of the municipality of Nijmegen, Van 
Ellen solution with minimal channel’202 for possible inclusion in the study. However, a 
presentation of the study results on 12 February 2001 showed that Van Ellen’s side 
channel (minimum variant) did not prove to be a full alternative to the dike relocation, 
which performs better for ecology and urban development. The residents felt 
disappointed. They found that too much emphasis had been laid on urban development 
aspects. Besides, they did not take the arguments seriously (‘with the dike relocation a 
roe and a badger would still able to swim to the island -  except during high water’) and 
asked why the study did not say anything about the families who had to move.203 
Professor van Ellen reacted in an official letter to the consultants. He commented on the 
information about his proposal and the government plan.204 After a reaction from both 
the municipality of Nijmegen and the consultancy he sent a second letter to the 
consultancy in which he repeated his demand to correct the mistakes in the report.205 
The issue was later resolved in a telephone call.206
The residents’ groups hoped that the outcomes of the study would force the state 
secretary to look at the residents’ alternative. A representative, however, admitted that 
‘in all fairness, we only have hope, no more than that’.207 Executive councillor Paul Depla 
accepted the outcomes and declared that he did not see the need to work on the 
development of a residents’ alternative.208 As a result, municipal councillors asked him
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critical questions. They asserted that he ignored the decision of the City Council to 
commission a thorough study of the alternatives to get a clear picture of the various 
options first before adopting a final position. This demand was laid down in a motion 
calling for an end to cooperation if the state secretary was not willing to consider other 
alternatives. For Paul Depla it was clear: ‘the state decides’.209
Working on support
On 31 January 2001 the Brokx Advisory Commission published its report on the 
consequences of the dike relocation. Authorities like the municipality of Nijmegen and 
the province of Gelderland relied on the national government to inform the affected 
residents about procedures and compensation as quickly as possible. According to the 
municipality of Nijmegen the emotional pain could not be taken away, but the 
maximum financial compensation would be offered. Further, the local government 
worried about the fact that the Commission backed making a binding agreement, which 
was considered to be an agreement between the municipality of Nijmegen and the state 
secretary.210 The chair of GeWaLent was clear about the outcomes: ‘It was really a 
misapprehension because they did not listen to the residents’ voice. Brokx came up with 
fancy pictures of facilities for the hotel and catering industry, including recreation. No, 
the Commission only viewed it from its own perspective.’211 The chair of Lent Village 
Council reacted: ‘Actually, the decision had already been made when the Quick Scan was 
finalised. Brokx elaborated the plan a little bit more.’212 He wrote a letter to the 
municipal executive of the municipality of Nijmegen saying that the residents of Lent 
felt left in the cold.213 Thanks to the lobby of the residents groups,214 Nijmegen City 
Council voted unanimously in favour of the residents’ alternative in its motion on 7 
March 2001, which demanded certainty and clarity concerning the legal and financial 
consequences for the people of Lent, the municipality of Nijmegen and other parties 
involved. Additionally, it urged the state to study possible alternatives and insisted that 
the outcomes of the various alternatives may be a reason for withdrawing the 
government decision made in December 2000. Furthermore, it stated that if 
negotiations with the state failed, the local government must consider stopping 
cooperation with the government.215 The residents also tried to convince the 
municipality of Nijmegen not to agree to the government contribution to the cost of 
the second bridge over the river Waal, but did not succeed.216
After the municipality of Nijmegen signed the two voluntary agreements concerning the 
financial and legal arrangements, the project was delegated to a regional office of 
Rijkswaterstaat situated in Arnhem near Lent.
Co-opted by the government
The appointed project manager began by holding conversations, among others with 
Professor van Ellen. He also arranged several meetings with Professor van Ellen and 
experts of Rijkswaterstaat,217 but they finally disagreed with the premises and the 
measures to resolve the bottleneck in the Waal. The project manager then set up a
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project organisation. Three residents’ groups became members of the advisory group.218 
Professor van Ellen was not asked to join, but this was not a problem for him: ‘It is only 
waffle....You must not commit yourself, never be a member of a Rijkswaterstaat 
advisory group. If you are against, show it!’219 The residents, however, spent a lot of time 
in it. ‘From its inception in January 2003 until January 2005 the advisory group met 
every Monday. We went through project documents and commented on texts.’220
The first task of the advisory group was to react to the draft of the Notification of Intent 
in which the guidelines for the EIA were formulated, including which options for solving 
the bottleneck in the river Waal near Lent would be compared. During the consultation 
period from 8 May until 5 June 2003 the public was invited to react to the document221 
and 27 representations were made, including several from the residents’ groups and 
Professor van Ellen. A chair of a residents’ group commented: ‘First, the Government is 
of the opinion that the design discharge of 18,000 m3/s needs to be accommodated, 
while the legal design discharge is 16,000 m3/s. This turned out difficult to measure. 
Second, the objective of spatial quality has been mentioned, while the problem at stake 
is a hydraulic problem. The spatial design of the area will also have to be taken into 
account, but the hydraulic problem must not be used as an excuse for restructuring the 
area.’222 Professor van Ellen suggested postponing decision-making until the results of the 
Dutch-German study of possible design discharges in the Rhine were available. He 
argued that the consequences of the bottleneck were previously included in the 
calculations for the dike heights and ‘Lent’ is not the only bottleneck in the Dutch river 
system.223 The study near Lent can thus not be viewed apart from other measures -  
whether they are necessary or not -  to be taken upstream and downstream. In addition, 
the accuracy of the calculations is limited. Dike reinforcement would therefore be an 
adequate alternative. Among other criticisms was that the government plan has various 
hydraulic engineering disadvantages and the choice of the project area is limited. He 
further pointed that a number of Van Ellen side channels near Lent224 were in circulation 
which would be useful to study. This representation did not result in a modification of 
the study objective. The chair of the advisory group wrote a letter to the provincial 
executive of province of Gelderland to express his disappointment with the 18,000 m3/s 
discharge standard as point of departure for the EIA.225
At the final stage of the EIA the residents discussed the functioning of the advisory 
group. They listed their comments, including the planning (late and incomplete supply 
of documents and shortage of time for reading, communication with support group 
and formulating responses) and the incorporation of residents’ comments into 
background reports (not only technical comments, but also political, strategic and other 
remarks have to be included).226 This resulted in postponing the finalisation of the EIA.
Until then, their plan was not treated as a full alternative as promised by the 
municipality of Nijmegen. As a result, a residents’ group requested the local government 
not to include this alternative in the EIA, unless it was willing to provide supporting
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information on the various planning variants in due time. In addition, the residents 
submitted proposals for various planning variants.227 In the end the municipality of 
Nijmegen developed the urban development plan and Rijkswaterstaat did the 
environmental impact studies.
Finally, the outcome of the EIA proved to be positive for the residents’ alternative, which 
was the most environmentally favourable alternative (meest milieuvriendelijke 
alternatief). On 22 October 2004 the advisory group published its advice in which said 
that the bottleneck in the river Waal would only be solved by implementing the 
residents’ alternative.228 The residents unsuccessfully tried to convince the steering 
group to choose for their alternative. On 19 November 2004 the steering group 
announced its advice favouring the dike relocation.229 Since the project group attached 
a memorandum to the advisory report of the advisory group and sent it to the steering 
group, the constructive collaboration including the openness between the project 
manager and the members of the advisory group was gone.230 The residents were 
thoroughly disappointed. Reflecting on the EIA process, a resident stated: ‘I really have 
the idea that on certain points they [Rijkswaterstaat] listened to us. Differences of 
opinion remained, but these had been dealt with together. There were times when we 
talked a lot, but we did not come close to an agreement, for example on the seepage 
water problem, the 18,000 m3/s discharge standard, and the conditions for river 
projects.’231 Another reacted: ‘It is just like the Betuwelijn railway construction project: 
‘We want it, so we get it’.232 During the penultimate meeting of the advisory group the 
project manager gave a present to the members to thank them for their effort and 
collaboration. Later, he was not pleased with their criticisms.233
A second lobby campaign
The next aim of the residents’ groups was to convince Nijmegen City Council of their 
alternative through a lobby campaign, the media234 and a brochure for the residents of 
Lent.235 This succeeded on 2 February 2005 when Nijmegen City Council unanimously 
backed the residents’ alternative as it proved to be a full alternative to the government 
plan. It demanded that the municipal executive of the municipality of Nijmegen adopt 
the residents’ alternative and send a letter to the state secretary stating the council’s 
reasoning.236 A chair of a residents’ group: ‘It would appear to be a breach of trust if the 
state secretary did not choose our alternative. It is practicable and much cheaper than 
the government plan, but then she has to decide against the advice of the officials’.237
The chair of the advisory group asked for an appointment with the state secretary to 
inform her about the residents’ perspective.238 The meeting took place on 18 March 
2005. The residents emphasised the advantages of their plan and their doubts about 
the government plan. One of the residents thought that ‘it was a constructive meeting. 
We got the impression that the state secretary was not informed about the elaborated 
version of our plan’.239
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On 25 March 2005 the project manager informed the residents of Lent about the latest 
situation and the next steps. ‘Apart from the government plan for relocating the dike in 
Lent, the residents’ alternative will also be part of the SPKD Room for the River. At this 
moment the question is which procedure will be followed.’ He assumed that it would 
become clear before 1 June when the consultation period started.240 The fact that the 
state secretary viewed the residents’ alternative valuable gave the residents some hope.A 
chair of a residents’ group. ‘Of course, one swallow does not make a summer, but I really 
thought that the chances for the residents’ plan were improving. We provided the state 
secretary with relevant arguments. She liked that.’241 The state secretary postponed her 
decision to wait for reactions of the consultation of the SPKD.
Many consultation reactions
The public consultation of the SPKD resulted in 2843242 reactions, 532 of which 
concerned the proposed dike relocation in Lent. Of the 532 responses, 485 were 
similar.243 Most people were against the dike relocation. They found the consequences 
of a dike relocation too radical: too many houses, historic buildings and monumental 
trees have to be demolished and heritage features will be affected. Moreover, they 
expected seepage water inside the dike, which they consider unsolvable. Generally, the 
residents doubted the need and usefulness of the measure and commented on the terms 
of reference and the height of the dike. They also found the reasoning behind the 
government plan unconvincing, saying the design discharge of 18,000 m3/s had not 
been properly justified. Some residents pointed to the procedures, for example the 
reason for doing an EIA and the lack of alternatives. Furthermore, the reactions 
indicated that the residents’ alternative is more cost effective. For the long term, a land 
reservation has to be made.244 The project manager informed the steering group that the 
reactions did not provide new information, so there was no reason for changing the 
preferred option for a dike relocation.245
Making a hidden reaction public
Professor van Ellen also sent a response just before he died in August 2005. His reaction, 
number 27, was given confidential status and was therefore inaccessible to others. Van 
Ellen’s submission included a diagram that showed that ‘near Lent nothing needs to be 
done. The dike in Lent is very high and the eventually desired decrease in the water 
level of 0.03 m is so small that extra measures downstream might compensate for this. 
If one is of the opinion that a side channel is needed, a side channel in the flood plain 
as proposed by me would be in all respects more than sufficient’.246 Appealing to the 
freedom of information legislation, a residents’ group obtained the van Ellen’s reaction, 
which was discussed during a visit to Lent by a delegation from the House of 
Representatives. A resident sent van Ellen’s reaction as an attachment to an opinion 
article to a national daily newspaper, stating ‘It is incomprehensible that these data have 
not been published and included in the EIA’,247 but it was not picked up. The MPs, 
however, demanded that the state secretary responds to these reactions as soon as 
possible. One MP said: ‘Some people did not receive an answer yet. Everybody has the
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right to get a reasonable and correct reply, irrespective of the content. In fact, I do not 
want to continue before this has been arranged.’248 On 25 April 2006 Mrs van Ellen 
received an official, twelve-page reply from the Room for the River programme 
manager.249 This response was at odds with the state secretary’s promise to reply to all 
submissions personally before the end of March.250
State secretary’s decision, distinguished guest and next lobby campaign
Just after the consultation period, in the first week of October 2005, the chair of the 
Lentse Federatie was called by the state secretary who informed him about her decision 
to reroute the dike relocation in Lent.251 On 3 November 2005 the residents had an 
opportunity to present their views to Prince Willem-Alexander when he visited 
Nijmegen and Lent.252
The incorporation of the government plan in the SPKD and its front-runner status253 
was the ultimate sign for the residents’ groups to seize all opportunities to get their 
voice heard in The Hague. The planned vote on the SPKD in July 2006 in the House of 
Representatives and in December 2006 in the Senate made it imperative to make every 
effort to promote their alternative. They renewed their communication campaign in the 
village, for example through a banner along the flyover on the road that splits the village 
with the text ‘Dike relocation No, Lentse Warande Yes’, a hundred or so flags in gardens 
and posters in windows with the text: ‘Dike relocation: is Lent being sacrificed?’, and 
defiant signs in gardens saying ‘We will remain here’, ‘I won’t move’, ‘Dike relocation 
boo’, ‘We won’t let this happen’, ‘Dike road, no’, ‘Melanie Schultz, will you marry me? I 
have a nice dike house’, and at the entrance to the village, ‘No Waal through Lent. Water 
over this land, 58 houses pulled down’.
On 3 March 2006 a delegation from the House of Representative visited Lent to get 
acquainted with the situation. They were not convinced of the need for the dike 
relocation and most did not intend to vote for the government plan.254 Even the Social 
Democrats (PvdA), who were previously critical of the residents’ alternative, were now 
positive about the residents’ plan on certain conditions.255 Later that week they asked 
the state secretary for an explanation of the government plan. She emphasised that the 
following questions were relevant: Is there room for the measure, does it deliver benefits 
for a wider area, and is support available? ‘I do not want any “no regret” measures,’ she 
said. She did not accept the idea of buying land for a reservation. ‘Land can only be 
reserved for ten years. This is too short in an area under pressure for urban 
development.’ Despite counter-arguments by some MPs, the state secretary remained 
firmly in favour of the dike relocation: ‘First, there is no land reservation instrument 
available; second, it requires a measure upstream in the Gendtse polder; third, it gives 
greater chances to realise other government plans, such as emergency water storage; 
and fourth, the contribution to the second bridge over the river Waal will be recouped.’ 
256 This last statement met with an angry reaction from Nijmegen executive councillor 
Paul Depla (‘I do not want to profile myself, only the content is at stake’) and the
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residents’ groups (‘We will have to continue our struggle in The Hague’).257
In her letter of 23 March 2006 to the chair of the House of Representatives, the state 
secretary explained the decision for the government plan. ‘Of the 55 houses that have 
to be demolished under the government plan, 17 have already been bought. While all 
the measures in the SPKD have to meet the design discharge of 16,000 m3/s, some 
exceptions were made, for example the dike relocation near Lent. Here, Rijkswaterstaat 
chose for a ‘robust’ measure to avoid the need for a “second” intervention if higher 
water discharges occur.’ Apart from the costs, the Government’s decision was also based 
on other considerations, including a robust design, water safety, spatial quality and 
regional support. The state secretary stated that the residents’ alternative would have a 
disadvantageous effect on the division of water discharge upstream.258 On their website 
the residents commented on this argument by the state secretary.259
Getting their voice heard
The positive outcome of the MPs visit prompted the residents to ask the province of 
Gelderland to support their plan.260 A meeting of a provincial committee held on 29 
March 2006 presented an opportunity to achieve this aim and a chair of a residents’ 
group was given time during the meeting to promote the residents’ alternative, with a 
packed public gallery looking on. In brief, the case was that ‘the province ignored the 
residents’ voice by excluding their alternative in the regional advice. The residents were 
never opponents of flood risk measures, but worked on an alternative based on a side 
channel in the flood plain, designed by Professor van Ellen. Despite obstruction by 
Rijkswaterstaat, van Ellen’s side channel accommodated the design discharge of 16,000 
m3/s. Provision for a land reservation and excavation of a flood plain upstream261 were 
included to meet the 18,000 m3/s safety standard. The EIA showed the comparability 
of both plans. For the short term, the residents’ alternative was the most 
environmentally favourable (meest milieuvriendelijk alternatief) one.262 Relocating the 
dike would throw the residents into uncertainty about whether they will have to move 
or not. In addition, it would have considerable consequences for the rest of the village, 
including the demolition of about 50 houses. Furthermore, relocating the dike 350 
metres inland would move the seepage water zone closer to the village. Rijkswaterstaat 
brushed aside residents’ comments by replying that they would then compensate the 
residents.263 What particularly worried the residents was that the province of Gelderland 
did not accept the 18,000 m3/s safety standard for the proposed plan for emergency 
water storage, but when it came to the dike relocation they supported the government 
plan.264 The committee decided that a letter from the province of Gelderland might 
send a ‘signal’ to the state secretary.
In a meeting on 12 April 2006265 Harry Keereweer, a member of the provincial executive, 
made clear that he did not intend to sign the proposed letter. ‘A year ago the region 
published an advice ‘set in concrete’. It supported all measures designed to guarantee 
flood safety for all residents, except for the emergency water storage. We don’t like to
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come back on our position.’266 The Provincial Council of Gelderland finally 
unanimously passed a motion267 in which the councillors declared their wish for a 
careful decision-making process on the SPKD and questioned the need for a design 
discharge of 18,000 m3/s. Besides, the residents’ alternative needed to be studied in a 
comparable way, particularly the opportunities in the field of flood safety.268
Another platform for the residents’ groups proved to be a hearing of the House of 
Representatives. On 20 April 2006 they presented seven arguments for their alternative. 
One of their main concerns was the seepage water problem, for which Rijkswaterstaat 
suggested a sheet piling and advised the state secretary to reply that ‘experts say that 
this will be solved technically’. However, the residents doubted whether this could be 
solved. A few options were available, including the build of a seepage canal with 
sufficient capacity, but there was insufficient land available. Another option was a special 
construction with gravel for water storage, but again there was too little space, and the 
construction of terps turned out not to be feasible for the existing buildings. A last 
option was the construction of a so-called ‘seepage barrier’, a sheet piling resting on an 
impermeable layer in the subsoil. The residents questioned whether this would succeed 
because they claimed that there was no such impermeable layer, or at least only in part 
of the area. It is still unclear where and to what extent an impermeable layer is present. 
Furthermore, subsoil sounding and borings hit upon layers of coarse gravel, which will 
make the engineering work more difficult. The residents claimed that Rijkswaterstaat 
failed to explain how it would solve this problem. Even the consultants had doubts 
about securing adequate foundations for the sheet piling. They recommended a 
thorough geohydrological study of the dike foundations.269
A mediation action
The day after the hearing the consultant involved in the EIA studies contacted the 
person who presented the residents’ case to the House of Representatives hearing,270 
and asked for a meeting. During the meeting on 23 April 2006 both reflected on the EIA 
studies271 and listed conditions for starting up a new planning process. A second meeting 
was planned on 9 May 2006, to which the same resident, his ‘colleague’ and the project 
manager were invited.272 Meanwhile the mediation process was altered by members of 
the other residents’ groups who were not involved.273 One of them wrote a letter to the 
board of directors of the consulting firm complaining of the activities of the 
consultant.274 The other posted negative reports about the consultant on the 
internet.275The consultant was therefore annoyed for the first hour of the second 
meeting, but the residents at the meeting knew nothing about these actions.276 The 
consultancy firm wrote a reply277 and the residents involved gave feedback to the 
‘outsiders’.278 They continued communicating with the project manager by 
email.279According to the residents, the mediation attempt generated various new points 
of view worth working on. The project manager, however, explained the state secretary’s 
choice not to negotiate, but he thought there would be some room for dialogue after the 
debate in the House.280 The residents’ current position and ‘the developments of recent
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months’ were sent by email to the state secretary, with a copy to the project manager.281 
They suggested postponing the relocation of the dike to see first whether other measures 
along the river have the desired effect.282 This email did not result in a direct response 
from the state secretary, but she did refer to it during the debate in the House of 
Representatives on 19 June 2006. She stated that she did not believe in such an 
approach.283 At that point, the project manager gave up. ‘How could I work on a 
compromise while the state secretary had already determined her position?’284
The media as residents’ platform
Once again the media provided the residents with a platform to comment on the 
government plan. A resident accused Rijkswaterstaat of ‘flexing their muscles. It is a 
political solution, not a technical one. It appeared to be a matter of prestige.’ The writer 
made a connection between the plan for calamity polders upstream and the dike 
relocation in Lent. He claimed the rejection of the plan for emergency water storage had 
a direct effect on the plan in Lent. ‘The plan for an emergency water storage failed, so the 
dike relocation has to succeed.’285 Other articles in the media covered the apparent 
endorsement by the ‘region’. ‘Support is broader than a handful of politicians,’ one 
resident stated. ‘In Lent there is much public indignation over the inadequate arguments 
used to justify the choice of the government plan.’286 Another issue was the comparability 
of the two plans. ‘The government plan is supported by the powerful Rijkswaterstaat. 
Which enterprise dares giving an advice that would be diametrically opposed to 
Rijkswaterstaat?’287 Executive councillor Paul Depla was accused of striking of a bargain. 
His reply: ‘What would you do? Remain angry and refuse every dialogue with 
Rijkswaterstaat? As a government decision-maker I am not in a position to remain angry. 
We are not in charge of flood safety. Instead of sulking and being obstructive, we should 
deal professionally with the consequences of the decision and set our own conditions.’288 
The residents’ publications resulted in an intervention with a member of the provincial 
executive. He questioned the conditions for river projects, saying they formed an 
unsound basis for the forced movement of the house owners.289
Final attempt
The residents fought to get a majority in the House of Representatives. On 15 June 2006 
the regional daily newspaper published the latest update: ‘Dike plan Lent faltering’ and 
‘Uncertainties in river plans to last years’ in which it appeared that two political parties 
(Conservatives and Social Democrats) tended to favour the dike relocation and the party 
that backed the residents’ plan (Christian Democrats) held all options open. No party 
openly supported the residents’ alternative,290 but the residents continued hopefully.291
In a final attempt to influence the decision-making a local party (Stadspartij Nijmegen) 
sent an email to the members of the House of Representatives stating that the Nijmegen 
City Council had voted unanimously for the residents’ alternative.292
During a parliamentary committee meeting on 19 June 2006 twelve motions were
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submitted.293 A member of the Christian Democrats (CDA), for example, tried to make 
a last attempt to promote the benefits of the residents’ alternative and asked the 
Government for an overview of the costs of the dike relocation. Other motions included 
the implementation in phases of proposed river projects rather than all at once294 and 
the proposal to make a new connection between the rivers Meuse en Waal, which would 
serve as canal for superfluous water.295
While all the motions were withdrawn, a resident argued that the state secretary 
misrepresented essential points in the debate with the House. ‘She responded to an old 
plan by Professor van Ellen in which he suggested a side channel and two additional 
measures in the Gendtse Waard and the Ooijpolder, but the water expert had revised 
this plan. By optimising the side channel, the new plan would withstand the highest 
water discharges, even the 18,000 m3/s safety standard. But the committee did not 
recognise this misinterpretation.’296
In the vote in the House of Representatives on 27 June 2006 the Christian Democrats and 
the Socialist Party opposed the government plan. ‘Christian Democrats surprisingly in 
opposition’ was the headline in the regional daily newspaper the next day.297 The 
Christian Democrat who did not back the government plan was of the opinion that 
people living along the river need to be protected. ‘But,’ he argued, ‘we do not have to rely 
on large-scale measures.’298 Finally, the House approved the SPKD, including the 
government plan, on 7 July 2006.299 According to a resident their lobby campaign had 
almost succeeded because the contact person at the nationalist party (LPF) was not 
available. ‘If I had convinced him we would have had a majority in the House.’300
On 14 November 2006 the SPKD was debated in the Senate. The senators asked 
questions concerning possible conflicts between the SPKD and European legislation, 
the calculation methods and the difference between the application of the design 
discharge of 18,000 m3/s and 16,000 m3/s.301 The debate was adjourned as a result of a 
yes-or-no impasse concerning the design discharge of the Rhine. The minister, replacing 
the state secretary as she was on maternity leave, promised ‘crystal clear’ explanations 
during the continuation of the debate in December.302 The Senate approved the SPKD 
Room for the River in December 2006.303
The arguments 
Residents’ groups
Reviewing the planning process, a chair of a residents’ group concluded: ‘We went a long 
way with our alternative, but in fact we did not have the ghost of a chance. As residents 
you do not have a chance against the government, with consultants and advisors working 
at least 40 hours a week, while we have only our evening hours to 
spend....Rijkswaterstaat has forced its plan through and the politicians snapped like
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matchsticks.’ 304 The residents felt like the butt of a joke. For those affected by the 
government plan it was clear the time had come to save their skins.305
The main arguments of the resident groups were: (1) No legal basis for a dike relocation 
in Lent; (2) Sense and nonsense about the bottleneck near Lent; (3) Water discharge 
capacity of the residents’ alternative; (4) (Limited) tenability of the land reservation; (5) 
Seepage water of Lent solvable?; (6) ‘Robust’ as the wonder oil of the SPKD; and (7) 
Costs suggest more than it is.
Concerning the legal basis for a dike relocation, the residents’ groups hired legal expertise 
to assess the chance of realising the government plan. They believed that as the 
government plan would have far-reaching consequences for the region, including 
exceeding the legal basis of the design discharge of 16,000 m3/s, with insufficient support 
from society and the availability of a residents’ alternative, it would be sure to fail if it 
went before the Council of State.306
Although there is no direct safety risk to people living near a bottleneck in the river 
Waal, the residents’ groups agreed that river widening would be sensible from a hydraulic 
engineering point of view. The side channel in the residents’ alternative appeared to be 
very effective in achieving a considerable decrease in the water level near the city of 
Nijmegen as well as upstream of the city. The government plan had the same aim, but 
the principal difference was the place. While the residents’ alternative created space where 
they wanted it, outside the dikes, the government plan involved the use of land inside the 
dikes, in the village of Lent. Moreover, the side channel in the residents’ alternative would 
accommodate the conditional design discharge of 16,000 m3/s. It was far from certain 
that a design discharge of 18,000 m3/s was realistic.
The residents’ groups opposed the state secretary’s argument that their alternative would 
reduce water levels by less and be less effective compared with the government plan, and 
would therefore require additional measures upstream.307 Their alternative was 
dimensioned to meet exactly the legal design discharge, they said. Now it appeared that 
this was a shortcoming in the design, although its capacity exceeded the legal design 
discharge of 16,000 m3/s by as much 17,500 m3/s. It would have almost the same effect 
as the government plan, it would make additional measures upstream redundant, and 
through the land reservation it would not exclude any measure in future.
Further, the residents’ groups doubted the state secretary’s assumption that a land 
reservation was uncertain, especially in an area under increasing development pressure 
from Nijmegen. This position was unjust, they argued, because the overview of the costs 
included a budget for buying land by Rijkswaterstaat. This suggested that the land issue 
had been accounted for, but if this was not the case, a land reservation could be a realistic 
option. Under the Spatial Planning Act ( Wet op de Ruimtelijke Ordening) provisions 
could be included in the local land use plan (bestemmingsplan) to reserve this land.
104
-Q-
Madelinde PHD zonder afbrekingen:Opmaak 1 15- -2011 14:44 Pagina 105
Moreover, they argued that if this was not possible the government could designate the 
land for this purpose via an order in council (a governmental decree).
The main challenge of the government plan would be managing seepage water. During 
periods of high water, residents living in a zone from 300 to 400 metres behind the dike 
will be affected by groundwater seepage from under the dike. This is why this area has 
never been built on to any significant extent. In fact, the village building starts behind 
this seepage zone. Relocating the dike 300 to 400 metres will move the seepage zone 
towards the existing built-up area. This implies that during periods of high water a large 
part of the village will be affected by seepage water, unless Rijkswaterstaat is able to make 
the foundations of the new dike sufficiently impermeable.
The residents mistrusted the word ‘robust’ because it seemed to be the ‘wonder oil’ of the 
SPKD. Rijkswaterstaat proclaimed that if measures are sufficiently ‘robust’, extra 
measures would not be needed, but this appeared not to be based on hard evidence and 
cost efficiency considerations. The justification seemed to be simply calling the dike 
relocation a ‘robust’ measure.
The costs of both plans proved debatable. For example, the costs of the future dike 
relocation are not known because it would be unlikely that a future dike relocation 
would be identical to one planned now. A report by the Netherlands Bureau of Economic 
Policy Analysis ( Centraal Plan Bureau) expected engineering techniques would in future 
enable other measures than a dike relocation. The main objection of the residents’ was 
that estimates of the costs suggest an accuracy that does not exist. Rijkswaterstaat 
published different cost estimations for both plans (see Table 5.4) which casts suspicion 
on the government agency for favouring the government plan at the cost of the residents’ 
alternative.308
Table 5.4 Cost estimation in €  millions for the government plan and the residents' alternative
Government plan 
(Dike relocation)
Residents' alternative (Lentse Warande; 
land reservation partly built)
September 2004 259 307
January 2005 303 274 Including 14 m for lowering groynes
February 2005* 304 329 Including 90 m for measure In Gentsche Polder
April 2005** 304
315 Including 58 m for measure upstream 
103 of the 315 m budgeted for purchase and 
planning would be partly used as receipts***
* Published In Snip 2a docum ent.
* *  In a publication o f the  Netherlands Bureau o f Econom ic Policy Analysis (Centraal Planbureau), April 2005 
* * *  O f this 315 million, 103 million w as  budgeted for land acquisition and planning, but part o f this w ou ld  
be used as receipts as part o f the  budget w ou ld  com e from revenues (e.g. from  housing),
Source: Lentse Fedemtie, Room for the River hearing, 20 A pril 2006.
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Water expert
Water expert Professor van Ellen commented on the state approach. In his view the 
ministry grabbed on to measures too quickly, without carrying out a comparative study. 
He got especially excited about the design discharges of 16,000 m3/s and 18,000 m3/s for 
the Rhine. ‘A situation in which a design discharge of 16,000 m3/s occurs will result in 
an increase in the water level of 3-5 cm, while a design discharge of 18,000 m3/s may 
lead to a maximum of 20 cm ... .First, a better model for calculating water discharges has 
been available since 2005, while the one used by Rijkswaterstaat dates from 1996. 
Second, the river bed has been lowered by 15-20 cm since 1996. Then you have the 
raising of the river dikes. Since 1995 the dikes have been raised more than necessary. In 
fact, near Lent nothing needs to be done, not even my side channel. But if you do it, then 
you will be ready for the next century.’309
5.2 Case analysis of the dike relocation in Lent
The case analysis of the dike relocation in Lent follows the framework laid down in 
Chapter 3. The point of departure for this analysis is the interaction between the 
authorities and the local groups. By focusing on what occurred in the relationship 
between these actors through their interaction outcomes, their interaction strategies, 
their power building and their potentials to act, we were able to analyse the 
government-citizen interaction. The authorities’ organisational culture and the local 
groups’ cultural background and the impact of these on their action were also analysed. 
The case analysis ends with a summary and discussion.
In the Dike Relocation in Lent case study the principal actors were the national 
government (Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency 
Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act), the local government (municipality of 
Nijmegen) and three active local groups of the village of Lent: Lentse Federatie,310 Lent 
Village Council and Lent 800/Werkgroep BOOM (referred to as Lent 800). As different 
authorities, the national and local government, were involved, a distinction has been 
made between these authorities and the local groups and between the different 
authorities.
The dike relocation was included in the national spatial planning instrument Spatial 
Planning Key Decision (SPKD) Room for the River, which meant that the plan would 
be decided at the national level. Because the project was initiated by the ministry in a 
top-down approach, the Dike Relocation in Lent case study has similarities with the 
Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder case study (Chapter 6). The Lent case study 
differs from the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study because of its bottom-up 
approach (see Chapter 7). The implications of this for the interaction between the 
authorities and the local groups are described below.
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5.2.1 Interaction between authorities and local groups
In the following, the interaction between the authorities and the local groups311 is the 
object of analysis. A distinction has been made between the national government 
(Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat 
has the mandate to act) and the local groups on the one hand, and between the local 
government (municipality of Nijmegen) and the local groups on the other. As the 
interaction between the authorities is considered important for the analysis of the 
interaction between the authorities and the local groups, this has also been taken into 
account.
Two questions are addressed here. First, how did the key actors interact? We examine 
the interaction between national government and local groups, between local 
government and local groups, and between national and local government. Second, 
how can these interactions be characterised according to the typology of conflict, 
debate, negotiation, dialogue and collaboration?
Interaction between national government and local groups: perpetuating conflict
Two types of interactions can be differentiated in the relationship between the national 
government and the local groups: direct and indirect interactions. Periods of direct 
interactions alternated with indirect contact, via members of the city council or via 
others, such as the media.
The first direct interaction occurred when a professor of water management, Professor 
van Ellen, who worried about the government plan, attempted various times to begin 
talks with Rijkswaterstaat about his ideas for an alternative. Finally, an appointment 
was made for a meeting. However, the Rijkswaterstaat official was not allowed to agree 
to a study by the water expert’s alternative as he had to inform his superior first, who 
finally agreed. Meanwhile, the water expert heard from his son, who worked for the 
consultancy firm that was awarded the contract for the calculations, that the results 
were available. When Rijkswaterstaat informed him about the outcomes the message 
was clear: ‘We studied your alternative but it did not meet the conditions, so the topic 
has been closed for discussion’. Professor van Ellen nagged the official to get the report 
and after a while he received it. After reading the results the water expert concluded 
that the government agency had not used the right model. ‘It was not done fairly, he 
commented. Therefore, he commissioned new calculations at his own expense. He 
believed that this was a source of conflict.312
Professor van Ellen’s proposal aroused a local group’s interest, who contacted him and 
subsequently incorporated the Van Ellen side channel into the residents’ alternative. 
However, in the course of the planning process disagreements arose, resulting in a 
breakdown in communication between the local group Lentse Federatie and the 
professor.313
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Meanwhile, indirect contact between the national government and the local groups 
occurred via other actors, such as Members of Parliament. They asked the state secretary 
questions concerning the rejection of the residents’ views. Various rounds of questions 
in Parliament finally resulted in a response from the state secretary: ‘The residents’ 
alternative may be included in the environmental impact assessment (EIA).’314 Indirect 
interaction also took place via the media, which proved to be a useful platform for the 
residents to present their views.
Subsequently, direct contact between the national government and the local groups 
took place after the planning process was delegated to the regional level in May 2002. 
The first action of the newly appointed Rijkswaterstaat project manager was ‘to repair 
the relationship with the stakeholders’.315 He started consultations with many people, 
including Professor van Ellen ‘who was pushed aside on false argumentation’ (van der 
Graaf, 2007). Experts from a specialised department of Rijkswaterstaat, Professor van 
Ellen and the project manager met several times.316 The project manager had to deal 
with various local groups who opposed the government plan, some of which merged 
to form one organisation, but without giving up their own identity. The project 
manager invited the local groups to participate in the advisory group which was part 
of the project organisation for the execution of the EIA. The advisory group turned 
out to be a platform for the residents to question the tasks, conditions, research results 
and budget outcomes, which led to fierce disputes with Rijkswaterstaat. On a few 
occasions this resulted in a negotiated solution, for example when Rijkswaterstaat 
recognised mistakes in the study results and changed them accordingly,317 and when 
the organisation accepted a change in formulations that proved to be acceptable for the 
residents.318 Most disputes, however, remained unresolved. An example is the discussion 
about the government’s safety standards for river projects. According to Rijkswaterstaat 
a design discharge of 18,000 m3/s for the Rhine at Lobith319 had to be met, whereas the 
legal discharge was 16,000 m3/s.320 In the course of the planning process a Dutch- 
German study resulted in a maximum discharge capacity for the Rhine of 15,500 m3/s 
(Nederlandse-Duitse werkgroep Hoogwater, 2004) which the residents used to 
underpin their argument. The project manager responded that the advisory group was 
not the place to discuss this.321 Nevertheless, it proved to be an important indicator for 
assessing the plans in the decision-making process. While the government plan was 
designed for the next 100 years (18,000 m3/s), the residents’ alternative was designed for 
50 years (16,500 m3/s)322 which again led to conflict. Another source of conflict was the 
project manager’s memorandum on the residents’ advice, which was sent to the steering 
group. Since then the little trust the local groups had in the government evaporated.
Another direct interaction occurred after the project manager sent the result of the EIA 
to the ministry and the residents asked for an interview with the state secretary.323 She 
invited them for a meeting in The Hague. As a result, she included both plans in the 
SPKD Room for the River324 and postponed the decision-making until after the 
consultation period.325 She called a local group chairman to inform him of this, and
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again to inform him about her decision in favour of the government plan, which he 
appreciated very much.326
The last direct interaction occurred during the mediation action by a consultant who 
was involved in the EIA studies. During the meetings in May 2006 both parties listened 
carefully to one another and were willing to come to a compromise. The project 
manager showed his commitment by commissioning calculations for a small-scale dike 
relocation with flood plain excavation, even though he did not believe this was the best 
option.327 However, the state secretary had already been decided and the initiative did 
not succeed.
To summarise, the main interaction between the national government and the local 
groups took place during the EIA studies, for which a project organisation was 
established including an advisory group with residents. This can be viewed as a limited 
form of public involvement. The outcome of this interaction can be characterised as 
debate and conflict. There was some negotiation, but only when minor subjects were 
at stake, making this form of interaction insignificant in comparison with the other 
interaction outcomes. Generally, debates escalated into conflicts which remained 
unresolved. A mediation action did not succeed because the state secretary had already 
decided in favour of the government plan.
Interaction between local government and local groups: recurring conflict
Like the interaction between the national government and the local groups, two types 
of interaction can be identified in the relationship between the local government and 
the local groups: direct and indirect interactions. Periods of direct interactions 
alternated with indirect contact via local councillors or via others, such as the media.
Although the municipality of Nijmegen was responsible for informing the residents 
about the government plan, it took more than six months to take action. The local 
government waited for state permission to continue with the part of the Waalsprong 
housing development that was planned for the same location as the dike relocation. In 
May 2000, prior to the first information meeting in September 2000, to which all 
residents of Lent were invited, there was a direct interaction between the municipality 
of Nijmegen and the retired water expert Professor van Ellen,328 who sent a letter to the 
local government in which he presented his ideas for an alternative. As he received no 
reply, he called the local government and an official told him that a commission would 
be established in June 2000 in which he would be invited to sit. When nothing 
happened, the water expert contacted the municipality of Nijmegen once again, but 
this time the responsible official referred him to Rijkswaterstaat. When he contacted 
Rijkswaterstaat the government authority referred him back to the municipality of 
Nijmegen. Finally, in September 2000 a meeting was arranged between the municipality 
of Nijmegen, Rijkswaterstaat and the water expert. While the Nijmegen official was 
quite positive about the water expert’s alternative and asked whether it would be
109
-Q-
Madelinde PHD zonder afbrekingen:Opmaak 1 15- -2011 14:44 Pagina 110
possible to study it, the Rijkswaterstaat official was not forthcoming because he had to 
refer this back to his superior first. It then became a Rijkswaterstaat affair.
The information meeting between the local government and the residents was the first 
direct interaction between them. The reason for this meeting was the state secretary’s 
decision to allow the Waalsprong housing development to go ahead, based on a positive 
outcome of the Quick Scan for the government plan. The meeting did not go very well. 
The residents were angry when the executive councillor’s informed them that the 
Waalsprong will go ahead because of the planned dike relocation and the resulting 
demolition of 55 houses.329 The executive councillor’s stance stirred the residents to 
organise themselves330 to oppose the government plan and save these 55 houses. The 
residents set up various groups and some existing groups shifted the focus of their 
activities to the dike relocation. Then, in a hastily organised follow-up meeting the 
residents presented their organisations.331
In the period leading up to the next direct interaction between the local government 
and the residents in December 2000 there was indirect contact via the members of the 
city council who sided with the residents. The council asked Nijmegen municipal 
executive to send a letter to the state secretary demanding a comparative study of the 
government plan and the residents’ alternative. In the meeting with the affected 
residents in December 2000 the executive councillor promised that if the reply was 
negative the municipality of Nijmegen would commission such a study.332 The executive 
councillor faced fierce criticism from the residents: ‘It appears that the municipality of 
Nijmegen supports the village of Lent but in practice it ignores our interest’.333 As the 
state secretary did not react to the local government’s demand, the municipality of 
Nijmegen reserved 25,000 euros for the promised study. When the residents asked 
whether this study would be comparable with the study by the Brokx Advisory 
Commission [the study commissioned by the ministry],334 the executive councillor had 
to say no.
After the presentation of the study outcomes, direct and indirect interactions took place. 
During the study the water expert continued to promote his alternative, of which 
various versions were in circulation, in letters and telephone calls. The study came down 
in favour of the government plan. The residents were disappointed. According to them 
too much emphasis was being put on the urban development aspects. The water expert 
discovered that his alternative had not been studied properly. Professor van Ellen: ‘The 
plans were compared on hydraulic aspects and not the morphological implications, 
which would have shown a totally different picture’.335 As a result, his alternative did 
not perform as well as the government plan. He justified his comments in an official 
letter to the consultancy that carried out the study. Both the municipality of Nijmegen 
and the head of the consultancy reacted. A second letter from the water expert followed. 
Finally, the question was resolved in a telephone call. The municipality of Nijmegen 
did not then feel the need to work on the development of an alternative.336 As a result,
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the executive councillor ignored a resolution by the city council to commission a 
thorough study of the alternatives and to cease cooperation if the state secretary did not 
want to consider other alternatives.337 He took this standpoint because he was 
negotiating with the national government for a state contribution to the cost of the 
second bridge over the river Waal.
During the execution of the EIA studies in which the government plan and the 
residents’ alternative were compared, contact between the local government and the 
residents was mainly indirect.338 The executive councillor was in the steering group 
while the residents took part in the advisory group. When the executive councillor had 
to decide between the government plan and the residents’ alternative in a vote in the 
steering group he abstained. The residents were furious that he was not willing to 
choose their plan. They lobbied the city council, which adopted various resolutions 
supporting the residents’ alternative. Other indirect interactions between the 
municipality of Nijmegen and the residents took place via the media, which provided 
a useful platform for opposing the government plan. However, when the municipality 
of Nijmegen was unwilling to develop the residents’ alternative, the residents presented 
the executive councillor with preliminary designs for the land reservation339 to speed up 
the delivery of the final designs.340
To summarise, the interaction between the local government and the local groups can 
be characterised as debate and conflict. The local government did not invest much in 
consulting and involving the public. As a result, the interaction between the local 
government and the local groups often resulted in debate, most of which escalated into 
conflicts which were not resolved. As the municipality of Nijmegen accepted a 
contribution from national government to the cost of a second bridge over the river 
Waal, it was obliged to cooperate with the national government, leaving no room for 
negotiation with the local groups. As a result, there was neither dialogue nor 
collaboration.
Interaction between government authorities: armed peace
When the national government launched proposals for the dike relocation, the first 
reaction from the local government was opposition, based on the premise that the plan 
might thwart the Waalsprong housing development. As soon as it became clear that 
this was a serious plan, the local government asked for a Quick Scan to study 
alternatives. When this came down in favour of the government plan, the local 
government started negotiations with the national government about damage 
compensation, including funding for a second bridge over the river Waal.341 These 
negotiations took a lot of time, but a breakthrough came in November 2001 when the 
national government was disposed to compensate for the ‘limited accessibility’ of the 
municipality of Nijmegen. Nijmegen entered the negotiations with the aim of obtaining 
the full cost of a new bridge over the Waal, but the government limited its contribution 
to 90 million euros.342 Meanwhile the state secretary had established the Brokx Advisory
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Commission to investigate the consequences and feasibility of the government plan. 
The results of this study also turned out positive for the government plan. The 
Commission worked up the government plan in more detail, the resulting plan being 
called Plan Brokx, and recommended drawing up two voluntary agreements, one for 
compensation for the homes that could not be built and another for the state 
contribution to the cost of the second Waal bridge.
After the authorities signed the agreements the planning process was delegated to the 
regional office of Rijkswaterstaat, which was responsible for carrying out studies as part 
of the EIA to comparison the government plan and the residents’ alternative. During 
this period several disputes arose between the national and local government, most of 
which were about who was responsible for what and the interpretation of outcomes. 
Disputes about responsibility for example arose while preparing a common press release 
and newsletters, the latter being Rijkswaterstaat’s responsibility. Because 
communication with the residents was a local government responsibility 
Rijkswaterstaat was not allowed to publish the newsletter without the local 
government’s permission. As a result, it had to accept many editorial changes.343 An 
illustration of a dispute on interpretation was the results of the EIA studies which 
revealed that both plans were ‘comparable’. According to the executive councillor of the 
municipality of Nijmegen comparable meant ‘equal’.344 But this proved not to be true 
from the viewpoint of Rijkswaterstaat: ‘The alternatives are not equal, but they are 
elaborated equally. Both alternatives offer a solution.’345 Another dispute concerned the 
question of whether the draft version of the environmental impact statement (EIS) had 
a legal status. In contrast to the municipality of Nijmegen Rijkswaterstaat was of the 
opinion that the draft version, which had not yet been adopted, was not a formal 
document and therefore did not have to be made public. 346 The project manager solved 
this by putting it on display in a community centre in Lent on the condition that 
interested residents first had to call to obtain the key.347
Although the EIA studies showed that the residents’ plan proved to be the most 
environmentally favourable alternative, the steering group chose the government plan. 
However, this decision was not unanimous as the executive councillor, among others, 
abstained in the vote. His main argument was that ‘otherwise the residents might think 
that the local government decides this issue’. Most others, like Rijkswaterstaat, 
emphasised the government plan’s ‘robustness’ and said that it comprehensively tackled 
the safety problem. As some members considered it important to decide by common 
consent they attempted to convince the executive councillor, but were unsuccessful.348 
Instead of openly backing the government plan, the executive councillor put his own 
interests first: ‘People hoped that we would decide unanimously, but that did not 
interest me.’349
To summarise, the interaction between national and local government can be 
characterised as debate, mostly about responsibility. On only one occasion did a
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negotiation lead to the local government’s acceptance of the state plan.
The prevailing outcomes of the interaction between the national government and the 
local groups and between the local government and the local groups were debate and 
conflict. Most debates and conflicts remained unresolved. The interaction between 
national and local government was dominated by debate, particularly in the area of 
responsibility, and only once did negotiation lead to the local government accepting 
the government plan. For an overview, see Table 5.5.
Table 5.5 Interaction between national government (Nat), local government (Loc) 
and local groups (Loc gr)
conflict debate negotiation dialogue collaboration
Nat
^  Loc o + + o o
Nat /
Loc gr + + o o o
Loc 
/  Locgr + + o 0 o
o = not occurring + = occurring
5.2.2 Interaction strategies of authorities and local groups
In this section we analyse the interaction strategies of the authorities and the local 
groups.
The interaction strategies of both authorities and local groups can be divided into 
framing, buffering and bridging strategies. As explained in Chapter 3, frames give 
meaning to events. As such, they can be viewed as an interpretation. Frames depend 
on context, usually not unequivocally. Often they are implicit. This analysis makes a 
distinction between four frames: a power frame, an identity frame, a conflict 
management frame, and a collaborative frame. A power frame is mainly used to show 
authority and to demonstrate who is in charge. It is accompanied by dominance or a 
sense of superiority. An identity frame includes ideas about who one is, what 
characteristics one shares with one or more groups and how one does and should relate 
to others. An identity frame is often used in situations in which people feel uncertain, 
threatened or challenged. A direct reaction to such feelings is to fall back on the group 
or organisation to which one belongs and position this group against others. When 
people make a distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ they are using an identity frame. In 
this analysis an identity frame is used when people adopt a specific identity or various 
identities and set themselves apart from others by referring to ‘us’ and ‘them’. A conflict 
management frame shows an open mind to the views and opinions of others, and 
involves a willingness to find commonalities rather than emphasising dissimilarities. A
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collaborative frame demonstrates joint action between actors against their opponent or 
to achieve a joint objective.
If actors interpret data, information and phenomena solely according to the logic of 
their own frame it becomes self-referential. This implies that they lose the ability to 
view their own arguments from different angles or to situate them (Eshuis & Stuiver, 
2005). As a consequence, buffering strategies may be used to convince others in a 
persuasive manner. Usually, argumentation is based on one perspective, often of the 
group or organisation to which one belongs. The point of view is principally one­
dimensional: ‘all or nothing’. This type of strategy is directed at other actors in the arena 
to justify actions that may accompanied by drama and extreme use of language. 
Sometimes this ends in ‘frozen’ frames if an actor cannot move out of his or her 
assumed position, as a change would be interpreted as a loss of face. Buffering strategies 
may also contribute to reframing, that is, taking up another frame. For example, if a 
dispute arises in a collaborative relation, such as an alliance or coalition, and both actors 
do not want to give in, this may result in a change of frame; the collaborative frame 
may be replaced by an identity frame. Bridging strategies are directed at overcoming 
problems and finding joint solutions. This type of strategy includes a willingness to 
approach someone, to build a bridge to another person, being receptive to the views and 
opinions of others, trying to involve the other, and provoking discussions. Hence, 
bridging strategies may contribute to reframing. For example, if an actor is in conflict 
with another person they may decide to broaden the scope of the relationship and 
change its nature to try to negotiate a solution, which may result in replacing the 
identity frame with a conflict management frame.
Again, in the analysis of the interaction between authorities and the local groups a 
distinction has been made between the national government (Department of Water 
Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act) 
and the local government (municipality of Nijmegen).
The analysis of the interaction strategies used by the authorities and the local groups 
addresses two questions. First, which interaction strategies are used in the interaction 
between the authorities and the local groups, and between the authorities? Here, a 
distinction can be made between the interaction strategies used by the national 
government when dealing with the local groups and vice versa, the interaction strategies 
used by the local government when dealing with the local groups and vice versa, and the 
interaction strategies used by the national government when dealing with the local 
government and vice versa. Second, do the interaction strategies used by the authorities 
and the local groups explain the outcomes of the interaction between the authorities 
and the local groups and between the authorities?
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Interaction strategies of authorities when dealing with the local groups
Interaction strategies of national government when dealing with the local groups
The national government used framing as well as buffering and bridging strategies in its 
interaction with the local groups.
The national government used a power frame in its dealings with the local groups, of 
which there were many examples. The launch of the government plan for a dike 
relocation had all the characteristics of a state intervention. The residents had to learn 
of the initiative from the eight o’clock news and a current affairs programme on 
television.350 Communication with the residents was considered to be the responsibility 
of the local government.351 Another indication of the power frame was the design of the 
planning process: only after the project was included in national policy was there room 
for the residents to make their views known within the framework of the EIA. 
Furthermore, the state secretary’s approach and her communication style are illustrative 
of a power frame. Two rounds of parliamentary questions were needed before the state 
secretary admitted that within the framework of the EIA ‘all serious alternatives will be 
taken into account. I presume that Professor van Ellen’s variants might be considered as 
such’.352 Besides, the Brokx Advisory Commission’s brief was restricted to studying the 
government plan. The communication strategy of the regional office of Rijkswaterstaat 
was also based on a power frame: a double track would be followed, ‘the dike relocation 
as the most promising solution and the assessment of alternatives as second best’.353This 
view was also supported at the decision-making level, as evidenced by the director- 
general’s remark that the ‘point of departure is relocating the dike in the short term, 
including a side channel inside the dikes. This would offer opportunities for recreation. 
But the residents’ alternative with terps for housing development [on the land 
reservation] would generate revenue. We have to look seriously at this plan to see 
whether it deserves a chance’.354 The official’s advice attached to the residents’ advice to 
the steering group regarding the EIA also demonstrated a power frame. The most explicit 
illustration of the power frame, however, is the name of the project for the EIA studies: 
‘Dike Relocation in Lent’ which suggested that there was no room for other options. 
Only rarely did a conflict management frame emerge, for example when the project 
manager accepted minor changes in the reports and his participation in the mediation 
action, but that is insignificant in comparison to the national government’s dominant 
use of the power frame.
The national government often combined the power frame with buffering strategies 
when dealing with the local groups. Indicative of this approach was Rijkswaterstaat’s 
unwillingness to communicate with Professor van Ellen. Rijkswaterstaat first referred 
him back to the municipality of Nijmegen before agreeing to a meeting. Subsequently, 
they did not keep him informed about their actions. It was only from his son that he 
heard that calculations were made. He was later called by an official who told him that 
they had studied his alternative, but because it did not meet the requirements the topic 
was closed for further discussion.355 Another example of the use of a power frame with
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buffering strategies is the state secretary’s reaction to comments by members of the 
House of Representative that the residents’ alternative had been rejected too easily: ‘I 
did not feel like withdrawing the plan for a dike relocation.’ At the same time she used 
a bridging strategy by promising that if the Commission advised in favour of the 
government plan, the residents’ alternative would get a second chance in the studies for 
the EIA.356 The director for water management at Rijkswaterstaat regional office was 
involved in the steering group. She used buffering strategies when she acknowledged 
that the residents’ alternative had some environmental benefits. ‘The project criteria 
were time, budget, security and environment. Although the residents’ alternative did not 
meet the first three very well it did meet the last better than the government plan. This 
was logical: the measure would not be very invasive so it would be better for the 
environment.’357 The project manager changed the name of the plans twice, first in the 
final EIA report and later in the advice to the state secretary, which can also be considered 
as a buffering strategy. The first time, the name of the government plan remained the 
same -  ‘dike relocation’ -  whereas the name of the residents’ alternative was changed to 
‘dike maintenance’ (dijkhandhaving). 358 The second time, the name of the government 
plan was changed to ‘dike relocation now’ and the residents’ alternative to ‘dike relocation 
not yet’.359 Another buffering strategy used by the project manager was his approval to 
elaborate the government plan prior to the state secretary’s final decision.360 The state 
secretary used a buffering strategy when she was unwilling to discuss the conclusions of 
a report by the Research and Verification Bureau of the House of Representatives stating 
that cost estimations for infrastructure projects, such as the dike relocation in Lent, were 
not very transparent. In turn, the project manager felt obliged to inform the residents 
that ‘the state secretary did not want to negotiate the measure [to relocate the dike]. She 
has decided in favour of the dike relocation.’361 The national government used a buffering 
strategy to convince its opponents by describing its plan as ‘robust’ and ‘a measure that 
comprehensively tackles the safety problem’.362 At the same time it demonstrated that 
the residents’ alternative lacked these qualities.
The national government used several bridging strategies when dealing with the local 
groups. A bridging strategy used by Rijkswaterstaat was its agreement to meet with 
Professor van Ellen and make calculations for his alternative plan. However, it also used 
a buffering strategy to close the discussion with him by saying ‘we have studied your 
alternative, but it did not meet the conditions, so the subject is not open for further 
discussion.’363 Apart from the above-mentioned promise by the state secretary to include 
the residents’ alternative in the EIA studies,364 the national government used other 
bridging strategies. The project manager’s first action on taking office was ‘to reinstate 
the relationship with the stakeholders’, which included acknowledging that at first the 
government had given little thought to Professor van Ellen’s ideas.365 As a result, he 
arranged several meetings with experts from a specialised department of Rijkswaterstaat 
and Professor van Ellen.366 During the EIA studies the project manager frequently used 
bridging strategies to show his empathy with the residents by accepting changes in the 
study results proposed by the residents, whereas they tended to emphasise all the details
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that might support their alternative.367 He also used bridging strategies when the 
residents came up with the issue of seepage water, which they claimed had not been 
sufficiently addressed in the EIA studies. The project manager proposed a ‘seepage 
screen, a sheet piling supported by impermeable layer.368 Other examples of bridging 
strategies are the state secretary’s visit to Lent and her offer to talk to the local groups, 
the decision to include the government plan and the residents’ alternative in the national 
planning instrument SPKD Room for the River,369 and her two telephone calls to inform 
a local group’s chair about the postponement of decision-making and her final 
decision.370 The last bridging strategy was the project manager’s consent to mediation 
and his commitment to make calculations for a small-scale dike relocation.371 However, 
the mediation ended because the project manager concluded that it was too dangerous 
to continue as the state secretary already decided on Lent.372 The bridging strategies 
never resulted in reframing.
To summarise, in its interaction with the local groups the national government used a 
power frame to show who is in charge. This frame was accompanied by many buffering 
strategies and several bridging strategies. The dominant strategy was buffering, while 
bridging strategies were used mainly to prevent escalation, but never resulted in 
reframing.
Interaction strategies of local government when dealing with the local groups
The local government used framing as well as buffering and bridging strategies when 
dealing with the local groups.
During the planning process the local government’s frame was not used unequivocally. 
The difference between the view held by the local government and the view held by the 
local groups in the planning process was reflected in the municipality itself: Nijmegen 
municipal executive favoured the government plan (although not openly) while the city 
council supported the residents’ alternative. The point of departure for this analysis, 
however, is the Nijmegen municipal executive, also referred to as local government, and 
its use of interaction strategies.
Generally, the local government, adopted an identity frame when dealing with the local 
groups, emphasising its position in the administrative hierarchy (‘it is our position as the 
local government in relation to the national government’; in other words, ‘we’ are obliged 
to follow ‘them’) and its limited role in decision-making (‘it is the state secretary who 
decides’; in other words, ‘we’ are not in charge of decision-making).373 At first, the local 
government showed that it was not in favour of relocating the dike (‘the housing 
development would then be further from the city centre’).374 But during the planning 
process this changed into a latent preference for the government plan as the municipal 
executive was unwilling to execute all the city council’s motions on the residents’ 
alternative. Once the EIA studies were finalised, the executive councillor abstained in a 
vote of the steering group. The executive councillor: ‘Otherwise the residents would
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think that I am the one who decides’.375 The use of an identity frame was further 
confirmed by the executive councillor’s view on the position of the local government in 
the planning process: ‘From the beginning the municipality of Nijmegen tried to 
communicate openly and directly with the residents of Lent, explaining the policy 
intentions of the national government... .Looking back over the past years we are firmly 
of the opinion that until now we have been serving the public interest.’376 Also the 
executive councillor’s reaction to a remark by a representative of one of the local groups 
who accused him of striking of a bargain demonstrated an identity frame. ‘What would 
you do? Continue to be angry and refuse every dialogue with Rijkswaterstaat? As an 
executive councillor I am not in the position to remain angry. We are not in charge of 
flood safety. Instead of sulking and being obstructive we should be dealing professionally 
with the consequences of the decision and setting our own conditions.’377
The local government’s identity frame was accompanied by buffering strategies which 
were often used. The most striking illustrations of this type of strategy are the aversion 
to entering into discussion with Professor van Ellen (‘Nijmegen did not want anything 
to do with my plan’),378 the executive councillor’s message during the first information 
meeting for the residents in which he told the audience that ‘the Waalsprong will go 
ahead’379 without taking the residents’ views into account, and his reaction to the 
outcomes of the comparative study of the government plan and the residents’ alternative: 
‘I did not feel the necessity to work on the development of an alternative, for example 
the Van Ellen plan.’380 The passive attitude of the municipality of Nijmegen towards 
elaborating the residents’ plan as a full alternative in the EIA can also be considered a 
buffering strategy.381
The local government used several bridging strategies when dealing with the local 
groups, such as the organisation of several information meetings, the executive 
councillor’s expression of sympathy with the city council that the state secretary did not 
take alternatives to the dike relocation into consideration, and his intention to 
commission a study of the government plan and the Van Ellen side channel.382 
Additionally, the executive councillor used bridging strategies when he showed his 
willingness to develop the residents’ plan as a full alternative in the EIA.383 Another 
bridging strategy was the mayor’s telephone call to a local group chair in which she 
informed him about the state secretary’s final decision.384
To summarise, the local government used an identity frame when dealing with the local 
groups, emphasising its position in the administrative hierarchy and its dependence on 
the national government with regard to decision-making on the government plan. 
Although its buffering strategies were prevalent, the local government sometimes used 
bridging strategies to meet its obligations to inform the public and to show its 
willingness to work on the residents’ plan as a full alternative.
118
Madelinde PHD zonder afbrekingen:Opmaak 1 15- -2011 14:44 Pagina 119
Interaction strategies of the local groups when dealing with authorities
Interaction strategies of the local groups when dealing with the national government
The local groups used framing as well as buffering and bridging strategies when dealing 
with the national government.
The local groups used an identity frame in their interaction with the national government. 
The residents felt threatened by the government plan, particularly by the proposed 
demolition of 55 houses and the creation of an urban waterfront (the construction of a 
‘Manhattan on the Waal’).385 In fact, with the dike relocation they would lose ‘their’ village. 
This identity frame was clearly expressed in the residents’ plan, which they presented as an 
alternative that would improve flood safety. It included a land reservation to accommodate 
a dike relocation should this be necessary in future and excavating the flood plain through 
which the 55 houses could be conserved. The identity frame of the local groups was 
deployed forcefully during the first direct contact between the local groups and the national 
government. In the first meeting of the advisory group the residents questioned the project 
objective, for example whether the problem at stake was a river management problem at 
all. Although the advisory group also contained members of other organisations, the 
residents proved to be influential in the meetings because three resident groups were 
represented. The advisory group can therefore be viewed as a platform for the residents’ 
groups. On a few occasions the local groups used a conflict management frame, for 
example when they accepted the project manager’s explanation of disputed issues and 
during the mediation action that took place at the end of the planning process. As this 
frame was used only rarely, it does not seem to be significant when compared to the local 
groups’ use of the identity frame.
The local groups used buffering strategies to support their identity frame. They often used 
this type of strategy, especially in the media, to highlight their point of view without any 
qualification. They also used it during the execution of the EIA studies when they were 
focused on promoting their own alternative. The project manager: ‘The members of the 
advisory group had the tendency to emphasise all details that might support their 
alternative.’386 But as the executive councillor of the municipality of Nijmegen observed, 
buffering strategies alternated with bridging strategies: ‘The advisory group tried to do 
everything to get the principal question of dike relocation off the agenda. At the same time 
the residents were aware that it could go ahead anyway and that they would only able to 
influence the decision-making process. The advisory group had this two-faced character’.387
Bridging strategies were used only incidentally. The first bridging strategy used by the 
residents in their dealings with the national government began before the residents’ groups 
were formed: Professor van Ellen’s388 attempt to present his ideas to Rijkswaterstaat.389 
Other bridging strategies used by the local groups included their willingness to become 
members of the advisory group despite the constraints on the impact they could have on 
the decision-making, their acceptance of proposals by the project manager, their 
willingness to give presentations and being present during visits by Prince Willem-
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Alexander and others. On three occasions they were on the verge of leaving the advisory 
group, but eventually they changed their mind, which can also be considered a bridging 
strategy.39- Their participation in a mediation initiative just before the vote in the House 
of Representatives in June 2006 can be considered their last bridging activity, but the 
parties did not then reframe. The local group’s bridging strategies during their 
membership of the advisory group were based on their experience of a constructive 
atmosphere. This changed when the EIA came down in favour of the government plan. 
After that, all openness vanished.391 In other words, the buffering strategies then prevailed.
To summarise, the local groups used an identity frame in their dealings with the national 
government to promote their alternative plan to improve flood safety. They often used 
buffering and sometimes bridging strategies when dealing with the national government, 
depending on the situation, to do their utmost to get their alternative approved.
Interaction strategies of local groups when dealing with the local government
In their interaction with the local government the local groups used framing as well as 
buffering and bridging strategies.
The local groups used an identity frame when dealing with the local government as they 
thought this was their last opportunity to profile themselves as a village community. 
Apart from the demolition of 55 houses, the residents felt threatened by the creation of 
an urban waterfront (the construction of a ‘Manhattan on the Waal’).392 The local groups 
used the media and the city council as forums to demonstrate an identity frame.
The residents’ use of an identity frame was accompanied by buffering strategies. The local 
groups frequently used this type of strategy, for example during the information meetings 
organised by the municipality of Nijmegen. In the first meeting the residents thought 
the dike relocation was already planned and were afraid it meant the construction of a 
‘Manhattan on the Waal’. This was not without reason because ‘from an urban 
development perspective the dike relocation would be an enormous facelift for the 
municipality of Nijmegen. Before the dike relocation was on the cards the Waalsprong 
housing development was planned with its back to the river. With the dike relocation the 
city would get the opportunity to be connected to the river.’393 Other buffering strategies 
included giving preference to the study results that might support the residents’ 
alternative, and emphasising questions which could not be resolved in the advisory group 
or in the city council, such as the safety standards for peak discharges of 16,000 m3/s and
18,000 m3/s for the Rhine in the river plans.
The local groups rarely used bridging strategies when dealing with the local government. 
Examples are the letter from the water expert Professor van Ellen to the municipality of 
Nijmegen in which he explained his ideas for an alternative and his participation during 
a meeting organised by a local government official, to which a Rijkswaterstaat staff 
member was invited.
120
-Q-
Madelinde PHD zonder afbrekingen:Opmaak 1 15- 2011 14:44 Pagina 121
To summarise, the local groups used an identity frame when dealing with the local 
government to emphasise their alternative to the state plan to improve flood safety. In 
their interaction with the local government, buffering strategies were prevalent, while 
bridging strategies were rarely used. The residents used these strategies mainly because 
in their experience the local government was not acting to defend their interests.
Interaction strategies between authorities
Interaction strategies of national government when dealing with the local government
The national government used framing as well as buffering and bridging strategies when 
dealing with the local government.
During the planning process the national government used a power frame in its 
interaction with the local government to show that it was in charge of the planning 
process. An illustration of this frame is the launch of the government plan for a dike 
relocation in Lent, which was not discussed with the municipality of Nijmegen. The state 
secretary’s remark during the Loevestein meeting, where the government plan was 
launched, that ‘some hard nuts have to be cracked with the municipality of Nijmegen’,394 
referring to the Waalsprong housing development that had just been started on the same 
location where she planned a dike relocation, also demonstrated a power frame. The state 
secretary’s main reason for using this frame was to present a decisive image.395 She used 
a sketch of the dike relocation in Lent to show her approach to dealing with flood risk 
management: daring to take action. However, even the director of the Rijkswaterstaat 
regional office felt uncomfortable with the situation because the housing development 
had just been approved by all the authorities involved: ‘It was an extremely politically 
sensitive question’.396 The power frame of the national government was also revealed 
during the negotiations between the national and local government on compensation 
measures. The negotiation process took nearly a year (from mid-May 2001 to April 2002) 
with a breakthrough halfway through the negotiations when the government agreed in 
principle to provide compensation for the ‘limited accessibility’ of the city.397
The dike relocation case shows that buffering strategies followed naturally from the 
national government’s power frame. This type of strategy was used occasionally. An 
illustration of this is the state secretary’s visit to the municipality of Nijmegen that took 
place shortly after the Loevestein meeting. She looked at the existing dike and was not 
particularly shocked: ‘I am not saying that I find it awful, no. I find [the proposed dike 
relocation] less terrible than a noise barrier’.398
Sometimes the national government attempted to bridge, particularly when something 
had to be done, to prevent a dispute between national and local government from 
escalating. Illustrations of bridging strategies are the state secretary’s willingness to 
commission a Quick Scan and her consent to pay compensation and contribute to the
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cost of the second bridge over the river Waal. Other examples include responses to 
questions from the local government, solutions to disputes about responsibilities and 
interpretation of outcomes, such as the editing rounds before the publication of press 
releases and newsletters,399 and the question of whether the draft version of the EIA had 
to be made public.400
To summarise, the national government used a power frame when dealing with the local 
government to make it clear who is in charge. Buffering strategies, which were employed 
occasionally, followed naturally from this frame. Sometimes the national government 
used bridging strategies to prevent a debate escalating into a fierce conflict.
Interaction strategies of local government when dealing with the national government
The local government used framing as well as buffering and bridging strategies when 
dealing with the national government.
The local government employed an identity frame in its interaction with the national 
government. The first reaction of the Nijmegen executive councillor after the Loevestein 
meeting, where the government plan was launched, was illustrative. He inclined towards 
disbelief and denial: ‘I was not surprised that the problem of water safety was raised as 
the memory of the high water events in 1993 and 1995 was still alive. After the recent 
dike reinforcement there was a growing awareness that river widening was an optional 
measure. But the proposed location near Nijmegen was difficult to accept. With the 
approval of the national and regional governments, the municipality of Nijmegen had just 
begun the construction of the new Waalsprong urban extension’.401 His statement revealed 
a division between two parties: the municipality of Nijmegen as ‘us’, who intended to 
implement the Waalsprong housing development, and the national government as ‘them’, 
who proposed a dike relocation despite knowing that a housing development was 
planned. Later the executive councillor explained the position of the local government, 
which also revealed an identity frame. ‘It is a national government plan, and conforming 
to national planning decisions is our legitimate role in Dutch governance.’402 The 
executive councillor placed the local government between the national government and 
the residents. ‘In everything it did the national government expressed its preference for 
the dike relocation, while the local groups wanted their alternative in order to save their 
homes. These two positions were part of the process. There was much mutual 
understanding, but the principal differences of opinion remained.’403 In its position 
between the national government and the residents, the local government endeavoured 
to realise its own objectives.
The municipality of Nijmegen sometimes used buffering strategies in its dealings with the 
national government to make its position clear. This was illustrated by the position it 
adopted in the negotiations with the national government, which was to stick to the 
original plan for the new Waalsprong urban extension of 12,000 homes. Other examples 
of buffering strategies include the local government’s abstaining in the vote of the steering
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group (‘People had hoped that we would decide unanimously, but that did not interest 
me.’404) and the executive councillor’s view of the local government’s relationship with the 
national government: ‘I have always said that we are participating in the steering group 
to take stock of the process. Rijkswaterstaat remain responsible.’405 The local government 
also used buffering strategies during the EIA studies, an example being its comments on 
the Rijkswaterstaat newsletter on the dike relocation, which resulted in many editorial 
changes,406 and its interpretation of the results of the study, which led to disagreements 
with Rijkswaterstaat.407
Bridging strategies were used incidentally. The main bridging strategies employed by the 
local government in its dealings with the national government included the acceptance 
of the government plan on certain conditions, including the completion of the Quick 
Scan and an agreement on compensation and a contribution to the cost of the second 
bridge over the river Waal.
To summarise, the local government used an identity frame in its interaction with the 
national government, stressing that it sets its own conditions by claiming damages and 
a second Waal bridge, among other demands. The local government sometimes used 
buffering strategies as well as bridging strategies as part of the local government’s strategy 
of completing the Waalsprong housing development.
An overview of the interaction strategies used by the government authorities and local 
groups is given in Table 5.6.
Table 5.6 Interaction strategies of national government (Nat), local government (Loc) 
and local groups (Loc gr)
framing buffering bridging 
strategies strategies
± = low + = moderate ++ = high
The analysis shows that the local government used its identity frame strategically. In its 
interaction with the national government it emphasised that conforming with the national 
interest, but under certain conditions, was its legitimate role, but when communicating 
with the residents it stressed that it was the state secretary who makes the decision to avoid 
being blamed by the residents for its non-responsiveness.
The analysis also shows that employing a power frame or an identity frame and the 
accompanying buffering strategies hampered the development of negotiation, dialogue
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and collaboration. The occurrence of bridging strategies did not change this. The use of 
bridging strategies, however, implies that even in such situations there is always an 
opportunity to resolve the deadlock and move forward (see Tidwell, 1998; Kriesberg, 2007).
5.2.3 Power building by authorities and local groups
In this section we analyse the power building by the authorities and the local groups. 
The following types of power building have been identified: direct and indirect coercive 
power, legitimate power, reward power, hindering power, knowledge power, media 
power and sociability. While direct coercive power is exercised through repression, such 
as a police action or imposing penalties, indirect coercive power may achieve the same 
result indirectly, for example explicitly through threats or by appealing to the law and 
hierarchical relationships, or implicitly through a high turnover rate of officials 
(frequently moving officials to different positions). In modern democracies the 
government exercises restraint when using direct coercive power because this is 
considered to be a last resource to produce a desired social result. Other options are 
used first to achieve the government’s objective, such as the use of indirect coercive 
power. Legitimate power denotes how actors legitimise their position towards others. 
They may refer to a social structure, such as a hierarchy, or to other social norms, such 
as reciprocity, equity and responsibility. Reward power signifies that an actor is 
rewarded in a material way, in the form of money or goods, or in an immaterial way, 
through a honourable mention, a decoration or an appointment as honorary member. 
Hindering power means that an action or progress has been hindered or prevented by 
obstruction or slowing down progress. Knowledge power uses knowledge to influence 
the position of actors in their interaction with others. Examples are calling in external 
experts, commissioning studies and having a numerical superiority of experts in 
meetings, which relays signals to others that things are serious. It may also involve the 
use of the specific knowledge of the parties involved. Media power signifies the use of 
the media by actors to give meaning and interpretations to their values. Actors go to the 
media for various reasons, including mobilising support, validating the relevance of 
the actor concerned and expanding the field of influence of the actors concerned. The 
sociability of an actor is considered a separate power source (Nesler et al., 1993) (see also 
Chapter 3) because it tends to call forth reciprocity. It is proper to give something back 
to a person who has always been helpful, or it may be a motivation for getting favours 
from others. Since respondents rarely said anything about the sociability of other 
people, I noted their opinions of other actors or quotes that can be interpreted as such.
In this analysis authorities are differentiated into national government (Department 
of Water Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate 
to act) and local government (municipality of Nijmegen). Two questions about power 
building by the authorities and the local groups are posited. First, which power types 
are built by the authorities and the local groups? Here, a distinction can be made
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between the power exerted by the national government over the local groups and vice 
versa, the power exerted by the local government over the local groups and vice versa, 
and the exertion of power by the national government over the local government and 
vice versa. Second, what are the consequences of power building by the authorities and 
the local groups for their interaction strategies, and for the outcomes of the interaction 
between the authorities and the local groups and between the national and local 
authorities?
Power building by authorities with regard to the local groups
National government power building with regard to the local groups
The national government built indirect coercive power, legitimate power, hindering 
power, knowledge power and sociability in its dealings with the local groups.
The national government sometimes built indirect coercive power in its dealings with 
the local groups. An example of the national government’s building of this power type 
is that it left the decision on whether the residents’ alternative would be incorporated 
in the planning process to the state secretary. With regard to the power relations, the 
state secretary’s decision to incorporate the residents’ alternative in the EIA needs careful 
attention. As Hillier (2002:112) states, ‘consensus-building processes are likely to lead 
to “co-option” into the discourses and practices of the already dominant participant’. 
This was confirmed during the execution of the EIA studies. The meetings of the 
advisory group demonstrated that the national government was in charge. 
Rijkswaterstaat determined the agenda and to a large extent the outcome of the 
discussions.408 Its influence was also striking after the advice by the steering group and 
the advisory group was sent to the ministry. The project manager continued to elaborate 
the government plan while the state secretary had not yet come to a decision.409 Another 
illustration of indirect coercive power is the state secretary’s response to questions in 
Parliament, including a request for the state contribution to the cost of the second 
bridge over the river Waal to be reclaimed if the members voted for the residents’ 
alternative.410
In its interaction with the local groups the national government often built legitimate 
power, which was used to emphasise the state role in decision-making. An illustration 
of this is during the execution of the EIA studies when the project manager referred 
regularly to the state secretary’s responsibility for the final decision.411 The way 
Rijkswaterstaat dealt with the conditions set for river projects, the statutory design 
discharge of 16,000 m3/s and the forecast of 18,000 m3/s for the Rhine412 can also be 
considered as a form of legitimate power. Neither government officials nor government 
decision-makers, could explain these well and often referred to the national 
government.413 For the local groups, however, it was incomprehensible that during the 
last flood of 1926 a discharge of 12,600 m3/s was measured, while the high water events
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of 1993 and 1995 did not even reach this. Furthermore, they stressed that if these 
statutory design discharges would occur, Germany would be flooded first. Nevertheless, 
the design discharge of 18,000 m3/s turned out to be an important factor in the decision­
making.414 Another example of legitimate power is Rijkswaterstaat’s reaction to the 
residents’ proposal to reserve land. ‘Our conclusion is that it would not be legally possible 
to realise this. The local land use plan is valid for ten years, after which the statutory 
process of preparing and approving a new plan is required to designate the land for a 
possible dike relocation in future. That would not be the solution. Alternatively, we could 
buy the land, but then the area would be unavailable for development and that would 
go against the executive councillor’s wishes.’415
The national government frequently built hindering power in its dealings with the local 
groups. A striking example is Rijkswaterstaat’s unwillingness to enter into a dialogue 
with Professor van Ellen when he wanted to discuss his ideas for an alternative. 
Rijkswaterstaat first referred him to the municipality of Nijmegen before it agreed to a 
meeting with him, but later were unwilling to send him the report on the calculations 
for his ideas for an alternative or to commission a new round of calculations using 
another model, as van Ellen requested.416 Rijkswaterstaat withdrew van Ellen’s reaction 
during the consultation period for the SPKD Room for the River. The local groups had 
to appeal to the freedom of information legislation to get van Ellen’s submissions 
released for consultation. However, questions in Parliament were needed to get 
Rijkswaterstaat to respond to Professor van Ellen’s representations,417 which was 
eventually sent to his wife after he had died.418 In addition, the national government did 
not react to letters from the municipality of Nijmegen based on resolutions of the 
council, and it was unwilling to release detailed information on the different outcomes 
of the cost calculations for the government plan and the residents’ alternative.419
In its interaction with the local groups the national government often built knowledge 
power through its access to models for calculating the effects of measures that lower the 
water level of the river and the costs of river plans, its access to Rijkswaterstaat experts 
who were able to interpret the outcomes,420 and to outside experts appointed to prepare 
reports421 and provide advice, for example on the seepage water problem.422
In its dealings with the local groups the national government sometimes used sociability. 
An illustration of its sociability is the project manager’s present to all participants of the 
advisory group to show his appreciation of their local groups’ input during the meetings.
To summarise, in its interaction with the local groups the national government built 
indirect coercive power in an attempt to influence the decision-making, legitimate power 
to emphasise who has the authority to make decisions and set conditions, hindering 
power to avoid difficult discussions, knowledge power to get information about costs and 
effects of the government plan and the residents’ alternative, and sociability to express 
its appreciation of the local groups’ input during the advisory group meetings.
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Local government power building with regard to the local groups
The local government built indirect coercive power, legitimate power, hindering power, 
and knowledge power in its dealings with the local groups.
It sometimes built indirect coercive power when dealing with the local groups to 
withstand opposition, for example by not executing resolutions of the city council, or 
by executing these but formulating the wishes of the city council in such a way that 
Rijkswaterstaat could continue the planning process.423
The local government often built legitimate power in its interaction with the local 
groups. An example is the executive councillor’s explanation of his position: ‘It is a 
national government plan and conforming to national planning decisions is our 
legitimate role in Dutch governance.’424 In addition, the executive councillor brought 
legitimate power into action (he used it interactionally) by emphasising that the 
residents could not call the municipality to account for the final decision. In other 
words, he claimed legitimacy as a means for not being blamed for his actions. The 
executive councillor: ‘The question is whether the municipality of Nijmegen has to 
declare openly for or against one of the alternatives. According to me, you should not 
do this. From the beginning I have said that the plan for a dike relocation is a decision 
for the state secretary.’425 Apart from positioning himself in the political arena, he 
downplayed his role to avoid being blamed: ‘I only participated to take stock of the 
process;.. .it is the state secretary who decides.’426
The local government sometimes built hindering power to avoid discussions with the 
residents. An example is not responding to Professor van Ellen’s alternative. Later he 
heard that a commission would be set up and that he might be invited to participate. 
When he contacted the local government to ask why he had not heard from them, the 
local government officer referred him to Rijkswaterstaat.427 Another illustration of 
hindering power is the local government’s unwillingness to elaborate the residents’ 
alternative despite its promise to do so.
The local government rarely built knowledge power in its interaction with the local 
groups. Examples of its use of knowledge power are the commissioning of a 
comparative study of the government plan and the residents’ alternatives and the 
involvement of local government experts in the elaboration of the residents’ alternative. 
To summarise, in its interaction with the local groups the local government built 
indirect coercive power to resist opposition by the residents, legitimate power to 
emphasise its position in the decision-making, hindering power to avoid discussions 
with the residents, and knowledge power to get knowledge about the state plan and the 
residents’ alternatives, and to comply with the residents’ request to elaborate their 
alternative as a full alternative to the state plan.
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Power building by local groups with regard to authorities
Local groups power building with regard to the national government
The local groups built legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power, media 
power and sociability in their dealings with the national government.
In its interaction with the national government the local groups occasionally built 
legitimate power to stress that alternatives to the government plan also had to be taken 
into account. ‘Our message was that we are not against taking measures, but that 
alternatives have to be taken into account when there are good arguments for doing 
so.’428 Strikingly, the residents did not express their legitimate rights, such as their right 
to have a say in decision-making, more clearly. Another illustration of legitimate power 
is the emphasis placed by the local groups’ on elaborating their alternative in such a way 
that it would be comparable to the government plan, including the design of the land 
reservation. In fact, the project manager did not want to decide on the land use before 
the state secretary took a decision. The residents, however, replied that without various 
elaborated land-use options the assessment process would not be fair, so the project 
manager demanded that the local government elaborated various options.429
The local groups occasionally built hindering power when dealing with the national 
government. Examples are the establishment of various residents’ organisations and 
their presentation of an alternative, the Lentse Warande, which was not that different 
from the government plan.430 The local groups demanded attention for their alternative 
and the national government had to respond to them and their alternative. Their 
questions and demands for answers hampered the planning process that was geared 
totally to pushing the government plan through. In fact, it introduced much insecurity 
into the planning process in the sense that it complicated the acceptance of the 
government plan. In other words, it added ‘noise’ and ‘loose ends’ to the process. A local 
group chair: ‘We were particularly focused on the fact that our alternative would be 
comparable to the government plan and getting the state secretary’s attention for our 
alternative. As a result, she postponed decision-making. When she finally decided for the 
government plan, only Parliament was left to influence decision-making.’431
Knowledge power was often built since the local groups were informed of the 
government plan and they prepared an alternative. They called on Professor van Ellen 
for advice432 and his ability to communicate with Rijkswaterstaat experts on the details 
of Dutch river science. Additionally, they obtained legal advice on whether the discharge 
norm of 18,000 m3/s for the Rhine would be tenable if they went to the Council of 
State.433 The local groups were particularly active in building knowledge power during 
their membership of the advisory group. Thanks to their knowledge of the area they 
found many mistakes in the EIA reports.434
Media power was frequently built through articles in regional and local newspapers,
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which highlighted the residents’ view of the process while the national government was 
tied to strict communication rules.435 The media turned out to be an important platform 
for the residents to draw attention to their point of view and their alternative. It gave 
them the opportunity to inform the general public that there were alternatives to the 
government plan for widening the river. At the same time the residents pressured the 
national government to incorporate their alternative in the decision-making. However, 
media power was built randomly rather than strategically.
In their dealings with the national government the local groups built sociability several 
times. For example, despite their disputes with the national government, the local groups 
appreciated that their voice was heard in the advisory group and were grateful for 
Rijkswaterstaat’s willingness to discuss subjects the local groups put forward.436The local 
groups also showed their sociability towards the state secretary when she invited them 
for a conversation. They gave her a pair baby boots for her three-month-old daughter.437
To summarise, the local groups built legitimate power in their dealings with the national 
government to stress that alternatives to the government plan also have to be taken into 
account, hindering power to demonstrate that the residents are an actor in the process 
and have to be listened to, knowledge power to present an alternative plan that meets 
the safety standard and to comment on the reports of the EIA studies, media power to 
inform the public and to put pressure on the national government, and sociability to 
show their appreciation towards the national government.
Local groups power building with regard to the local government
The local groups built legitimate power, knowledge power, hindering power and media 
power in their dealings with the local government.
In their interaction with the local government the local groups sometimes built 
legitimate power to underline the fact that they were clearly the local government’s 
second priority after the second bridge over the Waal.438 They wanted to be heard and 
threatened to take protest actions. A local group chair: ‘If we are not heard then we will 
fight to the death... .We stumbled on the government plan at the meeting in September 
2000 when [executive councillor Paul Depla] announced that the Waalsprong housing 
development would go ahead, while completely ignoring the people who are affected’.439 
The opposition of the local groups can be considered as the use of hindering power 
towards the local government, among others. According to the local groups, opposition 
in today’s political context has to be accompanied by an alternative plan. A resident: 
‘We could say we are against, but that is not what we want. That is not fair. I am of the 
opinion that you have to use substantive arguments. If you are against, the discussion 
soon comes to an end and there is nothing left for you to do. What we have done is to 
come up with an alternative that is not very different from the government plan and 
continuously counter arguments against our alternative.’440 The local group frequently 
built hindering power by tabling motions demanding that the municipal executive send
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a letter to the state secretary asking for the residents’ views to be heard in the planning 
process or to study residents’ alternatives thoroughly. Both motions were adopted 
unanimously by Nijmegen City Council. The first motion could not be pushed to one 
side. A local group chair: ‘Oh, Paul [Depla] was mad’.441 The local groups also gave a 
presentation about their alternative to the city council. A local group chair: ‘In three 
minutes I showed that we are affected and presented our alternative, the Lentse Warande. 
I was complimented on my clear presentation. As a result, once again I convinced some 
members of the city council. I liked that’.442 The local groups attempted sideline the 
executive councillor’s objective of realising the Waalsprong housing development and 
the second bridge over the Waal by increasing their influence in the city council to put 
pressure on the municipal executive to take the local residents’ views into account in 
the decision-making process.
In their dealings with the local government the local groups occasionally built 
knowledge power by incorporating the ideas of Professor van Ellen into their alternative. 
Van Ellen also commented upon the outcomes of the comparative study that the local 
government commissioned, which included ‘his’ side channel.443 Knowledge power was 
also built after the presentation of the report that the local government commissioned. 
According to the local groups too much emphasis had been laid on urban development 
aspects and that the authors therefore did not take their arguments seriously because 
they were mainly concerned with ecological ad landscape aspects rather than the human
aspects.444
In their dealings with the local government the local groups often built media power by 
publishing articles in local and regional newspapers drawing attention to the residents’ 
alternative. Apart from the free local paper Lentse Lucht that functioned as the local 
groups’ mouthpiece, the local groups did not build media power strategically. As a result, 
they missed many opportunities to call attention to their views and their alternative.
To summarise, in their interaction with the local government the local groups built 
legitimate power to stress that the local government did not represent the residents’ 
interests, hindering power to show their opposition by presenting an alternative that 
would also serve the public interest, knowledge power to present an alternative plan 
that meets the safety standard and to assess a report that was commissioned by the local 
government, and media power to draw attention to their alternative.
Power building between authorities
National government power building with regard to the local government
The national government built indirect coercive power, legitimate power, reward power 
and hindering power in its dealings with the local government.
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In its interaction with the local government the national government occasionally built 
indirect coercive power, for example when the national government launched the plan 
for a dike relocation and said that ‘some hard nuts have to be cracked with the 
municipality of Nijmegen’.445 Here, the national government meant to say that at least 
a part of the plan for housing development cannot be realised because it is situated in 
the same place as the planned dike relocation.
In its argumentation when dealing with the local government the national government 
also often built legitimate power. The state secretary legitimised her plan by referring to 
factors such as climate change, increased water discharges, sea level rise and land 
subsidence, which required appropriate action and far-reaching measures. She therefore 
presented as a vision for the long term. State secretary Monique de Vries: ‘We have to be 
alert and be prepared to take far-reaching measures. In my White Paper on Room for 
the River I sketched the relation between upstream and downstream measures and my 
vision for the long term.’446 Presenting the final package of measures to be implemented 
in the Room for the River programme, the state secretary’s successor Melanie Schultz 
van Haegen revealed ‘her preference for relocating the dike, which means demolishing 
some houses. It shows that she takes a long-term view.’447
On one occasion, the national government built reward power to convince the local 
government to agree to the government plan. While compensation was widely 
recognised as a standard means of dealing with the negative impacts of planning 
decisions, a state contribution to the cost of a second bridge over the river Waal was 
not. An official: ‘It was the final offer’.448
In its interaction with the local government the national government frequently built 
hindering power. An example of the national government’s building of hindering power 
is the time-consuming negotiation process, which lasted from May 2001 to April 2002, 
before it reached agreement with the local government. In November 2001 the national 
government agreed in principle to provide compensation for the ‘limited accessibility’ 
of the municipality of Nijmegen.449 Another example is the project manager’s apparent 
willingness to disclose the draft EIA, but in practice it was not publicly available because 
interested residents had to call the project manager to obtain the key.450 Furthermore, 
hindering power was built by insisting on many editorial changes to the press releases, 
newsletters and letters to residents. This proved to be very time consuming and resulted 
in dissent between the national government and the local government.451
To summarise, in its interaction with the local government the national government 
built indirect coercive power in an attempt to influence decision-making, legitimate 
power to justify its role in far-reaching measures to ensure flood safety, reward power 
to finally convince the local government to agree with the state plan, and hindering 
power to show that it would not readily agree with the conditions set by the municipality 
of Nijmegen.
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Local government power building with regard to the national government
The local government built legitimate power and hindering power in its dealings with 
the national government.
The local government sometimes built legitimate power to withstand attempts by the 
national government to influence decision-making. An example is the list of conditions 
drawn up by the executive councillor after the state secretary informed him about the 
outcomes of the Quick Scan.452 Another example of the local government’s position in 
decision-making is the executive councillor’s reaction: ‘It is a national government plan 
and conforming with national planning decisions is our legitimate role in Dutch 
governance.’453
Hindering power was occasionally built during the execution of the EIA studies. The 
national government and the local authority had to agree on the content of newsletters, 
press releases and letters, which was often disputed. The municipality of Nijmegen did 
not accept Rijkswaterstaat’s edits and suggested detailed alterations.454 Another example 
of hindering power is the local government’s unwillingness to elaborate the residents’ 
alternative, for which the residents blamed Rijkswaterstaat.455
To summarise, the local government built legitimate power in its dealings with the 
national government to resist attempts by the national government to influence 
decision-making and to position itself in the decision-making, and hindering power to 
influence the planning process.
Table 5.7 contains an overview of the authorities and the local groups’ power building.
Table 5.7 P ow er bu ild ing by natio na l g o vern m en t (N at), local g o vern m en t (Loc) and local groups  
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The analysis of power building by authorities and local groups shows that both built a 
similar number of power types. The national government and the local groups built 
five power types. The national government built indirect coercive power, legitimate 
power, hindering power, knowledge power and sociability, while the local groups built 
legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power, media power and sociability.
132
-Q-
Madelinde PHD zonder afbrekingen:Opmaak 1 15- -2011 14:44 Pagina 133
Their aims were identical: both intended to favour their plan as much as possible. Both 
the local government and the local groups built four power types. The local government 
built indirect coercive power, legitimate power, hindering power and knowledge power, 
whereas the local groups built legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power 
and media power. As a result of their power building the local groups were quite 
powerful in their dealings with the authorities. Their use of knowledge power and 
media power in particular enabled them to put pressure on the authorities. However, 
the use of reward power by national government (its contribution to the cost of the 
second Waal bridge) was decisive in gaining the local government’s support for the state 
plan.
Although the residents felt threatened by the proposed demolition of 55 houses, they 
never raised it in discussions with the authorities. Rather than emphasising the loss of 
the village character, they attacked the assumptions underlying the government plan, 
which became apparent in their use of specific power types, particularly knowledge 
power and media power.
The building of indirect coercive power and legitimate power hampered development 
of the interaction into negotiation, dialogue and collaboration. The authorities chose 
to enforce rather than negotiate. The analysis thus demonstrates that a power frame 
and an identity frame is not conducive to dialogue and collaboration. For the latter, a 
common understanding is needed and a tolerant relationship that fosters trust. This 
will not occur as long as the parties are convinced that their own interests are the most 
important. By focusing strongly on their own interests and being unwilling to listen to 
others, they put dialogue and collaboration out of reach. The interaction between the 
authorities resulted in neither dialogue nor collaboration because of a conflict of 
interest and loyalties. While the national government’s objective was flood safety, the 
local government’s aim was realising the Waalsprong housing development and a 
second bridge over de river Waal. When the incompatibility of these interests was 
resolved by a state contribution to the cost of the second Waal bridge, the conflict of 
loyalties between the interests of the residents of Lent and the wider public interest 
experienced by the local government was also resolved. The local government, however, 
cleverly used an identity frame interactionally (see section 6.2.2). In so doing it avoided 
being blamed by the residents for its non-responsiveness.
5.2.4 Authorities' and local groups' potential to act
In this section we analyse the authorities’ and the local groups’ potential to act. Both 
potentials to act are broken down into capacity to act and motivation to act. With regard 
to the authorities, a differentiation was made between the national government 
(Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat 
has the mandate to act) and the local government (municipality of Nijmegen).
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Two questions were investigated: What are the authorities’ and the local groups’ 
potentials to act? and To what extent do these potentials to act shape the authorities’ and 
the local groups’ power building, their interaction strategies and the outcome of the 
interaction between the authorities and the local groups?
National governm ent's potential to act
The national government’s potential to act consists of its capacity to act and motivation 
to act.
National government’s capacity to act
The national government’s capacity to act is based on its mandate, resources, 
coordinating mechanisms and consistency (the construction or adoption of a 
narrative).
Mandate
The national government’s mandate was to realise the Room for the River policy that 
was included in a national spatial planning instrument, the Spatial Planning Key 
Decision (SPKD). This policy is to lower the water level of the rivers Rhine and Meuse 
in 2015 to accommodate peak discharges in future.
At the Loevestein meeting in February 2000 the state secretary for water management 
presented a sketch of the plan for a dike relocation to show which measures could be 
taken in the Room for the River programme. The dike relocation in Lent was the first 
river project in the programme that was steered by the ministry and devolved to a 
regional office of Rijkswaterstaat for the execution of the EIA studies. A new 
phenomenon was the involvement of the municipality of Nijmegen. Relocating the dike 
land inwards implied that Rijkswaterstaat had to deal with the municipality of 
Nijmegen authority for this area. It thus had to cede responsibility, which led to disputes 
in the area of responsibility. Disputed subjects included the content of newsletters and 
letters and the transparency of the national government’s actions.456 The national 
government’s mandate can thus be considered strong.
Resources
The resources of the national government included budget and people.
The national government provided a budget (2.2 billion euros) for implementing 39 
river projects within the framework of the SPKD Room for the River, including the 
proposed dike relocation in Lent. The size of the budget for the dike relocation in Lent 
was not known until the final stage of the EIA studies. The latest cost estimation for the 
government plan was 304 million euros, including 25 million euros reserved for solving 
the seepage water problem,457 whereas the residents’ alternative was calculated at 315
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million euros, including 58 million euros for a measure upstream.458 As the ministry was 
also in charge of transport it was able to contribute 90 million euros to the cost of a 
second bridge over the river Waal.
Regarding personnel resources, the national government had enough staff to work on 
the project, both at the ministry as well as at the Rijkswaterstaat regional office.
The national government therefore had many resources at its disposal. In other words, 
its resource base was strong.
Coordinating mechanisms
Apart from the top-down launch of the government plan, the national government 
used several instruments to embed the plan in current policy. First, a Quick Scan was 
carried out to compare various options for solving the bottleneck in the river Waal. 
Second, the state-established Brokx Advisory Commission studied the need for and 
value of the plan for a dike relocation. Third, two administrative agreements were drawn 
up between the national and local government. Finally, studies for the EIA were 
commissioned. In these studies the residents’ plan was elaborated as a full alternative 
to the government plan. The advisory reports from the steering group and the advisory 
group were sent to the state secretary who decided on the measure ‘Lent’ after the 
consultation period of the SPKD Room for the River.
The national government’s use of coordinating mechanisms can be considered to be 
strong.
Consistency
The construction of a narrative started after the publication of the Quick Scan, which 
came down in favour of the government plan as the preferred option for widening the 
river near Lent. The state secretary: ‘The plan for a dike relocation proved to meet the 
conditions safety and costs best.’459 Later, the features ‘cost effective’, ‘robust’, ‘a measure 
that would be implemented in one go’ and ‘supported by the region’ were added. 
Furthermore, there was an agreement with the local government in which the national 
government promised to contribute 90 million euros to the cost of a second bridge over 
the river Waal.460
The national government’s consistency (the construction of a narrative) was therefore 
strong.
National government’s motivation to act
The national government’s motivation to act entails political priority, organisational 
ambition and personal vision.
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Political priority
The political priority of the national government was to reduce flood risk, as stated in 
the Room for the River policy. The state secretary’s intention was to push water high up 
the political agenda to motivate politicians to support the policy programme that 
included measures to lower the water level. She presented a sketch of the plan for a dike 
relocation in Lent as an example of measures that could be taken.
The political priority of the national government can thus be described as high. 
Organisational ambition
The overall organisational ambition of the national government supported the political 
priority to work on flood safety.461 However, the plan for a dike relocation was not 
communicated properly within the organisation (particularly Rijkswaterstaat). The 
director of Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands office: ‘The state secretary took the project 
into her own hands. I was really furious about that. There was an agreement about the 
Waalsprong housing development. I just had arranged that all authorities involved 
agreed with it; it was therefore an extremely politically sensitive question.’462 A civil 
servant: ‘The director’s problem was that he had to consult the local authorities. [As a 
state secretary] you have the cheek to do that [the dike relocation]’.463 The national and 
local government achieved a negotiated solution. Both agreed with the state payment 
of compensation for houses that could not be built and a contribution to the cost of a 
second bridge over the river Waal. By way of compensation the local government was 
loyal to the national government’s intention to relocate the dike. The national 
government therefore had a strong organisational ambition.
Personal vision
Officials were strongly motivated to take action to achieve the flood safety objective; 
they had a feeling that this period was the right moment to act.464 Although at the 
regional level there were some dissonant views, after negotiations between the national 
and local government resulted in a positive outcome for both, they changed their 
mind.465 The project manager who was in charge of the execution of the EIA studies did 
his utmost to gain the support of the residents, but this proved to be impossible. 
According to him it was a close finish between the government plan and the residents’ 
alternative.466
The personal vision of politicians and officials can thus be considered to be strong.
To summarise, with a strong capacity to act and a strong motivation to act, the national 
government’s potential to act was strong (see also Table 5.8).
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Table 5.8 Capacity, m otivation and p o ten tia l to act of na tio na l go vernm ent
N ationa
government
capacity to act motivation to act potential 
to act
resources mandate coordinating
mechanisms
consistency political
priority
organisational
ambition
personal
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+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
± = w eak /lo w  + = m oderate  ++ = strong/high
Local governm ent's potential to act
The local government’s potential to act consists of its capacity to act and motivation to 
act.
Local government’s capacity to act
The local government’s capacity to act encompasses its mandate, resources, 
coordinating mechanisms and consistency (the construction or adoption of a 
narrative).
Mandate
Whereas the local government does not have a mandate in the field of flood risk 
management, except in emergencies, it does for the local land use plan. This spatial 
planning instrument had to be revised to permit the dike relocation in Lent. This 
implied that the national government depended on the municipality of Nijmegen to 
incorporate the dike relocation in the local land use plan.
Just before the state secretary launched the White Paper on Room for the River and 
presented the sketch proposal for a dike relocation in Lent in February 2000, the 
municipality of Nijmegen received the approval to begin the Waalsprong housing 
development in Lent. It therefore had a mandate to build a new urban extension on 
the same location where the dike relocation was planned.
The local government’s mandate can therefore be considered to be moderate.
Resources
The resources of the local government included budget and people. The Waalsprong 
housing development was a major financial commitment for the municipality of 
Nijmegen, so it was not willing to agree with the dike relocation beforehand. The city’s 
budget to commission studies was not that high. It provided 25,000 euros for a 
comparative study of the government plan and various residents’ alternatives. The local 
government had sufficient staff with the skills required to work on the dike relocation
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in Lent project. The resources of the local government can thus be considered to be 
moderate.
Coordinating mechanisms
The local government has various coordinating mechanisms at its disposal, including 
the commissioning of studies. The municipality of Nijmegen used this instrument when 
the state secretary did not want to include the residents’ alternative in the remit of the 
Brokx Advisory Commission.467 The study resulted in a positive outcome for the 
government plan, which motivated the executive councillor to abandon further research 
into the feasibility of the residents’ alternative.468 The local government’s use of 
coordinating mechanisms can thus be described as moderate.
Consistency
As the municipality of Nijmegen was not the initiator of the plan for a dike relocation 
it was not in a position to construct a narrative. However, during the planning process 
the local government adopted the national government’s narrative, although this was 
not done explicitly. It did not therefore act consistently and presented two faces: loyalties 
towards the national government and towards the residents. Since the second bridge 
over the river Waal was a long cherished desire of the municipality of Nijmegen, the 
state plan for a dike relocation presented an opportunity to negotiate with the national 
government on funding to cover the full costs of this bridge. The local government’s 
interest therefore weighed more heavily than the residents’ interest in retaining the 55 
houses that would be demolished under the government plan. This paradox was felt 
throughout the planning process. On the one hand, municipality of Nijmegen could not 
be explicitly in favour of the government plan as this would result in fierce protests by 
the residents; on the other hand, in its relations with national government it was ‘not 
done’ to be a supporter of the residents’ alternative.
The local government’s consistency (the adoption of a narrative) can therefore be 
considered moderate.
Local government’s motivation to act
The local government’s motivation to act entails political priority, organisational 
ambition and personal vision.
Political priority
The political priority of the local government followed the political priority set by the 
national government as it fitted in perfectly with its own interest, the desire to realise a 
second bridge over the river Waal and a riverfront on the north bank. The political 
priority of the local government can thus be considered high.
Organisational ambition
The organisational ambition of the local government was to realise the Waalsprong
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housing development and the second bridge over the Waal. However, after the national 
government launched proposals for a dike relocation, the municipality of Nijmegen 
recognised the importance of the river for the city. ‘When we started with the 
preparations for the Waalsprong housing development fifteen years ago, we viewed it 
as a suburb behind the dike. The sketch plans for the dike relocation prompted us to 
change our minds. We doubted whether we should oppose the government plan, but it 
turned out that the costs would be high. Then a Quick Scan was carried out, followed 
by the establishment of the Brokx Advisory Commission. Engineers from 
Rijkswaterstaat and local authority urban planners finally elaborated the ideas for a 
dike relocation into an embankment with buildings to minimise the number of houses 
that could not be constructed. An additional benefit was that it would be a facelift for 
the municipality of Nijmegen....We negotiated hard for a second bridge. In the end we 
did not get a bridge, but a contribution towards it.’469 Evidently, this contribution met 
the local government’s expectations. The organisational ambition of the local 
government can thus be considered to be strong.
Personal vision
The local government officials were strongly motivated to support the key aims of the 
municipality of Nijmegen including the realisation of the Waalsprong housing 
development and the second bridge over the river Waal. An official: ‘At some point, you 
have to choose, that is one of the roles of the local government. However, a few people 
felt cheated. You can make a drama of it, and it is regrettable that your house will be 
demolished, but look at urban renovation projects elsewhere, where many more houses 
will be demolished. And we guarantee compensation. At the moment the municipal 
executive is playing it smart by running with the hare and hunting with the hounds.’470 
However, the Nijmegen executive councillor felt very uncomfortable about his position. 
‘Although I tried to communicate openly and directly with the residents of Lent, they 
considered us to be the bearers of bad news rather than the ministry.’471
The personal vision of the local government officials can thus be considered to be 
strong.
To summarise, with a moderate capacity to act and a strong motivation to act, the local 
government’s potential to act proved to be moderate. For an overview, see Table 5.9.
Table 5.9 Capacity, m otivation and po ten tia l to  act of local go vernm ent
Local
g o v e rn m e n t
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Local groups' potential to act
The local groups’ potential to act consists of their capacity to act and their motivation to 
act.
Local groups’ capacity to act
The local groups’ capacity to act includes resources, trust and social identity.
Resources
The local groups’ resources include dispositional force, bonding force, bridging force and 
linking force.
The dispositional force of the local groups was weak because there were three local groups 
active: Lentse Federatie, Lent Village Council and Lent 800 which preferred to profile 
themselves as three separate organisations. Furthermore, the practical work was done by 
four active members, three of whom were chairpersons and can also be considered to be 
‘chiefs’ (individual leaders). As a result, at crucial moments they did not present a unified 
front. This was illustrated by the variety of articles, opinion articles and letters which the 
groups published in the media, which gave a rather confused picture of the opposition 
against the government plan. A particular case in point was the response by two active 
local groups who were not involved in the mediation action. These groups published their 
comments in a blog472 and sent a letter with comments to the consulting firm employing 
the consultant who initiated the mediation action.473
The bonding force of the local groups was weak because they were not able to enlist 
residents who would be willing to be active in the local group in some way or other, nor 
were they able to bring in residents with expertise in various fields who could contribute 
to protest actions. Moreover, they did not try to get Professor van Ellen on their side 
during the planning process. The chair of the local group Lentse Federatie explained this 
as follows: ‘Everyone came to me to express their sympathy, so I was well known in the 
village. But I didn’t know everyone... .There were not so many people actively involved in 
the protest actions, which meant we had to manage with the few we had.’474 This statement 
shows that the chair was passive rather than active in motivating residents who could 
have made important contributions to the local group. This was also true for the chairs 
of the other local groups.
The bridging force of the local groups towards the local government and the national 
government was weak. They had neither a well-considered strategy for dealing with the 
national government and the local government nor a strategy for dealing with the 
provincial government, which proved to be crucial for the decision-making.475
The residents’ linking force was weak, despite their ability to get attention from members 
of the city council, members of parliament and Prince Willem-Alexander. However, they
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failed to persuade the government to drop its plans for relocating the dike. For example, 
during a visit by a delegation of MPs to Lent most said they were in favour of the residents’ 
alternative, but when it came to the vote they changed their mind. According to them 
they could not get a majority in the House because ‘the LPF (nationalist party) was the 
only party we could not reach.476 With the support of this party we might have had a 
majority for a motion concerning the residents’ alternative in the House of 
Representatives.’477
Trust
The local groups lacked faith in specific people and organisations. They had little trust in 
others even those who supported their alternative. A chair of a local group described their 
trust in Rijkswaterstaat as follows: ‘There was little trust, but a constructive 
atmosphere....An expression often used in business reflects the relationship well: “We 
agree to disagree”. We differed in crucial respects: seepage water and the cost of the plans. 
You discuss it, but you don’t get any further.’478 With regard to the local groups’ trust in 
MPs, they were totally disappointed when the parliamentary vote did not deliver the 
expected outcome: instead of coming down in favour of the residents’ alternative, which 
they indicated during their visit, they voted for the government plan. ‘The politicians 
caved in when it came to the crunch’. The residents felt as if they had been taken for a 
ride.479 A proponent of their alternative was Professor van Ellen, but the local group’s 
relationship with him proved to be difficult. ‘While we were heavily involved in the politics 
of situation, Professor van Ellen just wanted to discuss the substantive issues. There was 
a mismatch.’480 Communication between the local groups did not go smoothly either. 
Although they said that they trusted each other,481 in practice this was not the case. They 
had little trust in each other, not to say distrust. The mediation initiative in which one local 
group was represented and two others were not resulted in a dispute between these groups
-  an example of the ‘free riders’ problem of Olson (1965). The two local groups reckoned 
they could have little impact on the outcome of collective actions, which was a strong 
inducement to free ride.
The local groups also distrusted the government, as evidenced by the comments 
Rijkswaterstaat appended to their advice to the steering group. The chair of the local 
group: ‘The constructive atmosphere then disappeared.’482 This distrust of the 
government was part of a general feeling about the political system: ‘This is a democracy 
in which everybody has the same rights. But in fact that is not true. We are not in the 
same position. The government spent a million euros on advice, but as an individual you 
are only allowed to make comments. That is not equitable, absolutely not... .I do not trust 
democracy as such anymore.’483
The local groups’ trust can therefore be described as weak.
Social identity
Although the village of Lent was annexed by the municipality of Nijmegen in 1998 for the
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construction of the Waalsprong urban extension, the residents of Lent still identified 
strongly with their own village when the national government launched its plan for a dike 
relocation. This was expressed during the planning process because the residents saw this 
as a last ditch action by the original ‘Lent community’. Almost all the residents backed 
their alternative, with the exception of just a few, such as a voluntary firefighter who was 
involved in the repairs to the dike during the high water episode of 1995.484 However, most 
residents did not turn their words into action and remained passive onlookers; only a few 
actively opposed the government plan. The four active people -  of which one grew up in 
the village -  were spread across three local groups. They failed to come together to form 
a single organisation not because of differences of opinion about strategy, but because of 
differences between their own interests and incompatible characters.
The social identity of the local groups therefore can be considered to be moderate.
Local groups’ motivation to act
The local groups’ motivation to act encompasses common purpose and solidarity. 
Common purpose
The common purpose of the local groups was strong. For centuries the village of Lent 
has been at the mercy of big plans by the municipality of Nijmegen and the national 
government (e.g. the Grift canal, the railway, the railway bridge over the Waal, the Waal 
bridge in the east of the city, and the N325 trunk road). The penultimate action was the 
annexation of the village of Lent by the municipality of Nijmegen in 1998 and the plan 
for a Waalsprong housing development. Shortly after the annexation the national 
government launched a plan for a dike relocation in Lent, including the demolition of 55 
houses, which the residents did not accept either. As they were not able to resist annexation 
and the Waalsprong housing development, they intended to fiercely oppose the dike 
relocation. Over the years the residents of Lent have witnessed the demolition of many 
historic buildings in the village. As a consequence, the village atmosphere (or what was left 
of it) faded slowly but surely. The plans for the dike relocation included the demolition 
of 55 houses, which meant the destruction of the last vestiges of the village identity, which 
were close to the hearts of the residents. Their ideal was clear: to save as many historic 
buildings as possible. In addition, they had a strong belief in the value of their alternative 
and their strategy to convince the members of Nijmegen City Council and the House of 
Representatives. In fact, the residents’ opposition had to do with a broader feeling of 
dissatisfaction with the current situation, particularly the annexation by the municipality 
of Nijmegen, which was the final blow for the village, and the loss of the village character. 
In this respect the protest action against the dike relocation was symbolic for the residents’ 
dissatisfaction with the status of their village.
Solidarity
The residents were generally united in their support of the residents’ alternative, but this 
was not reflected in active participation in local groups, as only four residents became
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active. There was little solidarity among the residents as a result of the annexation of the 
village by the municipality of Nijmegen, the Waalsprong housing development and the 
loss of economic activities, which used to be the bedrock of community cohesion.
As the low level of active participation by the residents in the local group weighs most 
heavily, the solidarity of the local groups can be considered weak.
To summarise, with a weak capacity to act and a moderate motivation to act, the local 
groups’ potential to act in the Dike Relocation in Lent case was weak. For an overview, see 
Table 5.10.
Table 5.10 Capacity, m otivation and po ten tia l to  act of local groups
capacity to act motivation to act potential 
to act
resources trust social identity common purpose solidarity
d bo br 1
± ± ± ±
+ - + + —
± s w eak /lo w  + s m oderate  ++ s strong/high
Table 5.11 summarises the potential to act of all the parties involved in the case. The 
national government’s potential to act was strong, the local government’s potential to 
act was moderate and the local groups’ potential to act proved to be weak.
Table 5.11 Capacity, m otivation and po ten tia l to  act of natio na l go vern m en t(N a t), 
local g o vern m en t (Loc) and local groups (Loc gr)
capacity to act motivation to act potential to act
National governm ent + + ++ + +
Local governm ent + ++ +
Local groups ± ± ±
± s w eak /lo w  + s m oderate  ++ s strong/high
A striking result of the analysis of the actors’ potential to act is that despite the fact that 
the national government’s potential to act proved to be strong and the local groups’ 
potential to act proved to be weak, both parties felt that the outcome of the decision­
making process was a close finish. The power performance of the actors thus appeared 
to be different. Rijkswaterstaat proved to be less powerful and the local groups turned out 
to have more influence than their potentials to act would suggest. The analysis shows that 
the national government’s mode of action had several weak points, including its inability 
to adopt a conflict management frame, its difficulty in dealing with opposing views, the
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lack of transparency of its actions and its excessive concern with presenting the 
government plan in a positive manner. Officials felt limited by the bureaucratic rules that 
required them not to interfere in the decision-making after they had delivered the results 
of the EIA to the state secretary, whereas the residents had the freedom to try to 
influencing the decision-making. Although the government plan ‘won’, there remained 
some ill feeling about the process.485 The local groups lacked ‘in-house’ experts and a 
broad network of active people and did not present a unified front, neither did they have 
a thorough strategy for dealing with the authorities or the ability to adopt a conflict 
management frame due to their fixation on their own interests. The ‘weak’ potential to 
act of the national government and the ‘strong’ potential to act of the local groups, from 
the viewpoint of the actors involved, was mainly because the local groups built various 
power types, in particular knowledge power and media power. This indicates that the 
action potential of the actors reveals more about their position in the planning process 
than the process of interaction. Therefore, the power building and interaction strategies 
have to be taken into account. Additionally, the outcomes of the analysis need to be 
discussed with the actors involved in order to assess the influence of the power building 
and interaction strategies on the government-citizen interaction.
Whereas the literature often discusses residents organised in a single group, the residents 
in Lent did the opposite: there were many resident groups, three of which were actively 
involved in the debate on the dike relocation. Although they did not win, they were able 
to exercise pressure on the national government to such extent that it was felt to be a 
close finish.
5.2.5 The authorities' organisational culture, the local groups' cultural 
background and the impact of these on their action
In this section I analyse the authorities’ organisational culture and local groups’ cultural 
background and the impact of these on their action. The object of the analysis is the 
organisational culture of the national government and the impact of this on its action, 
the organisational culture of the local government and the impact of this on its action 
and the cultural background of the local groups and the impact of this on their action.
National government’s organisational culture and the impact of this on its action
In the Dike Relocation in Lent case study the national government’s organisational culture 
was primarily based on an authoritarian government style (Pröpper & Steenbeek, 1999) 
or as Wolsink (2006) describes it, ‘the institutionalisation of technical perspectives in water 
management and the tendency to reinforce formal, top-down competencies in spatial 
planning’. This implied a preference for ‘deciding over’ rather than ‘deciding with’ the 
residents (Cooper, 1984). Over the centuries Rijkswaterstaat built up a reputation with 
this style (Bosch & van der Ham, 1998; van der Ham, 1999). The paradigm shift in water 
management from dike reinforcement to river widening that took place at the end of the
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20th century (Wiering & Arts, 2006) -  which in fact requires institutional change at all 
levels, including new forms of governance (Howe & White, 2004; Wiering & Arts, 2006)
-  did not result in a change in government style. The question that arises is why the 
authoritarian government style proved to be appropriate.
When dealing with the problem of river widening Rijkswaterstaat faced complexity and 
uncertainty (Meijerink, 2004). Since 2001 the Department of Water Management had 
worked on the Spatial Planning Key Decision (SPKD) Room for the River to accommodate 
the expected rise in the water level of the Dutch rivers as a result of climate change. The 
policy aim of the SPKD was to find spatial solutions to the flood safety problem instead 
of engineering solutions, such as dike reinforcements. According to Meijerink (2004), the 
complexity of the task was due to the involvement of three administrative levels of 
government (national, provincial and local) because river widening often meant that land 
inside the dikes would have to be used. This requires amendments to the regional plan 
(streekplan), a provincial government responsibility, as well as the local land use plan 
(bestemmingsplan), a local government responsibility. Additionally, the plurality and 
diversity of the organisations involved and the variety of interests that they represent also 
contribute to the complexity of the task, including the problem perception of these parties 
and their (sometimes strategic) behaviour. Apart from the uncertainty of the outcomes, 
there are also uncertainties concerning the substantive issues. Which climate change 
scenarios have to be taken into account, what does this mean for the water discharge, and 
to what extent will river widening measures contribute to a lowering of the water level?
The character of the Room for the River programme therefore implied that a management 
style of ‘command and control’ was always present in the background (van der Werff, 
2004). According to Korthals Altes (2002) the national government introduced national 
projects and proposed a general framework that reinforced hierarchical tendencies. It was 
also concerned more with providing legal and procedural certainty, by facilitating planning 
processes on these issues, and less with quality, by investigating in the process design and 
public involvement. Furthermore, Rijkswaterstaat officials, most of whom were engineers, 
still believed in ‘the engineering of society’ and, normatively, prioritised flood safety above 
other river values and functions, such as landscape and biodiversity (Wiering & Arts, 
2006). Whereas lower-tier government agencies were included in the process because of 
their role in realising the programme objectives, the inclusion of the residents was out of 
the question as this did not fit in with Rijkswaterstaat’s organisational culture and 
approach. However, Dutch legislation requires that an EIA is prepared in which 
alternatives have to be studied. In the Lent case, the residents rightly proclaimed that not 
only the government plan, but also other options had to be taken into account. Therefore, 
alternatives had to be included in the planning process somehow. The state secretary set 
about it cleverly by using the EIA to kill two birds with one stone: to include the residents’ 
alternative and to co-opt the residents.
The organisational culture of the national government and the impact of this on its action 
can therefore be considered to be strong.
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Local government’s organisational culture and the impact of this on its action
The SPKD process was designed in such a way that parties could also explore 
opportunities to realise their own goals within the parameters of the wider policy 
objectives (Meijerink, 2004). This became true for the municipality of Nijmegen. After 
initial scepticism, the local government decided to alter its orientation from ‘a city with 
its back to the river’ to ‘a city with its face to the river’ and tried to make a virtue out of 
the necessity for the dike relocation.486 The national government’s approval of the 
Waalsprong housing development on the same location where the dike relocation was 
planned offered the local government room for negotiation, but throughout the process 
it felt pressured by the national government. However, the side effects of the proposed 
dike relocation had to be compensated for, including the houses that could not be built 
and the ‘limited accessibility’ of the city. This was settled in two voluntary agreements 
signed in April 2002.
In its actions the local government was ahead of the National Administrative Agreement 
on Water (Nationaal Bestuursakkoord Water) of 2003, in which national, provincial and 
local governments and water boards committed themselves to work jointly on water 
management problems expected as a result of climate change and soil subsidence. The 
aim of the agreement was to adapt the water system accordingly by 2015 (Nationaal 
Bestuursakkoord Water, 2003). Van Leeuwe (2007) states that societal support for changes 
in the field of water management have never been as complicated as they are now. Many 
stakeholders in society, such as provincial and local governments, have competences in 
policy areas that are directly related to or overlap with water management. Leeuwe (2007) 
quotes Schultz van Haegen (2003) in stating that water management is supposed to be 
decided in a process of consultation between water managers, experts, government 
decision-makers, interest groups, societal groups and citizens. In practice, however, 
fundamental choices have to be made in which inevitably there are winners and losers, 
and when it is clear who will be the winners and losers, conflict seems to be unavoidable.
In the Dike Relocation in Lent case study the local government was internally divided: the 
municipal executive was a low profile proponent of the government plan, while the city 
council was against it. This reflects the conflict of interests at the local level, which leaves 
the local government little room for manoeuvre: on the one hand it has to be loyal to the 
national government, on the other hand it has to deal with the residents, who will judge 
the politicians on their results at the next election. The responsible executive councillor 
turned out to be a tightrope walker with a preference for realising the local government’s 
objective, the Waalsprong housing development and a second bridge over the river Waal, 
rather than committing to the residents’ desire to conserve the village character by 
retaining the houses that would be demolished under the government plan. He cleverly 
tried to support both causes at the same time.487 At the start, he managed to meet the 
city council’s wishes, including sending a letter to the state secretary -  but this was written 
in such a way that Rijkswaterstaat could continue to work on the government plan488 -  
and commissioning a comparative study between the government plan and the residents’
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alternatives. Later, he regularly dismissed the city council’s resolutions, for example when 
it asked for a thorough study of the government plan and the various alternatives. With 
the compensation and the state contribution to the cost of the second Waal bridge, the 
government plan fitted in perfectly with the local government’s ambitions. The local 
government therefore gave a higher priority to its loyalty to the national government 
than its loyalty to the residents. The residents can thus be considered as ‘the losers’.
The organisational culture of the local government and the impact of this on its action 
can therefore be considered to be moderate.
Local groups’ cultural background and the impact of this on their action
Until the 1990s the village of Lent was known as a horticultural centre for the cultivation 
of flowers, fruit, tobacco and vegetables. For a long time the municipality of Nijmegen, 
located opposite Lent on the south bank of the river, was an important customer. Most 
of these horticultural enterprises were restructured in recent decades and when the 
municipality of Nijmegen annexed Lent in 1998 for the development of an urban 
extension the village effectively became part of the city. As a consequence, Lent lost its 
village character. Although many residents of Lent did not grow up there, most of those 
who live in the older parts of the village know one another. The village residents could 
not resist the annexation, but they perceived the government plan for a dike relocation 
and the demolition of 55 houses this implied to be a threat to their village. The residents 
of Lent seized this opportunity to make their last stand as a separate community.
This willingness to take action to conserve the last part of ‘their’ village had its origins in 
Lent’s position in the region and the changes it has gone through during the past few 
hundred years. Until the end of the Second World War the village residents have often felt 
they were living in a contested area, under threat from either the Spanish, the French or 
the Germans. During the 20th century, the Dutch government and the municipality of 
Nijmegen agreed on the construction of major infrastructure works that cut through 
and divided up the village. The annexation of Lent by Nijmegen and the construction of 
the Waalsprong housing development turned Lent into a suburb of Nijmegen. When 
shortly after the annexation the government launched the plan for a dike relocation, the 
residents felt unfairly treated.489
Only the residents of the ‘old’ parts of the village and adjacent housing developments felt 
a sense of community interest. Street interviews490 showed a distinction between the 
residents living in these parts of the village and those who just arrived to live in the new 
houses built around neighbouring village of Oosterhout. Among the former, everyone 
knew about the government plan to relocate the dike and, apart from the volunteer 
firefighter, they all supported the residents’ alternative. Among the latter, some did not 
know that they were living close to the river, others did not know about the river plans, 
and if they did they supported the government plan based on their trust in the state.
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The village community was not a closely knit social network, mainly because of the 
decline in economic activities and the large influx of new residents since the 1970s and 
the infrastructure that split the village into three parts (see section 5.1). Like the village, 
the community was also split, as evidenced by the formation of different residents’ groups, 
including GeWaLent (the victims of the cut-off of the river bend, the ‘movers’), the ‘dikers’ 
(those who could remain), the ‘watchers’ (those who will have a view of the new dike) and 
existing organisations such as the Lent Village Council and Lent 800, which had similar 
objectives: to oppose the government plan. After an attempt to merge these groups, only 
GeWaLent, the dikers and the watchers were willing to form a new group, the Lentse 
Federatie, but under the express condition of retaining their own identity.491 Besides this 
range of local groups, only a few residents became active. This was probably partly 
because the three ‘chiefs’ of the active residents’ groups did not attempt to mobilise the 
residents. This became problematic during the planning process, for example after a chair 
of a residents’ group became ill in July 2006 and there was nobody available to take over. 
The local groups therefore missed the initiative to lobby the Senate.492 This shows that 
there was not really a village culture in the sense that villagers could rely on one another.
The local groups’ cultural background and the impact of this on their action can therefore 
be considered to be weak.
To summarise, the organisational culture of the national government and the impact of 
this on its action appeared to be rather strong. Its authoritarian management style based 
on Rijkswaterstaat’s centuries-long command of river management did not change when 
a shift in policy was introduced, while in fact this requires the involvement of citizens 
and other parties (Wiering & Arts, 2006). Instead, the national government broadened 
its scope somewhat by including lower-tier authorities in the planning process because 
it depended to a large extent on their commitment to realise its objectives. Throughout 
the planning process the local government felt subjected to the national government’s 
‘command and control’ approach. The organisational culture of the local government 
was flexible in that it leant towards the national government’s objective without denying 
its own interest; the local government’s organisational culture and the impact of this on 
its action can therefore be considered moderate. The local government’s disregard of the 
residents’ desire to save the historic part of their village can be seen as an indication that 
the residents were the ‘losers’ of this game. The loss of much of the village culture proved 
to be a weak point which had repercussions on their action potential. Nevertheless, the 
residents were able to seize the opportunity to present their alternative as a solution that 
met both the public interest and their own interest. In the end, their arguments and 
actions were not convincing enough for Parliament, which voted for the government 
plan. In view of the history of Lent, this outcome is not surprising. In the past the 
government had successfully planned and built various infrastructure works, the Grift 
canal, the railway, the N325 trunk road and the Waal bridge, that have had a considerable 
impact on the village. The community was not able to influence decision-making to 
prevent the implementation of these works and this has not changed. The cultural
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background of the local groups and the impact of this on their action can therefore be 
considered to be weak.
5.2.6 Sum m ary and discussion
The Dike Relocation in Lent case study can be summarised as follows. The interaction 
between the authorities and local groups can be broken down into the interaction 
between government authorities and local groups and between the different government 
authorities: the national government (Department of Water Management, for which the 
executive agency Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act) and the local government 
(municipality of Nijmegen). In the village of Lent there were three active local groups.
The interaction between the national government and the local groups ended in debate 
and conflict. Although the national government attempted to acknowledge the residents’ 
concerns to prevent escalation, this never ended in negotiation. Most issues, however, 
escalated into conflict, which remained unresolved. The interaction between the local 
government and the local groups evolved in a similar way: issues were disputed and then 
often escalated into conflicts which also remained unresolved. The interaction between 
the authorities resulted in debate and negotiation. Most debates were about the division 
of responsibilities. Negotiation took place once, when the national government decided 
to contribute to the cost of a second bridge over the river Waal in order to get the support 
of the local government.
With regard to the interaction strategies, the national government used a power frame 
throughout the planning process. The most striking examples are the launch of the 
government plan without first discussing it with its own officials and the local 
government, and the way it dealt with the residents’ alternative, which was considered to 
be the ‘second best’ right from the start. The local government and the local groups 
employed an identity frame. The local government used its identity frame interactionally. 
In its dealings with the national government it emphasised that ‘conforming to the 
national interest is our legitimate role, but under certain conditions’, but to the residents 
its position was that ‘it is the state secretary who decides’ to avoid being blamed by the 
residents for its non-responsiveness. Neither the national government nor the local 
government changed their frame from an identity frame to a conflict management frame. 
In its interaction with the local groups the national government used buffering strategies 
very often, while the local groups employed this type of strategy regularly. Both used 
bridging strategies occasionally. The local government and the local groups both used 
buffering strategies moderately in the interaction with each other, and bridging strategies 
incidentally. The government authorities occasionally used buffering and bridging 
strategies when interacting with each other.
Both the national government and the local groups built five power types in their
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interaction. The national government built indirect coercive power, legitimate power, 
hindering power, knowledge power and sociability. The local groups built legitimate 
power, hindering power, knowledge power, media power and sociability. The local 
government and the local groups both built four power types in their interaction. The 
local government built indirect coercive power, legitimate power, hindering power and 
knowledge power, whereas the local groups built legitimate power, hindering power, 
knowledge power and media power. The national government built four power types in 
its dealings with the local government (indirect coercive power, legitimate power, reward 
power and hindering power), whereas the local government built two power types 
(legitimate power and hindering power). The most important use of power was the 
national government’s use of reward power when dealing with the local government, in 
the form of a contribution to the cost of the second Waal bridge.
The power building by the government authorities and local groups gives insight into 
both the use of interaction strategies and the interaction outcomes. The building of 
indirect coercive power and legitimate power hampered the development of the 
interaction outcomes negotiation, dialogue and collaboration. The authorities chose to 
enforce rather than negotiate. The analysis therefore demonstrates neither a power frame 
nor an identity frame are conducive to dialogue and collaboration. The latter requires a 
common understanding and an atmosphere of tolerance in which trust may grow. This 
will not happen as long as the parties are convinced that their own interests are the most 
important.
The national government’s potential to act proved to be strong, whereas the local 
government’s and the local groups’ potential to act proved to be moderate and weak 
respectively. While the national government’s potential to act was powerful and the local 
groups’ potential to act appeared to be less influential, this was viewed differently by the 
actors involved. The national government’s potential to act was weakened by its inability 
to adopt a conflict management frame as a result of its excessive concern with presenting 
the government plan in a positive manner, its difficulty in dealing with opposing views, 
and the lack of transparency of its actions. In addition, it did not have an answer to the 
local groups’ building of knowledge power and media power. The local groups, however, 
turned out to be more influential than their potential to act would suggest, which 
indicates that their lack of ‘in-house’ experts, a broad network of active people, a united 
front, a thorough strategy for dealing with the authorities and their inability to adopt a 
conflict management frame as a result of their fixation on their own interests were not 
as significant or consequential as expected. The ‘weak’ potential to act of the national 
government and the ‘strong’ potential to act of the local groups, from the viewpoint of 
the actors involved, was mainly a result of the local groups building various power types, 
in particular knowledge power and media power. This implies that the action potential 
of the actors better explains their position in the planning process than the process of 
interaction. Therefore, the power building and interaction strategies have to be taken 
into account. Additionally, the outcomes of the analysis need to be discussed with the
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actors involved in order to assess the influence of the power building and interaction 
strategies on the government-citizen interaction from their point of view. As this case 
study shows, the actors may have a different interpretation of the outcome than my 
analysis.
Concerning the authorities’ organisational culture and the citizens’ cultural background 
and the impact of these on their actions, the analysis shows that culture had a strong 
impact on the national government’s actions, a moderate influence on the local 
government’s actions and a weak influence on the local groups’ actions. The 
organisational culture of Rijkswaterstaat was largely an authoritarian style of governance. 
In practice this meant that Rijkswaterstaat took a technical approach to water 
management and tended to reinforce formal, top-down competencies in spatial planning. 
The Room for the River programme resulted in new forms of governance, including 
cooperation with lower-tier authorities, but the organisation did not change its style of 
operation. The Room for the River programme was set up in such a way that a command 
and control approach operated in the background. Examples are the presentation of 
national projects, such as the dike relocation in Lent, the emphasis on procedures and the 
focus on flood safety which meant that other river values and functions, such as landscape 
and biodiversity, were given a lower priority. The municipality of Nijmegen pursued its 
own course independently of the public interest which the national government 
defended, and the residents’ interest. In the past the local community in Lent had been 
unable to change the authorities’ mind when infrastructure works were planned in their 
village and this has not changed.
Discussion
The Dike Relocation in Lent case study shows that relatively badly organised groups of 
residents were able to exercise pressure on the national government in such a way that it 
was felt to be touch and go whether the government plan or the residents’ alternative 
would win. The question that arises is what would happen if the residents had formed a 
single group led by a chairperson with management qualities and strategic insight?
If the residents had had a strong leader every effort would have been made to establish a 
good relationship with the water expert Professor van Ellen and he would probably have 
stayed on as adviser to the local group. Other experts in different fields would also have 
been invited to advise the residents. Furthermore, more effort would have been given to 
establishing and maintaining closer contacts with the residents and inviting them to 
become active members of the local group. At the same time, the local group would have 
presented a more united front and adopted a well considered strategy for dealing with the 
authorities (national, provincial and local) in which the media would have been seen as 
an ally rather than a coincidental partner. Opposition would have been centred on the 
‘substance’ -  particularly the assumptions underlying current policy, such as the need 
for a dike relocation, and the effects of the proposed measure, such as the seepage water 
problem -  and on the ‘process’, such as the ‘closed’ design of the planning process, the
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residents legitimate right to have a say in decision-making, the disregard of public values 
and the little attention given to reasonable alternatives supported by the residents. 
Should the residents have allowed themselves to be co-opted by the government, for 
example by taking part in the advisory group? There are two possible views. One view is 
that it was a good idea, although the chair of the High Water Platform (see section 6.1) 
considered it disadvantageous493 because it meant the residents had fewer options and 
rights, for example to give advice. However, if they had attached conditions to their 
membership, for example by demanding a different planning process in which the public 
was involved, then the local group’s membership of the advisory group might have been 
beneficial. They could have made their membership of the advisory group conditional 
upon withdrawal of the government plan from consideration. A second option for the 
local group was to remain outside the planning process, but this would only have been 
an option if the authorities were unwilling to include the residents in the planning process 
anyway. As the dike relocation had been included in the SPKD Room for the River policy 
programme, the residents’ group would have been invited to participate in the planning 
process sooner or later, since the national government is bound by legislation that requires 
it to take reasonable account of the local community’s wishes. It would therefore have 
been difficult to refuse an invitation as this would have shown an unwillingness to engage 
in the process, which could have had disadvantageous effects on the relationship with 
the national government and weaken the residents’ position in any legal challenges.
The government authorities seemed to be in a powerful position. The plan for a dike 
relocation was included in the SPKD Room for the River, there was no discord between 
the experts or between the authorities and money was no object. Getting the plan realised 
seemed to be a question of prestige. In other words, all the conditions were present to go 
ahead and implement the project.
The power frame of the national government is typical for enforcing large infrastructure 
works in the Netherlands when flood safety (e.g. the Delta Works) or the national 
economy (e.g. the Betuwe rail freight line from the port of Rotterdam to Germany; 
Betuwelijn) is at stake. For a bottleneck in the river Waal, however, this power frame seems 
to be a case of overkill, all the more because flood safety was not at risk. In fact, the power 
frame is not typical of the Dutch polder model, in which each stakeholder has a say. As 
Dutch society is geared towards consensus, conflict makes the authorities feel uneasy. 
Therefore, before launching a plan they generally play it safe by consulting with other 
government authorities and civil society organisations to avoid discord and attempt to 
come to a consensus. In Rijkswaterstaat’s command and control approach there was, 
however, another scenario for the dike relocation because the plan was not undisputed 
and was based on many assumptions which were questioned during the course of the 
planning process, such as the safety standard of 18,000 m3/s for the Rhine discharge and 
the disregard of transboundary aspects. In the course of the planning process the national 
government changed its command and control approach towards a more moderate one 
to avoid conflict. Given the insecurity of the political process the outcome of the decision­
making is never certain. It finally became clear that politicians did not make an issue out
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of the safety standard of 18,000 m3/s and the limited room for public involvement. In 
the end, Rijkswaterstaat ‘won’, but according to its officials it was a close finish.
While the national government totally ignored the residents, the local government would 
not be expected to consider this to be an option. One would expect that a lower-tier 
authority is closer to the local population. But this was not the case. The municipality of 
Nijmegen used an identity frame when dealing with the national government and the 
residents and proved to be opportunistic in its approach. It focused entirely on meeting 
the public interest in such a way that also met the local government’s interest and ignored 
the residents’ interest. Furthermore, it sought to avoid any blame by legitimising its role. 
As a result, the residents of Lent lost their faith in democracy, as evidenced by the 
statement of a local group chair: ‘I am not keen to be involved [in the implementation of 
the dike relocation] because I do not trust democracy as such.’494
For various reasons the provincial government, the province of Gelderland, was 
conspicuous by its absence. First, it supported the government plan to relocate the dike 
in Lent, so apart from being involved in the project organisation for the EIA studies it did 
not have any further part to play. Second, at the same time the provincial government was 
involved in a dispute with the national government about another government plan: the 
designation of an emergency water storage area in the Ooijpolder (see Chapter 6).
The analytical framework and ideas for further research
The analytical framework worked quite well, but did not cover the feelings of the actors. 
At first sight the national government’s and local groups’ potentials to act were clear: the 
national government had a strong potential to act while the local groups’ potential to act 
was weak. However, both these actors had a different view of this. The national 
government felt less powerful, particularly because of the local groups’ building of 
knowledge power and media power, and it had several weak points, including its inability 
to deal with the residents and their alternative, which it expressed as an ill-feeling about 
the process. The local groups managed to exert pressure on the national government 
through their use of knowledge power and media power despite their weaknesses, 
including their lack of ‘in-house’ experts, a broad network of active people, a united front, 
a thorough strategy for dealing with the authorities and their inability to adopt a conflict 
management frame as a result of their fixation on their own interests.
What the analytical framework missed was the ability to follow the policy discourse and 
the narrative of the actors. It would be of interest to analyse the development of the policy 
discourse and the development of the national government’s narrative, including the 
local groups’ inability to adopt the national government’s narrative or inability to change 
the national government’s narrative and adopt a joint narrative. This raises the question 
of why the local groups were not able to develop their own narrative and whether a joint 
narrative would have been within the bounds of possibility.
Another shortcoming of the analytical framework was that it only includes two types of
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actors, government authorities and residents, whereas the water expert also played an 
important role. In the analysis this was dealt with by considering the water expert as ‘one 
of the residents’, but this was not the case. His role in the planning process deserves a 
specific place in the framework.
A subject for further research is the question of the leadership of the local groups. 
Relevant questions are: What was the reasoning behind the multileadership (which stories 
were told by the different chairs)? Is multileadership an inevitable consequence of the 
physical barriers and social divisions in Lent? How did the relations between the leaders 
develop during the planning process? Did they divide tasks and responsibilities between 
themselves and subsequently make (oral) agreements, for example on relations with the 
media and specific tasks? How were the local groups and their leaders viewed by the 
residents and the authorities? and Is multileadership a workable arrangement for 
achieving the objectives of a coalition of local groups?
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Chapter 6 Emergency Water Storage in 
Ooijpolder case study
The plan to create emergency water storage facilities in areas bordering the main rivers, 
including Ooijpolder, was a state initiative to prevent the densely populated Randstad 
area in the west of the Netherlands from flooding. This case study covers the period 
running from the launch of the plan in February 2000 to the state secretary’s decision 
in March 2005.
Between 2005 and 2008, 47 in-depth, semi-structured interviews were held with key 
persons, 30 of whom were from government authorities, consultancy firms and a non­
governmental organisation, and 17 were residents, including various members of the 
residents’ organisation High Water Platform (Hoogwaterplatform). The chair of this 
organisation was interviewed three times, once to reflect on specific moments in the 
planning process with another member. Conversations with the manager of the Room 
for the River project office at the province of Gelderland and two members of a 
historical association in which additional information was acquired are not included in 
the list of respondents. During the interview period a desk study was carried out, for 
which reports, letters, articles and newspaper clippings were used.
6.1 Case narrative
This case narrative of the emergency water storage in Ooijpolder includes a brief review, 
a historical perspective that sketches in broad lines what happened prior to the state 
initiative and the descriptions of the case from the government’s point of view and the 
local group’s position.
Emergency W ater Storage in Ooijpolder in brief
While presenting the White Paper on Room for the River on 28 February 2000 state 
secretary Monique de Vries for water management emphasised the necessity of 
additional measures, including the plan for three emergency water storage polders, or 
‘calamity polders’,[496] one of which was Ooijpolder (see Figure 6.1).
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F ig u re  6.1 The w h ite  a re a s  a re  p lanned fo r  em e rg e n c y  w a te r  s to rag e  (Luc D innissen)
Duivense Broek
That very evening it was an item on the eight o’clock national news on television. 
Government decision-makers in the region were not happy. Although most of them 
knew the direction water policy was developing, there had been no proper discussion 
about which measures would be taken. Rather than worrying about the technical 
aspects of the proposed solutions, they were afraid of the social consequences (Roth et 
al., 2006a). Their premonition was right: the state secretary’s speech caused considerable 
unrest, particularly in Ooijpolder. Until then, government officials and residents 
thought they lived in a secure area, but the state secretary’s emphasis on ‘residual risk’[497] 
and her plan for emergency water storage (‘controlled flooding’) to reduce this type of 
risk changed that overnight. The evacuation of 1995 was still fresh in their minds 
(Warner et al., 2008).
The state secretary’s next step was to establish the Advisory Commission on Emergency 
Water Storage Areas (Commissie Noodoverloopgebieden), also referred to as the Luteijn 
Commission after its chair, David Luteijn. The Commission’s assignment was to study 
the need and purpose of the proposed measure and to generate support for it in the 
region. It therefore consulted selected lower-tier government authorities and societal 
organisations to try to win them over to the idea that emergency water storage actually 
functions like an airbag in a motor car. The commission published its report in May 
2002. The newly appointed state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen, who wanted to 
deal firmly with the subject,495 chose emergency water storage from five options for 
reducing flood risk: international collaboration, emergency water storage, 
compartmentalising, raising safety standards and organisational measures (Roth et al., 
2006a). From then on, all efforts were focused on emergency water storage.
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In the meantime, the bank manager of a local branch of the Rabo cooperative bank in 
Ooijpolder, who felt responsible for his clients and their future, invited David Luteijn, 
who was a member of the supervisory board of the corporate Rabo group, to a meeting 
to discuss the matter after the bank’s annual general meeting. Luteijn expected a hostile 
audience, but it was only during the meeting that the residents realised that the 
proposals were in earnest. The meeting became tumultuous and can be considered to 
be the start of a broadly supported protest action against the plan for emergency water 
storage. The first to take action to oppose the plan were some farmers who were 
members of the regional farmers’ organisation GLTO. They expressed their rage by 
erecting straw figures with slogans in the landscape.
After the Luteijn discussion meeting the bank manager worked on setting up a residents’ 
organisation. The chair of the organisation was assumed by a recently retired rector of 
a secondary school whose family came from the area. He proved to be a real manager 
and established a well run organisation called High Water Platform 
(Hoogwaterplatform), with several working groups. The main strategy was to call the 
state secretary ‘the enemy’ and try to undermine her position. To this end the residents 
commissioned a contra-expertise to attack the Government’s assumptions, used various 
means of communication and tried to convince local and provincial elected officials and 
senior government officers to take their side against the plan. Lower-tier authorities 
also commissioned a contra-expertise to underpin their arguments against calamity 
polders.
During the course of their work the residents discovered an undisclosed report in which 
the measure was critically analysed. They tried to obtain a copy of the report by 
appealing to the freedom of information legislation (Wet openbaarheid van bestuur). 
Finally, they directed all their efforts at the members of the House of Representatives 
by visiting political parties in The Hague and priming them with a steady flow of bite­
sized information on new insights, developments and research into emergency water 
storage, and by inviting MPs and local and provincial politicians for a guided tour in 
Ooijpolder, with running commentary from the technical advisor to the residents’ 
organisation (Warner et al., 2008). The residents had a close relationship with the 
media, which played an important role through the publication of a constant stream of 
articles about the subject in the regional newspaper. This proved to be effective. The 
technical and economic arguments put forward by the residents’ organisation 
persuaded the MPs of the validity of their case. While the state secretary was on 
maternity leave the residents’ organisation managed to get a majority in the House of 
Representatives to oppose the plan. In November 2004 the House of Representatives 
adopted a parliamentary motion by the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats to 
reallocate the funds earmarked for emergency water storage to the Room for the River 
programme. On 24 March 2005 the state secretary conceded defeat, and the emergency 
water storage in Ooijpolder was shelved (Warner et al., 2008).
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Table 6.1 is a process outline listing the different planning and decision-making stages 
in the Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder case.
Table 6.1 Process ou tlin e  fo r  the  E m ergen cy  W a te r  S to rage  in O o ijpo lder case study
Process stage Date Method Participants
Prepara tory stage (February 2000 -  M ay 2002)
Launch o f plan 28 February 2000 Presentation in 
Loevestein Castle
State secretary fo r  
w a te r m anagem ent
Advisory Commission 
on Emergency W a te r 
Storage Areas 
(Lute ijn  Commission)
A u tu m n  2001­
15 M ay 2002
S tudying th e  need and 
purpose o f em ergency 
w a te r storage
D. Lu te ijn  (chair),
E.M. d 'H o n d t (vice 
chair; m ayor o f  th e  
m u n ic ipa lity  o f 
N ijm egen),
Prof. J.P. Bahlm ann, 
G. Blom, J. van D ijk, 
J.C.M. Hovers,
Prof. C. Veerm an
D ecis ion-m aking stage (N ovem ber 2004 -  M ay 2005)
Acceptance m o tio n  to  
rea lloca te  funds fro m  
em ergency w a te r 
s to rage to  th e  Room 
fo r  th e  River 
p rogram m e
N ovem ber 2004 P arliam entary m o tion Two m em bers o f th e  
House o f R epresentati­
ves: Erik van Lith 
(Christian Democrats) 
and Jan B oe lhouw er 
(Social Democrats)
G overnm ent's decision 
to  rea lloca te  funds 
fro m  em ergency w a te r 
sto rage to  th e  Room 
fo r  th e  River 
p rogram m e
24 March 2005 G overnm ent's decision C abinet
F igu re  6.2 O oijpolder
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Historical perspective
Ooijpolder and Duffelt lie in the flood plain of the river Waal to the north and the push 
moraine on which Nijmegen is situated to the southwest. Ooijpolder contains the 
villages Ooij, Persingen, Wercheren and Erlecom; the Dutch part of Duffelt496 contains 
the villages Leuth, Kekerdom and Millingen aan de Rijn (Figure 6.2).497 The two polders 
have a total population of about 13,000 inhabitants (van Eck, 2005).
A border area for government and water management
Until the 19th century Ooijpolder and Duffelt contained several different polders and 
straddled national and municipal boundaries. After French rule ended in 1813 it took 
a while before the Prussians and the Dutch agreed on the national border. In 1816 Leuth 
and Kekerdom became Dutch and the border was situated roughly where it now lies (see 
Figure 6.2). For a long time Millingen, Ubbergen and Ooij were autonomous 
municipalities. During the 19th century Ooijpolder and Duffelt consisted of a few 
separate polders, which often had opposing interests. In this territory of Gelderland 
and Kleve the national border was convoluted and so it took much longer to establish 
a settled water management regime than in other areas along the main rivers. The 
existence of upper and lower polders in the border area was a point of contention. The 
polder authorities upstream were keen to discharge excess water, but often this flowed 
more easily via the downstream polders rather than the river. This meant that the 
downstream polders not only had to contend with excess water from the river, but also 
the drainage water from the upstream polders. In 1726, 1740 and 1744 dike breaches 
occurred in Germany, leading to flooding in Ooijpolder. From the Middle Ages on, the 
inhabitants of Ooijpolder regularly had to contend with flooding, leading to crop failure 
and damage. Their livelihoods have therefore long been insecure and unstable. Living 
on the higher ground did not guarantee safety from flooding.
As early as 1300 the inhabitants of Ooijpolder started to construct dikes from 
Wercheren, Ooij and Tiengeboden to the outlet in the river Waal (see Figure 6.2). Two 
dikes were built in the east to keep out water flowing under pressure from the push 
moraine and water from the surrounding countryside, which together formed a circle 
called the Circul van de Ooij. The close network of dikes prevented the river from 
overflowing its banks and as a result the channel followed a fixed course. Little by little 
the river was contained and the inhabitants built houses and cultivated the land. Dike 
breaches then had enormous consequences, which made their maintenance crucially 
important. In the farming communities it was common practice to maintain only the 
dike that was situated on their own territory under the system of customary law.
A close network of dikes also had consequences for drainage water. The surplus water 
could not drain naturally and had to be drained artificially. During high water periods 
this proved to be a hard job, partly because the dikes themselves formed a barrier as 
there were no openings through which to discharge the water. Besides, the improved 
drainage led to soil compaction in the areas outside the dikes. Another problem was
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groundwater seepage. Water infiltrated into the sandy soils on the higher ground outside 
the dikes and flowed through deeper layers of subsoil under the dikes. This seepage 
water usually emerged during high water periods, making it difficult to drain the water 
to the river. It also had a positive effect: it provided a counterweight to the river water 
when it rose to the crown of the dike during periods of high water. Spring water from 
the push moraine was also a source of great concern to the landowners. Therefore, the 
Schependom Nijmegen built a drainage sluice (Meersluis) at the mouth of the river Aa 
where it flowed into in the Waal.
Disputed territory
The border territory proved to be an important bone of contention. It changed hands 
from the Duchy of Gelre to the Duchy of Kleve (part of present-day Germany), then to 
the Republic of the United Netherlands, then to the Kingdom of Prussia (part of current 
Germany) and the French Empire for a short time. However, to which lord the village 
belonged seemed to be of less importance than the water management borders, as 
everyone needed ‘to keep their feet dry’ (van der Most & Wehrung, 2005).
At the time Duffelt got its dike letter (dijkbrief) from the Lord of Gelre on 13 June 1364, 
six villages belonged to the municipality: Duffelward, Keeken-Bimmen, Kekerdom, 
Leuth, Niel and Mehr. However, although neighbouring villages belonged to the Duchy 
of Kleve, like Rindern, Zyfflich and manorial Millingen, they were given permission to 
drain their water to the river Waal via Gelre’s territory. This was conditional upon 
keeping to the rules of the ‘dike chair’ (dijkstoel), consisting of a dike reeve and the dike 
board ( heemraad). The dike board were representatives elected by the landowners who 
carried out the inspection and contributed to the maintenance of the water 
infrastructure, such as dikes, ditches, canals and sluices. Because the Millingen dike 
continued along both sides of Duffelt, manorial Millingen got its own dike chair, 
although it was a relatively small polder consisting of ten farms. With the lapse of time 
Millingen was no longer able to pay for the costs of dike maintenance. Therefore, the 
Dutch state took it over in 1817, but the responsibility for water drainage was left to 
Millingen. Later, when the Millingen polder became part of Gelre, it was obliged to 
follow the Duchy’s river polder regulations.
In 1794 French troops crossed the Rhine under the command of Charles Pichegru and 
Gelre and Kleve were placed under French rule until 1813. After the defeat of Napoleon, 
the Congress of Vienna decided in 1815 to cede the villages Kekerdom and Leuth to 
the Republic of the United Netherlands. The water management consequences were 
arranged in 1819 -  the two villages would get their own polder board -  but before this 
could be put into effect the dike near Leuth was breached in 1820. The landowners in 
Duffelt were of the opinion that all landowners, also those living in Prussia, should 
contribute to the dike renovation. As the Vienna arrangement had not yet been effected, 
this resulted in a situation in which Prussia was in charge of the maintenance of a Dutch 
river dike. A new agreement was signed in June 1821. The Prussian villages of
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Düffelward, Keeken, Bimmen, Niel and Mehr and the Dutch villages of Kekerdom and 
Leuth once again fell under the same water board, Zyfflich-Wyler, which corresponded 
with the old Prussian water board of Duffelt.
Water management as a source of conflict
Like Duffelt, Ooijpolder received its dike letter in the 14th century. Ooijpolder was 
divided into four jurisdictions: Rijck of Nijmegen, Schependom Nijmegen, manorial Ooij 
and manorial Persingen. The greater part of Ooijpolder lays within manorial Ooij and 
manorial Persingen. The board of each of the jurisdictions was responsible for the 
maintenance of the river dikes and the dikes in the hinterland. However, instead of 
safeguarding the dike maintenance the dike letter proved to be a permit to omit it. The 
lords who ruled in Ooij and Persingen had different interests. The disagreement 
between the lords of Ooij and Persingen and the landowners was mainly about the dikes 
and their maintenance, each side claiming that the other was responsible for 
maintaining the dikes and the costs of this maintenance. The members of Schependom 
Nijmegen faced the consequences of this overdue maintenance and took the side of the 
landowners in the conflict. They presented a petition to the Court of Gelre to alter the 
dike letter to rectify the failure of customary law. With the help of a commission, dike 
legislation was prepared. Next, the Court of Gelre enacted a Landtbrief des Circuls van 
der Ooy, a revised version of the previously published dike letter. This letter arranged 
several water management matters and their administration. The Circul van de Ooij 
became a regional water board and the river dike in Ooij became a main dike, which 
meant that a dike chair had to be established. The Landtbriefestablished a fixed draining 
regime in the Circul van de Ooij along with other matters, such as the repair of dikes and 
the construction of sluices.
The course of the river Waal underwent continuous minor changes, but in the 16th 
century the river changed shifted about 2 km to the north, which offered new 
opportunities. Erlecom was now situated on the left bank of the river, but for the time 
being this had no administrative consequences. At the end of the 16th century a low 
dike connection was made, the dike of Erlecom, creating Erlecom polder. At that time, 
water from the land of Erlecom was drained manually via the sluice in the west of the 
territory near Oortjeshekken. In 1747 a new sluice was built near the connection to the 
Erlecom dam to improve inundation, a practice used to fertilise the soil, especially in 
the higher parts of the territory. Despite high expectations, the sluice failed. Therefore, 
the main dike was raised and two spillways were constructed. Although the 
infrastructure was costly, it did not function well because of regular dike breaches. After 
the opening of the new sluice, however, the dike boards of Mehr and Niel observed that 
the water also inundated Duffelt and draining water proved to be more difficult. While 
in the first instance the damage was limited to Kranenburg and a small part of Duffelt, 
later the entire territory of Duffelt flooded now and then. The Circul van de Ooij was 
blamed for this, but Duffelt suffered the consequences, compaction of the surface soil.
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In 1830 it was decided to lower the main dike and raise the spillways. Originally the 
aim of the spillway in Ooij was to drain water after a dike breach in the territory of 
Kleve. Later it was used to inundate the Circul van de Ooij to fertilise the land and to 
provide sufficient hydraulic head to reduce the chance of a dike breach. However, the 
Prussian part of Duffelt suffered disadvantageous effects of the annual flooding of the 
Circul van de Ooij. To rectify this, a crosswise dike, the Querdamm, was constructed in 
1853 along the current Dutch-German border. This measure resolved the disagreement 
between Nijmegen and Kleve about drainage water.
A regional water management conflict emerged when the province of Gelderland 
considered turning the Circul van de Ooij polder district into a polder outside the dikes 
(buitenpolder) in response to the obstinate attitude of the dike chair during the building 
of the Querdamm. The province’s intention was to establish a common polder board, 
but the city of Nijmegen was fiercely against and protested to the king. It had doubts 
about the proposed change in water management, in which the local landowners would 
be given an important voice. A good functioning water management board, in this case 
a regional water board, was also the city’s concern because many charitable institutions 
in Nijmegen owned land in Ooijpolder. The city of Nijmegen was finally successful and 
the province conceded defeat.
Towards a joint transboundary water board
At the end of the 18th century the French rule had a noticeable effect on water 
management. A centralistic approach was established by the creation of Rijkswaterstaat 
in 1798. Whereas formerly the water boards were in conflict, French authorities imposed 
state control.498 However, a transboundary initiative for cooperation, including the 
establishment of a binational Duffelt water board in 1821, the construction of the 
Querdamm along the border of Gelre and Kleve, and the establishment of the joined 
polder Querdamm in 1853 failed. The differences between the two countries’ 
legislations proved too great. It was therefore decided that Duffelt water board would 
be divided along the national border.
The period of Prussian rule also had an influence on the organisation of water 
management. In 1838 Gelderland province drew up a ‘Regulation for the management 
of the river polders in province of Gelderland’ (Gelders rivierpolderreglement). This 
document drew inspiration from the Kleve water board regulations on water 
management dating from 1767. At that time it was a revolutionary regulation which put 
an end to all historical rights. It legally established the equality of all people and made 
dike maintenance a common responsibility. Financing of the costs was based on a 
proportional relationship between interest and payment, a principle that underpins the 
funding of Dutch water boards to this day. The regulations included uniform orders for 
governance and administration, which meant that the decisions and budgets of the 
water boards had to be agreed upon by the province of Gelderland. The water boards 
were divided into polder districts, village polders and polders outside the main dikes
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(buitenpolders). For the river district between Nijmegen and Kleve the new regulation 
meant that the Circul van de Ooij became a polder district and Erlecom became a polder 
outside the main dikes.
Flooding and inundation: a continuing story
The flood of 1926 can be viewed as the last river flood. From the historical record we 
know that autumn 1925 started with a cold spell and heavy precipitation. In many parts 
of Europe snow had banked up. In December the thaw set in and the rain came. The 
rivers had to discharge a lot of meltwater, supplemented with large quantities of 
rainwater. This combination of circumstances resulted in a Rhine discharge of about 
12,600 m3/s on 3 January 1926. The discharge wave took about fifteen days to reach the 
Netherlands. The level of the Rhine rose to just below the crown of the dikes. River 
water began flowing through several spillways and overtopping the dikes, flooding large 
areas. These spillways were effective during the high water periods of 1883, 1920 and 
1924. Their function was to prevent dike breaches downstream, but the spillway in 
Ooijpolder could not prevent this in 1926. Water flowing through the spillway in the 
Waal dike and a breach in a dike in Erlecom (upstream of the spillway) led to the 
flooding of Ooijpolder on 2 January 1926 (Ververs & Klijn, 2004). The flood made two 
breaches in the Querdamm, the dike on the German border designed to prevent 
floodwater flowing into Germany from the Netherlands. Duffelt was protected from 
flooding because the breaches were repaired immediately.
Priest Smulders of Ooy-Persingen wrote about the flood in his diary: ‘4 January 1926: 
I did not read Mass this morning. At eleven o’clock our mayor arrived in a barge with 
rescued inhabitants at the iron stairs near the kitchen. More rescued people arrived 
later. At around three o’clock some 35 people were in the presbytery and in the evening 
ten more arrived. The cattle belonging to Frans Arts and Bart Kroes were rescued from 
the flooded stable and swam to the dike. I opened the doors of the church and offered 
shelter.’ On 4 March 1926 he wrote: ‘On the day before yesterday the water receded from 
the houses of the sexton and the cobbler; they will return in about five days. The day 
before yesterday a meeting was held with the residents of Erlecom polder. I participated 
in my role as priest and helped to solve the problem of dike repair. The result was that 
the polder proposed to contribute 5,000 guilders (about 2,300 euros) and not a cent 
more for reinforcing the dike from Nijmegen to Erlecom. The total costs will be 45,000 
guilders, and for the Erlecom polder the costs were expected to be 50,000 guilders. Will 
the plan be realised?’(Bullinga & Offermans, 1993; van Eck, 2005).
After the flood it was decided to establish a common drainage regime for the German 
and Dutch border territory. This meant that Ooijpolder had to give up its right to 
inundate the polder. In 1933 a Dutch-German pumping station was built at the lowest 
place in Ooijpolder and Duffelt, near the city of Nijmegen. At the end of World War II 
the polder flooded once again. The Germans had blown up the Erlecom dike to 
inundate Ooijpolder and Duffelt. They did the same near Till, upstream of Kleve, in an
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attempt to stop the Allies. Shortly after the war the Dutch-German pumping was 
recommissioned and since then the river water has been kept out of the polder. 
However, the threat of inundation did not disappear.
In the 1950s Ooijpolder was incorporated into the IJssel defence works, a Dutch defence 
system to withstand a probable invasion from the Eastern bloc, a consequence of the 
Cold War. A weir was built near Groenlanden and a ‘sliding dike’ (schuifdijk) was 
constructed in the Ooijsebandijk. In the case of an invasion, Ooijpolder would be 
inundated. The advent of the army helicopter that can transport army vehicles made the 
IJssel defence works redundant. In the course of the 1960s these were finally dismantled.
Plans for annexation, dike reinforcement and the Waal river bend cut-off
Besides the danger of flooding, Ooijpolder faced another threat: annexation by the 
neighbouring city of Nijmegen. At the beginning of the 20th century the city of 
Nijmegen planned to annex Ooijpolder, which was part of the municipality of 
Ubbergen. This proposal was presented in a letter to Gelderland provincial executive 
dated 3 January 1900. The city wanted to expand eastwards because ‘the residents of 
Ubbergen live too far away from schools and churches in the municipality’. The 
municipality of Ubbergen reacted in a report dated 30 January 1900 that the residents’ 
interests ‘will be covered by the village council. For example, although the number of 
residents is limited, infrastructure for electricity will be laid on to the border of the city 
of Nijmegen. Besides, there are a few hundred hectares of open sites in neighbouring 
villages to the west of the city.’ Nevertheless, in a law passed in 1914 the municipality 
of Ubbergen did lose part of its territory. It received financial compensation and a parcel 
of land of Ooijpolder from the city of Nijmegen in part exchange.
Once again, in the 1960s the city of Nijmegen targeted Ooijpolder for housing 
development. In the province’s regional plan Ooijpolder was identified as a site for 
housing development on the edge of the city of Nijmegen. This prompted fierce protests 
by the residents of Ooijpolder, initiated by students who moved to Ooijpolder in the 
mid 1960s after completing their studies. The protest movement in the polder was 
widely supported by a mix of ‘old’ and ‘new’ residents. On 9 February 1970 the housing 
minister sent a letter to the city of Nijmegen in which he rejected Ooijpolder as a site 
for housing development, referring to its diversity of landscapes, including the push 
moraine and the specific characteristics of the river landscape, which were considered 
important to conserve.
Less than eight months later, the residents of Ooijpolder were startled by another threat. 
They received messages that Rijkswaterstaat had reserved 10 million guilders (4.5 
million euros) for plans to excavate a river bend cut-off along an old branch of the Waal 
near Groenlanden, an important area of natural wetland habitat. The proposals were to 
create a channel that could accommodate multiple barge convoy sets since the Waal 
was the most important European transport waterway. On 20 November 1970 residents
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organised a meeting attended by around a hundred people. They decided to write an 
angry letter to the House of Representatives emphasising the irreplaceable ecological 
and landscape value of the area. Despite the residents’ objections the minister decided 
to approve the plan. The House of Representatives agreed, but insisted on a consultation 
round in the planning process. The residents, however, did not sit by and watch. With 
the help of the Environmental Management group at the University of Nijmegen they 
carried out an environmental impact assessment (EIA). Students focused on the 
political aspects and encouraged the residents to protest and established a residents’ 
organisation called Groenlanden to organise joint action. However, expectations were 
not that high. Later, an action committee was formed and through a clever combination 
of public actions, formal protests and use of the media and public opinion they forced 
the minister to concede defeat on 26 April 1978.
Meanwhile, large-scale dike reinforcements were implemented, which could not be 
prevented by citizen protests, for example in Brakel, the place where the first protest 
actions were initiated (see also section 2.2). In the early 1970s the disastrous effects of 
the dike reinforcements became visible, which led to the establishment of the Becht 
Commission (Commissie Rivierdijken -  Commission on the river dikes, generally 
referred to by the name of its chair, Cees Becht) in 1975 (Ministerie van Verkeer en 
Waterstaat, 1995). Among the Commission’s recommendations were proposals for 
ameliorating the impacts, for example through more sophisticated dike designs. For 
Ooijpolder this meant that the dikes had to be raised by about 70 centimetres. The 
residents were not enamoured of the dike reinforcements, but at that time they were too 
busy opposing the plan for the river bend cut-off and the expected large-scale 
excavation of the flood plains to react immediately to the announcement of the first 
plan for dike reinforcement in their polder. The dike reinforcement only became an 
issue among the residents in 1986, when they decided to establish a new association, De 
Ooijse Dijken, to promote communal and individual interests concerning the dike 
reinforcement. The residents proposed alternatives for the dike heightening that did 
not affect their houses. However, the responsible government authorities, the province 
and the polder district (later merged into a water board), did not take their interests on 
board as an EIA was not obligatory for works on stretches of dike less than 5 km long. 
Assisted by their mayor, the residents arranged to have an input to the planning process. 
The chair of the residents’ association took part in meetings with the relevant 
organisations in the capacity of adviser to the mayor.
The residents’ strategy was to focus on achieving small successes, for example new sites 
for housing development for the affected residents. Cooperation with other residents’ 
associations with similar objectives made the association in Ooijpolder widely known. 
It also gave the organisation a reputation for expertise. As a consequence, the residents 
were taken more seriously, which was also reflected in an increase in the number of 
members of their association and their successes. The association gained approval for 
a plan for a 3.8 km section of the dike, including the preservation of five houses, local
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reductions in the standard increase in height from 70 cm to about 30 cm and 
concessions on some individual wishes. Assisted by students and experts, it succeeded 
in developing an alternative for a 4 km stretch near Groenlanden, which also won its 
support from nature conservation organisations. The association’s image therefore 
changed from a club of dike residents opposing the dike reinforcement to a broad 
societal movement operating in various parts of the river landscape. The residents made 
use of research results, for example a study by J. Bervaes, who questioned the dike 
reinforcement, arguing that flooding was mainly caused by ice dams rather than rising 
water levels in the river and that the current dike standards were needlessly high 
(Bervaes et al., 1990). This study and the support of the media and artists who blamed 
the government for harming the river landscape aroused the interest of politicians, who 
no longer turned a deaf ear to the local population. For the last stretch of the dike the 
association managed to get Rijkswaterstaat to agree to reduce the proposed heightening 
of the dike by 60 cm and conserve an old river branch. However, for some residents it 
was too late: their houses were already demolished.
High water experiences in the 1990s
The high water periods in 1993 and 1995 made residents living along the rivers more 
aware of the implications of the location of their houses, which were situated between 
high dikes. Apart from a very wet season in 1988, which caused a considerable rise in 
the water levels in the Rhine and Meuse, many residents did not have any experience of 
the effects of high water. After the high water period in 1993 the authorities in the 
province of Gelderland became fully aware of the risk of a dike breach. They drafted an 
emergency plan for the region, which was adopted in December 1994 (Diepenbrock, 
1998). When the safety standard was exceeded in 1995, the authorities implemented 
their local emergency plans and ordered the evacuation of 200,000 residents in areas of 
potential flooding along the Rhine. For many residents the high water was a surprise. 
Although a high water event shortly after an earlier one was statistically not unlikely, 
they did not believe that flooding was a serious possibility (Rijksplanologische en 
Rijksmilieuhygiënische Commissie, 2003).
The general view was that there was not much difference between the high water of 
1993 and 1995. A resident: ‘I experienced the high water periods of 1993 and 1995. In 
1993 everybody walked on the dikes while the water was coming up everywhere. In 
1995 the water level was a bit higher and there was complete panic. Everybody, down 
to the last chicken, had to be evacuated. Across the border in Germany the people did 
not understand what the fuss was about. Their cattle had to be evacuated, but not the 
people....Later you heard that people were backed up in a traffic jam to get out the 
polder and looking around desperately, saying “Oh God, where’s the water coming 
from?” That surprised me, that people know so little about their landscape and where 
they are living....My wife and daughter evacuated; I intended to stay but after a few 
days the army ordered me to leave. Next time I will stay anyhow.’499
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On 30 January the evacuation of Ooijpolder started. It caused a lot of frustration among 
the polder residents. Within two days Ooijpolder was totally empty. Almost all the 
residents moved with all their belongings, including furniture, to relatives, friends or 
colleagues and waited. Farmers moved their livestock to colleagues in neighbouring 
safe areas. The dikes near Ochten and Bemmel were on the verge of being breached, 
but this was prevented in time (Benning et al., 1995). There were also some weak dike 
sections in Ooijpolder (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 1995).500 In fact, 
evacuation turned out not to be necessary in the end, but was solely based on the 
municipality of Nijmegen’s emergency plan in which evacuation was deemed to be 
necessary when the water level reached 16.50 metres above Amsterdam Ordnance 
Datum (NAP) (van Meurs, 2003:27-48). The director of the Rijkswaterstaat East 
Netherlands regional office501: ‘I was ill, but participated in a meeting of the crisis team. 
They [the mayor of Nijmegen and the dike reeve of the polder district] said: “We have 
to evacuate, it is no longer safe”. If you do not have the facts, you cannot say that a dike 
will be breached. I could not do anything but cooperate. The emotional element in this 
type of decision-making is very important.’502 This version of events was refuted by the 
government decision-makers involved (Diepenbrock, 1998:59) and contradicted by 
reports of sightings of officials assessing whether the dike had to be breached to relieve 
the pressure. 503 This was part of the state emergency strategy to prevent a disaster or 
minimise its effects.
Does a fighting spirit pay off?
Over the centuries the inhabitants of Ooijpolder had grown used to fighting against 
the authorities. Whereas in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries landlords were locked in a 
struggle with the higher authorities about water management, in the 20th century 
Ooijpolder was confronted with various government plans, from housing development 
in 1900 and the mid 1960s, the dike reinforcements of the 1970s to the end of the 1980s 
and the river bend cut-off in 1985 to the proposal for a calamity polder in 2000. Would 
the residents succeed once again in their opposition to a government plan?
Government perspective
In this section the emergency water storage in Ooijpolder is described from the 
government’s point of view.
Calamity polders: a new idea?
The idea of calamity polders was not new. They had been used in the past to increase 
the storage capacity of the river during periods of high water and to prevent other 
polders from flooding (WL Delft Hydraulics, 1998). The idea of ‘calamity polders’ was 
picked up again by Frans Klijn, at that time affiliated with the Centre of Environmental 
Science at Leiden University. He started with the idea of spillways and green rivers in a 
book on environmental ideas for sustainable development. Later, he gave students an
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assignment to study this Dutch version of temporarily controlled flooding, the outcome 
of which was published at the beginning of the 1990s.504 Calamity polders were also 
put forward as an option for water retention in the study ‘Rhine in the Long Run’ (Rijn 
op Termijn) (WL Delft Hydraulics, 1998).505 Some months later the concept, this time 
called ‘controlled inundation’, was included in the Fourth National Policy Document on 
Water Management (Vierde Nota Waterhuishouding). However, the studies ‘Room for 
the Rhine Branches’ (Ruimte voor Rijntakken) and ‘Integrated Study of the Downstream 
Rivers’ (Integrale Verkenning Benedenrivierengebied) presented during the Loevestein 
meeting in February 2000 did not include emergency water retention areas 
(overloopgebieden voor nood). However, the proposed locations in the state secretary’s 
presentation were similar to those included in a draft background study for the latter 
report, but were intended for shallow inundation during high water (Klijn & van der 
Most, 2000).
Past experiences had proved that emergency water storage is an effective measure 
against flooding and experts consider controlled flooding to offer flexibility in the river 
system (Silva, 2001).506 The technical functioning of emergency water storage areas 
depends on their location and the capacity and on the velocity and manageability of the 
inflow of the water. The river water has to be diverted into these areas at the right 
moment and in the right manner. Based on a study of the 1926 flood, experts concluded 
that emergency water storage is a useful method as it has considerable effect in reducing 
the water level in the river, resulting in fewer dike breaches downstream (Ververs & 
Klijn, 2004).
According to an official, it was a brave move to propose emergency water storage. ‘At 
that time the regional offices of Rijkswaterstaat were dominant and there was a culture 
of all working together. The director of the regional office responsible for Ooijpolder 
had a very good network in The Hague, so for ideas like emergency water storage you 
didn’t have a leg to stand on in the organisation. You needed cheek to put it on the 
table.’507
Searching for support for water policy
Searching for support for its long-term water policy, the Government established a 
Commission on Water Management in the 21st Century (Commissie Waterbeleid 21e 
eeuw), also referred to by the name of its chair, Frans Tielrooij. ‘He was a former 
provincial delegate, a spatial planning man. It was more about communication and 
publicity than about substance.’508 The Commission, in which the state, the provinces, 
water boards and municipalities worked jointly on recommendations for desirable 
changes in water management, focusing on the consequences of climate change, sea 
level rise and land subsidence, began work in 1999. Studies on the maximum design 
discharge for the rivers in the Netherlands resulted in figures between 17,500 m3/s and
18,000 m3/s for the Rhine, depending on the height of the dike along the Rhine in the 
German state of Nordrhein-Westfalen (Klijn & van der Most, 2000). Instead of the
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traditional approach of draining the water, the Commission advocated a three step 
strategy (retaining, storing and draining) for all government plans to ensure flood safety 
and reduce water-related problems. The new approach also included more room for 
the river; in addition to implementing technical measures and allocating more land for 
water storage when necessary (Van Stokkom et al., 2005).
The calls for extra measures besides the dike reinforcement became more urgent. 
Experience indicated that the longer a disaster or near disaster did not occur, support 
for radical measures would wane. This had led to the dike reinforcement works falling 
behind schedule in the 1980s. Water managers were now in a hurry. The Room for River 
policy prohibited building in the flood plains without sustainable compensation 
measures (Kuil, 2000), but plans that were already in the pipeline could not be stopped 
(Roth et al., 2006a). It appeared advisable to designate in advance areas that would be 
eligible for emergency water storage in the event of extreme events. As the Ministry of 
Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment was just about produce a white paper 
with ‘green’ (nature), ‘red’ (construction) and ‘blue’ (water) spatial contours, it was 
decided to conditionally include emergency water storage.509 As a result, when the Room 
for the River White Paper was presented to the general public, it included a map with 
‘search areas’ showing which areas were provisionally designated for emergency water 
storage (Warner et al., 2008a).
‘On 28 February 2000 we presented our study Room for the Rhine Branches (Ruimte 
voor Rijntakken), which included measures to provide more discharge capacity for the 
rivers, and the state secretary launched her own plan emphasising measures inside the 
dikes, such as emergency water storage and dike relocations. That was a silly moment. 
Although we prepared our proposals in cooperation with all the regional partners, the 
region was surprised.’510 Two policy developments were set in motion: (1) a change in 
spatially policy towards no longer relying on raising dikes even higher, but creating 
space by widening the winter bed of the rivers; and (2) an administrative change in 
which the national government was no longer willing to take the lead, but negotiate 
solutions as a partner with lower-tier government authorities. This shift to a ‘horizontal’ 
form of decision-making did not come easily to Rijkswaterstaat. Being used to a 
patronising but indulgent paternal role, Rijkswaterstaat found it difficult to adjust to 
assertive bargaining as first among equals511 (Warner et al., 2008).
The political story
The Room for Rhine Branches study could be considered as an inventory of possible 
options for the Room for the River measures, but it did not lead to concrete decisions. 
Direction was needed and state secretary Monique de Vries was keen to make a name 
for herself on the issue of flood safety,512 and not without reason. Since she had taken 
office the state secretary for water management had worried about her image. She was 
the first of her kind, as previously her job was a relatively minor part of the policy 
portfolio of the minister for transport, public works and water management. Polls
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showed that only 2 per cent of the public knew who she was.513 This low public profile 
and press attention translated into little bargaining power in the government and 
parliament. A government official: ‘We disagreed with the state secretary’s personal 
communication adviser. She thought that the state secretary had a low public profile 
and that she needed to generate more media attention. We preferred to take a lower 
profile approach, but we did give her a few options. In fact, the Loevestein session was 
organised with her in mind, to profile the state secretary.’514 The state secretary decided 
to boost the image of her policy area considerably by widely publicising her 
department’s plans (Warner et al., 2008). A government official: ‘She was in the position 
to set out a new course. The state secretary was on good terms with the housing 
minister, so she had some room for political manoeuvre.’515
The Loevestein meeting, the day after and beyond
The state secretary’s presentation was broadcasted on prime time national television. 
Neither the liberal politician nor her advisers had expected fierce protests (Warner et 
al., 2008). The state secretary made a mistake, particularly by talking about emergency 
water storage instead of calamity polders.516 A government official: ‘The session at 
Loevestein castle was about principles and policies for the downstream part of the Rhine 
and Meuse and the upstream part of the Rhine. During the session afterwards, the state 
secretary focused on the maps, and some incorrect statements were broadcast on 
national television. As a result, we lost our grip on the situation and all hell broke 
loose.’517 Lower-tier authorities in the region were not amused. They claimed they had 
not been involved in the latest policy decisions, although insiders were convinced that 
the direction the policy was taking was generally known.518 Rather than worrying about 
the technical aspects of the proposed solutions they were afraid of the societal 
consequences (Roth et al., 2006a).
A provincial delegate: ‘The discussion had been about the change in the design 
discharge for the Rhine from 15,000 to 16,000 m3/s. The idea to raise the dikes had been 
abandoned, so there were two options left: dike relocation and emergency water storage 
in relatively isolated areas. The responsible official said to me: “The state secretary had 
to be in the news”. Then the maps were produced on which some areas were tentatively 
indicated. These were arbitrary areas; nobody seemed to take a close look. First, they 
called them ‘likely areas’, but later changed them into ‘search areas’. It was really a civil 
engineering logic: technical measures with little societal support. It was a rather cavalier 
approach to launch such an idea in such a way. And then rather than saying that these 
were just options and that there were other options as well, the state secretary took a 
firm approach and defended it hotly. Later, stories emerged about enormous dikes 
around villages with some openings to get in and out. It was no surprise that there was 
fierce resistance.’519 A Rijkswaterstaat official had similar experiences, but recognised 
the opportunities. ‘The presentation in Loevestein castle with the map was awful! 
Nevertheless, it accelerated the awareness-raising process.’520
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The premonitions were right. A turbulent period began, with considerable commotion 
among the stakeholders. Until then, government decision-makers and the residents had 
assumed that the area was safe, but the state secretary’s emphasis on ‘residual risk’521 and 
her proposal for emergency water storage (‘controlled flooding’) to diminish this type 
of risk changed all that. The evacuation of 1995 was still fresh in their minds (Warner 
et al., 2008). Although the residents of Ooijpolder were upset about the state secretary’s 
move and despite the national media coverage of their grievances, resistance by the 
residents and the government decision-makers soon dissipated (Roth et al., 2006a).
Meanwhile, the state secretary had achieved her objective: flood safety and water 
management had become a public issue and it boosted her public recognition to 4 per 
cent.522 She still focused on the idea that ‘controlled flooding is better than uncontrolled 
flooding’.523 In advance of his report, the chair of the Tielrooij Commission made it 
clear that a design discharge of 18,000 m3/s for the Rhine would be possible (Ministerie 
van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2000b), which strengthened the state secretary’s belief that 
emergency water storage was a necessity. She was determined to explain the plan to the 
stakeholders. Her communication expert, Martine Leewis, is a great supporter of Social 
Learning and intended to stage a one-on-one dialogue between politicians and citizens. 
However, the envisaged interaction with polder residents was soon thwarted by senior 
policy advisers representing the mainstream ministerial culture that discourages too 
much communication between government ministers and the public, or indeed 
between ministers and public servants (Warner, 2008).
The interior ministry was not pleased with the state secretary’s unexpected move. It 
did not oppose controlled flooding as a way of dealing with residual risk, but saw the 
issue rapidly becoming unfit for discussion. Its minister, Tineke Netelenbos, demanded 
an explanation in a cabinet meeting (Warner, 2008). As a result, the Advisory 
Commission on Emergency Water Storage Areas ( Commissie noodoverloopgebieden, also 
referred to by the name of its chair, David Luteijn) was instated on 27 April 2001.524
On the institutionalisation track
The reason for establishing a commission was ‘to put the idea of emergency water 
storage on the track of institutionalisation’.525 It was established for the political purpose 
of gaining support for the idea of emergency water storage.526 The chair was required 
to write a report within a short time. ‘The assignment was not well prepared but the 
director-general wanted to continue, the Commission was independent, and the state 
secretary had to decide later. Luteijn looked for support in the region, although this 
was not part of his assignment.’527
Interviews with Commission members and advisers revealed that the chair treated the
18,000 m3/s design discharge and the need to do something as a given. He did not find 
the lack of a public debate and consideration of alternatives to be strange. To impress 
the urgency of the task at hand on his fellow commissioners, Luteijn had a video
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animation prepared depicting a disastrous flood event. This video drove home to key 
members that something needed to be done: ‘If you do nothing, you will have to 
evacuate half a million people’. The chair’s move for closure led to a clash between 
‘converts’ and ‘doubters’(Warner, 2008). Research into uncertainties concerning dikes 
conducted since 1995 had shown that many more failure factors than overtopping dikes, 
such as piping, play a role in flooding (Klijn & van der Most, 2000; Stijnen, 2007). 
Doubters sought to put their views on issues of uncertainty to the Commission. A 
Rijkswaterstaat official recalled a furious row between those who accepted a degree of 
uncertainty and those who did not.528 Others, like a provincial delegate and a mayor, also 
complained.529 However, this debate threatened to be time-consuming and the chair 
felt he had no time for an extensive debate about rationales and information 
uncertainties (Warner, 2008). When the ruling government fell prematurely in early 
2002, the Commission chose not to engage in discussions about the quantitative 
assumptions underlying design discharge, uncertainty and causes of failure (Roth & 
Warner, 2007) and decided to speed up the work in order to present its report in time 
to set the agenda for the new coalition government (Roth et al., 2006a).
As Ooijpolder became an indicative site for emergency water storage, the Commission 
first considered Ooijpolder and Duffelt for designating controlled flooding, which 
included an area in German. However, inundating German territory (Duffelt) would 
have international consequences and raise a foreign policy issue that would cause great 
political problems. Rijkswaterstaat could not or would not take measures that had 
transboundary effects. Nevertheless, it would not be easy to isolate German territory 
from the impacts of controlled flooding in Dutch territory: dikes with a height of 8 to
9 metres would be required to stop the water from crossing the border.530 In order to 
explain the policy and allay German fears, officials regularly visited municipalities across 
the border in Germany rather than talking to their Dutch counterparts in Ooijpolder.531 
The amount of water retained determines the amount of space needed to deal with 
high flood scenarios. By concentrating on the Dutch polder, the Commission lost a 
sizeable chunk of its inundation capacity (Warner, 2008). The three areas finally selected 
(Ooijpolder, Rijnstrangen and Beerse Overlaat, see Figure 6.1) could not accommodate 
the amount of storage originally intended (de Boer, 2003a).
The chair of the Commission overestimated the support for the proposed measure. In 
his perception it was a matter of taking firm decisions and formalising procedures. 
During the drafting of his report he held three consultative rounds of meetings with 
local government and civil society organisations, which resulted in negative reactions 
from municipalities.532 But it did not change his objective. The form of participation 
was of a decidedly ‘controlled’ nature. The Commission actively avoided open dialogue 
with the local population likely to be affected (Roth & Warner, 2007). The chair simply 
judged safety to be too important to bring citizen stakeholders into the discussion,533so 
the Commission searched for ‘support’ among a narrowly defined group of actors and 
civil society organisations (Roth et al., 2006a).
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Communicating flood risk
In its report the Commission advised reserving land for three ‘calamity polders’ in 
Ooijpolder, Rijnstrangen and Beerse Overlaat because they are situated in the upstream 
stretch of the rivers, which would limit the number of measures needed in the rest of 
the country. Furthermore, the rationale was that the designated areas were quite thinly 
populated and contained fewer sites (such as chemical factories) that would pose a 
health risk during flooding. The Commission used the metaphor of an airbag in a car 
to explain the functionality of calamity polders (Commissie Noodoverloopgebieden, 
2002). In order to safeguard the residents in Ooijpolder, the main villages would be 
surrounded by a dike.534 The Commission’s report placed less emphasis on 
compensation for damages: ‘the usual damage compensation procedure is adequate’.535
The newly appointed state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen decided on a rigorous 
approach (Roth et al., 2006a) and agreed with the Commission’s advice. However, the 
officials directly involved took a different point of view. ‘We preferred the option of 
further research while reserving land for emergency water storage for the time being. 
The Luteijn Commission came up with the idea of surrounding the villages in the areas 
with a dike and the construction of a special inlet, but this made the measure no longer 
financially attractive. We had our reservations, such as why the design could not be 
simpler. Actually, we did not bother about outcome as long as there was a political 
discussion and a political statement.’536
Demand for contra-expertise
It became clear that an exclusive focus on norms and peak discharges simplified 
complex processes characterised by uncertainty. The debate on emergency water storage 
was actually a confrontation between different views about flood protection, focused 
mainly on the degree to which uncertainty and failure factors could be included in 
analyses and decision-making (Roth & Warner, 2007). The region authorities also 
became involved in the debate and presented a contra-expertise (second opinion) study 
by WL Delft Hydraulics,537 commissioned by the Association of Provincial Authorities 
(Interprovinciaal Overleg, IPO) and carried out in close cooperation with some 
Chambers of Commerce, social partners of Gelderland provincial government, polder 
districts, the farmers’ organisation GLTO and others (Rijksplanologische en 
Rijksmilieuhygiënische Commissie, 2003). The aim of the study was to map the 
consequences of the probable implementation of the plans (Klijn & van der Most, 
2000). The authoritative civil engineering and hydraulic consultancy that was mainly 
responsible for the idea of reviving the historic Dutch practice of inundating calamity 
polders (Warner et al., 2008) did not consider the concept itself to be problematic, but 
did not support the application of the principle in the three selected calamity polders 
(Roth et al., 2006a). In 2002 Gelderland provincial government initiated a Dutch- 
German study into the possible discharge of the Rhine where it enters the Netherlands, 
which resulted in a discharge of between 12,000 and 15,000 m3/s for the Rhine river, but 
at these levels the German dikes would be topped and the excess water would not reach
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the Netherlands. The maximum expected discharge was 15,500 m3/s and in a worst case 
scenario 16,500 m3/s (Nederlandse-Duitse werkgroep Hoogwater, 2004). The provincial 
government therefore declared the design discharge of 18,000 m3/s to be an 
exaggeration. Another technical research report was commissioned by eight Dutch and 
two German municipalities. It pointed to the same weaknesses in the calamity plans as 
earlier reports.538 Additional comments included the need for a mix of ‘structural’ and 
‘non-structural’ measures instead of concentrating on emergency water storage and 
retention areas. These and other reports raised growing doubts about calamity polders 
(Roth & Warner, 2007).
Opposing voices from within
There were calls from within Rijkswaterstaat for the Technical Advisory Commission 
on Flood Defence (Technische Adviescommissie voor de Waterkeringen, TAW), which 
consisted of Rijkswaterstaat officials, consultants and scientists, to study the report of 
the Luteijn Commission. Formulating their main conclusions diplomatically, the 
members of the TAW mainly endorsed the principle of emergency water storage, but 
were critical of content of the report of the Luteijn Commission.539 They recommended 
first improving weak sections of the dikes sections, questioned the usefulness of the 
measure and fiercely criticised the cost-benefit analysis of the 200 million cubic metres 
of water that was neither covered by the measures nor included as a loss-making item 
in the budget. This omission occurred because the calculations used by the Commission 
were made prior to its decision to reduce the storage capacity from 400 to 200 cubic 
metres (de Boer, 2003b). Another standpoint was based on the ‘Expansion Force’ study 
(Spankrachtstudie) carried out by experts of a specialised department of Rijkswaterstaat, 
which focused on the needed and available space for the river in the long term. This 
report came to similar findings as the contra-expertise commissioned by Gelderland 
provincial government. It confirmed a possible future design discharge of about 18,000 
m3/s, but instead of emergency water storage, the researchers proposed retention areas. 
Whereas emergency water storage or ‘controlled flooding’ is meant to reduce the effects 
of a calamity elsewhere, a retention area aims to prevent flooding. The government 
officials were not sure which report the Government would endorse.540
How to get support from the region?
After two years of negotiation, the national government and the provinces, 
municipalities and water boards signed a National Administrative Agreement on Water 
(Nationaal Bestuursakkoord Water) on 2 July 2002. The agreement outlined the water 
management policies for the coming years and the parties involved committed to bring 
national and regional water systems up to standard by 2015. This meant that they had 
to take sufficient measures to withstand the consequences of climate change, such as 
increased precipitation, long periods of drought and sea level rise, and other trends, 
such as urbanisation and soil compaction. A key aim of the agreement was to improve 
coordination and consistency between the national, regional and local approaches to 
water management.541 However, this proved to be not so easy in the light of the
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discussion about emergency water storage in which the national government and the 
region seemed diametrically opposed to one another. In this question, the region 
received support from MPs belonging to the Social Democrats (PvdA) and Christian 
Democrats ( CDA).542 At the end of 2002 the state secretary postponed decision-making 
and asked the region for alternatives, while stressing her preference for emergency water 
storage.543 In response, the provincial government came up with an alternative plan, 
including nine dike relocations, excavation of flood plains and the removal of groynes 
and embankments.544 Later that year it presented another plan with five proposals for 
lowering the water level, including dike relocations and bypasses.545 The Arnhem­
Nijmegen regional authority (Knooppunt Arnhem Nijmegen, KAN) refused to cooperate 
and presented a High Water Memorandum. Like Gelderland provincial government, 
KAN rejected the designation of Ooijpolder for emergency water storage. Instead, it 
proposed a set of small emergency water storage areas from five to fifty hectares in size 
that would offer the best protection against extreme river discharges. Dike relocations 
and the construction of bypasses in the river would also be needed.546 The provincial 
delegate was bitterly disappointed: ‘It is truly sad’.547 The ranks were finally closed with 
the preparation of the Regional Advice (Regioadvies), on which lower-tier authorities 
and civil society organisations cooperated. Based on earlier proposals from provincial 
delegates Johan de Bondt and his successor Harry Keereweer,548 the provincial 
government initiated a broadly supported alternative for controlled flooding,549 which 
was presented on 14 March 2005, just in time for the Government’s decision on the 
package of Room for the River measures a month later.
Towards decision-making
In the meantime, the proposed ‘calamity polders’ were incorporated into various policy 
documents. Based on the Luteijn Commission’s report, the Netherlands Bureau for 
Economic Policy Analysis (Centaal Plan Bureau) study of the cost-effectiveness of 
emergency water storage and an additional study in which emergency measures were 
considered necessary (Dijkman et al., 2003), the state secretary resolved to designate 
three emergency water storage areas in December 2003, which culminated in the 
national Disaster Management Strategy for Flooding along the Rhine and Meuse 
(Rampenbeheersingsstrategie overstromingen Rijn en Maas).550 In addition, she began 
preparing a special law on the administrative competences and procedures to be 
followed in the event of an emergency. In the Fifth National Policy Document on Spatial 
Planning ( Vijfde Nota Ruimtelijke Ordening), published in May 2004, the Government 
reserved land for emergency water storage (Ververs & Klijn, 2004). In November 2004, 
during the maternity leave of the state secretary, a political deal saw the two largest 
parliamentary parties (Social Democrats and Christian Democrats) acting in tandem 
to move the money reserved for controlled flooding to supplement the budget for the 
Room for the River programme (Warner, 2008; Warner et al., 2008). An MP who was 
previously a member of Noord-Brabant provincial executive: ‘ [State secretary] Schultz 
phoned me to say that she had come to the conclusion that emergency water storage was 
not needed for the time being. Then I knew that there was some room. For me it was a
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signal that if it is not necessary, we don’t have to do it’.551 On 24 March 2005 the state 
secretary decided on the final package of measures to reduce the risk of flooding, which 
did not contain reservations of land for emergency water storage in Ooijpolder and 
Rijnstrangen.552 In mid April 2005 the Government adopted the plan, conceding defeat 
on the plan for emergency water storage in Ooijpolder and Rijnstrangen. The third 
location, Beersche Overlaat, remained as a potential emergency water storage area if 
the Room for the River programme could not meet the required safety standard in 
2015.553
Reasoning for abandoning the plan for emergency water storage
Why was the national government’s plan for emergency water storage not successful? 
There are four reasons.
First, the government plan was launched for political reasons and was not internally 
coordinated, which meant that officials at the Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional 
office as well as experts from a specialised department felt sidelined.
Second, the Advisory Commission on Emergency Water Storage Areas had a limited 
remit,554 which focused on the relevance of and need for calamity polders as well as 
giving advice on criteria for area selection, the consequences of selection, land 
reservation, decision-making on actual use and compensation. Furthermore, the 
Commission consisted of people with various political affiliations and social and 
professional backgrounds. However, water professionals who could speak with 
authority on flood protection were largely absent, so that the Commission was 
dependent on support and advice from the ministry. From its inception the 
Commission stressed the need to generate public support for calamity polders, and to 
bridge the gap between the ‘rational logic’ of controlled flooding and the weight of 
emotion among inhabitants and companies in the region following the actual 
designation of areas. This reveals the basic attitude of social actors to knowledge on 
this issue. While knowledge and ‘rational logic’ were ascribed to the expert world in 
favour of calamity polders, critics were supposed to be primarily guided by ‘emotion’. 
Although formally neutral, in its communication the Commission gave the impression 
that it was primarily seeking to legitimise a decision that had already been taken. Apart 
from the fact that the Commission actively avoided open dialogue with the population 
likely to be affected, it chose not to engage in discussions about the assumptions 
underlying design river discharge, uncertainty and causes of dike failure. To avoid 
further debates, the possibility of an 18,000 m3/s safety standard was taken as a starting 
point. Knowledge and insights that were critical of this simplification made for the sake 
of smooth policy-making were marginalised in the decision-making process (Roth et 
al., 2006a).
Third, the result of this top-down approach was the absence of public support for 
emergency water storage, and an unwillingness to draw on citizen knowledge and
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perspectives on flood safety (Warner et al., 2008). The outcomes of internal reports in 
which the costs and benefits (including the planned dikes around villages) and failure 
factors (e.g. the dimension of the areas) were studied, several contra-expertises 
commissioned by lower-tier authorities and fierce protest actions by residents of 
Ooijpolder prompted a public debate about the Commission’s assumptions.
Fourth, the residents managed to persuade MPs to back their opposition to the plans 
on the basis of technical and economic arguments. While the state secretary was on 
maternity leave a House majority was against the plan and adopted a motion to assign 
the funds earmarked for emergency water storage to Room for the River measures 
(Warner et al., 2008). As a result, the state secretary did not lose face when she was 
forced to abandon the plan for emergency water storage.
Negotiating water safety
Two developments in the underlying approaches to flood safety took place during the 
planning for emergency water storage: first, a shift from flood probability (the chance 
of exceeding the water levels at dike sections) to a flood-risk approach (risk defined as 
probability times impact); second, the lifting of the absolute guarantee of flood safety 
(Dicke & Roovers, 2007).
Regarding the first development, while the government changed the design discharge 
for the Rhine from 15,000 m3/s to 16,000 m3/s as part of the flood probability approach 
in the Flood Defence Act 2001, the discussion among experts focused on the 
development of a flood risk approach (Roth & Warner, 2007). Rijkswaterstaat’s 
Technical Advisory Commission on Flood Defence ( TAW) had already proposed a 
change of focus from the probability of flooding to flood risk in dike rings, including 
consideration of the likely damage as well as the probability of a flood (Klijn & van der 
Most, 2000). This was supported by the report ‘Dutch dikes and risk hikes’ (Risico’s in 
bedijkte termen) that focused on the risks of flooding in the Netherlands (RIVM, 2004). 
The report concluded that the present spatial distribution of economic interests in ‘dike 
rings’ is no longer in accordance with the spatial variation of these economic security 
standards. Due to the rise in sea level, climate change and further economic and social 
development, a further increase in flood risks is expected. Technical solutions no longer 
form the sole answer to this increase. The focus had been on reducing the chances of 
dike breaches by technical means, such as emergency water storage, whereas efficient 
solutions, including strategies such as avoiding flood-prone areas and the construction 
of compartment dams to split up large flood-prone areas into smaller ones, had been 
overlooked. The results of the Flood Risks and Safety in the Netherlands project 
(Veiligheid Nederland in Kaart, VNK), which examined the flood risk of dike rings, 
confirmed that existing dike standards did not comply with the law. A flood risk of 
once in 10 years to once in 100 years was not uncommon.555 From the political point 
of view, however, this proved to be a sensitive question and a decision on how to deal 
with flood risk other than to carry out further research556 has not yet been made.
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As to the second development, a shift can be seen from trusting the legal standards for 
flood safety towards a situation in which negotiation and harmonisation of policies 
and measures play an important role. The parties involved moved from a situation in 
which they followed fixed rules and legislation accompanied by clear criteria towards 
a situation in which they negotiate and coordinate measures and the necessary 
‘exchange’ (compensation) in order to arrive at a lowering of the water level. Whereas 
in the past flood safety was conditional, it now seems to have become more of a public 
interest in the way that the economy, the environment and quality of life are. This meant 
that Rijkswaterstaat is more of an adviser in a preparatory stage of planning than an 
enforcer of the law in the sense of assessing proposals for measures against the rules 
and regulations (Dicke & Roovers, 2007). However, practice shows (see also Chapters 
5 and 7) that Rijkswaterstaat still employs the latter role.
The argum ents
The state secretary for water management
The main reason why state secretary Monique de Vries opted for emergency water 
storage was that controlled flooding is cheaper than uncontrolled flooding. The lesson 
she learned from the high water event in 1995 was: ‘Absolute safety is impossible’.557 She 
emphasised that the Dutch measures are not isolated and that attempts were also being 
made to get more control over the Rhine at the international level. In February 2000 a 
huge dike relocation operation began in Nordrhein-Westfalen in Germany, which will 
give back 4,700 hectares to the river, resulting in a lowering of the water level by about
10 cm. The Dutch government contributed 10 million euros from its European funds 
for water management to this German programme.558
It was no accident that David Luteijn was appointed chair of the Advisory Commission 
on Emergency Water Storage Areas. The state secretary knew him from the board of the 
liberal party ( VVD). Luteijn: ‘That played an important role. I am involved in many 
important networks and have many contacts with various political parties.’559 The chair 
was a charismatic heavyweight and a more senior member of the party than the state 
secretary. He knew that the state secretary was in a difficult position and it was his job 
to find a way to dissipate the commotion following the Loevestein meeting (Warner et 
al., 2008). He had to protect the state secretary and was a father figure to her. When he 
was absent she always felt under pressure and felt a need to say something.560 
Luteijn: ‘The task was to produce an advisory report that could be implemented and 
would not end up in the bottom drawer. In other words, the question was how to 
improve flood safety, especially through the implementation of structural measures, 
but acceptable to all interested parties. This question strongly influenced the 
Commission’s method of proposing a structural approach to flood safety while ensuring 
political support for our recommendations. We decided to identify ‘search areas’ for 
the most likely candidates. There was broad support for the basic idea of emergency
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water storage areas and the design of such areas. Regarding damages, we encountered 
considerable distrust among politicians and civil society organisations, and they were 
opposed to the limitations on development in these areas. The process was very 
opportunistic, which is not desirable, but an inevitable part of the process.’
Luteijn had a clear agreement with the state secretary about the way the outcomes 
would be presented. ‘At Loevestein castle the state secretary caused a lot of unrest 
because of the clumsy way she presented the issue. My task was to get broad public 
support. The political responsible person could present the outcomes only with my 
permission.’561 In Luteijn’s opinion, the three principles of retention, storage and 
drainage applied primarily to the short term and provisions for emergency water 
storage should be included to cope with exceptional situations.
The newly appointed state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen wanted to have 
options. She chose far-reaching options also proposed by the Luteijn Commission and 
accepted the whole procedure for setting land aside for emergency water storage.562
Rijkswaterstaat head office and Directorate-General for Water Affairs 563
The director of water management at Rijkswaterstaat head office: ‘In 1990 we had a 
storm, in 1994 extreme rainfall which caused flooding in some places in the province 
of Noord-Holland, in 1993 and 1995 high water periods and in 1998 a very rainy season 
in the summer. So it was an excellent decade to make policy under the motto “no 
disaster, no policy”. We held a brainstorming session and a colleague came up with the 
idea of establishing a commission. We had already had the Boertien I and II 
Commissions and later the Tielrooy Commission [Commission on Water Management 
in the 21st Century], so we were used to this approach.’
The report of the Luteijn Commission put emergency water storage back on the agenda. 
The water management director: ‘I would never have done it. It is based on the wrong 
premise. Who will manage these areas? They are meant for a once in a 1,250 year flood, 
let say once in a 1000 year flood, which takes us back to the time of Charlemagne. Such 
inlet areas will become historic monuments. You have to take a firm approach to the 
Room for the River programme to prevent the use of emergency water storage. But the 
state secretary put emergency water storage on top of the agenda! From my point of 
view, emergency water storage is a measure of last resort. There is a good chance that 
such a measure would be used either too early or too late. We do not know how the 
river will behave when a discharge peak of 15,000 m3/s enters the Netherlands. It would 
already have caused flooding in Germany at 14,500 m3/s. Now they have a plan to create 
a peak discharge capacity of 17,000 m3/s in 2020. The idea of emergency water storage 
was put forward by a colleague. He was not averse to bringing something up, seeing 
what happens and then making policy. But it led to so much resistance, for example in 
Ooijpolder. In 20 years time they will still remember the plan for emergency water 
storage. If you want to make plans for that area in future, no one will trust the
179
Madelinde PHD zonder afbrekingen:Opmaak 1 15- -2011 14:44 Pagina 180
government. People could not understand why we were talking about measures for 
water discharges above the 16,000 m3/s safety standard. They do not even believe in 
such a peak discharge. I myself do not feel comfortable with emergency water storage. 
There are so many risks. You should not add extra risks like emergency water storage. 
First, you should solve the problem with measures in the river system itself, and only 
in specific cases, for example a calamity, you can make a breach in a dike and revert to 
emergency water storage.564 In other words, if a once in 1,250 years flood occurs, let the 
land be flooded.’565
Obviously, the official566 who came up with the idea of emergency water storage was in 
favour of the measure. ‘The plan for emergency water storage is a political question: 
you are for or against it. But this is difficult. While experts look at the economic 
optimum, politicians focus on the political optimum. The principle of emergency water 
storage appeals to me. Basically, I am in favour of it. We should study it (what is it about 
from a technical point of view; does it work?) and assess what it delivers. The most 
difficult question is a political and administrative one: if Florence V had made such a 
decision, would we now execute it in the event of an emergency? Perhaps it should be 
reconfirmed at regular intervals.’ He did not agree with the opinion of the 
Rijkswaterstaat experts who stated that Luteijn used outdated information and 
knowledge about the measure. ‘The question of the usefulness and necessity of 
emergency water storage is always relevant. But Luteijn ignored some other aspects, for 
example the area of land for emergency water storage area was too small. An important 
factor is the distribution of the discharge capacity between the different river branches 
during high water periods. The sums do not add up. Furthermore, he refrained from 
giving suggestions on when emergency water storage areas should be used. Another 
point is the transboundary effects, but that is not my business. Finally, while the Luteijn 
Commission focused on flood probability, it neglected the change from a probability- 
based to a risk-based approach567 which considers not only frequency of dike failure 
but also impact (damage incurred).’568
The secretary of the Commission, a Rijkswaterstaat official, also took a critical view of 
its work, but from another perspective. He was of the opinion that the critical note was 
lacking. ‘Critical discussions about the content were rare. The question of whether it 
would be necessary was put aside too easily. Some members were strongly in favour of 
emergency water storage, although the chair was not a priori in favour. One member 
took the initiative and said “I do not want us to wittingly take no measures, while we 
could have done something, only for a situation to arise that results in many victims”, 
and convinced two other members, including the chair. Another member was of the 
generation that considered the dikes to be safe. Next time I would do it differently. The 
remit should have been broader, covering not only emergency water storage but also the 
Room for the River programme. Moreover, the structure of the final report, in which 
the rational arguments of experts were contrasted with the emotions of the public was 
dubious, because it appeared that we were justifying a decision that had almost already
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been taken. It reflected something of the ‘old’ Rijkswaterstaat. We had not entirely 
negated the argument that Germany would have more room for spatial measures like 
emergency water storage. The Germany effect became known later. The Commission 
did not want to include technical statements in the report about things we did not 
know. And we could not list all failure mechanisms. After the publication of the report, 
the discussion with government decision-makers and politicians proved to be difficult, 
but the discussion with residents was even more difficult. Finally, the government 
decision-makers were nervous. The plan for emergency water storage would cost a lot 
of money and there was a lot of social unrest.’569
Discussions about risks were restricted entirely to experts and policy-makers. That was 
not without reason. Raising the issue of risk, especially in the Dutch water sector, is 
difficult because it is considered to be a politically sensitive question. According to a 
Rijkswaterstaat expert this closed attitude was motivated by the argument that they 
were working for the politicians in The Hague.570 A government official explained the 
background to this attitude: ‘When the Delta Works in Zeeland, which were built after 
the 1953 flood, were completed, we proclaimed that the Netherlands was finally 
protected against flooding. That was at the end of 1980s and the beginning of 1990s. It 
proved to be the worst thing you could do, because we cannot guarantee safety. We 
suffered from that statement. We did not foresee this and it became a difficult issue. 
The Cleveringa lecture by state secretary Schultz van Haegen in 2003, in which she 
emphasised that 100% security does not exist, opened up the question to debate.’571 
Later, Rijkswaterstaat officials noted that Rijkswaterstaat declared that ‘we have been 
safer than ever before, but not as safe as we think’.572 This formulation took a lot of time 
and discussion within the organisation, as evidenced by the officials’ statement that 
‘before one arrives at such a formulation ... .’.573
Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office
The director of the Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office strongly believed 
that a flood is inevitable at some time in the future. ‘Today, society expects that 
everything can be managed. I believe that government policies can never guarantee 
absolute safety. I was hesitant about the plan for emergency water storage. First, I 
hesitated because of the content. I do not believe that if a flood occurs, for example 
after 600 years, people will think of what has been agreed centuries before. In addition, 
I am not happy with the numbers of residents and the housing development in those 
areas. Second, technically it is hard to realise. The complexity of the river system makes 
it difficult to determine exactly when the emergency water storage arrangements should 
be put into effect. But I am in favour of making reservations for water retention474 to 
stop housing development and the growth in the number of residents in these areas. 
Third, political will is important: what type of flood safety do we want? That is a 
political choice. The current flood standard is the once in 1,250 year flood along the 
rivers. The problem is that people today do not know how to deal with insecurity. In 
addition, we have to deal with our neighbours. The minister for water management of
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the German state of Nordrhein-Westfalen protested against the plan for emergency 
water storage in Ooijpolder. If the polder were used Germany could be flooded [by 
water flowing back through the Querdamm on the border]. This would be prevented 
if the dike on the border was raised.’575
However, just before the Loevestein meeting576 in 2000 during the 2nd International High 
Water Conference in Rees he was strongly in favour of emergency water storage. ‘Within 
ten or fifteen years we do need a few retention areas or calamity polders. If it is going 
to be tight, the water can be stored temporarily in lightly populated areas in order to 
keep the rest of the country dry.’ He did not disguise the possible locations of these 
areas. ‘A retention area nearby the river Waal and the German border would be most 
effective. Rijnstrangen and Ooijpolder seem to be the best options, although in 
Ooijpolder the villages need to be surrounded by dikes. A similar operation in 
Nordrhein-Westfalen demonstrated that there would be emotional and fierce protests. 
Of the eleven indicated retention areas, only three are in the implementation phase. 
There are fierce protests in almost every location’ (Kuil, 2000).
A government official who was involved in the Commission’s work explained why the 
Dutch did not launch an international discussion about the expected discharges of the 
Rhine. ‘The idea was to raise it for discussion in the Rhine Commission, but this was 
not done for pragmatic reasons. An international discussion would take ten years or 
more and at the end you would still do not know anything, and it would make it 
impossible to meet the deadline of 15 May 2002 [the Commission’s deadline for 
publication of its report]. With regard to the content: whatever the figures, the airbag 
concept will remain necessary. Apart from international cooperation, you need to take 
measures and not factor in what may happen in neighbouring countries.’ She explained 
that in the beginning she was moderately in favour of emergency water storage, 
especially the technical aspects. ‘The discussion about emergency water storage 
functioned well as far as an exchange of ideas about water and risk was concerned. The 
Commission members had an important point, but the question became increasingly 
sensitive.’577 Besides, the question of hierarchy in Germany and the political issue played 
a role. There is no formal contact person for Rijkswaterstaat in Germany. Barbara Höhn 
from the state of Nordrhein-Westfalen was in charge of water policy, but she was 
responsible for only the stretch of the Rhine in her state, and Berlin is too far away. 
Although state secretary De Vries got along with her very well, apart from the Dutch- 
German study and the regular High Water conferences there were no other direct 
contacts. ‘The plan for emergency water storage affected the political image of Barbara 
Höhn. Germany has no flood defence legislation, so politicians have to find support 
for their plans to reduce flood risk. State secretary Monique de Vries set great store by 
a good relationship with Höhn and said “keep off Germany”....During the 
Commissions’ work I regularly visited German municipalities with the mayor of the 
municipality of Nijmegen and we found the atmosphere to be tense, and felt that the 
officials were thinking “tell us what you really want”.’578
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The director of water management at Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office 
had sympathy for the plan for emergency water storage. The director: ‘I was all for 
Ooijpolder as an emergency water storage area. Not for using it, but to plan for it in 
consultation with the residents. Look, a 18,000 m3/s design discharge, but also a lower 
design discharge, will lead to flooding in Ooijpolder from Germany. The polder is an 
emergency water storage area, whether the residents like it or not, but not controlled. 
Another issue in the discussion is the unreliability of the government. There were 
officials who said: “You have to create retention areas in those locations”. I was dead set 
against retention areas. The risk with retention areas is that the government will not 
want to wait to use them, that they will be used frequently, even more often than 
necessary. That is the risk. Using emergency water storage areas increases safety levels 
elsewhere. I said, “Let’s first see what happens with, say, a design discharge of 16,000 
m3/s, but be prepared to use them if needed”. My view was: no expensive measures, 
invest in ways of getting the water out of the polder, and instead of the inlet, arrange for 
machines, for example an excavator, make land reservations and buy the residents out, 
reconstruct their houses and provide damage compensation. I found that you have to 
arrange this through financial mechanisms, for example by exempting owners from 
property tax, but the mayors asked how they were going to get their money back; and 
then you get the nonsense stories that areas will be “locked up”.’579 Another government 
official: ‘The charm of emergency water storage is that you take a measure in one 
location. That was not a bad idea. [The Directorate-General for Water Affairs] was right 
to come up with the idea of emergency water storage; in about 20 years time the 
opportunity will be lost.’580
Concerning the relationship between the national government and the region, the 
director of the Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office knew perfectly what the 
political and administrative impact of his function was. ‘In my position as director of 
a regional office you stand with one foot in The Hague and another in the region. You 
are the eyes and ears of the state secretary. I knew many mayors and three or four times 
a week I had dinner with them. I sent all the local information on a little piece of paper 
to the state secretary. The director can therefore be considered as the representative of 
the state secretary in the region. Sometimes the ministry in The Hague developed 
proposals without consulting with the region, for example the plan for emergency water 
storage. That is why I am not surprised about the tumultuous political and public 
reactions [after the Loevestein meeting].’581
Although the director talked regularly with government decision-makers in the region, 
a dialogue with residents was not common. Nevertheless, he was pleased to meet them, 
such as Professor van Ellen who was involved in residents’ organisation Hoogwater 
Platform in Ooijpolder: ‘Let them come and discuss things openly. Van Ellen knows 
what we are talking about. It is Rijkswaterstaat’s business to underpin the arguments. 
Van Ellen once said to our river expert: “You know more about the river than I do”; a 
sporting gesture.’582 This opinion was not widespread among Rijkswaterstaat officials;
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it mainly depended on the individual. External contacts outside the professional circuit 
were not encouraged and experts were not easily accessible, with the exception of 
insiders like Professor van Ellen, who contacted them unhesitatingly.583
Province of Gelderland
On the question of emergency water storage the province of Gelderland assumed an 
active attitude towards the national government. Soon after the state secretary’s 
presentation provincial delegate Johan de Bondt criticised the plan for calamity polders. 
He was not convinced the measure was needed to accommodate higher water levels in 
future and was sensitive to the anger of the residents. ‘Storing and retaining excess water 
in Germany is preferable to rapid drainage in the Netherlands. The aim of emergency 
water storage is to remove the residual risks associated with a Rhine discharge of more 
than 18,000 m3/s where it enters the Netherlands. From Germany we know that such a 
discharge will probably never reach our country. Various emergency scenarios have 
shown that most of the dikes upstream will have been breached and most of the lower 
part of Germany (roughly the area from Cologne/Düsseldorf to the Dutch border) will 
have flooded. The water will flow naturally via northern Limburg in the direction of the 
Meuse and via the Liemers into the IJssel and not between the river dikes. The question 
was whether it would be useful to make arrangements for emergency water storage or 
to invest in transboundary crisis management and emergency plans. The provincial 
government has been committed to paying for measures in Germany and it has been 
demonstrated that a Dutch euro invested in Germany is more effective than measures 
in the Netherlands. In cooperation with the federal state of Nordrhein-Westfalen the 
province is looking for possibilities to realise a large retention area of about 2,000 
hectares, which would reduce the water level in Germany as well in Gelderland.’584
The province was not afraid to pursue a different policy to the national government. 
Besides the commissioning of contra-expertise,585 it initiated a Dutch-German study, in 
which Rijkswaterstaat also became involved, and various plans to convince the state 
secretary to abandon the plan for calamity polders. Provincial delegate Johan de Bondt 
defended one of his plans in the provincial executive.586 The chair of the residents’ 
organisation Hoogwaterplatform in Ooijpolder was present: ‘The delegate was looking 
for some support and I had some time that day. I went to the province and asked for 
an opportunity to speak. I recommended his plan warmly.’587 His successor Harry 
Keereweer followed the same path in August 2003, although his first reaction to 
emergency water storage was positive.588 As other authorities were critical about the 
position taken by the province of Gelderland,589 the delegate organised a joint initiative, 
the Regional Advice (Regioadvies), which was prepared in close cooperation with other 
lower-tier authorities. He emphasised the need to work closely with Germany. ‘If further 
measures are taken to store the water in Germany, a smaller area will be needed for 
temporary water storage in the Netherlands.’590
A water expert at the provincial government considered emergency water storage to be
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unreliable. ‘If you let water into these areas too early, it will go wrong.591...It is very 
precise work. If you flood an area too soon, it loses its function; it will be full of water 
before the flood wave arrives. And if you are just too late, the water will overtop the 
dikes. Moreover, there is no model available to test, so you cannot demonstrate that it 
will work. Therefore, it is a risky method.592...Our river system has been tailored to 
accommodate a design discharge of 15,000 m3/s and because of climate change this will 
rise towards 16,000 m3/s in the Rhine. The Room for the River policy was developed 
to deal with higher river discharges -  the middle scenario. But the state secretary wanted 
to make arrangements to cover the possibility of even higher discharges. In 1997 we 
began to study the river system in the province of Gelderland and the federal state of 
Nordrhein-Westfalen. When we heard of the plans to accommodate a river discharge 
of 18,000 m3/s we did not believe the Rhine could discharge this amount of water. We 
knew that Germany would not be prepared for such a high river discharge and that 
flood water would flow from Kreis Kleef (district of Kleve) to Ooijpolder. It was a very 
unpleasant discussion with the national government, also with the Luteijn Commission. 
We found that Luteijn was convinced that the national government’s proposal was a 
good plan. But it was not. The peak needs to be cut off in Germany, otherwise the dikes 
will be overtopped because the proposed emergency water storage capacity would be 
too small to accommodate such a flood wave. This meant that the plan for emergency 
water storage proved to be a measure for a problem that did not exist. You need to 
communicate better with the region and ask whether there is a problem and if so, how 
it can be solved. In cooperation with the region we developed mitigating measures. As 
a province we would like to have a robust water system without arrangements for 
emergency water storage, which would create new risks rather than reducing the current 
flood risk. If we need to accommodate a river discharge of 17,000 m3/s, then we have 
to make room for 17,000 m3/s. We chose to reserve more room than needed from a 
hydrological point of view. As a result of the energy we put in this relationship the 
national government is now grateful for what we did.’593
Municipalities
The plan for emergency water storage caused great indignation among the 
municipalities concerned. The first reactions came the day after the Loevestein meeting. 
The mayor of the municipality of Bommelerwaard, M. Peereboom, was surprised that 
his municipality was indicated as a ‘search area’ for emergency water storage. The mayor 
of Gorinchem, P. IJssels, reacted furiously: ‘It is extremely inappropriate to announce 
this without consulting the municipalities and polder boards. The state secretary had 
to be aware of the effect this announcement would have on people who were evacuated 
a few years ago.’ Even for those who knew about the plan beforehand it was a worrying 
situation. In his capacity as the representative of the Association of Netherlands 
Municipalities in the steering group for the Delta Plan for the Major Rivers, the mayor 
of Nijmegen, E. d’Hondt, received a map with preliminary designated areas for 
emergency water storage. ‘That is national policy. I was not keen on the idea.’ According 
to him, creating space for river water should not be limited to the Netherlands and
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Germany should also make plans for more retention areas. ‘The problem has been 
exported from Germany; let the Germans import the solution.’594 Mayor M. Schneeman 
of the affected municipality of Ubbergen, which contains Ooijpolder, knew that the 
polder would soon be on the radar. ‘During the high water event in 1995 there was 
discussion in the crisis team about whether the polder would be sacrificed to prevent 
the Bommelerwaard from flooding, but how would we inform the residents in the 
polder if there was a decision to evacuate?’ (Kuil, 2000). His successor, Paul Wilbers, 
was more explicit. ‘Rijkswaterstaat just said: “It is a study”. We are a civil service 
organisation, the state secretary decides. The state secretary said: “It is being investigated 
by Rijkswaterstaat; they are experts, I will wait for their report”. But from the interim 
report I understood that it would go wrong with this area. This is typical for 
Rijkswaterstaat engineers: they come up with a solution while the people do not even 
know about the problem. That could have been done differently. A turkey will not be 
willing to negotiate the terms and conditions of the Christmas dinner.’1595 According to 
him, the Luteijn Commission was too quick to identify calamity polders because the 
possibility of increasing the height of the dikes again and the effect of measures taken 
in Germany had not been sufficiently studied.596 Although he did not approve of the 
government plan, he did not formally oppose it. ‘I am not convinced of the necessity yet. 
I do not know the effects of such a measure.’597
After the publication of the Luteijn Commission’s report, mayor Lukassen of the 
municipality of Millingen aan de Rijn thought that her municipality would not be 
affected as Luteijn had identified Ooijpolder as one of the areas for controlled flooding. 
However, Luteijn meant Ooijpolder and Duffelt, the area from Nijmegen to the German 
border. This may have put the mayor on the wrong track: ‘I did not get the impression 
that our territory is a ‘search area’ for emergency water storage.’598 Mayor Wilbers of 
the municipality of Ubbergen, who was well aware of the ‘search areas’, took a more 
active approach and formed an alliance of 14 municipalities, German as well as Dutch, 
to commission a contra-expertise study. His argument: ‘Otherwise you are simply 
accused of being a NIMBY (not in my backyard). Here we call it NIMFABY (not in my 
front and back yard)....Whereas in the past flooding was seen as an act of God, 
nowadays it evokes an aggressive attitude. You are the government, so you have to take 
measures to make sure my parquet floor will not be flooded; that’s the NIMBY response. 
The attitude of the residents’ organisation High Water Platform has helped us to deflect 
the accusation of taking a NIMBY response. In every war there are screamers and that 
was the role adopted by the High Water Platform, who attacked the government plan. 
I had to consult with the state secretary. The argument against emergency water storage 
was that it is unnecessary, useless and against the law (Flood Defence Act). The tactic 
was to get rid of the NIMBY label by cooperating with a number of municipalities.’599 
The main purpose of the study was to provide evidence to refute the need for ‘calamity 
polders’. Mayor Wilbers: ‘The government is looking for a Dutch solution to a European 
problem and there is insufficient proof of the need to create emergency water storage 
areas.’ The municipalities intended to use the contra-expertise to contest the premises
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of the Luteijn Commission. The study was financed by the municipalities, but some 
were reluctant to contribute, including Beuningen. Executive councillor L. van 
Beuningen: ‘We are not in the Commission’s sights and we want to keep it that way. We 
do not see a reason to contribute to a study about the need for emergency water 
storage’.600
The topical subject provided an opportunity for the mayors to profile themselves. 
Mayor Wilbers of the municipality of Ubbergen was not averse to media exposure and 
proved to be a capable operator, with statements such as ‘Luteijn is acting rather like 
God’, referring to the way people viewed flooding in the past, and ‘Of course, nothing 
is more beautiful than a near calamity’. Wilbers: ‘It was easy. The population expected 
it; the people wanted me to do the talking on their behalf. From my former job, I was 
headmaster at a secondary school, I knew an old pupil who worked for the national 
news. After a while I received so much exposure that they stopped.’ The issue and the 
communal approach gave mayor Wilbers a feeling of pride. ‘We were very pleased to 
defeat Rijkswaterstaat on its basic figures and not on the conclusions [of the Luteijn 
report].’601
Another mayor also profited from the media exposure. The mayor of Duiven, H. 
Zomerdijk, had some experience with high water in his former position as mayor of 
Ochten, where the dike almost failed in 1995. In his role as secretary of the association 
of riverine municipalities he assumed an active role, which put him in competition for 
media attention602 with his colleague from the municipality of Ubbergen, mayor 
Wilbers, who became the informal spokesman. Mayor Wilbers changed his media 
strategy after he saw this was causing irritation among his colleagues. ‘When others said 
“It is easy to score”, I started to pass on questions from the media to the chair of the High 
Water Platform, Harry Sanders. He did a very good job.’603
Residents' perspective
The residents’ perspective on the emergency water storage area in Ooijpolder is 
described below.
Preparing for the fight
After the high water periods of 1993 and 1995 the Groot Maas en Waal polder district604 
did not stand still. After the residents were evacuated as a precautionary measure in 
1995 the organisation wondered what action it could take during high water events and 
commissioned an explorative study of the possibilities for flood water retention in 
Ooijpolder -  a natural reaction by an organisation that had been used to looking for 
answers to water management problems for centuries. Wim Arnts, a farmer in 
Ooijpolder and executive councillor of the municipality of Ubbergen, was a member of 
the board of the polder district. In this capacity, he was informed in an early stage about
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possibilities to prevent flooding in the future. Zeger Stappershoef, a farmer in 
Ooijpolder and member of the farmers’ organisation GLTO, was also involved in the 
study of the polder district. He did not find the study useful. ‘The polder district felt it 
had a responsibility to carry out a study. If you do research and the results are positive 
you run the risk that they will be used. The polder district did not expect the conclusion 
of the report to be that water retention in the polder is technically possible. If this is not 
what you want to hear, the report will not be as useful as anticipated. I was therefore not 
happy with this outcome.’605After the report was published the management board of 
the polder district was not willing to put it to one side. In a letter to the state secretary 
the dike reeve said that Ooijpolder was not suitable for designation as a retention area, 
but that the area could be reserved conditionally.’606 Like Zeger Stappershoef, other 
residents of Ooijpolder were also not happy about the polder district’s initiative. Mayor 
Wilbers of the municipality of Ubbergen reacted emotionally in a letter to the 
organisation at the end of June 2001: ‘After the evacuation of 1995, Ooijpolder should 
not be subjected to plans for water retention, however well the scheme is designed.’607 
The regional newspaper concluded that emotion had gained the upper hand at the 
expense of common sense.608
The report of the polder district lost significance when the report of the Luteijn 
Commission was published in May 2002. This caused some confusion because 
Ooijpolder was one of the areas identified for emergency water storage between 
Nijmegen and the German border, which also included Duffelt. Kees Nuijten, a member 
of the residents’ organisation High Water Platform: ‘The identification of the area led 
to confusion. Ooijpolder was identified as a location for emergency water storage, which 
also included Duffelt.’609 Zeger Stappershoef, a farmer in Ooijpolder, remembered the 
protest actions of the residents against other government plans in the polder. ‘We have 
a bit experience in this region of how to handle things, such as the cut-off of the bend 
in the Waal and the annexation plans of Nijmegen. The protest groups arranged for 
the housing minister to visit our polder. He proposed a ban on further building in 
Ooijpolder. We have saved the polder many times. And successfully!’610
How to organise a residents’ group?
The first people to resist the emergency water storage plan, before the meeting at the 
Rabo Bank, were farmers, who tried to draw attention to the government plan by 
erecting straw figures in strategic locations in the polder and placards with slogans such 
as ‘deep-sea diving in your back yard’.611 When the farmers’ organisation arranged a 
press conference about the plan, the local authorities backed them. A local political 
party which had close connections with the farmers’ organisation organised an 
information meeting which attracted fifty people (Warner et al., 2008). In addition, 
some ‘old’ opponents of earlier government plans started to meet with people who 
wanted to play an active role in opposing the government plan for calamity polders. 
The initial meetings held to arrange opposition to the plan were not well organised. 
According to mayor Wilbers, who attended a meeting, it was bedlam. Riny Zeegers, the
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director of the local branch of the Rabo Bank told the organisers to wait until after the 
bank’s annual meeting, to which David Luteijn, the chair of the Commission on Water 
Emergency Storage, was invited, but they did not. Riny Zeegers: ‘The next meeting with 
the ‘old’ opponents was informative as there was more clarity about the plans, but it was 
even stormier than the first one. Some of the key people asked me to take the lead and 
involve the Germans. I responded that I lacked time for the job but that I was willing 
to organise a meeting [in which a board would be chosen] and to initiate contact with 
the Germans. As a consequence, you have to offend people, particularly those who 
wanted to be chair, but lacked the capacity for such a function. Then, it proved difficult 
to get the farmers involved. At a given moment I visited Harry Sanders, a member of 
our board. He knew a lot about how to involve farmers. Harry was capable; he did not 
have a strong profile, but had many good qualities and no hidden agenda, as I 
discovered. Although there were some four or five candidates, I preferred Harry. It was 
a question of acting fast and I admit it was not very democratic. I knew that he would 
like to do the job and the others accepted. Sanders agreed, but under certain conditions, 
for example including Jan Smit, a former scientist who had a good network in Germany 
built up during his work as a researcher.’612 Harry Sanders was a retired rector of a high 
school. He was from a well known local family of gentleman farmers who used to hold 
various social functions (van Eck, 1999). The polder residents viewed the assumed chair 
as independent. He proved to be a strong leader who had time, authority, and 
managerial and communicative skills.
The residents formed an action group called High Water Platform. Shortly after its 
establishment on 7 November 2002, the residents’ group drew up an organisational 
structure, which included three working groups (technical, legal and communication) 
that supported the board.613 It proved to be efficient and effective. The organisation 
consisted of a healthy mix of locals and non-locals, as well as educated people with 
networks that had access to politicians, government decision-makers, government 
agencies and non-governmental organisations. It enjoyed broad support in the polder, 
with 400 members, 25 of whom were actively involved.614 A retired professor of water 
management, Wybrand van Ellen, was an active member of the technical working 
group. He questioned the assumptions of Rijkswaterstaat and made calculations. He 
was of particular value because of his extensive network within the scientific and 
political community.615
The solidarity in Ooijpolder was very strong, mainly because of its history of opposition 
to government plans, and was reflected in the 5,045 signatures that were handed to the 
state secretary during her visit to the polder.616
Battle with ‘the enemy’
Initially the residents’ organisation hoped that studies would be carried out to look for 
alternative solutions, which the state secretary had promised. This hope evaporated 
when procedures for implementing the plan for calamity polders were announced. In
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the meantime, further economic development in the area was in effect put on hold, 
which had a considerable adverse effect on the local entrepreneurs.617 This prompted the 
chair of the High Water Platform to change his strategy. The prime target was now the 
new state secretary, Melanie Schultz van Haegen. She fully believed Luteijn and her 
policy advisers that the public mood was ripe for controlled flooding and opted to go 
ahead with the policy. When she came away from a visit to the region saying the plan 
was ‘basically accepted’ by the local population (‘I heard “I do not like that” rather than 
“no”.’), the platform realised she ‘did not get it’.818 From then on, the state secretary was 
the ‘enemy’ and the Platform started looking for allies619 (Warner, 2008). The chair: ‘At 
that point I decided not to expend any more energy into trying to convince that woman 
and that it would be better to lobby for a majority in Parliament to block the plan.’620 
The strategy now centred on lobbying MPs, visiting political parties in The Hague, 
issuing a steady flow of bite-size information about new insights, developments and 
research into emergency water storage, and holding a guided tour of Ooijpolder for 
MPs and local and regional politicians, with a running commentary from the technical 
adviser of the High Water Platform (Warner et al., 2008).
On various occasions national government officials visited Ooijpolder and some MPs 
also showed their faces.621 During these visits active members of the High Water 
Platform, including Professor van Ellen, the technical adviser, were present and 
provided the members with ammunition. It became clear that the Rijkswaterstaat 
officials were not all of the same opinion about the government plan for calamity 
polders. ‘There were many opinions, but few were proponents of the government
plan.’622
One of the members of the platform uncovered a technical report consulted by the 
Commission Luteijn that was critical of the use of emergency water storage.623 While 
carefully worded, the report basically claimed that controlled flooding was uneconomic 
and ineffective. In the first instance, the requested report was promised, but was 
apparently lost. Later the official admitted that he was not allowed to send it. After 
appealing to the Government Information (Public Access) Act (Wet openbaarheid van 
bestuur) the report was made public. Based on the contents of this report, the Platform 
argued that Rijkswaterstaat had based its case on the wrong premises.624 Professor van 
Ellen: ‘The position taken by Rijkswaterstaat and the state secretary then started to
crumble.’625
Through its ability to use the members’ networks and the media, the residents’ 
organisation built a powerful political lobby towards the national government. It 
arranged for regular articles in the regional newspaper, which ensured that its voice was 
heard in the region and in The Hague. The residents’ organisation attempted to avoid 
the charge of nimbyism by emphasising that ‘we would basically be willing to make 
sacrifices in the interest of national security, if the arguments are based on solid 
grounds’.626
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In November 2004, during the maternity leave of the state secretary, two MPs laid a 
motion to reallocate the funds earmarked for emergency water storage to the Room 
for the River programme, which received broad support. In May 2005 the state secretary 
conceded defeat and the proposals for emergency water storage in Ooijpolder were 
shelved (Warner et al., 2008).
Rejection of emergency water storage plan: temporary or permanent?
The issue, however, had not finally been laid to rest. On 5 October 2005, a prime time 
current-affairs programme on national television suggested that emergency water 
storage was not quite off the cards. The High Water Platform protested vehemently and 
in response the state secretary sent a courier to the polder who delivered a personal 
letter to the chairman’s house at around 10.30 pm. In the letter she denied that the 
option of emergency water storage in Ooijpolder was again on the political agenda.627 
The Platform had once again proved to be a redoubtable political factor (Warner et al., 
2008).
External and internal threats
On two occasions Zeger Stappershoef had doubts about the outcome of the process. 
‘First, during a meeting when I asked a Rijkswaterstaat official whether it would be 
possible to surround a village with dikes. The official answered: “Mister Stappershoef, 
building dikes is our area of expertise”. In other words, he meant that they were bothered 
about it at all. Then I thought we still had quite a job on our hands; technically speaking 
we had nothing to win. Second, I had doubts when the plan for dike relocation near 
Groenlanden [a side channel in Ooij] emerged. The people involved in this protest 
action needed access to contacts in The Hague. I was worried that they would give up, 
because I heard some dissenting voices. It went well because of the report [by the 
Commission Luteijn]. Otherwise, the High Water Platform would have collapsed or 
would not have been able to present strong arguments.’628
The arguments
The chair of the High Water Platform
Before he became chair of the High Water Platform, Harry Sanders took little interest 
in the plan to designate Ooijpolder as an emergency water storage area. ‘I knew about 
it, but I was too busy. I had no time to follow the issue.’ Later on the full nature of the 
plans became clear to him: ‘It was a hundred per cent top-down approach. Via the 
media we knew that the Commission Luteijn had advised the government to designate 
Ooijpolder for emergency water storage. Well, “they are always writing a lot” is your 
first reaction.’629
When the government intended to designate Ooijpolder for emergency water storage 
his reaction was that it was ‘a catastrophic plan’. According to the residents’ organisation,
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the residents in Ooijpolder have the right to claim the same protection against flood risk 
as everyone else in the country.630 The chair: ‘Personally, as a citizen, I found that 
shameful. The government did not want to protect us any longer, but started to threaten 
us with flooding. Should a government treat its citizens this way?’631 Furthermore, the 
chair argued that no proven case had been made for the need for and effect of 
emergency water storage. The residents’ organisation distrusted the government plan.632 
One of the main arguments of the organisation was that the concept behind the 
measure had never been debated and despite the pile of thick research reports, there was 
no substantive basis for the need for calamity polders. The same was true for a 
comparative assessment. German measures had not been taken into account. On the 
basis of residual risk of a high water discharge that would statistically occur once in 
1,250 years, a whole area would be sacrificed.633
The residents’ organisation tried to convince the state secretary to look seriously at the 
possibility of discharging the water into the Ijsselmeer lake via the river IJssel. From 
the residents’ point of view, the calamity polders were identified too soon in the process. 
The organisation also doubted the effectiveness of the measure in the area. About 300 
to 400 million cubic metres of water had to be stored to lower the water level 
downstream by 0.5 metres. The Commission Luteijn was fully aware that space in the 
Netherlands was limited and decided to indicate three areas for storing 200 million 
cubic metres. This ‘limited’ capacity had been adopted by the government.634
The water expert
Professor van Ellen had a positive opinion of the residents’ organisation. ‘They are well 
organised, well-equipped and straightforward.’ According to Professor van Ellen the 
relationship with Rijkswaterstaat was as follows: ‘They make plans; we react. You have 
to keep the relationship pure....Generally speaking, the government solved problems 
by presenting measures too early. Then they carry out a comparative study. Look at the 
Commission Luteijn: a very limited assignment to search for areas for controlled
flooding.’635
According to Professor van Ellen, emergency water storage does not work. ‘Of the five 
preliminary areas designated for controlled flooding, one would be sufficient. 
Concerning the dikes, there are many risk factors at stake. For example, the dikes near 
the location of the Rhine bifurcation are not dimensioned for a situation with a 
northwest wind and a water level 10 cm higher than average.’636
He raised the German question by putting his finger on the problem of transnational 
cooperation. ‘There is no contact with Germany. Rijkswaterstaat felt superior towards 
the Germans and that feeling still remains. Contacts are now gradually being established 
between the province and Nordrhein-Westfalen. The Germans said that the 
Rijkswaterstaat officials did not know the first thing about it. That was right. 
Rijkswaterstaat did not send their best experts.’
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Professor van Ellen commented on the design discharge of 18,000 m3/s for the Rhine. 
‘This safety standard lacks any firm basis. The Becht Commission set the standard of 
water topping the dike only once in 3,000 years, which is equivalent to a design 
discharge of 18,000 m3/s. Nowadays this dike standard is once in 1,250 years, which is 
equivalent to a lower design discharge, but that was kept quiet. Rijkswaterstaat wanted 
to keep it at 18,000 m3/s, but that is not necessary. The Dutch-German study is based 
on a design discharge of 16,500 m3/s, but states no frequency, which is peculiar. I asked 
the water expert at Gelderland provincial government and he said, “I think once in
3,000 years”. It seems that you can extend the frequency of flood occurrence endlessly.’ 
He thus pointed out that two different standards were being used: the once in 1,250 
years flood occurrence and the design discharge for the rivers. Van Ellen also 
commented on the significance of the standard design discharge. When there are no 
high water events, the significance of the standard design discharge decreases. He 
explained this as follows: ‘The design discharge near Lobith [where the river Rhine 
enters the Netherlands] before 1993 and 1995 was 15,000 m3/s; after 1993 and 1995 it 
was 16,000 m3/s. If you do not experience a high water event, the significance of 1993 
and 1995 in water terms decreases. You can imagine that this will return to 15,000 m3/s, 
but after 1993 and 1995 it was set permanently at 16,000 m3/s. This means that 
emergency water storage areas are not needed because Room for the River measures 
have already been planned. We can allow ourselves to sit back and discuss this with the 
Germans. It is time to ban the computer for a while to stop the endless flow of 
calculations for the design discharge.’637
Farmers
When the Commission’s report was published the reaction of one farmer, Mrs Kroes, 
was: ‘It is terrible. They did not take into account the people who live here, let alone the 
animals... .In 1995 we suffered so much; you do not want to know. We took refuge in 
Friesland province with 150 cows. The cows were upset, the milk quality deteriorated 
and it took months before the situation was settled.’ The Commission tried to ease the 
people’s concern by assuring them that there would be a good evacuation plan and 
damage compensation. Fruit farmer Mrs Daamen: ‘You cannot compensate for 
emotions financially.’ She knew the people who left the polder in 1995: ‘Crying people, 
trailers full of fridges and chicken wire, you wouldn’t believe it.’638
In 1995 Zeger Stappershoef left the polder with his wife and two children. ‘The sheep 
went to Groesbeek, the cows to Uden and the tractor to Beek.’ His wife Marijtje: ‘This 
should never happen’. His first reaction when he heard about the plans for emergency 
water storage: ‘Are they crazy?’ After a few days he changed his opinion. ‘With controlled 
flooding you may avoid putting people downstream at risk. You can let the water into 
the polder for about 30 hours. Then the water level will be two metres, cutting off the 
first water wave.’ Compensation for damage would be a sensitive issue: ‘Now I have a 
robotic milking system, which was a rather expensive investment. Taking down and 
transporting it will take four or five days. I cannot leave it here; the insurance company
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would not accept it.’639 It was easier in the past. ‘You released the cows and they walked 
over the dike towards Germany. Nowadays, cooperation with Germany is not that easy. 
We live in the outlying area between the river, the push moraine and the border. The 
border is open, but that does not mean that it is easy to cross from the business point 
of view. Like the river it is an obstacle. You can cross it easily but on the other side you 
have different legislation and rules.’640
Citizens
Jan Smit, member of the board of the residents’ organisation High Water Platform and 
also a member of the German sister organisation Überparteiliche Bürgerinitiative gegen 
die Überflutung der Düffel, saw the advantages of Dutch-German cooperation for 
strategic reasons. ‘If we could lobby in The Hague, with support from the Germans, 
that would be important for strategic reasons. That was also the idea of the Rabo Bank 
branch director. A citizens’ initiative in Germany was given a legal status. The proposal 
led to fierce debates, but finally it was established and it functioned quite well. They 
got a lot of support from the population. The chair and secretary were present at our 
meetings and I was present at their meetings, so there was a perfect collaboration... .At 
the local level there was always cooperation between the Dutch and the Germans. One 
of the best results is the Dutch-German pumping station that was built in 1933.’641
Johan Bekhuis is nature conservation manager for the Millingerwaard, a habitat 
development area in Ooijpolder. ‘The Netherlands,’ he said, ‘thinks that the river Rhine 
starts near Lobith, at the border. However, the river crosses borders and goes beyond 
national structures. Moreover, there are funds from the European Union available for 
water quality, but also for measures to reduce flood risk. In about 200 years time people 
will laugh at our simplistic, nationalist approach.’642
6.2 Case analysis of the emergency water 
storage in Ooijpolder
The case analysis of the emergency water storage in Ooijpolder follows the framework laid 
down in Chapter 3. The point of departure for this analysis is the interaction between the 
authorities and the local group. By focusing on what occurred in the relationship between 
these actors through their interaction outcomes, their interaction strategies, their power 
building and their potentials to act, we were able to analyse the government-citizen 
interaction. The authorities’ organisational culture and the local group’s cultural 
background and the impact of these on their action were also analysed. The case analysis 
ends with a summary and discussion.
In the Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder case study the principal actors were the 
national government (Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency 
Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act), the provincial government (province of
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Gelderland), the local government (municipality of Ubbergen) and the local group High 
Water Platform (Hoogwaterplatform).
The plan for emergency water storage aimed to reduce the residual risk in the event of 
flooding for a design discharge in the Rhine of up to 18,000 m3/s (Warner, 2008) where 
it enters the Netherlands. It was provisionally meant to follow the ‘security chain’ -  it 
would delivered in a plane brown envelope to the responsible lower-tier authorities and 
nobody would ever hear of it but instead it was launched as an emergency measure to 
augment the national spatial planning instrument Spatial Planning Key Decision (SPKD) 
Room for the River should measures taken under this programme prove to be insufficient 
to accommodate the design discharge of 18,000 m3/s. As such, it was not part of the SPKD, 
which is the main difference between this case and the two other case studies, the Dike 
Relocation in Lent (Chapter 5) and the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder (Chapter 7). As a 
national plan, decisions on the plan for emergency water storage would be taken at the 
national level. The implications of not being part of the SPKD and the national decision­
making process for the interaction between the authorities and the local group are 
described below.
6.2.1 Interaction between authorities and local group
In the following, the interaction between the authorities and the local group643 is the 
object of analysis. A distinction has been made between the interactions between the 
national government (Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency 
Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act) and the local group, the provincial government 
(province of Gelderland) and the local group, and the local government (municipality of 
Ubbergen) and the local group. As the interaction between the authorities, including 
Rijkswaterstaat, province of Gelderland, municipality of Ubbergen, the province of 
Noord-Brabant and the municipalities bordering the Rhine, is considered important for 
the analysis of the interaction between the authorities and the local group, this has also 
been taken into account.
Two questions are addressed here. First, how did the key actors interact? We examine the 
interaction between national government and the local group, between the provincial 
government and the local group, between the local government and the local group, and 
the interaction between national and provincial government, between national and local 
government, and between the provincial governments and the local governments. Second, 
how can these interactions be characterised according to the typology of conflict, debate, 
negotiation, dialogue and collaboration?
Interaction between national government and the local group: diametrically opposed
In the relationship between the national government and the local group, two types of 
interaction can be distinguished: direct and indirect interaction. Direct interaction
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occurred irregularly, for example when the successive state secretaries visited Ooijpolder 
in May 2001 and November 2002, during meetings in which Rijkswaterstaat officials and 
the local group participated, in telephone calls between them, during visits by government 
officials to Ooijpolder, through the various letters the local group sent to the state 
secretary, and the delivery of a personal letter from the state secretary to the local group 
chair in October 2005.
The first direct interaction occurred when state secretary Monique de Vries, who 
launched the government plan, visited Ooijpolder. At the instigation of her 
communication expert, who was a great supporter of social learning, she was determined 
to explain the plan in a one-on-one dialogue between politicians and citizens. However, 
the envisaged interaction with citizens was soon thwarted by senior policy advisers 
representing the mainstream ministerial culture that discourages too much 
communication between state secretaries and the public, or indeed between the state 
secretary and public servants. As a result, a ‘traditional’ information meeting was 
organised. The state secretary did not feel comfortable under the residents’ critical 
questions, causing her to blush with shame. Afterwards, she called the meeting with the 
residents ‘a learning moment’.644 Her successor, Melanie Schultz van Haegen, received a 
petition signed by 5,045 polder residents during her visit to Ooijpolder, but she was not 
convinced of the residents’ arguments.645 In both visits the state secretaries did not make 
any attempt at reconciliation. The last visit -  just after the residents had organised 
themselves -  stirred the local group to change its strategy, and from then the polder 
residents saw her as ‘the enemy’ and ‘declared war’ on the politician. The strategy now 
centred on MPs and included visits to political parties in The Hague,646 issuing a steady 
flow of bite-sized information with new insights, developments and research into 
controlled flood storage, and inviting MPs and local and regional politicians on a guided 
tour of Ooijpolder, with running commentary from the water expert of the High Water 
Platform647 (Warner et al., 2008), which implied direct and indirect interaction between 
the national government and the local group.
Direct interaction also included meetings with Rijkswaterstaat experts that finally resulted 
in an invitation to submit an alternative plan drawn up by the local group’s water expert 
for inclusion in the SPKD Room for the River.648 In meetings with Rijkswaterstaat the 
residents’ organisation attempted to avoid the charge of nimbyism by emphasising that 
‘we would basically be willing to make sacrifices in the interests of national security, if the 
arguments are based on solid grounds’.649 Other examples of direct interaction are when 
the local group organised a discussion meeting in 2003, to which a director-general of 
Rijkswaterstaat and a high ranking government official of the interior ministry were 
invited to discuss the plan for ‘calamity polders’,650 and phone calls and correspondence 
regarding a classified report with critical comments about the government plan for 
emergency water storage. When the local group came away empty-handed from these 
contacts with government officials it wrote a letter to the state secretary, but she did not 
react to the local group’s demand for publication under the freedom of information
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legislation. After a second demand, in which the local group threatened to take legal 
action against the ministry, it received the report.651 In the last direct interaction, a letter 
from the state secretary to the local group after the issue of emergency water storage was 
discussed in a current affairs programme on television, the state secretary denied the 
option of emergency water storage in Ooijpolder was again on the political agenda.652
In direct interaction between the national government and lower-tier authorities (see 
below) it became clear that various other parties, including MPs, the mayor of the 
municipality of Ubbergen, the municipal executive of Ubbergen and Millingen a/d Rijn, 
consultants and scientists, were also critical of the state secretary’s plan. The residents 
operated in the background by supplying information via their website, with the latest 
news, media clippings and reports, generating recurring attention in the regional, national 
and foreign media, lobbying MPs and government officials in The Hague and giving 
guided tours. An MP who was previously a provincial delegate for the province of Noord- 
Brabant: ‘We prepared a motion and after we submitted it, Melanie Schultz van Haegen 
[the state secretary] called me to say that she had come to the conclusion that emergency 
water storage was not needed for the time being. Then I knew that there was some room 
for manoeuvre. For me, this was a signal that if it is not necessary it will not have to go 
ahead’.653
To summarise, the interaction between the national government and the local group can 
be characterised as debate and conflict. Debate started soon after the establishment of 
the local group, High Water Platform, and changed into conflict after state secretary 
Melanie Schultz van Haegen’s visit to Ooijpolder, where she received a residents’ petition 
against the government plan. In view of her and her predecessor’s unwillingness to 
negotiate, the local group saw her as ‘the enemy’ and ‘declared war’ on her, which can be 
considered an escalation towards conflict. This situation lasted until the vote in the House 
of Representatives, although between the ‘declaration of war’ and the vote in the House 
there were occasional periods of debate.
Interaction between regional government and the local group: mainly indirect support
Both the regional government and the local group were against the government plan. 
They became active in different periods. Gelderland provincial government took an 
opposing standpoint shortly after the launch of the government plan in February 2000 
by commissioning a contra-expertise. The residents organised themselves six months 
after the publication of the report by the Advisory Commission on Emergency Water 
Storage Areas (the Luteijn Commission) in May 2002. Apart from disagreeing with the 
design discharge for the Rhine of 18,000 m3/s, the province had serious difficulties with 
the nature of the proposed measure.654 Regarding the design discharge, the province 
commissioned a Dutch-German study into how much discharge the Rhine could 
accommodate. Regarding the measure itself, it proposed several alternatives, including the 
provincial high water plan with alternative measures, including dike relocations, flood 
plain excavation and bypasses.655 This finally resulted in a regional advice supported by
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lower-tier authorities (Stuurgroep Bovenrivieren-Stuurgroep Benedenrivieren, 2005). 
Provincial delegate Johan de Bondt: ‘Fortunately, I could offer the residents of Ooijpolder 
an alternative [the regional advice]. It was my job to look for structural and safe measures 
and to get support from The Hague.’656
Direct interaction between the provincial government and the local group occurred 
irregularly.657 On one occasion the provincial delegate called the local group chairman and 
asked for support during a debate in the provincial executive. As he welcomed everything 
that might help to oppose the government plan, the chair endorsed the delegate’s 
plan.658In turn, the local group was supported by the provincial government’s position in 
the public debate,659 the outcomes of the Dutch-German study, the regional advice and 
the media attention it received.660 Other direct interaction occurred during meetings and 
telephone calls with provincial experts, for example when the chair called a provincial 
expert for verification of news items in the media.661
From the research material it is not possible to determine whether there was indirect 
interaction between the provincial government and the local group, but in all probability 
it did occur, for example via the municipality of Ubbergen.
To summarise, the interaction between the regional government and the local group can 
be considered to be in the form of collaboration.
Interaction between local government and the local group: direct support
The interaction between the local government and the local group was direct rather than 
indirect. The first direct interaction was a letter by Wybrand van Ellen, a retired professor 
of water management, who later became the local group’s water expert. He sent this 
letter to the former mayor of the municipality of Ubbergen shortly after the launch of 
the plan for emergency water storage in which ‘search areas’ for calamity polders were 
made public. The mayor’s reaction was a formal one: ‘We are only concerned that the 
proper procedures are followed’.662 While at first sight his successor Wilbers was well 
aware of the fact that one of the ‘search areas’ for emergency water storage was located 
in Ooijpolder663 in his municipality, his colleague in the neighbouring municipality of 
Millingen a/d Rijn did not believe the government plan: ‘I have not been given the 
impression that our territory is a search area for emergency water storage.’664 Later she 
became convinced that central government was serious. Although she supported the 
local group, she did not assume an active role. Again, just after the publication of Luteijn’s 
report, Professor van Ellen sent a letter to mayor Wilbers, but like his predecessor he 
was not cooperative.665
Several months later, however, there was direct interaction between the local government 
and the residents, initiated by the combination of these roles in the person of executive 
councillor Wim Arts of the municipality of Ubbergen, who was also a local farmer. As a 
member of the Groot Maas en Waal polder district666 he knew about the consequences
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of the government plan. His son was member of farmers’ organisation GLTO and the 
initiator of the first actions against the government plan, including straw dolls placed in 
strategic locations in the polder and placards sporting slogans such as ‘deep-sea diving 
in your back yard’, and the organisation of information meetings for the polder 
residents.667 Besides the executive councillor, the mayor was now also willing to support 
the residents, despite his earlier refusal to cooperate. This led to direct interaction, for 
example through his agreement with the straw dolls protest action668 and his 
membership of the discussion panel during the annual meeting of the local branch of 
the Rabo cooperative bank, to which the chair of the Advisory Commission on 
Emergency Water Storage Areas was invited. He also attended a meeting with the ‘old’ 
opponents of earlier government plans, who made contact with people who would be 
willing to play an active role in protest actions against the plan for emergency water 
storage. 669, 670 After the establishment of the High Water Platform he was willing to add 
a visit to Ooijpolder to the state secretary’s programme with Dutch and German mayors 
from the region, which proved to be a platform for the residents to offer her a petition 
against the government plan signed by 5,045 residents.671 The mayor preferred to take a 
low profile: ‘In every war there are screamers. That role was for the High Water Platform, 
which was able to attack the government plan. I had to consult with the state secretary.’672
In his function as spokesman of the riverine municipalities and his active role in 
commissioning contra-expertise, the mayor of the municipality of Ubbergen supported 
the local group’s objectives.673 However, the mayor set a limit to his support, for example 
he was not willing to give a financial contribution to the High Water Platform for placing 
advertisements in national newspapers.
A final direct interaction happened after state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen 
conceded defeat on the government plan. Mayor Wilbers of the municipality of 
Ubbergen attended a meeting of the local group674 in which he and his colleague from 
Millingen a/d Rijn thanked the High Water Platform for its unyielding determination. 
‘Its opposition was not only fierce, but also based on expertise.’675
Apart from direct interaction with the municipal executive of the municipalities of 
Ubbergen and Millingen a/d Rijn, indirect interaction took place via both municipal
councils.676
To summarise, the interaction between the local government and the local group can be 
characterised as collaboration.
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Interaction between authorities
Interaction between national and provincial government: disputed conditions and 
solutions
The interaction between the national and regional government occurred directly and 
indirectly. Direct interaction took place through visits and meetings attended by the 
state secretary, government officials from Rijkswaterstaat head office and the East 
Netherlands regional office, the provincial delegate and provincial government staff, and 
through letters from the provincial government to the state secretary. Indirect interaction 
took place through the media, particularly regional newspapers, the Association of 
Provincial Authorities (Interprovinciaal Overleg, IPO), the National Administrative 
Council on Water (Landelijk Bestuurs Overleg Water, LBOW) and MPs.
The national government was not happy with the regional government’s position in the 
debate on emergency water storage. Provincial delegate Johan de Bondt: ‘I am not well 
known among politicians; I made things hard for the national government as I was 
opposed to the government plan for emergency water storage.’677 The province of 
Gelderland doubted Rijkswaterstaat’s proposed design discharge of 18,000 m3/s for the 
Rhine (‘At that level the water will flow into Ooijpolder via Kreis Kleve in Germany and 
Wesel will also be flooded’678). Johan de Bondt was also not in favour of ‘unstructured 
measures’ like emergency water storage to accommodate high water discharges in the 
river. He remarked that this interaction was ‘a very unpleasant discussion.’679 
Furthermore, the national government did not appreciate the province’s initiative for a 
Dutch-German study as it considered this to be central government business. The 
relationship improved when Rijkswaterstaat became involved during the execution of 
the study,680 as a result of which it accepted the need for scientific underpinning of the
18,000 m3/s safety standard. Nevertheless, the province of Gelderland’s alternatives for 
the government plan were not received well by the national government because of its
high cost.681
In his campaign against the government plan, the provincial delegate discovered that 
officials at the Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office had a similar opinion. 
‘The head of the water department agreed with me, but he could not say that in public,682 
whereas the director-general was not open to a discussion, saying that the government 
plan was a good solution.’683
Indirect interaction worked well, according to the provincial delegate: ‘A member of 
parliament [who was of the same party] was willing to talk to the state secretary and 
asked her if it would be wise to continue. That helped, and was more than I would do 
because I am closely involved because of my provincial interest.’ He was actively involved 
in the Association of Provincial Authorities (IPO), through which he raised the matter 
with the national government, but government officials at the ministry exercised
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restraint: ‘It [the government plan] was a political statement and they could not reverse 
the matter anymore. Furthermore, everyone was of the opinion that it would be a cheap 
solution, but this was changed by Luteijn, who proposed measures for the design of the 
area and damage compensation.’ The delegate had frequent contacts with the National 
Administrative Council on Water (LBOW), which meets regularly to decide on water 
issues.684
At the insistence of the provincial government and others, the national government 
made a gesture in the direction of the lower-tier authorities by requesting a regional 
advice. In its function as chair of the Upstream Rivers Committee, Gelderland provincial 
government assumed the coordinating role for this advice. After this, the national 
government and the regional government were on speaking terms. Finally, the national 
government approved the regional advice in part and gave up the plan for emergency 
water storage. ‘Afterwards, the national government was grateful for the energy we put 
into the relationship.’685
To summarise, the interaction between the national and provincial government can be 
characterised as debate, negotiation and dialogue. The interaction started with debate, 
but changed into negotiation when the national government got involved in the Dutch- 
German study, which led it to accept the need for a scientific underpinning of the 
discharge standard of 18,000 m3/s for the Rhine. The national government’s demand 
for a regional advice finally shifted the interaction towards dialogue.
Interaction between national government and local government: focus on 
maintaining the relationship
The interaction between national and local government occurred directly and indirectly. 
Direct interaction took place through visits and meetings which the state secretary, 
officials of the Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office and mayors attended, 
and letters and email messages from the local government to the state secretary. Indirect 
interaction took place via the media, particularly the regional newspaper, the 
organisation of municipalities bordering the Rhine, and MPs.
While the mayor of the municipality of Ubbergen had to exercise restraint in his contacts 
with the state secretary (‘in a bureaucratic organisation the state secretary has 
authority’), in his role as spokesman of riverine municipalities he was able to oppose 
the government plan. In this latter role he commissioned a contra-expertise. In close 
cooperation with regional authorities he also arranged for a letter to be written to the 
national government requesting a study of the actual situation. In this way he sought to 
deflect the charge of nimbyism.686
Apart from his presence during consultation meetings organised by the national 
government, the mayor of Ubbergen used the organisation of riverine municipalities to 
lobby against the government plan687 and asked the councillors to lobby in The Hague 
via their political parties.688 In contrast, his colleague at Duiven employed all his political
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contacts to argue for the abandonment of the government plan.689 But unlike the 
provincial government, which is responsible for regional water management, the local 
governments did not have a seat at the ministry’s table when it comes to water 
management.
The Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office viewed it as its task to explain the 
report of the Advisory Commission on Emergency Water Storage Areas to local officials 
in Germany, but it did not take similar action in the Netherlands. A government official 
who was involved in the Commission’s reporting and communication: ‘Various German 
mayors asked for a presentation to their municipal councils, but I have never been to 
Ubbergen Municipal Council.’690
To summarise, the interaction between the national government and local government 
can be characterised as debate.
Interaction between provincial government and local government: joint approach
The provincial and local government interacted both directly and indirectly. Direct 
interaction occurred through meetings in which both authorities participated. As a 
result, the province, the Arnhem-Nijmegen regional authority (Knooppunt Arnhem­
Nijmegen, KAN) and the riverine municipalities decided to send a letter to the state 
secretary requesting a study of the actual situation.691
Both authorities interacted indirectly through the media, particularly the regional 
newspaper.692 For example, the mayor of Duiven appealed to the province of Gelderland 
and others to prepare a joint reaction to the state secretary’s invitation to discuss 
measures to reduce flood risk with the region.693 Another example is the criticism from 
the mayor of Duiven of the provincial high water policy: ‘The region is unified about the 
national approach to accommodate a rise in the discharge of the main Dutch rivers, 
including dike relocations, excavation of flood plains and bypasses. Under this approach, 
retention areas have to be avoided as much as possible. However, this contradicts the 
regional high water plan, which identifies search areas for water retention. The province 
is therefore following the national government’s approach [to use emergency water 
storage] that it criticised earlier.’694 In a reaction, the provincial delegate explained that 
the mayor had commented on the regional river basin vision, which differs from the 
province’s high water plan by addressing various related problems, such as regulating 
excess precipitation. Those retention areas were for storing rainwater and not excess 
river water. He finally stuck to the inclusive approach and emphasised that municipalities 
have a free hand in taking measures, whether these would be retention areas or other 
options.695
The interaction between the regional government and local government can therefore 
be characterised as dialogue and collaboration.
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Interaction between provincial governments: joint action
The interaction between the provincial governments turned out to be collaboration, 
although they had different opinions with regard to the government plan for emergency 
water storage. While the Gelderland provincial delegate was utterly opposed to it, his 
colleague from Noord-Brabant was a proponent. Both delegates, however, agreed to 
support each other in their contacts with the national government.696 Interaction was 
only manifested directly, for example during meetings of the Association of Provincial 
Authorities (IPO).
Interaction between local governments: common goals
The interaction between the local governments was mostly direct, through meetings, 
letters, emails and telephone calls. Many local governments agreed with the initiative of 
the mayor of Ubbergen to commission contra-expertise, in which German 
municipalities were also involved.697 The ones that refused to cooperate did not enter into 
the public debate.
There were some difficulties between the local governments, for example the irritation 
between the mayors of the municipalities of Ubbergen and Duiven, who assumed both 
an active role in the public debate. While the former was volunteered to be spokesman 
of the riverine municipalities, which was second nature to him, the latter was secretary 
of the organisation and had experienced the real danger of bike breach during the high 
water period in 1995.698 The disagreement was resolved when the mayor of Duiven made 
his intentions explicit. Mayor Wilbers of the municipality of Ubbergen: ‘When others 
[including the mayor of Duiven] said it is easy to score points, I passed on questions 
from the media to the chair of the High Water Platform. He did a very good job.’699
To summarise, the interaction between the local governments can be characterised as 
dialogue and collaboration.
The prevailing interaction outcome between the national government and the local 
group was debate and conflict, whereas the interaction between the provincial 
government and the local group and between the local government and the local group 
was collaboration. The interaction between the national government and the provincial 
government led to debate, negotiation and dialogue, and the interaction between the 
national government and the local government resulted in debate. The interaction 
between the provincial governments led to collaboration and the interaction between the 
local governments ended in dialogue and collaboration. For an overview see Table 6.2.
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T ab le  6.2 Interaction of national governm ent (Nat), provincial governm ent (Prov), 
local governm ent (Loc) and the local group (Loc gr)
c o n f lic t  d e b a te  n e g o t ia t io n  d ia lo g u e  c o lla b o ra t io n
Nat - '
'  Loc + + o o o
Prov . - 
, - Loc gr o o o o +
Loc - " 
^ L o c g r o o o o +
Nat
^  Prov o + + + o
Nat /
^  Loc o + o o o
Prov
Loc o o o + +
Prov
Prov o o o o +
Loc
^  Loc o o o + +
o = not occurring + = occurring
6.2.2 Interaction strategies of authorities and local group
In this section we analyse the interaction strategies of the authorities and the local 
group.
The interaction strategies of the authorities and the local group can be divided into 
framing, buffering and bridging strategies. As explained in Chapter 3, frames give 
meaning to events. As such, they can be viewed as an interpretation. Frames depend 
on context, usually not unequivocally. Often they are implicit. This analysis makes a 
distinction between four frames: a power frame, an identity frame, a conflict 
management frame, and a collaborative frame. A power frame is mainly used to show 
authority and to demonstrate who is in charge. It is accompanied by dominance or a 
sense of superiority. An identity frame includes ideas about who one is, what 
characteristics one shares with one or more groups and how one does and should relate 
to others. An identity frame is often used in situations in which people feel uncertain, 
threatened or challenged. A direct reaction to such feelings is to fall back on the group 
or organisation to which one belongs and position this group against others. When 
people make a distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ they are using an identify frame. In 
this analysis an identity frame is used when people adopt a specific identity or various 
identities and set themselves apart from others by referring to ‘us’ and ‘them’. A conflict 
management frame shows an open mind to the views and opinions of others, and 
involves a willingness to find commonalities rather than emphasising dissimilarities. A
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collaborative frame demonstrates joint action between actors against their opponent or 
to achieve a joint objective.
If actors interpret data, information and phenomena solely according to the logic of 
their own frame it becomes self-referential. This implies that they lose the ability to 
view their own arguments from different angles or to situate them (Eshuis & Stuiver, 
2005). As a consequence, buffering strategies may be used to convince others in a 
persuasive manner. Usually, argumentation is based on one perspective, often of the 
group or organisation to which one belongs. The point of view is principally one­
dimensional: ‘all or nothing’. This type of strategy is directed at other actors in the arena 
to justify actions that may accompanied by drama and extreme use of language. 
Sometimes this ends in ‘frozen’ frames if an actor cannot move out of his or her 
assumed position, as a change would be interpreted as a loss of face. Buffering strategies 
may also contribute to reframing, that is, taking up another frame. For example, if a 
dispute arises in a collaborative relation, such as an alliance or coalition, and both actors 
do not want to give in, this may result in a change of frame; the collaborative frame 
may be replaced by an identity frame. Bridging strategies are directed at overcoming 
problems and finding joint solutions. This type of strategy includes a willingness to 
approach someone, to build a bridge to another person, being receptive to the views and 
opinions of others, trying to involve the other, and provoking discussions. Hence, 
bridging strategies may contribute to reframing. For example, if an actor is in conflict 
with another person they may decide to broaden the scope of the relationship and 
change its nature to try to negotiate a solution, which may result in replacing the 
identity frame with a conflict management frame.
Again, in the analysis of interaction between authorities and the local group a 
distinction has been made between the national government (Department of Water 
Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act), 
the provincial government (province of Gelderland) and the local government 
(municipality of Ubbergen). As the interaction strategies between the authorities, 
including Rijkswaterstaat, the province of Gelderland, municipality of Ubbergen, the 
province of Noord-Brabant and the municipalities bordering the Rhine, are considered 
important to analyse the interaction strategies between the authorities and the local 
group, these have also been taken into account.
The analysis of the interaction strategies used by the authorities and the local group 
addresses two questions. First, which interaction strategies are used in the interaction 
between the authorities and the local group, and between the authorities? Here, a 
distinction can be made between the interaction strategies used by the national 
government when dealing with the local group and vice versa, the interaction strategies 
used by the provincial government when dealing with the local group and vice versa, 
and the interaction strategies used by the local government when dealing with the local 
group and vice versa. Another distinction is the interaction strategies used by the
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national government when dealing with the provincial government and vice versa, and 
the interaction strategies used by the national government when dealing with the local 
government and vice versa. In addition, the interaction strategies used by the provincial 
government when dealing with another provincial government, and the interaction 
strategies used by the local government when dealing with another local government 
are analysed. Second, do the interaction strategies used by the authorities and the local 
group explain the outcomes of the interaction between the authorities and the local 
group and between the authorities?
Interaction strategies of authorities when dealing with the local group
Interaction strategies of national government when dealing with the local group
In its interaction with the local group the national government used framing as well as 
buffering and bridging strategies. Since these were mostly used implicitly, illustrations 
of the interaction strategies include either quotes of what others said about the national 
government or quotes of officials of the government agency itself.
In this case, a distinction can be made between two faces of the national government: the 
first served the purpose of ‘showing who is ruling’ and the second was used to make it 
clear that it served the public interest. The first used a power frame, while the second 
used an identity frame. The first was personified by the two state secretaries who held 
office in the period the project was running. An example of the power frame is state 
secretary Monique de Vries’s decision to establish an Advisory Commission on 
Emergency Water Storage Areas shortly after the launch of the government plan and her 
successor’s commitment to its outcomes, although the Commission’s report raised a 
great deal of controversy. An MP: ‘That went completely wrong. The mistake was that 
conclusions were drawn up by trampling on the residents. People do not accept this 
nowadays. It comes down to communication. Government departments have an attitude 
of “we decide what will happen” and “we are the main actors”.’700 Another example is 
state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen’s visit to the polder. Neither her visit nor the 
petition signed by 5,045 residents changed her mind. Throughout the years she stuck to 
implementing the government plan despite opposition from residents in Ooijpolder 
and others.701 An example of the state secretary’s power frame is her decision to release 
a classified report only after the local group threatened to appeal to the freedom of 
information legislation.702 A government official: ‘Looking back, I admit that the Room 
for the River programme jumped the gun a bit. People were not ready for thinking in 
terms of flood safety. Instead, they were confronted with specific measures.’703
The other face presented by the national government was represented by Rijkswaterstaat 
officials who exercised an identity frame in which they cast their relationship to the 
residents as ‘us’ against ‘them’. Government officials and experts employed an identity 
frame, although both used different arguments.704 Officials of Rijkswaterstaat East
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Netherlands regional office were bound to the ‘official’ line, whereas experts in the 
specialised department of Rijkswaterstaat were able to give their own opinions, within 
reason. The officials’ identity frame is revealed in the positioning of citizens as people 
who are hard to please with regard to the realisation of river plans, while being aware that 
their involvement is crucial and negotiation will be necessary. The experts were willing to 
consider another approach, expressed by one of them as follows: ‘Let them come and meet 
us; that will generate comprehension on both sides’. Talking about two sides, each with its 
own identity, implies that this expert takes a similar position as the government officials 
who sees citizens as ‘them’. Another expert: ‘Rationally speaking, the plan for emergency 
water storage is a good idea; only, we have chosen the wrong route... .Sanders [the chair 
of the High Water Platform] as well as Luteijn [the chair of the Advisory Commission on 
Emergency Water Storage Areas] are both talking nonsense.’705 The government officials’ 
and experts’ identity frame was to a certain extent understandable as their state secretary’s 
power frame did not give them much room for a more conciliatory approach.
State secretary Monique de Vries, who launched the plan for emergency water storage, 
often used buffering strategies. Examples of this type of strategy are her visit to the polder. 
After she visited the polder she downplayed the confrontation with the critical residents 
by describing it as ‘a learning moment’. Her attitude towards the residents was clear: ‘We 
must inform people adequately when they have to deal with the new water policy.’706 Her 
successor Melanie Schultz van Haegen also downplayed the encounter with the polder 
residents after her visit to Ooijpolder, saying: ‘I heard “I do not like that” rather than 
“no” ’.707
The state secretary sometimes used bridging strategies towards the residents. An 
illustration of a bridging strategy is state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen’s visit to 
Ooijpolder when she received a petition from polder residents. At that moment she 
‘bridged’ by offering the local group an opportunity to come up with alternatives. 
Afterwards she used a buffering strategy by saying ‘I not have heard anything that changed 
my mind’.708 Another example of a bridging strategy is her letter to the chair of the local 
group after the topic of calamity polders was raised in a current affairs programme on 
television, denying that the option of emergency water storage in Ooijpolder was again on 
the political agenda.709 Officials incidentally used bridging strategies when they were asked 
by the residents to explain the national government plan for calamity polders. They 
admitted, for example, that the idea of constructing side channels put forward by the local 
group’s water expert could also be a solution.710
To summarise, in its interaction with the local group the national government used two 
frames. The head of Rijkswaterstaat, in the person of the successive state secretaries, used 
a power frame, while government officials employed an identity frame. The state secretary 
showed who is ruling; the government officials emphasised their position in the debate. 
The national government often used buffering strategies and sometimes bridging 
strategies.
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Interaction strategies of provincial government when dealing with the local group
The provincial government employed framing and bridging strategies when dealing 
with the local group.
The provincial government used a collaborative frame when dealing with the local 
group, which would appear to be the most successful strategy for building an alliance 
to oppose the government plan and to communicate its alternatives. The province 
needed broad support for its alternatives, which included ‘structured’ measures, such as 
dike relocations, flood plain excavation and bypasses, as opposed to the ‘unstructured’ 
measure of the government plan for calamity polders. The provincial alternatives were 
finally presented as a regional advice.711 Instead of following the national governments 
approach, the province’s aim was to seek collaboration. As a government official 
explained: ‘You have to contact the residents and win them over’.712 The provincial 
government’s collaborative frame was particularly meant to convince others to act 
jointly, in this case a joint action with the local group.
As buffering strategies do not work with a collaborative frame, these were not used. 
The provincial government sometimes used bridging strategies in its interaction with 
the local group. An example is the provincial delegate’s request for support when he 
defended an alternative plan in the provincial executive.713 This showed his confidence 
in the local group, as he considered the residents to be supporters of his plan.
Interaction strategies of local government when dealing with the local group
The local government used framing as well as buffering and bridging strategies when 
dealing with the local group.
The local government employed a collaborative frame in its interaction with the local 
group. It felt that the government plan for emergency water storage would have a 
considerable effect on the polder and the residents, and therefore backed the polder 
residents in their struggle against the national government. The local government’s aim 
was to support the local group as much as possible, while keeping a low profile.
The local government rarely used buffering strategies in its dealings with the local 
group. An illustration of a buffering strategy by the local government is the mayor’s 
characterisation of a residents’ meeting which was held to find ways to organise 
opposition against the government plan, but ended in chaos, as ‘a bedlam’. At the same 
time, his attendance at the meeting can be described as a bridging strategy because he 
showed his support for the residents. Another example of a buffering strategy is the 
communication of a negative reaction to the local group’s demand for a contribution 
to a major advertising campaign in national newspapers. Mayor Wilbers: ‘That action, 
however, is very costly. We said we would not support that type of actions.’714 This was 
followed by a bridging strategy by saying that for incidental initiatives the local group 
could apply to the municipality for money.
208
-Q-
Madelinde PHD zonder afbrekingen:Opmaak 1 15- -2011 14:44 Pagina 209
The local government often employed bridging strategies in its interaction with the 
local group, such as the mayor’s agreement with the straw dolls protest action, his offer 
to open up the programme of state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen when she 
attended a conference of the riverine municipalities, and his acknowledgement after 
she conceded defeat on the plan for emergency water storage in Ooijpolder.715
Interaction strategies of the local group when dealing with authorities
Interaction strategies of the local group when dealing with the national government
The local group used framing as well as buffering and bridging strategies when dealing 
with the national government.
The local group exercised an identity frame in its interaction with the national 
government. The local group chair was clear about the residents’ support: ‘I have not 
met anyone here in the polder who says they sympathise with the plan.’ He also pointed 
to the 400 members of the local group: ‘The 400 members are our legitimacy. But that 
is common practice since just a few per cent of the population are members of a 
political party. Furthermore, historically, revolutions are always initiated by a 
minority.’716 The point of departure of the local group’s strategy was the question: Who 
is our enemy? An illustration of this is the reaction of the local group chair when state 
secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen did not change her mind after visiting Ooijpolder, 
where she received a petition signed by 5,045 polder residents: ‘I will not expend any 
more energy in trying to convince that woman’.717 The focus was now on the MPs who 
could cancel the government plan. The residents started a lobby campaign to get them 
on their side. The local group chair deflected the charge of nimbyism by saying that ‘if 
there are reasonable arguments for realising calamity polders to prevent the rest of the 
country from flooding, the residents might agree with the plan; we would not like it, but 
we would understand’. However, he usually followed this up by saying: ‘This does not 
apply when it concerns a bad measure that will probably not work’.718
The local group’s identity frame was often accompanied by buffering strategies. 
Examples of this type of strategy are the presentation by the local group chair during 
Melanie Schultz van Haegen’s visit to Ooijpolder, the ‘declaration of war’ on the 
politician after she said that she heard “preferably not” rather than “no”,719 and the local 
group’s communication with the media, including statements such as ‘Luteijn [the chair 
of the Advisory Commission on Emergency Water Storage Areas] is a disaster’,720 ‘No 
Berlin Wall in Ooijpolder’,721 and ‘In The Hague they have to know that flooding 
Ooijpolder is not an option’.722
Bridging strategies were solely used in meetings and telephone calls with Rijkswaterstaat 
officials, but the aim was always the same: to convey the local group’s point of view.723 
To summarise, the local group employed an identity frame in dealing with the national
209
-Q-
Madelinde PHD zonder afbrekingen:Opmaak 1 15- 2011 14:44 Pagina 210
government to emphasise its position in the debate. This frame was often accompanied 
by buffering strategies and sometimes by bridging strategies. Both were part of the local 
group’s strategy in which the state secretary was viewed as the ‘enemy’.
Interaction strategies of the local group when dealing with the provincial government
The local group used a collaborative frame in its interaction with the provincial 
government. This frame was particularly meant to maintain the support of the province 
in its fight against the government plan.
Buffering strategies did not fit into the collaborative frame that the local group 
employed. The local group sometimes used bridging strategies when dealing with the 
provincial delegate, for example when he asked for the local group’s support during a 
debate in the provincial executive,724 and in its communication with provincial officials. 
The local group’s ‘bridging’, however, was focused on bringing the citizens’ voice to the 
notice of the provincial government.725
Interaction strategies of the local group when dealing with the local government
The local group used a collaborative frame in its interaction with the local government. 
This type of frame was adopted to gain the support of the government agency in its 
protest against the government plan. The residents’ choice for a collaborative frame 
implied that buffering strategies did not match well and were therefore not used.
As a collaborative frame is generally exercised by partners who have a mutually tolerant 
relationship, this has to be maintained somehow. It is to be expected that the local group 
sometimes used bridging strategies towards the local government, but this was hushed 
up.
Interaction strategies between authorities
Interaction strategies of national government when dealing with the provincial 
government
The national government used framing as well as buffering and bridging strategies when 
dealing with the provincial government.
The national government used two frames when dealing with the provincial 
government: a power frame by the head of Rijkswaterstaat, exercised in particular by the 
successive state secretaries, and a conflict management frame used by officials of the 
Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office. An example of the power frame is the 
launch of the government plan. An official of the province of Gelderland: ‘ [The plan for 
emergency water storage] was a surprise for us. Rijkswaterstaat726 is like Gyro Gearloose 
(Willie Wortel) who will solve everything. It costs half a billion [euros]. Rijkswaterstaat 
was far too convinced that it was a sublime solution.727 The Gelderland provincial
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delegate: ‘It was engineering logic: typically technical solutions, but with little societal 
engagement. The idea [of emergency water storage] was launched all of a sudden.. .and 
then Monique [de Vries, the state secretary], instead of saying that it was only an idea 
and there are also other options, stuck to it and defended it with fervour. Later you got 
stories about enormous dikes around farm houses. It would be a complete fortress with 
possibly an opening to get in and out. It was no surprise that it caused such a 
tumult.’728Despite comments from lower-tier authorities and critical (internal) reports, 
state secretary Monique de Vries and her successor Melanie Schultz van Haegen stuck 
to the power frame, although the latter made less use of this according to the Gelderland 
provincial delegate.729 This was confirmed by the provincial delegate of Noord-Brabant, 
who later became an MP: ‘Melanie Schultz van Haegen changed her mind. She called 
me to say that she had come to the conclusion that emergency water storage was not 
needed for the time being.’730 Another illustration of the power frame was the attitude 
of the director-general of Rijkswaterstaat, who was not willing to enter into discussion 
as he was convinced that the government plan was ‘a good idea’,731 whereas officials of 
the Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office employed a conflict management 
frame towards provincial officials. An official at the province of Gelderland: ‘We had 
meetings with Rijkswaterstaat in which questions were discussed, like is it useful and are 
there risks. That was a really fair discussion.’732 They found a common ground in their 
standpoint with regard to the problem at issue and how to deal with it. However, 
according to the provincial delegate, ‘They exercised restraint, because the plan of the 
state secretary had to proceed’.733
Provincial officials’ statements, such as ‘that was a very unpleasant discussion’ and ‘at 
national level they are now grateful for what we did’,734 makes it likely that the national 
government used buffering strategies during meetings, particularly at the beginning of 
the process. Also, the provincial delegate experienced buffering strategies at the ministry 
when he raised the question of emergency water storage and government officials 
responded by saying that ‘they could not reverse the matter anymore’.735 Likewise, the 
government officials and the state secretary used a buffering strategy by saying that the 
provincial alternative was prohibitively expensive.736 It can be concluded that the 
national government sometimes used buffering strategies in its dealings with the 
provincials government, particularly at the beginning of the planning process. Later, 
state secretary Schultz van Haegen ‘bridged’ occasionally, for example by offering the 
opportunity to come up with alternatives.737
To summarise, the national government exercised two frames when dealing with the 
provincial government: a power frame which was used by the head of Rijkswaterstaat, 
exercised in particular by the state secretary, and a conflict management frame which 
was employed by officials of the Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office, among 
others. This meant that the successive state secretaries showed who is ruling, while the 
government officials were open to different views. Buffering and bridging strategies 
were used occasionally.
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Interaction strategies of national government when dealing with the local 
government
The national government used framing as well as buffering and bridging strategies when 
dealing with the local government.
The national government used a power frame and a conflict management frame in its 
interaction with the local government. While the former was employed by the head of 
Rijkswaterstaat, particularly through the successive state secretaries, the latter was used 
by government officials, such as those working at the Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands 
regional office. An example of the state secretary’s use of the power frame is the way the 
plan for emergency water storage was launched from the top down, without consulting 
the region beforehand. At that time, mayor Wilbers of the municipality of Ubbergen 
was not yet in charge. From the draft report of the Advisory Commission on Emergency 
Water Storage Areas he already knew that ‘it went wrong with Ooijpolder’.738 An 
illustration of the conflict management frame used by the director of Rijkswaterstaat 
East Netherlands regional office is his frequent dinners with mayors. He saw his function 
as being the representative of the state secretary in the region: ‘You are the eyes and the 
ears of the state secretary.’739 In other words, it was his job to mediate between the 
national and the local level. However, it proved to be a hard job for him because he 
doubted the government plan. ‘I was undecided about the plan for emergency water 
storage, its substance -  I am not happy about the number of residents in Ooijpolder -  
the technical question -  it is hard to determine when you need to put the emergency 
water storage function into effect -  and the question of whether politicians will have 
the courage to make the decision -  which safety level do we want?’740
The national government sometimes used buffering strategies. An example of this type 
of strategy is state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen’s remark during a visit to the 
polder that damage could not be fully compensated, although this was stated in the 
Commission’s report. A further example is its non-communication with the residents, 
whereas it was a state responsibility to communicate with the public. When asked who 
was responsible for the communication with the residents by the mayor of Ubbergen 
during a visit by the state secretary to Ooijpolder a government official said ‘Just do it 
yourself’, which can be considered an example of a buffering strategy.741
Bridging strategies were used incidentally. An example of a bridging strategy is state 
secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen’s offer to the local government to come up with 
alternatives. At the same time she used a buffering strategy when she said that until then 
she had not heard anything to change her mind.742
To summarise, the national government employed a power frame, which was used by the 
head of Rijkswaterstaat, particularly through the successive state secretaries, and a 
conflict management frame, which was employed by government officials, including 
those at the Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office. While the state secretaries
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demonstrated who is ruling, the government officials showed that they were open to 
other views. These frames were occasionally accompanied by buffering and bridging 
strategies.
Interaction strategies of provincial government when dealing with the national 
government
The provincial government used framing and bridging strategies when dealing with the 
national government.
The province of Gelderland simultaneously used an identity frame and a conflict 
management frame in its interaction with the national government. The provincial 
government was known for taking a firm, independent standpoint on other issues, such 
as the Betuwe rail freight line (Betuwelijn). Illustrations of the province’s identity frame 
are the development of its own high water policy, which was presented as an alternative 
to the government plan for emergency water storage (‘which offers only false security. 
It is typical product of the drawing board’743), the questioning of the design discharge 
of 18,000 m3/s of the Rhine and its initiative for a Dutch-German study to research this 
issue. A provincial official: ‘Our feeling about Rijkswaterstaat’s premise of the 
government plan was that 18,000 m3/s is not realistic. We know that floods in Germany 
are not prevented; for example in Kreis Kleve the water will flow backwards, via the 
hinterland to Ooijpolder. (...) We stick our neck out a bit further than the national 
government. If a flood occurs the risk that there will be people drowned is much higher 
in the Netherlands than in Belgium or Germany. It is not silly that we worried about 
it’.744 The identity frame was made clear by referring to ‘us’ (as a province) against ‘them’ 
(the national government). This illustration of an identity frame has power frame 
characteristics as the provincial government did not involve the national government in 
the Dutch-German study while it was in fact an international question rather than a 
transboundary collaborative initiative. A provincial official: ‘We had the cheek to work 
internationally. Later, we raised it to a higher level and included the Department of Water 
Management.’745 At the same time, the province used a conflict management frame to 
explain its intentions. A provincial official: ‘We had put a lot of energy into it [the 
relationship with the national government]. We explained that emergency water storage 
was a solution to a problem that did not exist. You have to discuss this with the region:
do we have a problem, and if so, how do we deal with it?_It is about how you bring it
up for discussion. Look, the capacity and expertise are largely present at the national 
level, there is less at the regional level and at the local level nobody has expertise in the 
field of water management. In cooperation with the municipalities and water boards we 
developed mitigating measures.’746 Overall, the conflict management frame was prevalent 
in the interaction with the national government. This frame was purely used to restore 
the relationship with the national government and for ‘damage reduction’. Reframing, 
therefore, was not relevant.
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Buffering strategies were not used while the province used an identity frame, nor when 
it employed a conflict management frame.
On many occasions the province took the initiative to bridge. The provincial delegate 
used bridging strategies particularly during meetings with other government agencies 
and MPs, and in his role as representative of the Association of Provincial Authorities 
(7PO)he had access to administrative meetings in The Hague. The provincial delegate: 
‘In order to influence decision-making you have to be in The Hague’.747
To summarise, the provincial government exercised an identity frame and a conflict 
management frame when dealing with the national government. While the identity 
frame was used to position the province in the debate, the conflict management frame 
was directed at finding a common ground for alternatives to the government plan. 
Bridging strategies were used very often to achieve this aim, while buffering strategies 
were not used at all.
Interaction strategies between provincial governments
The provincial governments of Gelderland and Noord-Brabant, in whose territories the 
proposed calamity polders were located, decided to take a joint stance in opposing the 
national government. They used a collaborative frame despite having different opinions 
about the plan. Provincial delegate Johan de Bondt of Gelderland recalled that Jan 
Boelhouwer, the Noord-Brabant delegate, had agreed to the Beersche Overlaat, one of 
the three areas designated for emergency water storage. ‘I said to him that we do not 
agree, but that does not matter. But if he did not create problems...by saying that the 
state plan for emergency water storage is a good solution, I promised that I would not 
comment on his attitude towards the Beersche Overlaat.’748
Both provinces did not use buffering or bridging strategies.
Interaction strategies of provincial government when dealing with the local 
government
In its interaction with the local government the provincial government used framing 
and bridging strategies.
The provincial government used a collaborative frame when dealing with the local 
government. This frame was particularly meant for building an alliance against the 
government plan and gaining support for its alternatives, which finally resulted in a 
regional advice to the national government. A provincial official commented on the 
province’s effort to involve local governments in the development of a regional advice: 
‘It is the way you bring it up for discussion. Look, the capacity and expertise [in the field 
of water management] are largely present at the national level, there is less at the regional 
level and at the local level nobody has the expertise. We wrote a memorandum on our 
standpoint concerning emergency water storage, which was brought into the discussion 
in the provincial executive. That was in close cooperation with regional and local actors,
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such as the municipalities. We invited the executive councillors to comment on this. 
That proved to be hard for them [due to their lack of expertise in the field of river 
science] but they were cooperative as they could not easily say no.’749
The provincial government did not use buffering strategies as these did not fit in well 
with its collaborative frame.
The provincial government regularly used bridging strategies when dealing with the 
local government, for example during the meeting of executive councillors with the 
provincial executive and in meetings of the riverine municipalities.750 In close 
cooperation with other lower-tier authorities, the riverine municipalities agreed with 
the provincial initiative to send a joint letter to the Dutch Parliament to request further 
research on alternatives.751
Interaction strategies of local government when dealing with the national 
government
The local government used framing as well as buffering and bridging strategies when 
dealing with the national government.
The local government used an identity frame in its interaction with the national 
government. The mayor of the municipality of Ubbergen made it appear as if his 
municipality was a victim of national government policy. ‘It seems unlikely that a turkey 
will happily negotiate about the terms and conditions of the Christmas dinner. We are 
against because we think that calamity polders are not necessary. And if research proves 
the opposite, well, so be it.’ His tactic was to communicate the position of his 
municipality to the state secretary by telling stories to create a visual impression, such 
as the story about a mudflow in an Italian village. ‘The question is whether you open the 
door to let the mudflow through or to keep it closed. I would only open the door if the 
neighbours helped with the cleaning; in other words, if I would be compensated for the 
costs of cleaning. If I have no confidence in the compensation measure, I will keep the 
door closed.’ He motivated the choice for an identification frame as follows: ‘The 
aggression [of the residents] was provoked, since it is not an act of God, but an inlet in 
the dike that will be opened by someone. Instead of praying in the church, people will 
go to the town hall. I am a representative of the government; I have to protect them from 
flooding.’ Here, the mayor emphasised the position of the local government in the 
administrative hierarchy. It is the national government that decides when the inlet will 
be opened, who is responsible for opening it and what compensation measures will be 
taken.
Buffering strategies were used incidentally. An illustration of a buffering strategy is 
mayor Wilbers’ standpoint about which government agency is responsible for informing 
the citizens, which he brought into the open during a meeting between representatives 
of the riverine municipalities and a delegation from the national government. But before
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using a buffering strategy towards the national government, the mayor made sure of the 
province’s position in the debate (‘the province also said: “it seems to be unnecessary, 
there are other options”.’).
The local government sometimes employed bridging strategies. Mayor Wilbers’ intention 
was to remain on speaking terms with the national government. An illustration of the 
use of a bridging strategy is when, as chair of the riverine municipalities, he invited the 
state secretary to Ooijpolder to show her the area. Another illustration of this type of 
strategy when dealing with the national government is the mayor’s suggestion of making 
a leaflet to inform the polder residents.752
To summarise, in its interaction with the national government the local government 
employed an identity frame to mark its position in the debate. It used buffering strategies 
incidentally. Bridging strategies were employed now and then to remain on speaking 
terms with the national government.
Interaction strategies of local government when dealing with the provincial 
government
The local government used a collaborative frame when dealing with the provincial 
government to show its willingness to support the provincial government’s initiatives to 
resist the government plan for calamity polders.
Buffering strategies were not used as they did not match well with the local government’s 
collaborative frame.
The local government sometimes used bridging strategies towards the provincial 
government, for example its agreement with a provincial initiative to send a letter to the 
Dutch Parliament requesting further research, and sending representatives to various 
provincial meetings.753
Interaction strategies between local governments
The municipality of Ubbergen used a collaborative frame towards other local 
governments, in particular the municipality of Duiven, to gather support to oppose the 
government plan.
Neither buffering nor bridging strategies were used in the relationship between the local 
governments.
An overview of the interaction strategies of the government authorities and the local 
group is presented in Table 6.3.
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T ab le  6.3 Interaction stra teg ie s of national governm ent (Nat), provincial governm ent (Prov), 
local governm ent (Loc) and local group (Loc gr)
framing buffering bridging 
strategies strategies
Nat Loc gr + + ± ±
Prov^Loc gr c c ° O ± +
Loc Loc gr >  C - O + ±
Nat- Prov PCM I CM ± O ± ++
Nat^  Loc P CM - : + ± +
Prov Loc C c o 0 +
Prov^  Prov c c' o / o o o
loc^  Loc ,c. c o o o o
C = co llaborative fram e C M  = conflict m anagem ent fram e I = identity fram e P = pow er fram e  
o = zero ± = low + = m oderate ++ = high
The most striking outcomes of the analysis of the interaction strategies used by the 
government authorities and the local group are the national government’s ‘double face’ 
when dealing with the local group and the lower-tier authorities. It employed a power 
frame and an identity frame towards the local group. The former was exercised by the 
head of Rijkswaterstaat, particularly through the successive state secretaries; the latter 
was generally employed by government officials. Due to the state secretaries’ use of a 
power frame the government officials had little scope for adopting another frame, such 
as a conflict management frame. The use of an identity frame by government officials, 
such as those working at the Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office, was 
understandable: they had to deal with the residents and the provincial and local 
governments. The provincial government’s conflict management frame and bridging 
strategies changed the interaction between the national and provincial government 
from debate towards negotiation and dialogue. The interaction between the national 
and local government remained one of debate as a result of the national government’s 
use of a power frame and an identity frame and the local government’s use of an identity 
frame.
The analysis shows that using both a power frame and an identity frame is not 
conducive to achieving the ‘collaborative’ interaction outcomes of dialogue and 
collaboration. For the ‘conflictive’ outcomes of conflict and debate, towards the other 
end of the continuum, a conflict management frame is needed first. This frame is used 
if an actor is willing to accommodate and/or wants to get support from others. Actors 
who want to working together to achieve shared goals may adopt a collaborative frame.
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In the interactions between the authorities the main opinions were formed in the 
interactions between the national and provincial government and between the national 
and local government. The interactions between these actors therefore had the greatest 
influence on forming the conclusions of this analysis and so the emphasis in the next 
section is on these relationships.
6.2.3 Power building by authorities and local group
In this section we analyse the power building by the authorities and the local group. The 
following types of power building have been identified: direct and indirect coercive 
power, legitimate power, reward power, hindering power, knowledge power, media 
power and sociability. While direct coercive power is exercised through repression, such 
as a police action or imposing penalties, indirect coercive power may achieve the same 
result indirectly, for example explicitly through threats or by appealing to the law and 
hierarchical relationships, or implicitly through a high turnover rate of officials 
(frequently moving officials to different positions). In modern democracies the 
government exercises restraint when using direct coercive power because this is 
considered to be a last resource to produce a desired social result. Other options are 
used first to achieve the government’s objective, such as the use of indirect coercive 
power. Legitimate power denotes how actors legitimise their position towards others. 
They may refer to a social structure, such as a hierarchy, or to other social norms, such 
as reciprocity, equity and responsibility. Reward power signifies that an actor is 
rewarded in a material way, in the form of money or goods, or in an immaterial way, 
through an honourable mention, a decoration or an appointment as honorary member. 
Hindering power means that an action or progress has been hindered or prevented by 
obstruction or slowing down progress. Knowledge power uses knowledge to influence 
the position of actors in their interaction with others. Examples are calling in external 
experts, commissioning studies and having a numerical superiority of experts in 
meetings, which relays signals to others that things are serious. It may also involve the 
use of the specific knowledge of the parties involved. Media power signifies the use of 
media by actors to give meaning and interpretations to their values. Actors go to the 
media for various reasons, including mobilising support, validating the relevance of 
the actor concerned and disseminating their message more widely. The sociability of an 
actor is considered a separate power source (Nesler et al., 1993) (see also Chapter 3) 
because it tends to call forth reciprocity. It is proper to give something back to a person 
who has always been helpful, or it may be a motivation for getting favours from others. 
Since respondents rarely said anything about the sociability of other people, I noted 
their opinions of other actors or quotes that can be interpreted as such.
In this analysis authorities are differentiated into national government (Department 
of Water Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate 
to act), the provincial government (province of Gelderland) and local government
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(municipality of Ubbergen). Two questions about power building by the authorities 
and the local group are posited. First, which power types are built by the authorities and 
the local group? Here, a distinction can be made between the power exerted by the 
national government over the local group and vice versa, the power exerted by the 
provincial government over the local group and vice versa, and the power exerted by the 
local government over the local group and vice versa. With regard to the authorities, a 
distinction can be made between the exertion of power by the national government 
over the provincial government and vice versa, and the exertion of power by the 
national government over the local government and vice versa. Second, what are the 
consequences of power building by the authorities and the local group for their 
interaction strategies, and for the outcomes of the interaction between the authorities 
and the local group, and between the national and lower-tier government authorities?
Power building by authorities with regard to the local group
National government power building with regard to the local group
The national government built indirect coercive power, legitimate power, hindering 
power, knowledge power and sociability in its dealings with the local group.
The national government occasionally built indirect coercive power in its dealings with 
the local group. While the publication of the report by the Advisory Commission on 
Emergency Water Storage Areas generated public debate about the need and purpose 
of the plan for controlled flooding, the local group did everything to oppose the 
government plan. At the same time the national government was on the 
‘institutionalisation track’. The Government decision of December 2003 designated 
three areas for possible emergency water storage.754 This decision showed that the state 
secretary was giving a signal that she was pursuing her own course, which can be 
interpreted as indirect coercive power.755
Legitimate power was frequently built. Examples of legitimate power include the 
legitimacy of the Government’s decision to designate three locations for emergency 
water storage and the attitude of the chair of the Advisory Commission on Emergency 
Water Storage Areas towards the local group. As to the first, the legitimacy of reserving 
land in the three designated areas for emergency storage was based on the idea that less 
populated areas needed to be flooded to protect the densely populated western part of 
the country against a catastrophe and considerable economic damage. In policy terms 
this concept is also known as ‘norm differentiation’, which means that various dike 
standards are used depending on the number of residents living in a specific area and 
the economic value of that area. It was, however, not undisputed as it would injure the 
principle of equality: it implies that the safety of some people is considered more 
important than that of others.756 This was politically a very sensitive issue, as shown in 
the following statement of the national government: ‘These reserved areas may be
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designated as emergency water storage areas, depending on the Government’s decision 
in December 2006. We shall choose a solution that is realistic, affordable and effective, 
and one that makes the safety of the inhabitants a matter of importance.’757 Regarding 
the attitude of the chair of the Advisory Commission, he did not feel the need to confer 
with the residents themselves, as evidenced by his statement that ‘security is too 
important to leave to a public debate’.758
The national government seldom built hindering power in its interaction with the local 
group. An example is the withholding of a critical report on the government plan.759 It 
was finally released at the insistence of the local group.760
Knowledge power was built regularly, but in an indirect way. An expert told about his 
experiences with the Commission Luteijn: ‘Experts from outside as well as from inside 
Rijkswaterstaat were not involved in the Advisory Commission on Emergency Water 
Storage Areas and could only give their opinion during the course of the process, but 
this was restricted due to the limited access to the Commission. Some institutions 
questioned the assumptions because these to a large extent determine the results. In 
the four or five times we met we had fierce debates about the assumptions (whether the 
design standard of 18,000 m3/s for the Rhine would be realistic and whether the 
existence of residual risk requires taking measures, such as emergency water storage), 
the uncertainties of the river discharge under extreme conditions (one simply does not 
know how the river would react), failure factors (types of waves, dike strength, 
overtopping dikes and piping, and wind) and the effectiveness of the measure (it would 
be brought into action too early or too late as well as the dimensions of the designated 
areas in relation to the estimated water quantity would not be sufficient). In fact, 
everything depends on the assumptions. There are many uncertainties. We do not know 
exactly what happens in that extreme scenario.’761 Knowledge power was also built by 
seasoned experts at Rijkswaterstaat (Warner et al., 2008) who supported the 
Commission, as it consisted of a carefully selected representation of national political 
parties, most of which had little or no substantive knowledge of water management.762 
Other illustrations of knowledge power include the critical reports which were 
commissioned by the Luteijn Commission763 and the stakeholder analysis of emergency 
water storage by the ministry’s communication department, which was carried out after 
the publication of the Commission’s report in May and June 2002 (Roth et al., 2006a).
The national government rarely built sociability. An example of this type of power 
building is the state secretary’s letter to the local group six months after she conceded 
defeat on the government plan. In a prime time current-affairs programme on national 
television the suggestion was made that emergency water storage was not quite off the 
cards. When the local group cried foul, the state secretary sent a letter by courier to the 
chair, delivered at about 10.30 pm, denying the option of emergency water storage in 
Ooijpolder was again on the political agenda (Warner et al., 2008). An MP: ‘An 
absolutely unique fact’.764
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To summarise, in its interaction with the local group the national government built 
indirect coercive power to show who is ruling, legitimate power to let the residents 
know that the government plan has a legitimate basis, hindering power to prevent 
difficult discussions, knowledge power to underpin the government plan and the 
designation of three locations for emergency water storage and sociability to show that 
the government plan is seriously off the table.
Provincial government power building with regard to the local group
The provincial government built knowledge power and sociability in its dealings with 
the local group.
The provincial government sometimes built knowledge power in its interaction with the 
local group. An example of the province’s building knowledge power is the development 
of own plans to accommodate high water discharges in the Rhine in response to the 
government plan for emergency water storage. The provincial plans sought to prevent 
the designation of areas for emergency water storage in its territory. The provincial 
delegate: ‘First, our experts worked out the expected consequences of high water 
discharges. Then we brainstormed about solutions for the safe storage of the excess 
river water without the option of dike reinforcement....Fortunately, I could offer the 
people in Ooijpolder an alternative. For me it is clear: the search for a structural and safe 
solution for the Netherlands.’765 His motivation: ‘All citizens have the same right 
concerning safety and protection against floods. It is pertinent injustice that people 
who live in a lightly populated area face higher risks.’766 The provincial alternatives 
included small-scale dike relocations, flood plain excavation, lowering of groynes,767 
bypasses, and removing obstacles in the river, such as industrial sites,768 which according 
to provincial delegate were ‘better, faster to implement, and cheaper than water storage 
in calamity polders’.769 Another example of the use of knowledge power is the provincial 
experts’ availability for questions from the local group.770
The provincial government built sociability in its dealings with the local group now 
and then. Sociability was shown when the provincial delegate asked the local group for 
support for his alternative in a meeting of the provincial executive.771 This was evidence 
of his appreciation of the local group’s work.
To summarise, in its interaction with the local group the provincial government built 
knowledge power to present an alternative to the designation of areas for controlled 
flooding in its territory, and sociability to show its appreciation of the local group’s 
work.
Local government power building with regard to the local group
The local government built legitimate power and sociability in its dealings with the 
local group.
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The local government sometimes built legitimate power in its interaction with the local 
group, an example being the remark by the mayor of the municipality of Ubbergen 
that in a bureaucratic organisation a state secretary has authority.772 In other words, 
she has the right to launch plans to increase flood safety and in the government 
hierarchy the local government’s role is to follow the line set by the higher authorities.
Sociability was used occasionally. An example of this type of power is the mayor’s 
practice of passing questions from the media on to the local group. However, this was 
not only a friendly gesture (‘they did a very good job’), but it was also in his own interest. 
It suited him well for two reasons. First, as the mayor put it: ‘In every war there are 
screamers. That role was for the High Water Platform, which was able to oppose the 
government plan. I had to be cooperative with her’ (state secretary Melanie Schultz van 
Haegen). Second, during the course of the process his colleague, the mayor of Duiven, 
assumed a more active position in the public debate. From then on, the mayor always 
referred to the local group when he was asked to give his opinion.773 Another example 
of sociability is the mayor’s acknowledgement of the local group’s work after the state 
secretary conceded defeat on the government plan. The mayor participated in a meeting 
of the local group774 in which he and his colleague, the mayor of Millingen a/d Rijn, 
thanked the local group for its unyielding determination. ‘Its opposition was not only 
fierce, but also based on expertise.’775
To summarise, in its interaction with the local group the local government built 
legitimate power and sociability. Legitimate power was used to show the local 
government’s position in decision-making, and sociability to let the residents know 
that it appreciated their efforts.
Power building by the local group with regard to authorities
Local group power building with regard to the national government
The local group built legitimate power, knowledge power, and media power in its 
dealings with the national government.
The local group frequently built legitimate power in its interaction with the national 
government, for example by emphasising the principle of equality. The government 
plan for controlled flooding implied that not all citizens would be equally protected 
against the risk of flooding; some areas (in the centre of the country) would be safer 
than others (in the areas designated for flood storage, including Ooijpolder).776 While 
this ‘norm differentiation’ was common practice in the sense that higher safety 
standards were applied for highly densely populated areas than for less densely 
populated regions and some dike rings were better protected than others (Roth et al., 
2006a), from a political point of view it proved to be a very sensitive question.
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Knowledge power was built very often throughout the planning process, particularly 
through the involvement of water management experts and legal experts. Water expert 
Professor van Ellen provided the local group with detailed technical information, which 
enabled it to show that there were many uncertainties in the national water policy. 
Additionally, the water expert had a good network of scientists and officials at the 
specialised agencies of Rijkswaterstaat. Legal experts advised the local group on how to 
deal with a classified report.777
In its dealings with the national government the local group employed media power 
very often. From the local group’s establishment in November 2002 until March 2005, 
when the state secretary conceded defeat on the plan for emergency water storage, the 
issue was covered by the local and regional media (every two weeks), by the national 
media (irregularly) and by foreign media (incidentally). The media coverage proved to 
be an important factor in keeping the issue high on the political agenda. In addition, 
through its media exposure the local group was considered to be a relevant political 
actor.
To summarise, in its interaction with the national government the local group built 
legitimate power to show that the government plan lacks a legitimate basis, knowledge 
power to underpin its arguments and media power to get support for its views and to 
put the issue high on the political agenda.
Local group power building with regard to the provincial government
The local group sometimes built sociability in its dealings with the provincial 
government. An illustration of the local group’s building of sociability is the support 
given by the local group chair to the provincial delegate’s plan in the provincial 
executive. The chair: ‘I wanted to do him a favour’.778
Local group power building with regard to the local government
The local group occasionally built sociability in its dealings with the local government. 
An example of sociability is the local group’s statement that the mayor of the 
municipality of Ubbergen had been a valuable asset,779 referring to the mayor’s help in 
facilitating the local group’s actions, such as handing over of a petition signed by polder 
residents to the state secretary when she visited the polder.
Power building by authorities
National government power building with regard to the provincial government
The national government built indirect coercive power, legitimate power and knowledge 
power in its dealings with the provincial government.
The national government sometimes built indirect coercive power in its interaction
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with the provincial government. An illustration of this type of power building is the 
state secretary’s progress with institutionalising the government plan. The identified 
areas for emergency water storage were provisionally designated by the Government’s 
decision of December 2003,780 despite the provincial government’s attempts to pursue 
a different course supported by the lower-tier authorities.
In its dealings with the provincial government the national government regularly used 
legitimate power through its flood risk management policy, which was based on two 
strands. The first concerned the Room for the River programme to reduce flood risk at 
a design discharge of 16,000 m3/s for the Rhine, and 18,000 m3/s for some locations 
conditional on certain river widening measures. The second emphasised the possibility 
of a ‘residual risk’ of a one in 1,250 year event involving a breach in the dike, which 
could be reduced by storing excess discharges in calamity polders (Warner, 2008). While 
the lower-tier authorities were involved in the preparation of the Room for the River 
programme, this was not related to the question of residual risk. Apart from the 
historical tradition of seeking a joint approach to water management,781 which can be 
considered to be an unwritten rule in the water sector -  at least between authorities, the 
water management principles themselves became the subject of discussion (the 
assumption of the design discharge of 18,000 m3/s for the Rhine and the existence of 
‘residual’ risk) and by extension the legitimacy of the government plan for emergency 
water storage.
Knowledge power was often built, particularly by the Advisory Commission on 
Emergency Water Storage Areas. During their deliberations, seven technical studies 
were carried out, for which a large budget was made available, the outlay eventually 
amounting to 1 million euros (Warner, 2008). Another example of knowledge power are 
the opinions about uncertainty and how to deal with it held by some experts from 
inside and outside Rijkswaterstaat, which differed from the mainstream view in the 
organisation. These experts based their opinions on studies which indicated the causes 
of flooding involve many more ‘failure factors’ than overtopping dikes, such as piping 
(Silva, 2001), and accepted a degree of uncertainty. Others, though, such as some 
Rijkswaterstaat officials and Commission members, were not convinced. One official 
from the Rijkswaterstaat East Netherlands regional office recalls a furious row between 
these parties during a hearing on uncertainty issues within the Commission.782 It came 
down to a clash between different approaches to uncertainty. While the experts were 
supporters of a flood risk approach (in which risk is defined as probability of occurrence 
multiplied by impact), many Rijkswaterstaat officials believed in the existing approach 
of flood probability (the chance of exceeding the design water level at dike sections). The 
flood risk approach proved to be a sensitive issue and getting support for it among 
Rijkswaterstaat officials would require considerable time and effort. The Commission’s 
chair felt he had no time for extensive debate about rationale and information 
uncertainties, particularly when the government fell prematurely in early 2002 and he 
decided to speed up the work in order to present the Commission’s report in time to
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set the agenda for the new coalition (Warner, 2008). Provincial government officials 
who also used the uncertainty argument in discussions with Commission members 
faced the same unwillingness to take other opinions into account.783 Another example 
of knowledge power is a report by the Technical Advisory Commission on Flood 
Defence ( TAW) of external experts and Rijkswaterstaat experts, which was quite critical 
of the government plan. A provincial delegate who supported the conclusions in the 
report: ‘It is wonderful to get support from unimpeachable authority.’784
To summarise, in its interaction with the provincial government the national 
government built indirect coercive power to show who is ruling, legitimate power to 
demonstrate that the plan for calamity polders has a legitimate basis, and knowledge 
power to underpin the usefulness of the government plan.
National government power building with regard to the local government
The national government built indirect coercive power, legitimate power and knowledge 
power in its dealings with the local government.
In its interaction with the local government the national government sometimes built 
indirect coercive power by continuing its attempts to institutionalise the plan for 
emergency water storage. The national government provisionally designated areas for 
emergency water storage in the Government decision of December 2003,785 despite the 
local government’s efforts to change the government’s position by pointing out the 
consequences and the demand for alternatives.786
The national government built legitimate power many times. An example is the state 
secretary’s justification of the Government’s decision by arguing that it takes account 
of ‘a small chance of an excess discharge, for which we prefer to take measures to enable 
controlled flooding beforehand rather than doing nothing, which would result in 
flooding of highly densely populated areas’.787 Here, she touched on the policy of ‘norm 
differentiation’. Although this is not considered official policy, it is common practice 
that some areas are better protected than others and some dikes are better maintained 
than others. The project Flood Risk and Safety in the Netherlands ( Veiligheid Nederland 
in Kaart, VNK) addressed this theme, but the outcome was not put before Parliament. 
The issue proved to be politically sensitive as questions emerged about whether it was 
acceptable to vary the safety standards for people in different regions.
The national government often built knowledge power in its dealings with the local 
government. An illustration of this power type is the advice given by experts at the 
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) on the economic costs of the 
spatial claims resulting from the plan for controlled flooding. The advice was positive 
as the costs for land were not included. Later, consultants who were asked to assess the 
costs and revenues found the plan for emergency water storage to be too costly due to 
the high costs of the recommendations for designating the area for controlled flooding,
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which included dikes around villages.788 Another illustration of the use of knowledge 
power is the advice of the Technical Advisory Commission on Flood Defence 
(TAW),789which focused on damage compensation and spatial planning procedures. 
The experts involved were not in favour of the government plan.
To summarise, in its interaction with the local government the national government 
built indirect coercive power to show who is ruling, legitimate power to demonstrate 
that the plan for calamity polders has a legitimate basis, and knowledge power to 
underpin the government plan.
Provincial government building power with regard to the national government
The provincial government built legitimate power, knowledge power, media power and 
sociability in its dealings with the national government.
The provincial government often built legitimate power in its interaction with the 
national government. An example of its use of legitimate power is its questioning of the 
legitimacy of the government plan, which was based on an assumed design discharge 
of 18,000 m3/s for the Rhine where it enters the Netherlands.790 In fact, the provincial 
government doubted the very concept of ‘residual risk’ (‘emergency water storage was 
a solution for a problem that does not exist’791). In addition, it argued that the 
government plan was not compatible with the principle of a ‘robust river system’ based 
on taking ‘structural’ measures as proposed in the Room for the River programme. The 
idea of a ‘robust’ water system is based on a river basin approach that considers the 
river system as a whole, including the German federal state of Nordrhein-Westfalen.792
The provincial government built knowledge power very often when dealing with the 
national government. An example is the reaction of the provincial government 
immediately after the 2000 plans were launched. The provincial government and social 
partners commissioned a contra-expertise, a report from the well-respected engineering 
consultancy Delft Hydraulics. The consultants predictably reported that controlled 
flooding in itself is a sound idea, but not in the locations and modalities it was then 
proposed (Warner, 2008). Another illustration of its use of knowledge power is the 
initiative for a Dutch-German study into the maximum discharge capacity of the Rhine. 
Although this initiative started without the involvement of Rijkswaterstaat, during the 
course of the study their involvement proved to be necessary for political reasons.793
The provincial government sometimes built media power, including the presence of 
alternatives and opinions on actual political issues.
Sociability was used occasionally. An example is the provincial delegate’s statement that 
ministry officials were clever at keeping the government plan alive.794
To summarise, in its interaction with the national government the provincial
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government built legitimate power to show that there are alternatives that could meet 
national government objectives, knowledge power to underpin their arguments against 
the government plan, media power to explicate its position, and sociability to keep the 
other parties amenable.
Local government power building with regard to the national government
The local government built legitimate power, knowledge power, media power and 
sociability in its dealings with the national government.
The local government frequently used legitimate power in its interaction with the 
national government. An illustration of the local government’s building of legitimate 
power is when it pointed out that the government plan contravenes the Flood Defence 
Act. With the support of the riverine municipalities along the Rhine it argued that the 
government plan would provide a greater degree of safety than required by the 
legislation, that the stated design discharge of 18,000 m3/s for the Rhine was not realistic 
as this amount of water cannot enter the Netherlands via the Rhine (later confirmed by 
the Dutch-German report by the province of Gelderland and the German state of 
Nordrhein-Westfalen), that the dimensions of the designated areas were too small for 
storing the expected quantity of water (i.e. the plan is not effective), and that the plan 
was not efficient because the costs are higher than the benefits (de Boer, 2003b). The 
municipalities made it appear that they were victims of national policy, which gave 
greater priority to protecting the densely populated and economically more valuable 
western part of the country at the expense of less densely populated areas.795 In other 
words, the national government injured the principle of equality.
Knowledge power was sometimes exerted by commissioning contra-expertise by a 
number of Dutch and German municipalities that declared the 18,000 m3/s scenario to 
be an exaggeration. They also questioned the dimensions of the designated areas, 
arguing that they were too small to accommodate the expected river discharge (de Boer, 
2003a).
When dealing with the national government the local government employed media 
power on occasions. An example is the mayor’s drive to profile himself in the public 
debate. As he had access to the national broadcasting company this proved to be easy. 
‘I used to be the head of a secondary school. I discovered that a pupil of mine now 
worked for the national news on TV. But when I appeared too often she stopped asking 
me.’796
The local government rarely built sociability. It only showed a ‘sociable face’ during 
meetings with the national government to remain on speaking terms.797
To summarise, in its interaction with the national government the local government 
built legitimate power to show that the government plan lacks a legitimate basis,
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knowledge power to underpin its arguments that the government plan would not be 
effective, media power to get support for its standpoint, and sociability to remain on 
speaking terms with the national government.
Table 6.4 summarises the authorities’ and the local group’s power building.
T ab le  6.4 Bu ild ing power by national governm ent (Nat), provincial governm ent (Prov), 
local governm ent (Loc) and local group (Loc gr)
direct coercive indirect coercive legitimate power reward power hindering power knowledge media power sociability 
power power power
Nat Loc gr ± + + o z'"" o ± o + Z ’ ++ O ++ ±. / o
Prov ^Loc gr 0 o / - 0 o O o 0 o + o o o + ±
Loc Locgr o o ° o o ° o o 0 o
± +
Nat .Prov o + + o o ° ° + ++ ° ± o ±
Nat /^ Loc o o + + o 0 o + ± o + o ±
o = zero ± = low + = m oderate ++ = high
The analysis of the power building by the authorities and the local group shows that the 
balance of power between the national government and the local group proved to be 
negative for the local group, because the national government built five types of power 
(indirect coercive power, legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power and 
sociability) while the local group built three (legitimate power, knowledge power and 
media power). However, the local group proved to be quite influential, particularly 
through its use of knowledge power and media power. Another important factor was 
that the regional and local government proved to be supporters of the local group. Right 
from the start, the provincial government took the lead in a dispute with the national 
government on flood risk policy, particularly on uncertainties, interpretations and 
values.
The national government built three types of power in its dealings with the lower-tier 
authorities (indirect coercive power, legitimate power and knowledge power), while the 
lower-tier authorities built four types of power (legitimate power, knowledge power, 
media power and sociability). In particular, the lower-tier authorities’ use of knowledge 
power made a difference. They commissioned a contra-expertise to gather arguments 
to back their opposition to the national government. In addition, the provincial 
government commissioned a Dutch-German research project to determine the 
maximum discharge capacity of the Rhine where it enters the Netherlands. Unusually 
for a project of national interest, the national government was not involved from the 
start of the project, but did became involved later on. The lower-tier authorities also
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built media power towards the national government, which is not very common for 
government authorities. Both authorities used it occasionally.
The power building in the interaction between the national government and the local 
group had considerable effect on the interaction outcomes, which were debate and 
conflict. The use of indirect coercive power and legitimate power by the national 
government proved to be influential, while the local group’s building of knowledge 
power and media power had an important impact. The same was true for the power 
building in the interaction between the national and provincial government. The 
provincial government’s use of knowledge power, media power and sociability had a 
substantial influence on the interaction outcomes, which were debate, negotiation and 
dialogue. Its interaction strategies (a conflict management frame and bridging 
strategies) also contributed to these outcomes. The interaction between the national 
and local government, which never reached a negotiated solution and remained stuck 
in debate, could not be explained by their power building alone. The actors’ interaction 
strategies (the national government used a power frame and an identity frame; the local 
government used an identity frame) and potential to act (see below) therefore also need 
to be taken into account.
6.2.4 Authorities' and local group's potential to act
- 9 -  - 9 ­
In this section we analyse the authorities’ and the local group’s potential to act. Both 
potentials to act are broken down into capacity to act and motivation to act. With regard 
to the authorities, a differentiation was made between the national government 
(Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat 
has the mandate to act), the provincial government (province of Gelderland) and the 
local government (municipality of Ubbergen).
Two questions were investigated: What are the authorities’ and the local group’s 
potentials to act? and To what extent do these potentials to act shape the authorities’ and 
the local group’s power building, their interaction strategies and the outcome of the 
interaction between the authorities and the local group?
National government's potential to act
The national government’s potential to act consists of its capacity to act and motivation 
to act.
National government’s capacity to act
The national government’s capacity to act is based on its mandate, resources,
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coordinating mechanisms and consistency (the construction or adoption of a narrative). 
Mandate
State secretary for water management Monique de Vries had the mandate to act due to 
the high water periods of 1993 and 1995 and the predictions of more frequent and 
intense climate change-induced extreme events (Warner, 2008b). The plan for 
emergency water storage was included in a package of measures for finding space for the 
rivers instead of dike reinforcement, which had been the focus until then. The measure 
was presented as an option in the event of an extreme Rhine discharge of 18,000 m3/s. 
Of the three locations provisionally designated as ‘calamity polders’, Ooijpolder is the 
first polder on the south bank of the Rhine after it enters the Netherlands from Germany.
While the elaboration of the Room for the River policy was a joint effort by national 
and lower-tier authorities, this was not the case with the government plan for emergency 
water storage. This plan was originally classified as a security issue, which meant it 
followed a ‘security chain’ directly from the ministry to the responsible government 
officers.798
The mandate of the national government can thus be considered moderate.
Resources
The resources of the national government included budget and people.
-9-  -9-
As the plan for emergency water storage was considered additional to measures to be 
taken in the Room for the River programme, it had a separate budget of 300 million 
euros for implementation. The national government had sufficient government officials 
at its disposal, both at the government department and the Rijkswaterstaat East 
Netherlands regional office. The resource base of the national government can therefore 
be considered strong.
Coordinating mechanisms
Apart from the top-down launch of the government plan, the national government 
established the Advisory Commission on Emergency Water Storage Areas (also called the 
Luteijn Commission after the name of its chair) to embed the plan in current policy. 
This Commission addressed the question of whether there was a need for calamity 
polders. In addition, it advised on criteria for area selection, the consequences of 
selection, land reservation, decision-making on actual use and compensation. In its 
report the Commission made a positive recommendation on the use of calamity polders 
and selected three areas: Rijnstrangen and Ooijpolder for the Rhine and Beersche 
Overlaat for the Meuse. State secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen acted on the report 
(Roth & Warner, 2007) and reserved land in the designated areas for controlled water 
storage. However, the publication of the Commission’s report led to a public debate 
about the assumptions of the plan (design discharges of 16,000 m3/s and 18,000 m3/s for
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the Rhine), the costs and benefits (the planned dikes around villages) and failure factors 
(for example the dimension of the areas). These and other issues were also included in 
several contra-expertises commissioned by lower-tier authorities.
The coordinating mechanisms of the national government can thus be considered 
moderate.
Consistency
State secretary Monique de Vries started to build a narrative by presenting the 
government plan for emergency water storage in Loevestein castle. The narrative was 
followed up with the establishment of the Advisory Commission on Emergency Water 
Storage Areas. Once the report was finalised the chair was keen to ‘sell’ it in the region. 
He felt he had a strong hand, being able to give the region far-reaching guarantees for 
compensation for damages resulting from emergency storage (Warner, 2008). He made 
striking use of the metaphor of an airbag in a car to explain the functionality of calamity 
polders (Roth & Warner, 2007). Although the chair claimed that the region was basically 
‘won over’ (Warner, 2008), in practice this proved to be far from the case. The narrative 
was ended by a parliamentary motion transferring the money reserved for controlled 
flooding to the budget for the Room for the River programme. Back from her maternity 
leave, state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen presented the Government’s decision 
to shelve the plans for emergency water storage in view of its cost and the lack of 
sufficient public support (Warner, 2008).
The national government’s consistency (the construction of a narrative) can therefore 
be viewed as weak.
National government’s motivation to act
The national government’s motivation to act entails political priority, organisational 
ambition and personal vision.
Political priority
State secretary for water management, Monique de Vries, was the first of her kind when 
she took office in 1998. Polls showed that the politician’s name recognition in the 
Netherlands was worryingly low: 2.5 per cent. The lack of public profile and press 
attention translated into little bargaining power for a politician in government and little 
chance of keeping her job in the next government. The state secretary decided to boost 
the image of her policy area considerably by widely publicising her department’s plan for 
emergency water storage as the miracle cure for the country’s water problems (Warner 
et al., 2008). Her successor Melanie Schultz van Haegen also tried to keep water high on 
the political agenda.
The political priority of the national government can therefore be considered to be high.
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Organisational ambition
Senior policy officers of the ministry did not resist state secretary Monique de Vries’ 
intention to work on her image by presenting the plan for emergency water storage. As 
the deadline for the public presentation of the plans neared in early 2000, two key worries 
emerged inside the ministry. First, at the close of the 1990s, flood experts started to worry 
about bigger floods. The 1994 Mississippi flood and worrying climate change scenarios 
raised the question of what to do if an unusual flood peak hit the Netherlands. It was 
clear that even if all the Room for the River measures were in place, they would not be 
able to cushion such an event. Some experts started to project an 18,000 m3/s peak 
scenario as a result of climate change and the effect of upstream (German) flood 
protection works. Second, the Room for the River projects would generate an enormous 
amount of excavated material (sand and clay), which the market might not be able to 
absorb.799, 800 Would it not be more sensible to concentrate intervention in a few rather 
than many locations?
Such considerations put the issue of planning for a ‘residual risk’ of a one in 1,250 year 
crisis event on the agenda. Thoughts turned to controlled drainage to store excessive 
flood water discharges in ‘calamity polders’. The officials, however, did not count on the 
state secretary’s political aspirations, which led her to make the measure an issue for 
public debate instead of ‘securitising’ it by restricting publication of the idea to a circular 
to the responsible civil servants (Warner, 2008). As a consequence, the government plan 
was not discussed internally and various officials and experts opposed the use of this 
measure.
The organisational ambition of the national government was therefore low.
Personal vision
Not all officials of the ministry, Rijkswaterstaat, the East Netherlands regional office and 
the specialised offices of Rijkswaterstaat were convinced of the effectiveness of controlled 
flooding. For example, there were differences of opinion among experts on various 
aspects of flood protection policy, with discussions focusing mainly on the way 
uncertainty and failure factors with regard to dike breakthroughs could be incorporated 
into analysis and decision-making. While a growing number of experts were ready to 
replace the existing standards based on flood probability with a flood risk approach that 
takes not only flood frequency but also damage into account (Warner et al., 2008a), the 
state secretary and the head of the department were not.801 The Advisory Commission 
on Emergency Water Storage Areas chose to start from the existing standards, including 
the seeming certainties of the discharge-based approach (Warner, 2008b). This led to a 
dispute between officials in favour of a flood risk approach and those who stuck to the 
government plan and the ‘old’ standards. As most of the latter were employed in the 
upper echelons of the department where there was little exchange with ‘the outside 
world’, it was difficult to convince them.
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The personal vision of national government officials can therefore be described as weak.
To summarise, the national government’s capacity and motivation to act proved to be 
weak, which resulted in a weak potential to act (see Table 6.5).
T ab le  6.5 Capacity, motivation and potential to act of national governm ent
National
government
capacity to  act motivation to  act potential 
to  act
resources m a n d a te c o o rd in a tin g
m ec ha n ism s
co ns is te nc y p o lit ic a l
p r io r ity
o r g a n is a tio n a l
a m b it io n
p e rso na l
v is io n
++ ++ ± + + ++ + ± + ±
± = w eak/low  + = m oderate ++ = strong/h igh
Provincial government's potential to act
The provincial government’s potential to act consists of its capacity to act and 
motivation to act.
Provincial government’s capacity to act
The provincial government’s capacity to act encompasses mandate, resources, 
coordinating mechanisms and consistency (the construction or adoption of a 
narrative).
Mandate
Until the early 1990s the province of Gelderland concentrated mainly on the regional 
river systems. After the high water event of 1995 it assumed an active role in large river 
systems.802, 803 This matched the joint approach favoured by the national government, 
because it believed it would not survive a second ‘Brakel’ (see section 2.2).804 The 
province’s role was legitimatised by chairing the Upstream Rivers Committee, which 
was established to develop options for widening the river.
From 2000 the province worked on the development of a provincial water policy for a 
‘robust’ river system based on a river basin approach in which the whole river system 
is taken into account. This policy was adopted in 2003.805
The provincial government’s mandate can therefore be considered to be moderate. 
Resources
The resources of the provincial government included budget and people.
The budget was sufficient to commission studies, hire contra-expertise and work on 
water policy, but there was no money to implement major works, such as bypasses and 
dike relocations.
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The province of Gelderland had a team of water experts at its disposal who had the 
right qualifications and were willing to cooperate with other authorities and listen to 
the local population.
The resource base of the provincial government can therefore be considered to be 
moderate.
Coordinating mechanisms
Immediately after the 2000 plans, the province and its social partners commissioned a 
contra-expertise report from a well-respected engineering consultancy, Delft 
Hydraulics. The consultants predictably reported that controlled flooding in itself is a 
sound idea, but not in the locations and modalities that were then proposed (Warner, 
2008).
The province was the first to publicly question the underlying assumptions for 
emergency water storage, notably the need to prepare for a design discharge of 18,000 
m3/s for the Rhine, rather than 16,000 m3/s. To back this up, the province initiated a 
study in close cooperation with the German state of Nordrhein-Westfalen and, in due 
course, with support from the Department of Water Management. The report found 
that a water discharge of 15,500 m3/s could flow into Dutch territory; a highly 
theoretical superwave would amount to a discharge of 16,500 m3/s. The maximum 
scenario was a 18,700 m3/s discharge, on the condition that there was no flooding at all 
in Germany, which would require extremely high dikes in Germany (Warner, 2008).
The province of Gelderland touched the right cord by looking across the German 
border. The German flood risk policy was not addressed in the report of the Advisory 
Commission on Emergency Water Storage Areas as it was the state secretary’s wish not 
to include Germany in the Commission’s remit. The German flood risk policy was not 
addressed in the Commission’s report because inundating German territory (Duffelt) 
would have international consequences and would raise a foreign policy issue that 
would cause the government great problems. Moreover, the Germans did not want the 
Commission to examine the situation in Germany (Warner, 2008).
In the meantime, Gelderland provincial government developed its own high water 
policy. This differed from the government plan by emphasising the creation of a robust 
river system based on the river basin approach, which included not only the Dutch part 
of the Rhine but also the stretch of the river in the German state of Nordrhein­
Westfalen. It also included various options for reducing flood risks using ‘structural 
measures’, such as dike relocations, bypasses and green rivers. This was the basis for a 
regional advice.
The provincial lobby for its own policy, including alternatives to the government plan 
for ‘calamity polders’, proved to be effective. The province got support from 
Rijkswaterstaat officials, though not openly, and eventually the state secretary and the
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head of Rijkswaterstaat were convinced that the government plan had to be 
abandoned.806
The provincial government’s use of coordinating mechanisms can be considered to be 
moderate.
Consistency
Although the province of Gelderland had recently shifted its policy focus from the 
regional water system to the large river systems, it presented a clear case.807 By 
developing its own high water policy and commissioning contra-expertise and the 
Dutch-German study it was able to start its own narrative. Thanks to an intensive lobby 
campaign that was supported by the local governments and the local group the 
provincial government got support from Rijkswaterstaat officials and consultants. The 
provincial narrative was partly adopted by the national government when it accepted 
the outcomes of the Dutch-German study, and later when the state plan was withdrawn, 
it was fully adopted.
The consistency of the provincial government (the construction or adoption of a 
narrative) can therefore be considered to be strong.
Provincial government’s motivation to act
The provincial government’s motivation to act encompasses political priority, 
organisational ambition and personal vision.
Political priority
For many years water management was not a prominent issue in provincial politics. 
This changed after the evacuations in 1995 when provincial delegate Johan de Bondt 
was given the water portfolio. ‘I then appreciated the importance of water 
management... .When the government plan for emergency water storage was launched 
we had just had the debate on raising the design discharge for the Rhine from 15,000 
m3/s to 16,000 m3/s. I said that the government plan was impossible. This is a subject 
for discussion with Rijkswaterstaat and the ministry. These are sensitive issues; you 
ought to have discussions at the administrative level first.’ Johan de Bondt found that 
rather than talking about solutions the state secretary and civil servants vigorously 
defended the government plan. In response, he decided to come up with alternatives 
and to work on a regional high water plan. Johan de Bondt: ‘Instead of solving it at the 
micro level you ought to solve it at the macro level, to take the whole river basin into 
account, also in Germany. The Germans were actually in favour of this, but we in the 
Netherlands were so intent on emergency water storage areas that cooperation with 
Germany was put on the back burner. Relations were restored again later, though.’808 
Like his predecessor, provincial delegate Harry Keereweer proved to be a proponent of 
a ‘robust’ river system and supported it with fervour.
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The provincial government’s political priority can therefore be described as high. 
Organisational ambition
The provincial government water department was in agreement with the political 
priority: a ‘robust’ river system in which there is no place for unreliable measures. An 
official: ‘We rejected the idea of retention [outside the dikes] and inlets that have to be 
opened at the right moment, because this creates new uncertainties which will not help 
to reduce flood risk. Instead, we chose for more room for the river coupled with housing 
or nature development; in other words, high water policy in combination with 
functions that can be realised outside the dikes’.809
The provincial government’s organisational ambition therefore proved to be high. 
Personal vision
Provincial government officials were set on reducing flood risk while at the same time 
striking a different note. ‘Sometimes we opted for an engineering solution with a 
riverside boulevard [in urban areas]. If you dare to do that; you need to be willing to 
make it attractive. In the Netherlands we tend to think small.’810
The personal vision of the provincial government officials can therefore be considered 
to be strong.
To summarise, the provincial government combined a moderate capacity to act with a 
strong motivation to act, which resulted in a moderate potential to act. For an overview, 
see Table 6.6.
T ab le  6.6 Capacity, motivation and potential to act of provincional governm ent
Provincial
government
capacity to  act motivation to  act potentia 
to act
resources m a n d a te c o o rd in a tin g
m ec ha n ism s
co ns is te nc y p o lit ic a l
p r io r ity
o r g a n is a tio n a l
a m b itio n
p e rso na l
v is io n
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
± = w eak/low  + = m oderate ++ = strong/h igh
Local government's potential to act
The local government’s potential to act consists of its capacity to act and its motivation 
to act.
Local government’s capacity to act
The local government’s capacity to act is based on mandate, resources, coordinating 
mechanisms and consistency (the construction or adoption of a narrative).
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Mandate
The local government does not have a mandate in the field of flood risk management, 
except in emergencies (COT, 1999), but it does for the local land use plan 
(bestemmingsplan). This planning instrument would have to be revised to permit the 
implementation of the plan for emergency water storage. This implied that the national 
government depended on the municipality of Ubbergen to incorporate the emergency 
water storage plans into the local land use plan.
The local government does not have responsibilities for water management, except in 
extreme cases, such as a breach in the dike, when the mayor has the responsibility to take 
action. The local government thus had a weak mandate to act.
Resources
The local government has a budget and people to carry out their tasks and 
responsibilities.
Part of the budget of the municipality of Ubbergen was spent on a contra-expertise 
commissioned with several Dutch and German municipalities, in which the mayor of 
the municipality of Ubbergen played a central role.
The local government did not have officials with expertise in water management at its 
disposal. The mayor assumed the role of spokesman for the residents in Ooijpolder. He 
attended meetings and arranged a visit by the state secretary to Ooijpolder during which 
the newly formed High Water Platform could hand over a petition signed by 5,045 
residents. While representing the interests of the local population, the mayor remained 
on speaking terms with the state secretary.
The local government’s resource base therefore can be described as weak.
Coordinating mechanisms
The local government had a few coordinating mechanisms at its disposal within its field 
of competence. While the provincial government took the lead in public debate and 
also behind the scenes, as a result of an extensive lobby campaign, the local government 
made use of a much smaller network of relevant organisations. However, the mayor 
did everything to get his viewpoint across, including commissioning a contra-expertise 
on the government plan and giving the residents every opportunity to protest.
The local government’s coordinating mechanisms can thus be considered to be 
moderate.
Consistency
As the local government did not play a central role in contesting the government plan, 
it was not able to construct a narrative. Therefore, soon after the ‘Rabo meeting’ it
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adopted the province’s narrative. Although the mayor made it appear that ‘the province 
has its own responsibility’, in practice the province’s position on this issue proved to be 
important. However, the mayor considered his position to be pivotal: ‘We managed to 
convince them all, the province, the Arnhem-Nijmegen regional authority and others.’811 
The mayor contributed to public debate by commissioning a contra-expertise that 
focused on the fact that the design discharge of 18,000 m3/s was disproportional and 
that the designated areas were too small to store the originally calculated amount of 
water.
The local government’s consistency (the adoption of a narrative) therefore proved to be 
moderate.
Local government’s motivation to act
The local government’s motivation to act entails political priority, organisational 
ambition and personal vision.
Political priority
According to the mayor the discussion about emergency water storage had a financial 
dimension, particularly compensation for damage to residents’ homes in the event the 
polder is used for water storage and for economic losses. As the residents viewed the 
local government as the first-line responsible authority to which they could complain 
about flood issues, the mayor foresaw new problems that he could not address properly. 
In the past, flooding was considered to be an act of God, but now it would be the result 
of someone opening an inlet in a dike. Instead of prayed to God to lowering the water 
level, residents now marched to the town hall. From the mayor’s point of view the 
government plan was ‘unnecessary, useless and contravened the Flood Defence Act ( Wet 
op de waterkeringy.su
The local government’s political priority was therefore high.
Organisational ambition
The municipality of Ubbergen had no plans for housing development or business sites 
and it did not intend to take responsibility for anything other than local water 
management. The local government did not have an organisational ambition in these 
fields.
Personal vision
The mayor viewed the opposition to calamity polders as a defeat of Rijkswaterstaat. 
‘For us it was quite nice to attack Rijkswaterstaat on their assumptions instead of [the 
Commission’s] conclusions.’813
The local government’s personal vision can therefore be considered to be strong.
To summarise, the local government’s capacity to act was weak and its motivation to act
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was moderate, resulting in a weak potential to act (see Table 6.7). 
Tab le  6.7 Capacity, motivation and potential to act of local governm ent
Local
government
capacity to  act motivation to  act potential 
to act
re so urc es m a n d a te c o o rd in a tin g
m ec ha n ism s
co ns is te nc y p o lit ic a l
p r io r ity
o r g a n is a tio n a l
a m b itio n
p e rso na l
v is io n
+ ± + + + + + o + + + ±
o = none ± = w eak/low  + = m oderate ++ = strong/h igh
Local group's potential to act
The local group’s potential to act consists of its capacity to act and its motivation to 
act.
Local group’s capability to act
The local group’s capacity to act consists of resources, trust and social identity. 
Resources
The dispositional force (skills, people, resources, available time) of the local group was 
strong.
The chair proved to be a strong leader who had time, authority and managerial and 
communicative skills. The local group was efficiently and effectively organised, with 
three working groups (technical, legal and communication) and experts to support the 
board. It also had a budget at its disposal.
The bonding force of the local group was high. The group consisted of a healthy mix 
of locals and non-locals, and a group of highly-educated former city residents with 
access to networks of politicians, government decision-makers, government agencies 
and the media. The local group had broad support in the polder and a steady 
membership of 400. Following its establishment it managed to convince 5,045 residents 
to sign a petition to the state secretary.
The bridging force was very high as the local group established contacts with 
neighbouring German organisations (Ooijpolder directly borders Germany and the 
use of Ooijpolder as a calamity polder would also flood the German Duffelt area) (Roth 
& Warner, 2007). In addition, it got support from politicians and the region. Although 
water was not high on the political agenda, the High Water Platform succeeded in 
holding the attention of politicians by keeping their website up to date, regularly 
sending leaflets on specific subjects to them and organising tours of Ooijpolder.
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The linking force was very high, especially through their ability to use the media to 
ensure a regular series of articles in the regional newspaper. As a consequence, their 
voice was heard in the region and in The Hague. Through their network the residents 
heard about one of the technical reports underlying the Commission’s report (Warner, 
2008). After appealing to the Government Information (Public Access) Act (Wei 
Openbaarheid Bestuur) the conclusions were made public (Roth & Warner, 2007).
Trust
The local group had a strong belief in its own capability rather than trust in specific 
people. In its dealings with others the members demanded that key people, particularly 
politicians, take responsibility. If they proved not to be exponents or fervent proponents 
of their ideas, the residents distrusted them. The local group had a certain belief in 
process trust, as evidenced by their objective of gaining a majority in Parliament on 
their side and the structural approach to achieve this aim. The local group’s trust in 
individuals that supported their opposition and their trust in the process can therefore 
be considered to be strong.
Social identity
The social identity of the residents of Ooijpolder proved to be strong. Despite the major 
economic and demographic changes in the polder in recent decades -  from a largely 
agricultural area towards a greater emphasis on nature conservation and recreation and 
the influx of many highly-educated people from the city to the polder -  the residents 
were a relatively close community. This was largely a legacy of earlier protests against 
the development of Ooijpolder as a de facto urban extension of Nijmegen in the 1970s, 
the relocation of a bend in the Waal in the late 1980s (Warner et al., 2008a) and the 
dike reinforcement from the mid-1980s into the 1990s. The groups’ feeling is 
encapsulated well in this statement by one polder resident: ‘We have saved the polder 
many times. And successfully’.
Local group’s motivation to act
The local groups’ motivation to act encompasses common purpose and solidarity.
Common purpose
The residents viewed the plan for emergency water storage as a threat to their polder. 
This brought about an increase in uncertainty as their houses and land might be flooded 
at any time and the economic prospects for the polder would be limited. Moreover, the 
landscape would be adversely affected by the construction of six-metre dikes around the 
largest villages. After state secretary Melanie Schultz van Haegen’s visit to the polder 
when she displayed no empathy for the residents’ interests, the local group labelled her 
‘the enemy’ and set out to defeat the government plan. The common purpose of the 
local group can therefore be considered to be strong.
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Solidarity
The solidarity among the residents in Ooijpolder was strong, mainly because of their 
past experiences of opposing government plans. During the 20th century the residents 
had succeeded in changing government plans on several occasions. Their solidarity in 
opposing the latest plan was reflected in the petition signed by 5,045 residents, which 
was handed over to the state secretary during her visit to the polder, and the steady 400 
strong membership of the local group.
To summarise, the local groups’ potential to act was strong, based on a strong capacity 
to act and motivation to act. For an overview, see Table 6.8.
T ab le  6.8 Capacity, motivation and potential to act of the local group
Local group _JL
capacity to act motivation to act potential to act
resources trust social identity common purpose solidarity
d bo br 1 + + + + + + + + + + + + + ++ + + + + + + + + +
± = w eak/low  + = m oderate ++ = strong/h igh  +++ = very strong/very high 
d = d ispositional force bo = bonding force bridging force l = linking force
The analysis of the authorities’ and the local group’s potentials to act shows that the 
national government’s potential to act proved to be weak, the provincial government’s 
potential to act proved to be moderate and the local government’s potential to act was 
weak, while the local group’s potential to act can be considered to be strong (see Table 
6.9).
Tab le  6.9 Capacity, motivation and potential to act of national government, provincial government, 
local governm ent and local group
c a p a c ity  to  ac t m o t iv a t io n  t o  a c t p o te n t ia l t o  ac t
Nationa l go ve rnm en t + ± ±
Provincial go ve rnm en t + ++ +
Local gove rnm en t ± + ±
Local groups ++ ++ ++
± = w eak/low  + = m oderate ++ = strong/h igh
A striking outcome of the analysis of the authorities’ and the local group’s potential to 
act is that the national government failed in the field of coordinating mechanisms and 
consistency (the construction of an own narrative, although in the course of the
241
-Q-
Madelinde PHD zonder afbrekingen:Opmaak 1 15- -2011 14:44 Pagina 242
planning process it partly adopted the provincial’s narrative), which resulted in a weak 
capacity to act. In addition, the national government apparatus had a weak 
organisational and personal motivation. The provincial government scored highly on 
coordinating mechanisms and consistency. It was able to use all possible coordinating 
mechanisms and to construct a narrative (for example, a Rhine discharge of 18,000 m3/s 
cannot enter the Netherlands smoothly) that was partly adopted by the national 
government, which meant that its justification for the plan (to accommodate a design 
discharge of 18,000 m3/s we have to implement emergency water storage) no longer 
held. The provincial government’s moderate potential to act and the local government’s 
weak potential to act did not explain their position in the public debate. Their interaction 
strategies and power building therefore have to be taken into consideration.
6.2.5 The authorities' organisational culture, 
the local group's cultural background and the 
impact of these on their action
In this section we analyse the authorities’ organisational culture and the local group’s 
cultural background and the impact of these on their action. The object of the analysis 
is the organisational culture of the national government and the impact of this on its 
action, the organisational culture of the provincial government and the impact of this on 
its action, the organisational culture of the local government and the impact of this on 
its action and the cultural background of the local group and the impact of this on its 
action.
National government’s organisational culture and the impact of this on its action
The natural landscape of the Dutch delta has been formed by the Rhine, Meuse and 
Scheldt. Since the ninth century people have been increasingly making their mark on the 
landscape. The peat fens were reclaimed by digging innumerable field drains and drainage 
ditches, leading to an irreversible fall in the ground level, a process which continues to this 
day (TeBrake, 2002). In addition, there is a natural lowering of the land in relation to the 
sea level. The first dikes to protect the land from flooding were built in the 11th century. 
A large part of the Netherlands can therefore be considered to be a man-made 
environment (van de Ven, 2004; Saeijs, 2008).
This man-made environment was synonymous with a struggle against the water, which 
in fact was a struggle to survive. Keeping the water out meant that people could continue 
working on their land. Whereas in the past this fight was waged primarily by individual 
farmers or mutual associations, later managed by water boards, with the establishment 
of Rijkswaterstaat in 1798 it became a state affair (Disco, 2002). The establishment of a 
national institute put an end to the phenomenon of ‘overdiking’, a competition between 
water boards to raise dikes higher than their neighbours.814 Rijkswaterstaat is to a large
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extent responsible for the transformation of the Netherlands from a country affected by 
floods into a country that offers considerable protection from flooding. Whereas 
elsewhere the history of containing and managing water is often a story of conflict and 
struggle between the forces of self-interest and opportunities associated with ‘progress’ 
and community-based values (Donahue & Johnston, 1997), in the Netherlands it has 
been a chronicle of cooperation that has had a major influence on shaping the national 
democratic model. A government official: ‘The country boasts a long tradition of 
independent water boards, an effective administrative culture with consultation, 
supervision, supreme control and implementation. Here, everything is related to water. 
Today there is a tendency to downplay our polder model of democracy, in which every 
stakeholder has to be heard, but it is really useful: you rely on others, otherwise you will 
drown.’815 The keystone of Dutch water culture was the conviction that conflict, left 
unresolved, would ultimately undermine everyone’s safety (Disco, 2006).
In assuming a leading role in water management, Rijkswaterstaat internalised the fight 
against water in its organisational culture. Nature, especially water, was an antagonist 
(the ‘hereditary enemy’) that took lives and property whenever and wherever it could. The 
classic hydraulic engineering tradition aimed to destroy this predatory ‘nature’ and 
replace it with a hydraulic culture. Since the 19th century this culture was ‘fed’ by graduates 
from the Civil Engineering Department of Delft University of Technology, which 
succeeded in establishing a monopoly on engineering posts in the organisation (Disco, 
2002). In addition, Rijkswaterstaat’s organisational culture was based on a historical 
consciousness that can be described best as ‘it is our job’; in other words, the common 
good is our responsibility, we stand above competing interests.
Since the mid-1960s environmental groups and ecologists, who were employed by 
Rijkswaterstaat from the 1970s, also called ‘green engineers’, asked for policy changes. 
The critical social climate in reaction to pollution and damage to the natural environment 
as a result of the dominance of technocratic approaches prompted the government 
agency to replace the anthropocentric policy line with a more ecosystem-based approach 
(van Heezik, 2007). The organisation gradually became aware that it had to work ‘with 
nature’ rather than ‘against nature’ (for example, using sand as a natural buffer instead of 
asphalt dikes), and ‘with society’ rather than ‘against society’. However, the extent to which 
this new approach will be integrated in its policy and its attitude is still unclear. While 
Rijkswaterstaat successfully integrated the ‘back to nature’ development into its official 
policy, it adopted a social engineering approach to achieving the objective of working 
‘with society’, without devolving responsibilities.
During the change in policy towards building with nature, the organisation had to deal 
with its centuries-long ‘resistance strategy’ of building dams and dikes. The probability 
of flooding from the rivers or from the sea in the Netherlands has substantially declined 
since the last flood in the southwestern part of the country in 1953, but the risk of 
casualties and economic damage from flooding have become much greater since then
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(ten Brinke et al., 2008a). In the Netherlands the minister of the interior is responsible for 
disaster policy, while Rijkswaterstaat and water boards are responsible for flood policy. 
The high water of 1993 prompted the national government to take action, including 
devolving responsibilities for flood preparedness and response to local authorities (ten 
Brinke et al., 2008b; Warner, 2008). The emergency plans hastily prepared by the local 
authorities were put into practice during the high water period in 1995 when 200,000 
people were evacuated. The evacuation showed that flood preparedness and the response 
and recovery measures for extreme flood events are limited (ten Brinke et al., 2008b). 
Government authorities and the public are no longer used to dealing with the 
consequences of floods. The Dutch public’s perception of the high risk of flooding had 
gradually ebbed away, along with its ability to cope with floods. The time when a rowing 
boat was standard equipment for those living in flood prone areas has long gone, along 
with hooks in the walls and ceilings to lift up furniture, and tiled floors. A recent study 
by Terpstra and Gutteling (2008) shows that the Dutch now have a low risk perception. 
A survey among Dutch households demonstrated that 73 per cent regarded the 
government as primarily responsible for protecting them against flood damage, and about 
50 per cent viewed disaster preparedness as an equal responsibility between themselves 
and the government. Living behind dikes is not considered to be a problem as residents 
rely on the government and its expertise to prevent dike failures.
Government officials referred to this desire for absolute safety a ‘struggle’,816 by which 
they referred to the paradox that Rijkswaterstaat’s flood safety remit includes ensuring 
that everyone has ‘dry feet’ and ‘protection against flooding’817 while not acknowledging 
that 100 per cent safety cannot be guaranteed.818 After finishing the Delta Works in the 
southwestern part of the Netherlands, Rijkswaterstaat even proclaimed that the country 
was ‘finished with regard to flood safety’. A government official: ‘The worst thing you can 
do’.819 After finishing the dike reinforcement programme in the 1990s, Rijkswaterstaat’s 
motto was ‘we have never been safer, but we are still not as safe as we want’,820 which paved 
the way for the announcement of a new set of measures based on a policy of river 
widening. In 1996 Rijkswaterstaat came up with the Room for the River policy for 
lowering the water levels by giving more room to the rivers. As government officials were 
not sure whether this river widening programme would be sufficient to accommodate a 
peak discharge (such as a Rhine discharge of 18,000 m3/s), the plan for emergency water 
storage was conceived to prevent the densely populated western part of the Netherlands 
from flooding. Social protest in tandem with objections by lower-tier authorities thwarted 
the central government proposals for designating calamity polders. In fact, Rijkswaterstaat 
did not have an adequate answer to the emerging disagreement about the need for the 
measure and its claim on land behind the dikes, which affected its sense of self-worth. 
Although it was well aware of the consequences -  as one government official said, ‘the 
problem has not been solved yet’821 -  it took a very cautious approach to public 
involvement in the safety chain (Warner, 2008).
Rijkswaterstaat can learn from British flood risk policy, which highlights the responsibility 
of the people to protect themselves and their properties by focusing more on risk
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communication and options for citizens to insure their property (ten Brinke et al., 
2008b). Apart from the fact that flood insurance does not exist in the Netherlands, such 
an approach would require a shift in Rijkswaterstaat’s organisational culture from a 
paternalistic ‘flood safety is government business’822 towards an inclusive approach.
The impact of the national government’s organisational culture on its action can therefore 
be considered strong.
Provincial government’s organisational culture and the impact of this on its action
Over the centuries the relationship between national and provincial government has been 
fraught with tension. An illustration of this is the relation between the duchy of Gelre and 
the Habsburg Emperor Charles V in the 16th century. The duchy withstood the emperor 
twice by forming a large state along the borders of Charles’s Habsburg territory, first on 
its own by expanding its territory, and later, when this failed, by seeking an alliance with 
the small neighbouring states of Kleve, Gulik and Mark. In 1579 when the northern 
provinces of the Netherlands united in the Union of Utrecht, the duchy of Gelre 
surrendered on specific conditions laid down in the Tractaat van Venlo. The aim of this 
agreement was to prevent Charles from incorporating the duchy into his empire and 
using it at his own discretion. Although Gelre was constitutionally and administratively 
bound to the central authority, it pushed the agreement to its limit, resulting in the duchy 
being split in 1581 (van de Pas, 2004:25-29) as laid down in the Plakkaat van de 
Verlatinghe (van Deursen, 2004:105). The larger part of the duchy broke with the 
Habsburg ruler while the rest continued to be part of the empire.
Gelre’s opposition, however, proved to be a passing thing. After an attempt to seek an 
alliance with a German ruler it came to recognise that the Republic of the Seven United 
Provinces was the least worst option for retaining sovereignty. In this constitution, 
Holland was most powerful province. Six of the seven provinces were dependent on the 
union of the united seven and had to relinquish their sovereign status to the general 
authority, the States General. Unanimity was required as long as the republic was fighting 
for its survival and the protection and each province’s rights and privileges were laid 
down in a treaty, which asserted their autonomy. This unity, therefore, served to 
maintaining the diversity. If any objective were to be given absolute priority over the 
means, the union would collapse. Conversely, if the means were to overshadow the 
objective, provincial independence would be put at risk. Therefore, it was important to 
adopt a middle course between these two essentially incompatible ideals. The use of 
coercion or violence would not prove helpful because the provinces retained their 
autonomy. This meant that decision-making on difficult issues involved consultation, 
compromise, reciprocal deals and give and take. The constitution prevented the 
concentration of power at all levels, not only at the level of the provinces, but also at the 
level of the nobles, the cities, and quarter meetings in each province (van Deursen, 
2004:139-140).
Similar to its behaviour with regard to other states and provinces, Gelre followed its own
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course in its relation to the local authorities, for example in the field of water 
management. It had a strong hand in a -  for that time -  revolutionary regulation for 
polders situated along the rivers in its territory. Following a Prussian model, Gelre drew 
up a ‘Regulation for the management of the river polders in Gelderland Province’ 
(Gelders rivierpolderreglement) in 1838. This document was based on the water board 
regulations of Kleve from 1767 and put an end to all historical rights. This legislation 
enshrined the equal rights of all citizens and made dike maintenance a common 
responsibility. Financing of the costs was based on a proportional relationship between 
interest and payment, a principle that still underpins the funding of Dutch water boards 
today. The regulations included uniform orders for governance and administration, 
which meant that the decisions and budgets of the water boards had to be agreed upon 
by Gelre. Water boards were divided into polder districts, village polders and polders 
outside the main dikes (buitenpolders). For the river district between Nijmegen and Kleve 
the new regulation meant that the Circul van de Ooij, which was situated in a part of the 
present-day Ooijpolder, became a polder district and Erlecom, actually part of 
Ooijpolder, became a polder outside the main dikes (van Eck, 2005).
Another example of the province’s influence in water management was the construction 
of the Pannerdens Kanaal, which was originally intended to be part of the defence line. 
The Dutch States commissioned fortress specialist Baron Menno van Coehoorn to 
reorganise the defence line. He started with a plan dating from 1681 for a canal between 
Pannerden and Candia drawn up by the water expert Passavent. In 1701 the construction 
of the canal started under the express condition stipulated by the cities on the river Waal 
that the canal would be closed for shipping for commercial reasons. Therefore, the ends 
of the canal were closed and the water was regulated by sluices, and a dike on the east 
bank was not raised. The provinces of Gelre, Utrecht and Overijssel, however, were 
resolved to make a canal for shipping. Finally, in 1706 after receiving financial 
compensation, the cities of Dordrecht, Tiel and Nijmegen agreed. The dams at the ends 
of the canal were opened and the dike along the east side was raised. The canal was 
officially opened for shipping in 1708 (Janssen, 2003).
Today, the province of Gelderland is not known for its acceptance of state plans and 
procedures, such as the Betuwe rail freight line from Rotterdam to Germany 
(Betuwelijn), the Room for the River programme, the use of specific procedures for river 
plans and the plan for calamity polders,823 two of which were situated in its territory. As 
in the past, the organisational culture of the province of Gelderland is in many ways one 
of defending its own ideas. Not surprisingly, it made things hard for the national 
government, as Rijkswaterstaat found out, but the government agency framed it 
differently: ‘The province likes to obtain the money to do its own things.’824 
Gelderland was one of the first provinces with an ambitious team of water experts who 
worked on a policy for a ‘robust’ water system that includes the three branches of the 
Rhine in its territory, the Waal, Nederrijn and IJssel, and is based on the river basin 
approach, which takes the whole river system into account. This was demonstrated by
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its close contacts with the German federal state of Nordrhein-Westfalen and its 
contribution to the EU Floods Directive through one of its experts, who represented the 
Dutch provinces.825 The provincial water department was highly professional. Provincial 
officials were particularly focused on the challenges that national water policy presented 
to their province and sought to adjust the policy where it did not fit in with their own 
ideas.
As the province held the chair of the Upstream River Committee, its officials put forward 
their own view. In fact, the national government and provincial government officials 
had the same aim -  a safe country -  but with a slightly different accent. While the 
Rijkswaterstaat officials had to defend the public interest and comply with state policy 
and plans, the representatives from Gelderland made optimal use of the bargaining 
leeway afforded them by the provincial delegates to pursue their own course. Provincial 
delegate Johan de Bondt: ‘The search for structural and safe solutions for the Netherlands 
was a message that I had to get across. In that process relevant contacts proved to be 
MPs, the National Administrative Council on Water (Landelijk Bestuurlijk Overleg Water, 
LBOW), and also the meetings of the Luteijn Advisory Commission, which I attended 
to prevent matters from going from bad to worse.’826 Soon after the launch of the plan 
for calamity polders it became clear that this plan would result in damage to the province 
of Gelderland, as it was not clear that it would meet the central government aim of 
accommodating a design discharge of 18,000 m3/s. Furthermore, it was not an optimal 
solution for the country. The provincial delegate: ‘I am not a person that covers his back 
by asking critical questions and then saying that I cannot do anything because it is up 
to the national government to decide. I consider it my duty to ensure that central 
government decides to adopt the optimal solution. If there is a decision, I am obliged to 
comply with it, but only after I have lobbied and exhausted all possibilities of appeal.’827
The impact of the provincial government’s organisational culture on its action can 
therefore be considered to be moderate.
Local government’s organisational culture and the impact of this on its action
Ooijpolder and Duffelt belong to two municipalities, the municipality of Millingen a/d 
Rijn (about 6,000 inhabitants) and the municipality of Ubbergen (about 15,000 
residents).828 The analysis focuses on Ubbergen because this municipality took a higher 
profile in the public debate on calamity polders.
Long before the establishment of the municipality of Ubbergen in 1818, when the 
villages of Beek, Ubbergen, Ooij, Persingen and Erlecom merged into one municipality, 
the presence of the city of Nijmegen was felt in Ooijpolder and other areas surrounding 
the city. In the second half of the 16th century, for example, the city assumed an active 
role in conflicts about water management, particularly concerning dike maintenance. It 
defended the interests of its residents who owned land or houses in Ooijpolder by taking 
on the local landlords, who were generally not concerned with maintaining the dikes to
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prevent flooding or with repairing dikes after floods and preferred to leave the 
maintenance of the dikes, and the costs, to others. However, the city’s access to Gelre 
brought this conflict to the attention of higher authorities. As the members of 
Schependom Nijmegen were faced the problem of overdue maintenance they assisted the 
landowners who lived in the city in the conflict and presented a petition to the Court of 
Gelre asking for the dike letter to be amended to rectify the failure of customary law. 
With the help of a commission new legislation on the dikes was prepared. In 1580 the 
Court of Gelre enacted a Landtbrief des Circuls van der Ooy, a revised version of the dike 
letter, which legislated for a range of water management and administrative 
arrangements. The Circul van de Ooij became a regional water board and the river dike 
in Ooij became a main dike, which meant that a dike chair had to be established. The 
Landtbrief established a fixed draining regime in the Circul van de Ooij along with other 
matters, such as the repair of dikes and the construction of sluices (van Eck, 2005). As a 
result, the landlords lost their power base.
At the beginning of the 20th century Nijmegen looked to Ooijpolder as an area for urban 
expansion. The city’s first plan to annex Ooijpolder was presented in a letter to 
Gelderland provincial executive dated 3 January 1900. The city wanted to expand 
eastwards because ‘the residents of the municipality of Ubbergen live too far away from 
schools and churches’. The municipality of Ubbergen reacted in a report dated 30 
January 1900 that the polder residents’ interests ‘will be covered by the village council. 
For example, although the number of residents is limited, infrastructure for electricity 
will be laid on to the border of the city of Nijmegen. Besides, there are a few hundred 
hectares of open sites in neighbouring villages to the west of the city’. Nevertheless, in a 
law passed in 1914 the municipality of Ubbergen did lose part of its territory. It received 
financial compensation and a parcel of land of Ooijpolder from the city of Nijmegen in 
part exchange (van Eck, 1999). The province of Gelderland had managed to prevent the 
annexation of Ooijpolder.
In the 1960s, however, the city once again targeted Ooijpolder for annexation, but this 
time it was not the province of Gelderland or the municipality of Ubbergen but the 
residents who withstood the plan and got the housing minister to intervene. On 9 
February 1970 he sent a letter to the city of Nijmegen in which he rejected Ooijpolder 
as a site for housing development. referring to its diversity of landscapes, including the 
push moraine and the specific characteristics of the river landscape, which were 
considered important to conserve (Bullinga & Offermans, 1993). In the meantime, the 
residents were also confronted by a plan for dike reinforcement. The mayor of Ubbergen 
ensured that they were represented in the discussion on the plans for dike reinforcement 
(Bullinga & Offermans, 1993).
The municipality of Ubbergen generally took a low-key profile when supporting the 
residents and in discussions with other authorities, but the government plan for 
emergency water storage prompted the municipality to adopt a more prominent role, led 
by its mayor. Nationally the municipality still operated in the background, but locally it
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had a strong profile. Mayor Wilbers, who is known for his wilfulness (see Gemeente 
Ubbergen, 2008) was strongly motivated to profile himself as a people’s keeper: ‘For a 
mayor nothing is better than a near disaster’. He felt that the residents expect this from 
him: ‘I am their spokesman. I have to make it clear that although rising sea levels 
necessitate government action, you cannot keep on raising the dikes. But he was not 
convinced of the usefulness and necessity of the government plan. ‘I do not know what 
effect the measure will have. It has not been properly established whether the dikes would 
have to be heightened once again and what the effect will be of measures taken in 
Germany.’ When he saw that the state secretary would not give way he assumed an active 
stance, but only to a certain extent. He took the initiative in forming an alliance of 14 
municipalities, both Dutch and German, to commission a contra-expertise. The purpose 
of the study was to gather evidence to take the edge off the arguments for the need for 
emergency water storage by contesting the premise of the Advisory Commission on 
Emergency Water Storage Areas. Wilbers believed an alliance with the riverine 
municipalities was need because ‘otherwise you will easily be charged with being a 
NIMBY. Here we call it NIMFABY, not in my front and back yard... .While people used 
to consider a flood to be an act of God, nowadays it evokes an aggressive attitude. You 
are the government, so you have to take make sure my parquet floor will not be flooded; 
that’s the NIMBY response. The attitude of the residents’ organisation High Water 
Platform is one of the reasons we have not been accused of a NIMBY response. In every 
war there are screamers and that was the role adopted by the High Water Platform, who 
attacked the government plan. I had to consult with the state secretary.’829
The impact of the local government’s organisational culture on its action can be 
considered to be weak.
Local group’s cultural background and the impact of this on its action
For centuries the residents of Ooijpolder have known what opposition means. Their 
polder was a theatre of conflicts in the field of flood protection, which were also bound 
up with disagreements about who has authority in the area. In the past the individual 
interests of the local lords were flatly opposed to regional interests. History shows that 
such conflicts could be resolved through the agency of the magistrates of the city of 
Nijmegen, who had direct access to the higher authorities, like the Duchy of Gelre and 
the King of the Netherlands. As a consequence the local lords had often to concede 
defeat. However, they were used to standing up for themselves and were not afraid to 
fight their corner (Roth et al., 2006a). The local lords and gentleman farmers, who owned 
most of the land in the polder, did not bother much about flooding. That was the 
concern of the leaseholders and labourers, who suffered the ill effects.
Later, despite the changes to the polder regulations on water management issues, money 
for dike repair was difficult to find, also after the 1926 flood, which was the last time 
Ooijpolder and Duffelt were flooded. The centuries of work on the river had changed the 
original broad river bed into a narrow channel. From the 18th century the river was
249
-Q-
Madelinde PHD zonder afbrekingen:Opmaak 1 15- 2011 14:44 Pagina 250
constrained to a narrow channel, but the risk of flooding remained. This put pressure 
on the relationship between the Netherlands and Germany, which was marred by long 
drawn out conflicts about drainage between water boards upstream and downstream. 
However, in the 20th century when the national border became the water management 
border the relationship between both countries improved. This is illustrated by the 
construction of the Dutch-German pumping station in 1933, which provided a common 
water drainage system to the benefit of the residents in the area (Roth et al., 2006a). 
However, the fight against the authorities was given a new impetus from conflicts about 
territorial boundaries. The municipality of Ubbergen withstood the first attempt to 
annex Ooijpolder in 1900. In the 1960s the city of Nijmegen again attempted to annex 
the polder. Soon after the housing ministry rejected the plan for housing development 
in the polder Rijkswaterstaat presented a proposal to cut off the Waal curve near 
Groenlanden in Ooijpolder. Joint action by the residents forced the state secretary for 
water management to concede defeat. Plans for dike reinforcement emerged in 1985, 
and again between 1995 and 1998 when the Government adopted the Major Rivers Delta 
Plan (Deltawet Grote Rivieren) and the Flood Defence Act, which contained proposals for 
a dike reinforcement programme along the rivers, including Ooijpolder. Despite fierce 
protests by the residents of Ooijpolder, the dike reinforcement projects went ahead with 
some minor alterations and compensation for the affected residents (Bullinga & 
Offermans, 1993).
In 2000 Ooijpolder became a search area for emergency water storage. Once again, the 
residents succeeded in resisting a government plan, driven by the confidence born of 
their historical winning streak, a strong drive to act as a group, their readiness to oppose 
whatever government without fear, and the skills at their disposal to influence decision­
making.
The impact of the local group’s cultural background on its action can therefore be 
considered to be strong.
To summarise, with its tradition of intervention, Rijkswaterstaat’s organisational culture 
had a strong influence on its action. However, in the emergency water storage case the 
organisation’s position was weakened by disagreements between its own officials and 
with lower-tier authorities and citizens about uncertainties and the types of measures 
that would be most appropriate. The impact of the organisational culture of the province 
of Gelderland on its action was moderate, based on its long tradition of getting its views 
across, particularly in disputes with Charles V and Holland in the past and more recently 
in opposition to Rijkswaterstaat. The impact of the organisational culture of the 
municipality of Ubbergen on its action was weak because throughout the centuries it has 
not had a distinct ‘voice’. Although its standpoint of ‘no, unless’ in the discussion about 
emergency water storage was clear and its position in the discussion reflected the 
solidarity among lower-tier authorities against the national government, the 
municipality’s aim was to remain on speaking terms with the national government. The
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cultural background of the local group had a strong impact on its action. Its strong 
culture of resistance found has its origin in various disputes with the national 
government, varying from opposition to housing development, shortening a river bend 
and dike reinforcement to the plan for emergency water storage. Apart from its resistance 
to the dike reinforcement programme, in which it achieved a few small successes, it won 
all these battles. Its strong cohesion and unity in fighting against government plans, also 
reflected in its organisation, made it a fearsome opponent.
6.2.6 Summary and discussion
The Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder case study can be summarised as follows.
The interaction between the authorities and the local group in the Ooijpolder case study 
can be broken down into the interaction between the authorities and the local group 
and between the different authorities: the national government (Department of Water 
Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act), the 
provincial government (province of Gelderland) and the local authority (municipality 
of Ubbergen).
The interaction between the national government and the local group can be 
characterised as conflict and debate, while the interaction between the lower-tier 
authorities and the local group can be characterised as collaboration. The interaction 
between authorities had various outcomes. The interaction between the national 
government and the provincial government resulted in debate, negotiation and dialogue, 
the interaction between the national government and the local government ended in 
conflict and debate, and the interaction between the provincial government and the 
local government led to dialogue and collaboration. The outcome of the interaction 
between the provincial governments was collaboration and between the local 
governments was dialogue and collaboration.
With regard to the interaction strategies, the national government used two frames in 
its interaction with the local group and the lower-tier authorities. It exercised a power 
frame and an identity frame towards the local group. The power frame was employed by 
the head of Rijkswaterstaat, particularly through the person of the successive state 
secretaries; the identity frame was generally employed by government officials. The use 
of a power frame by the state secretaries left the officials little room to taking up another 
frame, such as a conflict management frame. The use of an identity frame by government 
officials was therefore understandable as they had to deal with local and provincial 
authorities and the residents. The use of the conflict management frame and bridging 
strategies by the provincial government changed the interaction between the national 
and provincial government from debate towards negotiation and dialogue. The 
interaction between the national and local government remained one of debate as a
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result of the national government’s use of a power frame and an identity frame and the 
local government’s use of an identity frame. In its interaction with the national 
government, the local government did not change its identity frame towards a conflict 
management frame, which had a negative impact on the interaction outcome, which 
was debate. In its interaction with the lower-tier authorities the local group employed a 
collaborative frame.
The national government built five types of power in its dealings with the local group 
(indirect coercive power, legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power and 
sociability), while the local group built three power types (hindering power, knowledge 
power and media power; the latter two very often). The lower-tier authorities built two 
types of power in its dealings with the local group. The provincial government built 
knowledge power and sociability; the local government built legitimate power and 
sociability. The local group built one power type in its interaction with the local-tier 
authorities: sociability. The national government built three power types in its 
interaction with the lower-tier authorities (indirect coercive power, legitimate power 
and knowledge power), while the lower-tier authorities built four types of power in their 
interaction with the national government (legitimate power, knowledge power, media 
power and sociability) .
The power building in the interaction between the national government and the local 
group had a considerable effect on their interaction outcomes: debate and conflict. The 
building of indirect coercive power and legitimate power by the national government 
and the local group’s building of knowledge power and media power proved to be 
influential. The provincial government’s building of knowledge power, media power 
and sociability in its interaction with the national government influenced the interaction 
outcomes, with substantial shifts towards debate, negotiation and dialogue. Its 
interaction strategies also contributed to these interaction outcomes. The interaction 
between the national and local government, which never reached a negotiated solution 
and remained stuck in debate, cannot be explained by their power building. These actors’ 
interaction strategies therefore also needed to be taken into account (see above).
The analysis of the authorities’ and local group’s potentials to act shows that the national 
and local government’s potential to act was weak, while the provincial government’s 
potential to act proved to be moderate. The local group’s potential to act can be 
considered strong. The national government failed in the field of coordinating 
mechanisms, consistency (the construction or adoption of a narrative) and 
organisational and personal motivation, resulting in a failure to provide sufficient 
substantiation for the proposed plan. The provincial government’s potential to act was 
moderate due to its extensive use of coordinating mechanisms and its consistency (to 
construct a narrative that a design discharge for the Rhine of 18,000 m3/s cannot enter 
the Netherlands smoothly, which was partly adopted by the national government) and 
the organisational and personal motivation. The local government’s weak potential to
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act was a result of its weak mandate and resource base and the absence of organisational 
ambition. The local group’s strong potential to act was based on a strong capacity and 
motivation to act.
The analysis of the authorities’ organisational culture and local group’s cultural 
background and the impact of these on their action shows that the influence of the 
national government’s organisational culture on its action can be viewed as rather strong. 
Its engineering culture had a considerable influence on flood risk management practice. 
Rijkswaterstaat has a mandate for water safety, which is incorporated in its mission: 
ensuring that everyone has ‘dry feet’ and protecting the country from floods, but this 
cannot be guaranteed. Rijkswaterstaat views flood safety as government business and 
not something the public should necessarily be involved in. The impact of the provincial 
government’s organisational culture on its actions proved to be moderate. It is used to 
getting its message across, in the past in its interaction with other provinces and Charles 
V, and today in its interaction with Rijkswaterstaat. Although the impact of the local 
government’s organisational culture on its action was weak, its position in public debate 
clearly reflected the solidarity between the lower-tier authorities and the local group in 
opposing the national government. Nevertheless, the local government’s aim was to 
remain on speaking terms with the national government. For centuries the residents of 
Ooijpolder were used to opposing government authorities, whether on water 
management or other issues, and were not afraid to defend their own interests. In the 
20th century they had successfully opposed various government plans and when 
Ooijpolder became a search area for emergency water storage in 2000 the polder 
residents succeeded once again. Their cultural background therefore had a strong impact 
on their action.
Discussion
The Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder case study shows that the historical role of 
water boards in government-citizen relationships needs to be adjusted, knowledge rather 
than identity is the key factor in the government-citizen interaction, the local group’s 
and local government’s concern to avoid the charge of nimbyism (not in my backyard) 
was not convincing, and the actors used specific power strategies.
The history of Ooijpolder demonstrates that escalating conflicts in the field of water 
management were resolved at a higher level. The local lords’ fierce defence of their own 
(individual) interest was flatly opposed to regional interests. Such conflicts could be 
resolved through the agency of the magistrates of the city of Nijmegen, who defended 
the interests of its citizen who owned land in the polder. They had direct access to higher 
authorities, such as the Duchy of Gelre and the King of the Netherlands, which resulted 
in the defeat of the local lords. Nevertheless, the local lords were used to standing up for 
themselves and were not afraid to fight for their own interests. Despite the changes to the 
polder regulations throughout the centuries, it remained difficult to find money for dike 
repairs, also after the 1926 flood. Since the 1953 flood in the southwest of the
253
-Q-
Madelinde PHD zonder afbrekingen:Opmaak 1 15- -2011 14:44 Pagina 254
Netherlands the country has largely banished the distress caused by flooding and has 
established a considerable degree of flood security. Rijkswaterstaat is to a large extent 
responsible for this transformation. It is therefore questionable whether collaboration 
as such is an important feature of water boards in government-citizen relationships (see 
Blockmans, 2009; Disco, 2006). Rather than being a forum for collaboration, the water 
boards turned out to be a relevant platform for authorities and landowners to discuss 
water issues at the local level. In particular, the combination of local decision-making 
and the possibility of regional and/or national intervention in the event of escalating 
conflicts proved to be effective.
The discussion on emergency water storage focused largely on the assumptions 
underlying the government plan, which indicates that knowledge was an important 
factor. Generally speaking, the national government is seen as being the repository of 
knowledge on river management par excellence, to which others must bow. This time it 
went differently. Lower-tier authorities and the local group did not accept the 
government’s information and commissioned studies which they used to underpin their 
arguments. As a result, they became full discussion partners. By discussing standards, the 
dimensions of the designated areas for emergency water storage, and principles, the 
actors revealed the values they attribute to these subjects, such as ‘the Netherlands 
deserves a robust river system with structural measures’ (provincial government) and 
‘the national government is responsible for the safety of all citizens, not only for those 
living in densely populated areas’ (the local group). The residents’ arguments were based 
on their interests, including equity as basic principle for dealing with flood risk. Their 
connection to the area, their cultural background of opposing government plans and 
their solidarity, usually associated with emotions, were not brought into the discussion. 
This meant that the discussion was based on rational strategies rather than emotions. In 
the Netherlands it is a proven strategy of residents to take the authorities’ argumentation 
as the point of departure and come up with alternatives. While the residents of 
Ooijpolder did the first, they did not do the second. They chose the confrontation tactic 
by calling the state secretary their ‘enemy’. They used the media to get support and start 
a public debate. The expectation is that such an all-or-nothing strategy ends up with 
winners and losers. In this case, however, there were only winners: the national 
government did not lose face as the plan for controlled flooding was off the table thanks 
to a parliamentary motion, and the residents succeeded in their objective of thwarting 
the government plan.
The residents of Ooijpolder and the mayor of the municipality of Ubbergen were afraid 
of being accused of taking a NIMBY (not in my backyard) position. As a consequence, 
in their communication with the national government the residents emphasised that 
they ‘would basically be willing to make sacrifices in the interest of national security, if 
the arguments are based on solid grounds’.830 In addition, they chose to consult experts 
and adopt expert jargon in their communication with the national government. The 
mayor of the municipality of Ubbergen organised a contra-expertise in close
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cooperation with Dutch and German municipalities to underpin his arguments against 
calamity polders. At the same time he took a low profile to remain on speaking terms 
with the national government. In the literature (see for example Dear, 1992) the NIMBY 
syndrome is associated with the first irrational reactions of residents when confronted 
by threats, such as government plans. It is the common-sense view that people react 
irrationally when they fall into the grip of emotional forces they cannot, or are unwilling 
to, control. Since emotion is commonly viewed as a disorganiser of ongoing deliberative 
behaviour, irrationality produced by emotional arousal will have a diffuse and impulsive 
character. However, as research by Damasio (1994) and others has shown, emotion is 
better treated as a precondition for deliberative behaviour, rather than as a disorganiser 
(Kühberger, 2002). Those who accuse residents of NIMBY behaviour are generally 
officials who view critical and opposing views of residents as obstacles to the 
implementation of their plans. According to community psychologists who have studied 
public reactions based on concerns about environmental threats, officials do not seem 
to understand that resolving questions about environmental threats goes beyond simply 
trying to convince the public of the validity of numbers derived from quantitative 
methods. Many also fail to appreciate public scepticism and do not understand how 
little these numbers seem to help people (Wandersman & Hallman, 1993).
When applied to the Ooijpolder case study we see that, apart from a few experts, the 
Rijkswaterstaat staff could not explain the numbers behind the statutory Rhine 
discharges of 16,000 m3/s and 18,000 m3/s, which were used to underpin the government 
plan for controlled flooding.831 Models on individual and community dynamics that 
incorporate coping style, social support, uncertainty, attribution of responsibility, culture 
and context (economic, social, physical, environmental and political factors) suggest 
that responses to environmental threats follow patterns, are largely predictable, and are 
not as irrational as they appear (Wandersman & Hallman, 1993). Although the idea of 
using science to quantify risks is appealing (for example the safety standards of 16,000 
m3/s and 18,000 m3/s for the Rhine), risk assessment can be complex. An illustration of 
this complexity is uncertainty. Sjoberg (1980) states that even the best quantitative risk 
analysis is enveloped in uncertainty. In the Ooijpolder case, it was estimated that the 
safety standard of 18,000 m3/s would be reached at the end of the 21st century (100 years). 
However, the rationality of numbers does not relate to people’s everyday lives and the 
choices they make; they are used to acting in accordance with the situation they believe 
in. In scientific decision theory this is rationality in its weakest form. A stronger 
interpretation of rationality is found in utility theory, which sees people as vigilant, 
calculating decision makers who assess choice environments with care, determine the 
probable utility associated with each possible choice and then choose to maximise their 
expected utility. However, the classical definition of rationality is blind to content and 
context (Kühberger, 2002). It is more likely that people’s decision-making is shaped by 
situational recognition (matching features of the situation encountered to features of 
other situations that are already, at least partly, understood), personal identity (including 
all idiosyncratic factors that individuals bring with them into a social situation) and the
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application of rules, such as explicit and codified guidelines for behaviour (codes of 
ethics or laws), but also the visible and explicit influence of social heuristics (such as 
‘women and children first’) and habitual rituals (such as an equal division of resources) 
(Weber et al., 2004). This implies that the local group’s and local government’s fear of 
being labelled as exponents of NIMBY has no cogency.
Gambetta (1988) argues that societies which rely heavily on the use of power are likely 
to be less efficient, more costly and more unpleasant than those where trust is 
maintained by other means. This may lead to the hypothesis that there are two pathways: 
one via coercion, which does not always prove to be useful and effective, and the other 
via sociability. The Ooijpolder case study clearly demonstrates that sociability was built 
to a lesser extent than indirect coercive power and/or legitimate power. The interaction 
between the national government and the local group shows that distrust was prevalent. 
Sociability was used mainly in alliances or when partners expected to achieve a 
collaborative outcome, which turned out to be the case in the interaction between the 
provincial government and the local group, the local government and the local group, 
and between the lower-tier authorities. Here, trust in a positive outcome proved to be an 
important factor. The case thus confirms Gambetta’s reasoning.
The analytical framework and ideas for further research
The analytical framework was successful in revealing that those opposing the 
government plan, the lower-tier authorities and the local group, worked in tandem. 
However, the role of experts inside and outside Rijkswaterstaat is not well covered in 
the analytical framework, which is based on a relationship between two parties: 
government authorities and the local group.
The analytical framework failed to reveal the discourse between the authorities and the 
local group. The questions remaining are at what moment the national government’s 
narrative stalled and when the provincial government’s story prevailed, how the experts’ 
narrative received attention, and how this influenced the national government’s 
narrative.
An idea for further research is the residents’ conviction that uncontrolled flooding is to 
be preferred over controlled flooding. Relevant questions are: Do they think that an 
uncontrolled flooding will not occur in their lifetimes? Do they view uncontrolled 
flooding as a fact of life -  something unavoidable that must be faced? and Do they not 
trust the government to use controlled flooding appropriately?
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Chapter 7 Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder 
case study
The Terps832 Plan in Overdiep Polder is a residents’ initiative for a spatial redesign of 
their polder to make flood peak discharge possible.833 It contrasts with the other two 
cases, Dike Relocation in Lent (Chapter 5) and Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder 
(Chapter 6), which are both government initiatives.
The case study covers the period running from the initiation of the terps plan in 2000 
until the state secretary’s decision to implement it in October 2008. Between May 2005 
and October 2008, 15 in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted with key 
persons, including the chair and vice chair of the resident organisation Overdiepse 
Polder Interest Group (Vereniging Belangengroep Overdiepse polder) (the latter was 
interviewed regularly since 2005), the two project managers (the first project manager 
was interviewed once and his successor three times), the provincial delegates (both 
from Noord-Brabant provincial government), the manager of the Project Department 
Room for the River (PDR, Rijkswaterstaat834), and the river branch manager of the same 
department (interviewed twice). Interviews were also held with four Rijkswaterstaat 
officials, an official from the province of Noord-Brabant, an official of the Government 
Service for Land and Water Management (DLG) and the deputy director and an 
associate of Habiforum.835 Besides the interviews, the research consisted of a literature 
study on Dutch river management and a desk study for which reports, letters, project 
documentation, articles and newspaper clippings were used.
7.1 Case narrative
The case narrative for the terps plan in Overdiep Polder includes a short review, a 
historical perspective that sketches in broad lines what happened prior to the residents’ 
initiative and the description of the case from the government’s point of view and the 
local group’s position.
Terps plan in Overdiep Polder in brief 836
Overdiep Polder is located in the province of Noord-Brabant, and is enclosed by the 
Bergsche Maas and the Oude Maasje, which form part of the Meuse basin. In the 1970s
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technical interventions made the polder suitable for permanent occupation and year- 
round agricultural use. It is a small area: 550 hectares inside the dikes and a flood plain 
of 180 ha in the river forelands outside the river dike. The polder contains 17 farms, a 
marina and a military training area with an army barracks. In 2003 the polder had 94 
inhabitants (Habiforum, 2003). Most farms are dairy farms of 25 to 40 hectares (partly 
owned in leasehold), each with between 30 and 100 cows. Some farmers combine dairy 
production with arable farming, cultivating maize, beetroot, peas, potatoes and other 
crops. The polder also contains two meat production farms.
Due to its favourable location on the Meuse, its earlier function as a retention area and 
the small number of residents, in the late 1990s the polder was designated as a ‘search 
area’ for river widening projects . The residents had not been consulted during the first 
survey of alternative locations for flood peak retention. Only the farmers’ organisation 
ZLTO and the water board were initially informed. When a notice in the regional 
newspaper alerted the residents that the polder was a candidate for water retention, 
most were initially angry. The polder residents feared the water less than they feared the 
government (van Rooy et al., 2006). The farmers were especially apprehensive about a 
long period of uncertainty, which would have a negative impact on the future of their 
operations. Most of the residents were willing to resort to any legal means to block the 
government’s plans. A few, however, saw new opportunities for their business. Pursuing 
action against the state would bring even more uncertainty, and the residents recognised 
the need for water storage in the public interest. Moreover, the government study was 
only exploratory, not a final plan. After intensive discussions the residents decided to 
negotiate rather then oppose the plans at any cost. They asked the provincial 
government to play an active role in planning the future of their polder. They formed 
the Overdiepse Polder Interest Group (Vereniging Belangengroep Overdiepse Polder) to 
represent their interests in the bargaining process with the government.
The establishment of the residents’ group gave the residents an opportunity to develop 
their own plan for the polder. They developed a first draft of the ‘terps plan’ with the 
help of the farmers’ organisation ZLTO. Later, they worked on an elaborated version of 
the ‘terps plan’ with the help of water experts and a financial contribution of the 
provincial authority. The plan provides for the construction of artificial elevations along 
a yet to be constructed dike protecting the polder’s southern perimeter to permit them 
to continue their farming operations during periods of flooding, which were calculated 
to occur on average once in 25 years. The northern dike would be lowered and a water 
inlet and outlet constructed to allow floodwater from the Meuse to flow right through 
the polder. This would achieve the principal project goal: reducing the water level in the 
Meuse by 30 cm. A second objective was to improve the agricultural structure in the 
polder by expanding the size of the farms. As there was not enough land to continue all 
operations (the plan anticipated a need for eight to ten terps for each farm) some of the 
existing farms would have to be phased out over time. Residents who wanted to 
discontinue their businesses or continue them elsewhere in the Netherlands or abroad
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would be bought out by the province. Part of this land would be used to build additional 
infrastructure and the rest would be used to compensate the remaining residents for the 
reduction in the value of their land expected as a result of the flood measures. The 
remaining farms would therefore also have more land.
The terps plan meshed well with the government’s desire for a new approach to water 
projects. The government-instated Water Vision group (Bezinningsgroep Water) 
classified the terps plan as a ‘demonstration project’ (spiegelproject) (Habiforum, 2003), 
an experiment in which governments work in close cooperation with residents on 
sustainable solutions for water management.837 Remarkably, facilitation of the planning 
process was delegated to the province of Noord-Brabant and not put directly under 
direction of Rijkswaterstaat, a novelty in Rijkswaterstaat’s history.
After many conflicts, great progress had been made in negotiations between 
Rijkswaterstaat and the province, and between the province and the residents. Subjects 
for discussion included compensation for flood damage, compensation for those who 
intend to leave and those who want to stay, the design of the terps, the location of the 
farm buildings and the new dike. While most disputes were about the allocation of 
responsibilities between the government authorities, the residents remained focused 
and cooperated closely with the project manager and the provincial delegate, who 
assisted them as much as possible. The residents and project manager held informal 
meetings to prepare project decisions jointly. The residents put a lot of time and energy 
into the project, which would be not only in their own interests, but also in the wider 
public interest. The national government, which was in great need of a first real success 
in its new water policy, had no choice but to engage in negotiations with the affected 
residents. Moreover, it had to accept the inevitable uncertainties of such an open-ended 
process. In the coming period decisions will have to be made about who will stay in the 
polder and who will leave and the implementation of the terps plan. At the time of 
writing, the question of whether the plan will be a success for the government, for the 
farmers, or for both, remains unanswered.
F igu re  7.1 The Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder
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Table 7.1 contains a process outline showing the different stages that can be 
distinguished in the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study
Table 7.1 Process outline for the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study
Process stage Date Method Participants
Preparatory stage (February 2000 -  March 2001)
Launch of W hite Paper 
on Room for the River
28 February 2000 Presentation of studies 
at Loevestein Castle
State secretary of 
Water Management
Explanation of 'search 
areas' in Overdiep Pol­
der, among others
May 2000 Information meeting Provincial delegate 
province of 
Noord-Brabant
Publication report 
'Overdiep... retention 
Polder?'
March 2001 Report Farmers' organisation 
ZLTO in cooperation 
with residents
Development stage (April 2001 -  June 2003)
Development of terps 
plan in Overdiep 
Polder
October 2002 -  June 
2003
Design workshop with 
residents under super­
vision of Habiforum
Habiforum* in coope­
ration with residents
Decision-making stage (September 2003 -  October 2008)
State secretary's agree­
ment with fore-runner 
status of terps plan in 
Overdiep Polder
2 june 2004 State secretary's deci­
sion
State secretary of 
Water Management
Signing of administra­
tive agreement of 
terps plan in Overdiep 
Polder
14 December 2004 Administrative agree­
ment between Ministry 
of Water Management 
and province of 
Noord-Brabant
Minister of Transport, 
Public Works and 
Water Management 
and provincial dele­
gate province of 
Noord-Brabant
Cabinet's decision Spa­
tial Planning Key Deci­
sion Room for the 
River Part 1 includes 
terps plan in Overdiep 
Polder
May 2005 Cabinet's decision Cabinet
State secretary's agree­
ment with implemen­
tation of terps plan in 
Overdiep Polder
8 October 2008 State secretary's 
decision
State secretary of 
Water Management
*Habiforum is a non-governmental organisation for multifunctional land-use.
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Overdiep Polder in historical perspective
This section sketches in broad lines what happened prior to the residents’ initiative. 
Overdiep Polder: one of the most recently inhabited polders
Overdiep Polder was one of the last polders to become inhabited in the western part of 
the Netherlands. It was created by the excavation of the Bergsche Maas in 1904 to 
improve the discharge capacity of the Meuse. Until the 1960s the polder was inundated 
each winter. After the completion of the Haringvliet dam in 1971, the polder was largely 
free of regular inundations. Until then, farmers had used the land only for extensive 
farming activities, mainly as hay meadows (Habiforum, 2003).
After the construction of a sluice in 1975 and a second land reallocation, 17 farming 
families from the nearby villages of Waspik and Raamsdonk settled in the polder. 
Although they were used to living with high water and land reallocations, moving from 
a village to Overdiep Polder was quite a radical step in those days. As one farmer said, 
‘My land was spread out over great distances; part of it was even as far as 12 kilometres 
away. I found that difficult. When the land consolidation project began, one of the 
farmers had decided to try his luck in the province of Flevoland. He received a subsidy 
to build a farm and could buy land close to his house. We regarded this as a strange 
decision, going so far away. But after some time I decided to call the farmer who had 
moved and asked if I could come and have a look at his new farm. After I went there 
with my wife, we became convinced of the advantages of moving elsewhere. They had 
a new farm, with the land very close. If he wanted to harrow and then found that the 
land was too wet, he could just turn around and come back the next day. I could not do 
that. After a twelve kilometre tractor drive to my land I would never return before 
having finished the job. These things made us, and also other families, decide to move 
to Overdiep Polder.’838
Having moved from the same villages at the same time and working in the same small 
polder, the farmers are a close-knit community. This is manifested in the close social 
relationships and cooperative networks between the farming families, especially 
between adjoining farms. The close social relationships are based on kinship ties (several 
families are closely related) and bonds of friendship (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2008). 
Examples of reciprocity are help with harvesting, occupation of the farm during 
holidays and daily help with work on the farm. During one very wet summer season one 
of the farmer could not harvest his potatoes on time, so other farmers helped him, one 
with a powerful tractor, others with old but useful tools. At that time every bit of help 
was welcome. Some families also help each other during holidays. On one occasion the 
children of one family slept in their neighbour’s farm so that it was occupied, making 
a short holiday possible for their neighbours (Roth & Winnubst, 2009).
Overdiep Polder covers an area of 550 hectares, with an additional 180 hectares of river
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forelands. The polder falls within two municipalities, the majority belonging to 
Waalwijk and the remainder to Geertruidenberg. Currently the polder contains 17 
farms, a marina with 340 berths, and a military training site with army barracks 
covering about 4 hectares.
The total population is 94 people (2003). Many residents are relatively young (30-45 
years old). Most have a dairy farm with 30-80 cows and around thirty hectares of land. 
Some farmers combine dairy farming with other agricultural activities like cultivation 
of maize, beets, peas and potatoes. There is also a pig farm and a beef farm. The current 
land use and settlement pattern dates from the early 1970s, when the land was drained 
and reallocated (Habiforum, 2003).
Farm sizes vary from 25 to 40 hectares. Not all the land is owned by the farmers who 
live in the polder: 60% is privately owned and 40% is worked in leasehold. Several farms 
work land in the river forelands or inside the dikes in leasehold. While the State Property 
Department (Dienst der Domeinen)839 owns the river forelands, the owners of land in 
leasehold are primarily small private investors, municipalities, the church and charitable 
institutions. In the past, farmers who died often bequeathed land to the church. The 
church still derives income from this land through leasehold contracts for land and 
milk quota tied to the land. These leasehold contracts often cover a six year period and 
are routinely continued as long as the contracting parties agree to do so. Finally, some 
farmers living in the polder own, lease or rent agricultural land outside the polder 
(Habiforum, 2003).
Government perspective
In this section the terps plan in Overdiep Polder is described from the government’s 
point of view.
From ‘search area’ to residents’ initiative
As the small number of residents in Overdiep Polder and its historical water retention 
function made the polder a suitable location as a floodwater retention area, it was 
included as one of the ‘search areas’ in government studies carried out in the mid 1990s 
to find more room for the river (see below). As described in Chapter 2, after the 1995 
high water episode, government plans to strengthen and raise dikes and construct 
emergency dikes along the main rivers (Major Rivers Delta Plan, Deltaplan Grote 
Rivieren) were rapidly endorsed by Parliament and the Council of State.840 The high 
water had been a window of opportunity for pushing through radical flood protection 
measures (Meijerink, 2005; Wiering & Arts, 2006). However, water experts at 
Rijkswaterstaat also feared that a continued policy of dike reinforcement would be 
difficult to pursue without losing public support, because of its negative impact on the 
river landscape. In addition, climate change scenarios, including rising sea levels and 
falling land levels, suggested that a continued focus on dikes would not be sufficient to
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accommodate the expected discharges. Moreover, the increasingly elevated dikes could 
create a false sense of security.841 Breaches might cause rapid inundation and a ‘bath 
tub’ effect, from which residents would not be able to escape in time.842
In response to the 1995 high water episode, the government had already raised the safety 
standards from a river discharge of 15,000 m3/s to 16,000 m3/s for the Rhine near 
Lobith843 and 3,650 m3/s to 3,800 m3/s for the Meuse near Borgharen.844, 845 This 
standard, laid down by law, formed the basis of the new Room for the River policy 
(Ruimte voor de Rivier). In the meantime, additional studies were made -  Room for 
Rhine Branches (Ruimte voor Rijntakken) in 1998 and Integrated Study of the 
Downstream Rivers (Integrale Verkenning Benedenrivieren) in 1999 -  to investigate how 
a Rhine discharge of 16,000 m3/s could be safely accommodated without heightening 
the dikes. The first study examined the upstream stretches of the rivers, the second the 
downstream sections. The latter study identified Overdiep Polder as a possible retention 
area. Only a few interest groups had been involved in the study, including 
representatives of the farmers’ organisation ZLTO and the water boards, but it did not 
pass unnoticed. A resident read in a local newspaper that Rijkswaterstaat was looking 
for more room for the Meuse in their polder. When he informed his colleagues, most 
of them were surprised and indignant about it. Fearing a threat to the continuity of 
their farming activities, they decided to try to find the best lawyers in the country to 
block this process.
However, the study was a preliminary investigation rather than a final plan. The 
outcomes were presented by a Noord-Brabant provincial delegate, Jan Boelhouwer. 
Afterwards, two residents asked him if they could join the brainstorming session on 
finding room for the river in their neighbourhood. They recognised the important 
public interest involved in these flood protection measures, but doubted the 
government’s ability to decide quickly on the issue. According to the chairman of the 
residents’ group, ‘most people in the polder were more afraid of the government than 
of the water’ (van Rooy et al., 2006). They also sensed that embarking on the road to 
litigation would probably delay decision-making, but also start an even longer period 
of uncertainty that could lead to the demise of their farming enterprises. Therefore, 
these farmers opted for a critically cooperative rather than a defensive approach. ‘If 
something has to be done, then preferably quickly and on our conditions’, was their 
basic attitude (Slootweg, 2004). They established a residents’ association, Overdiepse 
Polder Interest Group (Vereniging Belangengroep Overdiepse polder) to represent their 
interests in negotiation with the government.
Meanwhile an appointment was made for a meeting between provincial delegate Jan 
Boelhouwer and four polder residents. They asked the provincial delegate if they were 
allowed to make their own plan to combine living and farming in their polder with 
provisions for accommodating flood water and if so, on what conditions. With the help 
of the farmers’ organisation ZLTO the residents developed a first draft of the ‘terps plan’
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with the following conditions: 1) compensation for all farmers involved; 2) a flood risk 
of once in 25 years; and 3) a speedy planning process, because a lack of clarity is 
destructive for entrepreneurs.846 Later, they worked on an elaborated version of the 
‘terps plan’ with the help of water experts and a financial contribution of the provincial 
government.
The province accepted the plan as a point of departure. The plan sought to combine the 
objective of water storage with strengthening the agricultural structure, in other words 
to invest in farms so that they would be economically viable in future. As several farming 
families would leave the polder, their land could be bought by the government. Some 
of this land could then be sold to farmers remaining in the polder to improve the 
viability and economic prospects of their farms; other areas could be used for the new 
infrastructure needed for the terps plan (terps, dikes, roads). The residents currently 
living in the polder would have priority over ‘outsiders’ in buying land from those 
moving out (Roth & Winnubst, 2009).
Plan embedded in policy
The plan for the polder came at a time when water management policy was open to 
approaches. The Water Vision Group847 was looking for projects that could put the new 
water policy into practice. Provincial delegate Jan Boelhouwer proposed the residents’ 
plan for Overdiep Polder. The Group was surprised by this plan,848 which it considered 
suitable as a pilot project to illustrate the new approach to water management.849 He 
also informed the state secretary about the plan.850 She replied that the plan had to be 
anchored in the Spatial Planning Key Decision (SPKD) Room for the River and 
proposed to put the plan before the Upstream Rivers Steering Committee851 as this 
Committee had been asked to draw up a regional report on options for river widening. 
The provincial delegate who chaired the Committee carried out the state secretary’s 
instructions and the members gave the green light for an experiment (Habiforum,
2003). The terps plan thus became a demonstration project (spiegelproject, literally 
‘mirror project’852), an experiment in which the authorities work in close cooperation 
with residents on sustainable solutions for water management.853 The premise was that 
residents should be the starting point for the planning process, a new element in Dutch 
water management. The national government provides the primary infrastructure, but 
increasingly devolves responsibility for implementation to lower-tier agencies, in this 
case Noord-Brabant provincial government, which became the first provincial authority 
to take charge of a river project. But while the provincial delegate arranged for a central 
role for the residents in the planning process -  which is very uncommon -  he ran the 
risk of alienating all the government authorities. In taking this action he stuck his neck 
out and displayed unusual initiative in using his both networks and the government 
hierarchy854 to get the plan institutionally embedded.
After the publication in March 2001 of the ZLTO report in which the residents 
presented their conditions for redesigning their polder as a retention area, it took more
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than two years to get the plan accepted by various government authorities and 
incorporate it into current policy. In autumn 2001 the mayor of Waalwijk invited the 
chair of the Water Vision Group to visit Overdiep Polder to discuss why the project was 
not moving forward. Behind the scenes the province was pushing and pulling,855 but 
Rijkswaterstaat officials were trying to thwart the terps plan, for example by expressing 
doubts about its usefulness and diplomatically suggesting how it could be rejected 
(Slootweg, 2004). From June 2002, when it became clear that the effects of climate 
change would substantially increase the discharge of the Bergsche Maas, the project 
started to move.
Nevertheless, eleven versions of the project proposal were required, five of which after 
the state secretary had agreed to it, before all it was accepted by all the government 
authorities involved. It took a further 16 months (from July 2001 to October 2002) 
before the demonstration project could be implemented (Slootweg, 2004). The 
Downstream Rivers Steering Committee,856 first chaired by provincial delegate Jan 
Boelhouwer and later by his successor Lambert Verheijen, stipulated that a feasibility 
study would have to be carried out before it could adopt the plan.857 In the meantime 
the residents worked on the development of the terps plan for water storage in their 
polder under the supervision of Habiforum. They finally chose the option which 
located 8 to 10 mounds along the newly built southern dike and lowered the northern 
dike, in which an inlet and outlet are constructed. The plan would lower the water level 
of the Bergsche Maas by 30 cm and it proved to be cost-effective.858
Although the government authorities involved were positive about the outcome of the 
demonstration project (Habiforum, 2003), the residents worried about how their plan 
would fit in with other planning proposals. This was not without reason. The Wijde 
Biesbosch Area Commission, for example, was working on an ‘area plan’ (gebiedsplan) 
in which two side channels were planned, one of which in the Overdiep Polder to lower 
the water level in the Bergsche Maas.859 However, this proved unacceptable to the 
residents. They complained that the municipality of Waalwijk was not forcefully 
promoting the terps plan in the Commission while it was chaired by the mayor of 
Waalwijk. As a result, the Commission was not willing to take the terps plan into 
consideration.860 This was resolved through the efforts of their water expert, an associate 
of Habiforum, the provincial delegate and the chair of the Water Vision Group. The 
water expert pulled strings to make the plan a subject for discussion.861 The province 
then rejected the plan for two side channels and opted for the terps plan in Overdiep 
Polder. From the province’s point of view, this option would make a greater 
contribution to reducing the water level in the Bergsche Maas than the proposed side 
channels. Furthermore, this plan would cost less.862 Later, the province argued that ‘the 
execution of two projects along the Bergsche Maas could not be explained to the general 
public....In fact, the side-channel project was overtaken by events.’863 The province 
convinced the state secretary to postpone the plan for the side channels indefinitely 
while waiting for the alternative plan for the Overdiep Polder.864 One of the
265
-Q-
Madelinde PHD zonder afbrekingen:Opmaak 1 15- 2011 14:44 Pagina 266
considerations was that if the plan for side channels was realised, other measures would 
have to be taken865 to meet Rijkswaterstaat’s conditions in the Room for the River policy. 
Finally, in his capacity as chair of the Area Commission the mayor of Waalwijk received 
a letter from the chair of the Water Vision Group in which he was politely but firmly 
called to account for his position and role in the process (‘I knew that you would carry 
considerable weight’).866 Following the decision by the Wijde Biesbosch Area 
Commission to change their position and support the province’s standpoint,867 the 
mayor yielded to the political pressure and became an advocate of the residents’ plan 
once again (Slootweg, 2004).
There were more hurdles ahead. First, development of the terps plan was not allowed 
to begin until the Government had had finally adopted the national spatial planning 
instrument SPKD Room for the River. There was no money available868 since the budget 
for the Room for the River projects had not yet been approved by the Government 
(SPKD procedure).869 The cost of the residents’ plan was estimated at between 90 and 
150 million euros.870 The province was prepared to provide an advance of 10 million 
euros.871 From the Rijkswaterstaat’s point of view, the plan was too expensive (Slootweg, 
2004) in relation to the total budget for Room for River measures.872, 873 As the Terps 
Plan in Overdiep Polder was one of 39 Room for the River projects, the government 
authority did not want to set a precedent. The plan was then given a low priority.874 A 
meeting with the provincial delegate and the state secretary revealed that the topic was 
not to be off-limits.875 It proved that the state secretary’s main concern was that giving 
the plan a formal status ahead of the SPKD would contravene the existing regulations,876 
but this could be solved procedurally.877 As soon as the terps plan was given front-runner 
status the budget was arranged. However, the provincial contribution of 10 million 
euros was disputed. ‘It was money from the national government which the province 
was told it did not have to pay back, so the province kept it. The province now says that 
it is its own money, but this is a matter of perception.’878 Finally, on 2 June 2004 the 
state secretary agreed to a proposal by the Downstream Rivers Steering Committee to 
nominate the terps plan as front-runner project.879, 880 From that point the Committee’s 
influence decreased.881
Another hurdle was the administrative agreement between the national government 
and the province, which took six months to finalise after many meetings and telephone 
calls. As one provincial official said, ‘At least ten drafts were made; alterations included 
words, details. It was clear that some government officials had some difficulty with it. 
There was no question of buckling down and getting a draft ready within a week.’882 
Finally, on 14 December 2004, the administrative agreement between the ministry and 
the province was signed.883
All in all, three years passed without any visible progress for the residents and no start 
had yet been made with getting the plan through all the necessary required procedures.
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Getting the plan through the procedures and overcoming ‘teething troubles’
Although known for her firmness,884 the state secretary could not speed up the slow 
progress of the terps plan through the required procedures, nor was she able to help to 
overcome the ‘teething problems’885 that emerged during the planning process. Like the 
preceding phase to get the plan approved, the future of the terps plan was mainly in the 
hands of Rijkswaterstaat officials. The principal problems to be tackled were the project 
auditing (the auditing method and frequency of reporting) and the environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) procedure (which variants will be studied). Most of these 
problems led to disputes about responsibility between Rijkswaterstaat and the 
province,886 which proved to be an extra obstacle to accelerate the process.
As the terps plan was the first project to be delegated to the province, the project 
auditing became a disputed issue. This was closely related to the question of how to 
deal with responsibility. Although the national government was used to entering into 
contracts with government authorities on various topics, this was the first time in its 
history that the Department of Water Management had signed an administrative 
agreement with the province. The contract covered just a single sheet of paper and 
listed the main agreements. From the viewpoint of Rijkswaterstaat this proved to be a 
very narrow basis to work on. It had just been reorganised and it wanted to exert tighter 
control over the process.887 Its main argument was its responsibility to Parliament. ‘What 
was required was a clear description of the relationship between the national 
government and province, what the project was about, which options would be studied 
and how to audit the project, because we have to manage the project planning, the 
approach and the risk management.’ Everything had to be audited externally, including 
the property issues and compensation, and it turned out to be a full review: ‘this is 
running smoothly; that could be better’.888 Rijkswaterstaat and the province finally 
agreed to a compromise. The province continued to report to the state secretary every 
six months (rather than every three months, which Rijkswaterstaat preferred), but in 
line with Rijkswaterstaat’s auditing requirements (‘It is useless to stick on your own 
rules and regulations’).889
An obligatory step in the planning of infrastructure is the EIA procedure in which 
various alternatives are studied. However, the residents had already bypassed this stage 
and stuck to their terps plan, saying there must be a way to adapt the EIA procedure. 
The province was amenable to their argument and proposed studying three variants for 
the construction of the inlet and outlet and the number, forms and locations of the 
terps.890 Rijkswaterstaat, however, did not agree to this. Finally, the government agencies 
agreed to a compromise in which the terps plan would be the point of departure for the 
EIA procedure, in which four variants would be studied.891 While the government 
authorities felt confident about the negotiated solution, the residents considered it to 
be ‘wasting money on something that you already know’.892
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Avoiding setting precedents
Other disputed issues included the land value (how to value land) and property 
assessment (is the provincial regulation or the Rijkswaterstaat regulation applicable).
Land valuation and property assessment were disputed issues, because these proved to 
be within the competence of both the provincial government and the national 
government. The terps plan requires a restructuring of the polder, including rebuilding 
farms and reallocating land. A flexible plan that causes minimal disruption would be 
needed to ensure undisturbed continuation of farming operations during 
implementation. Land will be needed for new infrastructure (dikes, terps, roads and 
water-related infrastructure) and for expansion of the farms that will continue in the 
polder. As only some of the residents will remain in the polder, land transactions will 
be an important element in the implementation of the project to give those who stay 
an opportunity to expand their enterprises. Strengthening the farm structure is 
generally seen as the only way to ensure they have an economically viable future, which 
is needed to justifying the project investments (Habiforum, 2003). In order to operate 
as flexibly as possible and buy out families that decided to move or to stop farming, the 
province drew up regulations to acquire their land at an early stage, even before the 
national decision-making on the SPKD Room for the River and the project had been 
completed (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2006). These ‘anticipatory purchases’ 
(anticiperende aankopenj offered residents the opportunity to look for alternative 
locations in the Netherlands or abroad at an early stage, and allowed the province to use 
the land for relocating enterprises, land exchange and reallocation. Those who decided 
to stay could sell their property (farm buildings) to the province, but continue to use 
it until they moved to a terp (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2006). However, there were 
many ways of dealing with such land transactions. They could either be concluded on 
the basis of agricultural value (agrarische waarde) or market value, or on the basis of 
compulsory purchase value (onteigeningswaarde), the former being much lower than 
the latter. The project manager estimated the difference at 25 to 30 per cent.893 The 
various parties directly or indirectly involved in the implementation of the project had 
different approaches to this issue. Whereas the province takes the compulsory purchase 
value as its point of departure for land acquisition, the Government Service for Land 
and Water Management (Dienst Landelijk Gebied, DLG), which is involved in habitat 
development projects, takes a different approach. Although DLG was not yet involved 
in Overdiep Polder it kept a close eye on the development. Generally, it regards 
compulsory purchase as a measure of last resort if voluntary agreements and incentives 
do not work. A DLG official stated that the province’s approach could easily create 
precedents for future projects in the Room for the River programme.894
The residents demanded a purchasing policy based on the compulsory purchase value 
of their property, and stated that they had always been clear on this point (van Rooy et 
al., 2006). At the same time they feared a difference in purchasing policy between land 
inside and outside the polder. Some residents not only owned land inside the polder, but
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also in the surrounding area. It was important for those who decide to move to know 
whether the province would buy all their land or only the land they own inside the 
polder. The province stressed the need to provide the residents with the best possible 
help in looking for solutions, which meant that it intended to buy not only their land 
in the polder but also their other land (with assistance from DLG, for which this is part 
of their core business for habitat restoration and creation projects) if the farmers 
concerned want this (Roth & Winnubst, 2009).
Regarding land values, tensions arose between the provincial government’s limited 
leeway in offering flexibility and incentives to residents and the residents’ conditions, 
and between central government control over the process (by Rijkswaterstaat) and the 
decentralised implementation (by the province). Furthermore, while the province 
wanted the residents to decide on their future as soon as possible, some residents might 
want to postpone their decision for personal reasons or to influence negotiations (see 
‘Residents’ perspective’ below). The province opted to acquire the land at the 
compulsory purchase value, but this changed following central government 
intervention. For the time being this friction between the national and provincial 
government was solved by establishing a Property Coordination Team ( Coördinatie 
Team Vastgoed),895 but the tension between the province and the residents continued. 
The province offered 10,500 euros per cow and four euros per square metre 
(agricultural land value), but the residents did not accept this. ‘We asked for a second 
opinion and this was 15,000 or 16,000 euros per cow. With the provincial offer you 
neither can stay nor leave.’896 Although the province promised to obtain a second 
opinion and that the final price would be a realistic value (‘we review current land 
prices; if our estimate turns out to be too low than we may amend it’), the residents’ 
dissatisfaction with the provincial offer remained. ‘The impression is that apart from the 
residents everybody will be better off. In that case it is useless to continue.’897
Further negotiation and fine tuning of the terps plan
In 2008 new disputes arose between Rijkswaterstaat and the province concerning the 
increased project costs (how to economise), the new river guideline containing 
engineering and design specification, such as the materials to be used in dike 
construction (the extent to which it applies as it leads to a considerable increase in 
project costs), the policy objective of ‘spatial quality’(how far this guidance is applicable 
as it goes against other government regulations), and the reduction in water level 
resulting from the plan (30 cm in the original plan; 27 cm according to later calculations 
by Rijkswaterstaat and 28 cm calculated by consultants).
In spring 2008 the province submitted a draft plan for the polder that met 80-90 per 
cent of the original objectives. The project manager: ‘We made clear that if 
Rijkswaterstaat wants a 100 per cent match with the new river guideline, the other 
objectives [such as spatial quality] would decrease towards 20 per cent. We presented it 
as a package deal, but this was not considered acceptable. From Rijkswaterstaat’s point
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of view, the first priority is the effect on lowering the water level. We had to prove that 
the package deal was the way to meet the various objectives.’898
Apart from the new river guideline, inflation correction, earth moving, prices of land 
and real estate and higher wages all led to an increase in the project costs. The project 
manager: ‘A major part of the budget will go on the special clay required by the river 
guideline, which is only available in Germany. As we were afraid that building the dike 
with lower quality clay would not be approved, we included the heaviest dike option 
using the best clay. But we want to discuss about other options because the price is so 
high.’899
As spatial quality is the second objective of the Room for the River programme it has 
to be included in the design of the plan. The concept of spatial quality is connected to 
notions of functionality (practical value), attractiveness (perception) and sustainability 
(future quality), and may be interpreted in different ways. This vagueness has also a 
function: it makes context specific interpretations and negotiations about objectives 
possible. This combination of safety and spatial quality objectives is designed to make 
the river landscape viable, sustainable and attractive (Ministerie van Verkeer en 
Waterstaat 2007). To implement this in current plans a Q-team (landscape quality team) 
was established to advise on this subject, which meant a new player in the policy field. 
In 2006 the influence of the Q-team was becoming apparent. The contacts between the 
residents and the national landscape adviser were laborious (Roth & Winnubst, 2009). 
The project manager: ‘The Q-team was disappointed with our design of the plan. They 
said it was too vague and they wanted to see detailed maps. Our route was a different 
one. We focused first on the procedural part of the planning process. The ideas of the 
Q-team did not fit in at all with those of the province or the residents. We talked about 
this openly, also with the ministry. Finally, our landscape designer and the Q-team 
arrived at a negotiated solution. The spatial quality objective came in halfway through 
the process and we had to meet it somehow.’900
The effects of the terps plan on the water level were originally calculated at around 30 
cm. The project manager: ‘We have tried our utmost to achieve that number, but even 
if you demolish everything the maximum effect would be 27 or 28 cm. For example, the 
demolition of the army barracks will lower the water level by 1.5 cm, but the army asked 
for compensation of 6 million euros for the new build. Rijkswaterstaat then said: “Just 
don’t do it”. Then there’s the war monument. Demolishing that gains a further 0.9 cm 
reduction. If the terps were to be built close to each other you win a few more 
millimetres, but the effect is minimal. The only solution is to relocate the dike more 
towards the Oude Maasje, but then you lose some spatial quality and part of the planned 
habitat development area. We work “area specific”, in other words, all objectives run 
parallel and at the end a maximum might be achieved of 80-90 per cent. This implies 
that everyone will have to make some concessions. The residents knew that; 95-98 per 
cent of the original plan has been retained and they accepted that a 100 per cent match
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would not be realistic. But now we have to convince the others.’901
The increase in the project costs of the terps plan (125 million euros instead of the 
expected 86 million euros) led to the question of which government authority has to 
pay. Rijkswaterstaat used this in the discussion about who is responsible for the 
implementation. ‘Rijkswaterstaat said: “You [the province] could implement it, but then 
you have to take on the risk”. We [the province] thought: “OK, we have some money, 
but to take on the risk for a government project for which we are the executing agency? 
It is a state responsibility! We won’t do that.” We negotiated and arrived at the solution 
of economising as much as possible (111 million euros proved acceptable) and both 
the water board and the province became responsible for the implementation phase.’902
After the state secretary agreed to the plan study in October 2008, negotiations between 
the province and the residents were directed at compensation measures concerning the 
purchase of land and real estate, the distribution of the terps, and the construction of 
the terps and dike.
The arguments
Department of Water Management and Directorate-General for Water Affairs
Various state secretaries were involved in the terps plan. The first agreed to the 
experimental status of the terps plan, the second approved the front-runner status of 
the plan, and the third approved the plan study. Whereas the first and third lacked 
vigour, the second dared to show leadership.903 However, realising the terps plan was 
primarily a job for government officials.
The second state secretary was the most explicit when she said during the annual 
‘Mirror Day’ organised by Habiforum in 2003 (to discuss/review the various 
demonstration projects (spiegel projecten)): ‘In an unusual way residents have taken the 
initiative for the redesign of their polder.’904 From their point of view it was not a 
question of whether the terps plan would be implemented, but when and in what form. 
Although she was not certain about the budget905 and decision-making in June 2004 she 
was convinced of the need for this sort of creative thinking. ‘I am not employed to be 
creative with water; that job is better done at the local level.’906
The director-general for water affairs, who was the contact person for Noord-Brabant 
provincial government to evaluate the progress of the terps plan, confirmed that the 
Overdiep Polder was in fact the first ‘experimental garden’ in which the responsibility 
for planning has been delegated to the province. ‘Traditionally we did it ourselves. As 
we want to learn from these experiences we asked Habiforum to reflect on the process. 
I am satisfied with the experiment. What we learn with Noord-Brabant we may apply 
at a larger scale in the Netherlands’ (Habiforum, 2006).
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Rijkswaterstaat
The delegation of the terps plan to a lower-tier authority was not undisputed among 
Rijkswaterstaat officials. An opponent: ‘I always said: “Rijkswaterstaat has to take the 
lead, along with a steering group.” But no way, it must be totally different. The provinces 
have never done such a job, but they want to. “We are going to do it”, they said. But 
everybody with a bit of experience knows that some things can better be done by others. 
It is better to form a good project team; then it is up and running. We have completed 
many projects this way.’ According to this government official it became too complicated 
when the residents asked for full participation. ‘I would have done it differently: make 
a survey of the farms, give the residents a bag of money, construct the terps for those 
who want to stay and let them build their own farm buildings. I would even venture to 
bet that nobody will remain, and then you have an unoccupied area.’907 However, others 
viewed it more positively. ‘People in Overdiep Polder looked at the opportunities 
underlying the threat of making room for water. Instead of waiting until the 
government had made a decision, they initiated their own plan. This pays off as it is 
partly an agricultural reconstruction and for most of them it offers new prospects for
the future.’908
The terps plan was new in many ways. First, residents initiated a plan that will be 
implemented; second, the province was in charge of a river project; third, during the 
planning process many aspects emerged which required further research909 and 
adaptation of rules and regulations;910 and fourth, it demanded a new working style. The 
last three were acknowledged by the Room for the River programme manager. ‘I found 
it challenging to be a front runner. They are the first to face teething problems and face 
a situation in which they have to invent the wheel. These situations emerged because the 
nature of the Room for the River programme -  creating space for the river -  and the 
decentralised implementation of the measures are both new. This implied that you do 
not always have a standard solution. That is sometimes hard for front-runner projects, 
but other projects can benefit from the way they learned how to deal with specific 
problems... .Sometimes, this process was one of trial and error, but we need to give each 
other a helping hand. This is an unfamiliar and new way of working in water 
management.’911 Writing on his blog, the programme manager showed his 
communicative side. In daily practice, however, he proved to be a tough negotiator who 
stands for the government interest and a traditional way of governing.912 But he was 
well aware that compromises are inevitable. In his field the manager is known for being 
verbally adept in the sense that he is open to other opinions and able to negotiate a 
joint solution.913 On the terps plan the programme manager said: ‘ [Since 2006] there has 
been a regular project manager who knows how to run a project, whereas his 
predecessor was really a policy-maker. Now there is an atmosphere of trust. Provincial 
delegate Annemarie Moons and I are in regular telephone contact.’914
A government official: ‘The formal line runs from Rijkswaterstaat to the province. And 
the province organises the process. Apart from the fact that we have an opinion on that,
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it is the province’s responsibility.’ He also mentioned the different roles played by 
Rijkswaterstaat in the process. ‘We have different roles: a controlling role that implies 
that each project has to deliver progress reports about the planning, the budget, spatial 
quality, the hydraulic engineering aspects, effectiveness and risk management, and a 
facilitating role, but this has to be developed yet.’ About the terps plan, he said: ‘My 
opinion of the terps plan is that it does not matter whether it is a sensible choice or 
not. As a government official my job is to make choices within certain conditions. It 
must be accountable to society and the politicians make the final decisions.’ His reaction 
to the issue of disputed accountability: ‘I thought I was facilitating and not directive, in 
other words, I said: “We disagree on many issues, but if you discuss them as early on in 
the process as possible they will not be consequential. They will be resolved.” ’915
Noord-Brabant provincial government
From the very beginning the Noord-Brabant provincial delegate, Jan Boelhouwer, was 
the contact person for the residents in Overdiep Polder. He managed to get the plan 
accepted by other government authorities. He found this to be a hard job. He felt that 
the Rijkswaterstaat officials had a ‘not invented here’ attitude.916 He explained: ‘I was not 
surprised when the state secretary presented a map of the Netherlands with large areas 
coloured blue, but it scared the residents. From my weekly cycle tour I know Overdiep 
Polder well, and I was deeply impressed when the residents showed their ideas to build 
their farms on terps. After the intense media exposure in the beginning, the daily 
routine set in. The government authorities looked at each other and made an inventory 
of all sorts of negative arguments to avoid having to stick their necks out, such as: it is 
expensive; we don’t need to implement it for the next twenty years; it is not our 
ministry’s responsibility, but yours. No admiration for the residents, no new thinking, 
no learning experiment that pays off in follow-up projects. And then the costing of the 
plan, which consultants showed was so high because of the inclusion of contingency 
plans and contingencies for contingencies.’917 The action taken by the residents of 
Overdiep Polder was very uncommon. He described his motive for helping them as 
follows: ‘The government’s intention to make areas suitable for floodwater retention 
stirred the residents in Overdiep Polder to initiate their own plan to meet their wishes 
and secure clarity about the status of their polder for possible flood risk measures. While 
this is entirely reasonable, we as government authorities are not very responsive in 
clarifying this type of question. Problems need to be answered adequately by setting 
clear conditions for the use of areas for flood risk management. We need to learn to 
deal with uncertainties and to be decisive about them. It is not fair to shift the 
disadvantages [of such measures] onto the residents.’918 He noted that Rijkswaterstaat 
took a less constructive attitude,919 which he believed had to do with the hierarchical 
structure in which Rijkswaterstaat was used to operating and its feeling that it was 
loosing control.920
It was the job of his successor, Lambert Verheijen, to get the state secretary’s approval. 
He was not confident about the state secretary’s official reaction during the annual
273
-Q-
Madelinde PHD zonder afbrekingen:Opmaak 1 15- 2011 14:44 Pagina 274
‘Mirror Day’ in 2003. ‘The good news is that she thinks that it is a likely project that 
could serve as an example. The bad news is that she is not willing to spend any money 
on it. That is disappointing for the residents, who made a good plan and prefer to start 
at once.’921 Some progress was made following a meeting between the delegate and the 
state secretary in spring 2003 in which the state secretary said that the issue was not ‘off- 
limits’.922 Finally, after various meetings and letters923 the terps plan was incorporated 
into the advice by the Downstream Rivers Steering Committee, which the state secretary 
approved. Verheijen commented that ‘Rijkswaterstaat found it very difficult to share 
the planning of the project with the province’.924
The third provincial delegate in charge of the terps plan, Annemarie Moons, had the 
same proactive attitude as her predecessors. She is proud of the project. ‘First, because 
the farmers’ plan still stands; second, we are looking after the residents and all are treated 
properly; third, we have always had the farmers’ support. We had some difficult 
moments, but we did not fall on our face. Furthermore, for all parties it has been a 
creative process that focused on multifunctional land use, combining agriculture, water 
storage, nature and recreation in the redesign of the polder. This required some hard 
thinking.’925 According to her, the relationship between the province and the residents 
is not always harmonious and there were often tough confrontations.926 With regard to 
Rijkswaterstaat, her experience was that Rijkswaterstaat ‘always started with a rigid 
attitude. Rijkswaterstaat polices the planning process like a terrier. But Ingwer [the 
Room for the River programme manager] can give ground; he is rather careful.’927 She 
emphasised that ‘during negotiations it is crucial that you understand each other’.928 
Apart from a cooperative attitude, the provincial delegate knew that the atmosphere is 
an important factor in relationships. For example, she resolved disputes over dinner in 
a restaurant to avoid excuses like ‘I have no time’ and seized the opportunity to come 
to a better understanding with her conversation partner.929
The first project manager for the terps plan was a provincial official. From his point of 
view the biggest innovation in the planning of the terps plan was juggling with the 
many legal procedures. ‘If they are all followed in sequence, it will take more than ten 
years to complete the reconstruction of the polder. The art is to synchronise and 
combine the procedures without making mistakes that can be punished by the Council 
of State. However, this required a ‘front-runner mentality’ by all the government 
authorities involved (government decision makers and government officials) and the 
residents (van Rooy et al., 2006).
His successor was appointed from outside the province. He was very supportive of the 
residents and the terps plan. ‘The key is to keep talking to the residents. Some 50 to 60 
per cent of my working hours are devoted to the residents. I am well aware that you can 
keep on communicating with other government authorities and your own organisation; 
it could take up all your time. But that is not what I want.’ He did not want to have to 
say ‘the operation was successful, but the patient died’. ‘If I did not appear in the polder
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or contact the residents, they would alert me to the need to stay in touch to avoid 
disagreements of conflicts in future.’930 He admitted that ‘the residents’ trust has been 
based mainly on what they see in practice.’931 The relationship with Rijkswaterstaat was 
reasonable when it was about ‘the day-to-day wheeling and dealing. But when it comes 
to issues like lowering the water level it proved difficult. They then tended to fall back 
on their Rijkswaterstaat reflexes. But the province is not part of Rijkswaterstaat.’932 He 
explained: ‘Their argument is that they have to be in control because Parliament wants 
to know what is happening. Our defence is: “You are allowed to be in control, that is OK, 
but we have an administrative agreement with you. This implies that the project has 
been decentralised and that we make our own administrative judgements. There is no 
going back on this decision. We would not accept this.”’933 At the same time he qualified 
this statement. ‘It is easy to criticise Rijkswaterstaat. But I see it differently. 
Rijkswaterstaat has the assignment to realise 39 river projects before 2015 and within 
a budget of 2.2 billion euros. In fact, the government authorities have a very narrow 
assignment. As a provincial government we stand at the heart of society. We therefore 
have a different remit; we would sooner say ‘this is not possible’, while Rijkswaterstaat 
would say: “You have to do it”. Moreover, we are closer to politics, not only in the region 
but also at a national level... .To get things done the playing field has to be wider and 
Rijkswaterstaat has to be accommodating, which means we have to “push”.’934 His 
personal objective is to show that the province is able to lead a river project.935
Municipality of Waalwijk and municipality of Geertruidenberg
Mayor De Beus of Waalwijk qualified the residents’ condition that the flood frequency 
should not exceed once in 25 years. ‘Nature cannot be tied to legal frameworks. But if 
nature is forced to exceed the norm, appropriate damage compensation must be
arranged.936
The responsible executive councillors of Waalwijk and Geertruidenberg were happy 
with the project and the integrated approach. ‘The common goal of flood control has 
been met.’ They welcomed the fact that the farmers’ initiative was based on seizing 
opportunities rather than resisting threats, resulting in the preservation of farms. From 
their point of view, the provincial government proved itself capable of implementing 
river projects. ‘The province is the bridge between national and lower-tier government 
authorities. It quickly assesses the various issues at stake and listens carefully to the 
region, and the provincial delegate is always willing to explain the ins and outs of the 
project to the residents. As municipalities we cooperated by passing responsibility for 
incorporating the terps plan into the current local land use plan (inpassingsplan)937 to 
the province. This proved to be advantageous, because the province made an overall 
plan for the whole area, the first in Dutch history.’938
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Residents' perspective
In this section the terps plan in Overdiep Polder is described from the residents’ point of 
view.
Negotiating blue services
The terps plan, a farmers’ initiative, makes retention, or rather ‘flowing with the river’ 
(meestromen), possible, while also protecting property and guaranteeing the 
socioeconomic continuity of the farms. Such local initiatives are quite new in the water 
world and form the basis for experiments with more interactive forms of policy-making 
and planning. Although the parties agreed to the project goals, the points of departure of 
the parties in the Overdiep project are quite different. What the government regards as 
‘flood risk management’ is in the eyes of the residents concerned primarily a government 
intervention that presents both opportunities and threats to their daily life, their property 
and the continuity of their farms. The government priority is finding spatial options for 
flood protection by adapting the ‘green’ functions of agricultural land in such a way as to 
accommodate ‘blue’ functions. For the residents, selection of such measures might imply 
a long period of uncertainty and doubts about the future, a disincentive to investments 
in their farms and decreasing property prices. For them, therefore, these are primarily 
negotiations about their property and property rights, their future social and economic 
security, and the continuity of their enterprises (Roth & Winnubst, 2009).
What about my cows?
A few interest groups, like the farmers’ organisation ZLTO and the water board, knew 
about the government intentions for water storage in the region. Sjaak Broekmans from 
Overdiep Polder was a member of both organisations and was therefore acquainted with 
the ideas.939 But this did not mean that the message did not shock the residents. His 
neighbour Nol Hooijmaijers: ‘It was a bitter pill for me to swallow. We thought that we 
might stay here for two or three generations. When you get home you realise what it 
means. I thought, “What about my cows?”’940 It is a typical human characteristic to resist 
such threats, but that is not what he wanted. ‘You have to recognise the opportunity,’ he 
said. He remembered it well. ‘It was a warm day. For a while he was thinking about how 
to deal with this water storage issue. He sat under his chestnut tree when Sjaak Broekmans 
passed on his bike. He asked Sjaak to join him and they started listing the pros and cons 
of redesigning their polder for water retention. At that moment the terps plan was 
born.’941 Looking back at that period he said: ‘When we got over the initial shock, the 
phase of contributing ideas started soon afterwards. Frustrate the plans is of no help. 
Besides, the government could use their power of compulsory purchase.’942
Broekmans and Hooijmaijers decided to work together on their terps plan. They took 
the initiative and established the residents’ organisation Overdiepse Polder Interest Group 
(Belangenvereniging Overdiepse polder), with Sjaak Broekmans as chair and Nol 
Hooijmaijers as vice chair. The support of the provincial delegate Jan Boelhouwer proved
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to be indispensable. He treated them as serious partners and was available in case of 
emergency. Once on a Friday evening Nol Hooijmaijers called Jan Boelhouwer about a 
dispute among the farmers about one of the options for water storage. As promised, the 
provincial delegate came to the polder the next day. He confirmed that the disputed 
option would never be taken seriously.943 With the help of farmers’ organisation ZLTO the 
residents concluded that combining water storage and agriculture would work in their 
polder944 under the following conditions: 1) compensation for all farmers involved; 2) a 
flood risk of once in 25 years; and 3) a speedy planning process as a lack of clarity is 
destructive for entrepreneurs.945
The residents’ role
From the beginning the residents demanded a key role in the planning process. It was 
their condition for cooperating with the authorities on realising their plan. They wanted 
to be part of the project organisation, not in a traditional advisory group or ‘sounding 
board’ (klankbord group) but as a full member of the project group, a role usually reserved 
for officials of the government agencies involved. From the experience of some members 
who held positions in various government authorities, for example in Waalwijk Municipal 
Council and the water board, they knew that crucial project decisions are prepared at the 
project level. It would therefore be possible to influence decision-making if they could 
take part in project decisions. While the residents were represented in the official 
supervisory group (ambtelijke begeleidingsgroep, ABG), their water expert, who was also 
their confidant,946 participated in the official supervisory group and the steering group. 
In the latter he participated firstly as an observer and later as adviser. The participation 
of the residents in the official supervisory group and the advisory role of the water expert 
in the steering group were a source of tension between the government authorities and 
the residents and between the government authorities. All the parties finally agreed to 
this arrangement, although some with reservations.947 The residents also arranged a series 
of informal meetings (called SNP meetings after the initials of first names of the two 
residents Sjaak and Nol and the water expert Peter) in which the project manager and 
provincial officials were also present. These meetings usually took place prior to the 
formal meetings.948
During the planning process it became clear that the residents’ input would be crucial, not 
only on the issues of property and tenure, animal welfare and regulations, but also 
because of their knowledge of the area, the logistics of the farms and not least because of 
their entrepreneurial mentality, their willingness to negotiate and skill in resolving 
conflicts. The complex regulations and variety of policy fields involved proved to be a 
perfect context for practical ‘hands on’ entrepreneurs used to remaining focused on the 
long term and averse to too much detail. Besides, the residents were very receptive towards 
all the project partners and to questions from media, researchers and others. They were 
willing to embrace anyone as an owner of the project, whether a government authority 
or consultant, which proved to be a useful strategy. Who does not want to be the owner 
of a successful project?
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Internal coherence
Although the residents were a small group of farmers, it could not be assumed without 
question that all the residents would support the terps plan during the whole planning 
process. From the start in 2000 the board of the residents’ organisation did not expect 
this. After the first few years in which the project did not move forward, the first resident 
moved out. He did not accept the residents’ organisation’s policy of focusing on 
embedding the plan in the formal decision-making procedures and government policy. 
Other residents also considered leaving the polder at difficult moments when the 
interests of the group seemed to contradict their private interests. Some of them 
stipulated impossible conditions in private negotiations with the province (‘he has euro 
signs in his eyes’949). These residents were seen by the group as simply wanting to ‘get 
their own way’. As the vice chair of the residents’ group said, ‘They offer resistance; if 
they don’t it might be disadvantageous later’.950 One resident moved out, but knew that 
his brother, with whom he co-owned a farm, would remain a member of the residents’ 
association and would keep him informed. An important factor in the internal cohesion 
of the residents’ group was the bonds of friendship between the residents. In particular 
the weekly sewing circle in which all the women in the polder met each other was crucial 
(Provincie Noord-Brabant 2008). For the province it did not matter whether a resident 
was a member of the residents’ group. The provincial strategy remained the same: group 
matters were discussed with the residents’ group, individual matters with the resident 
in question. For those who wanted to stay in the polder, membership of the residents’ 
group proved to be particularly important when their future livelihoods were up for 
discussion, such as the design of the terps, the dike and polder, the allocation of land 
and the implementation of the project.951
Replacement of the project manage
In their relationship with the province the residents were not afraid to discuss personal 
matters, such as the functioning of the project manager. After a good start, their 
relationship with the project manager became strained, because he focused more on 
internal matters than on the project. His often vague responses to residents’ questions952 
concerning progress with the project led to questions about his passivity. Another 
complaint was that he adopted a risk avoidance attitude. The residents therefore asked 
for him to be replaced. Although it was an unwelcome message for the provincial 
delegate, she finally accepted the residents’ argument and the residents’ profile for the 
new project manager: a young and audacious leader. The newly appointed head proved 
to be the right man for the job.953
Other issues were also disputed. Some of these are discussed below, including the 
valuation of land inside the dikes and land outside the dikes, other consequences of 
water storage, the ‘all-are-equal’ principle and the continuity of the farms.
Land valuation
The valuation of the land inside the dikes and outside the dikes proved to be a delicate
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question as the land is a main source of income for the residents in Overdiep Polder. The 
value of the land is determined mainly by its quality, the size and shape of parcels and 
elevation, but its location in relation to the farm is also important. Land near a farm has 
a higher value than a more distant field. Apart from land inside the dikes of the 
Overdiep Polder, the farmers also use some 180 hectares of flood plain outside the dike, 
which is regularly inundated during winter (two or three times a year for several days 
or weeks). Four of five farmers use this land, most of which is state property. Generally, 
this land is of lower economic and market value than land inside the dikes because of 
the flood risk. Flooding means that the land can be contaminated with pollutants. The 
risk of this is relatively high along the Meuse because it contains sewage discharges from 
various large cities in Belgium and nutrients from fertilisers applied to agricultural land 
in the river basin upstream. These pollutants can cause damage when farmers grow 
maize or potatoes on land outside the dikes and the crops are then considered to pose 
a risk to human health. The farmers therefore do not use this land as intensively as land 
inside the dikes, over which they have more control.954 Implementation of the terps 
plan implies that land currently located inside the dikes will become land outside the 
dikes. The question then arises of how to value this land after the plan has been realised. 
The answer to this question can be found in the ‘regulations’ drawn up by the residents 
and the province. However, these leave much room for further negotiation, 
interpretation and debate.
The province intended to include land inside and outside the dikes in a land 
consolidation scheme. The objective of this reallocation of land was to give owners and 
tenants land near their farms. This meant that the future terps and farmland would 
have to be divided in such a way that each farmer would have a suitable parcel. Reducing 
the number of farm enterprises to eight or nine would make reallocation in accordance 
with farmers’ priorities easier: they wanted to have land close to their farm buildings to 
make grazing possible. If more farmers opted to stay in the polder, the land could only 
have been allocated in very long plots stretching across the breadth of the polder along 
a length of almost one kilometre. This would seriously complicate putting the cows out 
to pasture, as cows will not cover such distances and part of the grazing land would 
remain unused.
Because of the water retention function of the polder, land inside and outside the dikes 
will have the same value, which means that the value of land inside the dikes will 
decrease. As the expected flood frequency is once in 25 years, it is uncertain in which 
season flooding will occur. High water during the cropping season is rare; winter or 
early spring is more likely, which will probably result in limited damage. As it is also 
difficult to estimate the damage resulting from the deposition of silt and sludge and 
the damage to fences and watercourses, the land valuation surveyors assessed the 
reduction in value as a result of all relevant aspects, such as damage and consequential 
losses.
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The parties involved focused on two options for compensation for damages caused by 
planning decisions (in this case a flood risk measure). The first option is to compensate 
the farmers in advance for future damage through the payment of a lump sum. They 
can invest this money directly or set up a fund. The alternative is to provide 
compensation payments after each flooding event. As the administrative costs of an 
event-based form of compensation will probably be higher as after each flood all the 
damages will have to be assessed, this option was not favoured by the government 
authorities. They wanted to classify such events as ‘normal entrepreneurial risk’ under 
existing procedures for compensation for total damages caused by flooding beforehand. 
Under the first option the national government offered compensation amounting to a 
5% reduction in the value of the land. This was not acceptable to the residents, who 
claimed a much higher percentage, although they did not want to fix this percentage at 
that stage of the negotiations (Roth & Winnubst, 2009). Finally, the residents chose the 
alternative (second) option of 100 per cent compensation.955
Other consequences of water storage
Negotiations about property not only concern crucial decisions related to land and real 
estate, but also a more distant future in which the use of the polder for temporary water 
storage may become a reality. Actual use may bring new threats and uncertainties related 
to the polluting impact of the river water on (grazing) land, crops and products, such 
as milk and meat. In their negotiations with the provincial government, the residents 
proved to be keenly aware of the possibility of polluted sediment and polluted water 
damaging their future farming operations. The residents demanded clarity on this issue, 
pointing to other river flooding cases, such as the Elbe.956
The flooding of farmland is not unusual in the Dutch river landscape. Farming on the 
regularly inundated land outside the river dikes is quite common, and has never caused 
great difficulties for farmers. Most farmers in Overdiep Polder share a long history of 
delivering their milk to the same milk cooperative. According to this company, milk 
from cows grazing outside the river dikes is seldom rejected, although these areas are 
flooded once or twice every winter. However, the Overdiep farmers regarded this as a 
serious point in their negotiations with the province. They demanded reliable 
estimations of the environmental impact of using the polder for water storage and its 
consequences in terms of environmental and food safety regulations.
The issue was crucial for those who were considering staying in the polder. They would 
only stay on the condition that a clear arrangement was made on the reduction in land 
value, damage compensation and marketing restrictions related to food safety. Most of 
them were in principle in favour of the government compensation for loss of value and 
damage in a one-time payment in advance on the basis of a negotiated agreement. At 
the same time, they doubted how it would be possible to estimate and deal with risks 
pertaining to agricultural production. A resident: ‘If the polder is used for water storage 
at the end of the winter, this means that we run the risk of having to do without the first
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mowing period of the year. In order to be able to deal with such a situation, we always 
need to have a stock of dry fodder available that is sufficient for one year.’957
While the residents did not easily accept the uncertainties relating to such issues, and 
wanted to distinguish them from ‘normal entrepreneurial risk’, the provincial 
government wanted the opposite. The project manager: ‘The farmers asked things like, 
“If we cannot continue production, will you buy up everything from us?” We cannot do 
that, of course. There are two tracks in dealing with this: first, reduce this issue to the 
dimension of normal entrepreneurial risk; second, devise a regulation for 
compensation. My preference would be to buy it off once and for all, which has the 
advantages of a lot of money for the farmers and no legal procedures for the 
government in future. This would mean that this is reduced to a normal business risk, 
for which the government will be partly accountable’ (Roth & Winnubst, 2009). As 
stated earlier, the residents chose for an event-based 100 per cent damage compensation.
Same rights, but not equal
The residents’ organisation realised that guarding the interests of all farmers was crucial 
in elaborating the various options and incorporating them into the Room for the River 
programme. Efforts were geared to getting all the farmers ‘on board’, even those who 
intended to move and had apparently less interest in the outcomes of the design process 
of the terps plan. Although discussions about design options were not very relevant to 
them, negotiations about procedures and compensation were. Therefore, the strategy 
was to focus first on reaching a general agreement on the terps plan and then the design 
of the terps, dike and polder.
Although the province intended to treat each resident equally, this proved to be difficult 
in practice. Each individual resident’s situation is different, despite the fact that the 
conditions set by the residents themselves were the point of departure for the planning 
process. The residents negotiated a ‘new for old’ arrangement (the opportunity to sell 
their old farm and build a new one) under which those who intended to move would 
be compensated. However, the number of residents who can stay is limited by the 
number of terps. If more residents want to stay, the principle of free choice and equal 
treatment will come under pressure.
The provincial government’s need for clarity about which farmers will move and who 
will stay and the differences in the intentions, strategies and initiatives of the residents 
for dealing with the terps plan led to differences in the opportunities available to 
individual residents to negotiate their future. There is a fixed budget (89 million euros) 
for the planning (3 million euros) and implementation of the terps plan (86 million 
euros), including the anticipatory purchase of land from one resident in January 2006. 
Additional money became available later for other anticipatory purchases. However, 
the residents did not know the provincial budget and its purchasing strategy. Also, the 
division of the residents into those who want to stay, those who have already stopped
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dairy farming, and those who intend to move out undermined the ‘all-have-the-same- 
rights principle’. Those who want to stay have to negotiate a price for their land and 
farm buildings that is sufficient to buy newly parcelled land, a terp and some extra land 
to ensure they have an economically viable enterprise. Those who have already stopped 
dairy farming have no other choice than to move out of the polder, because the terps 
are reserved for dairy farmers. Residents who decide to move to another location in the 
Netherlands will be compensated with land: between 30 and 40 hectares per farming 
family, and another five hectares as additional compensation. Residents who intend to 
emigrate and start a farm abroad (for example in Denmark, Canada or Portugal) will 
be bought out in such a way as to make this feasible. There are also differences between 
farms in terms of ownership and leasehold structure, the quality of the land, crops 
cultivated, kind and number of animals, and value of infrastructure. In addition, the 
location of the current farm is important. Some farms are located where the new dike 
will be built; others are in the middle of the polder or near the flood plains along the 
Bergsche Maas. The land reallocation and the new parcelling will be crucial. Those 
living where the new dike will be built and who want to stay may claim a terp nearby. 
‘We must be honest, all farmers are not equal. If terps are going to be constructed along 
the dike as planned, those who live there now and intend to stay will prefer to keep their 
own land. It will be extremely difficult for another farmer to claim to a terp there. The 
province said that all farmers have equal opportunities...In fact, all may have equal 
rights, but not equal opportunities. This awareness of existing differences becomes 
increasingly apparent as we move towards the final choice [of whether to stay or 
move].’958
Finally, the group of residents is not homogenous in terms of household composition, 
ownership of the enterprise, plans, ambitions, objectives and ideas and expectations 
about the terps plan. Each resident has a different starting position, strategy and 
objective in these negotiations. Much depends on the negotiation process between each 
resident individually and the province (Roth & Winnubst, 2009).
Property, uncertainty and continuity of the farm
The choice residents have to make between staying in the polder and moving out is 
complicated by a number of crucial issues that are not primarily to do with the prospect 
of ‘living with water’, but rather with the future of the property and the continuity of 
the farming enterprise, property transfer across generations (inheritance) and the 
presence or absence of children capable of and willing to take the farm over, and social 
networks, kinship and family relations. Continuation of production may require 
investments in farm infrastructure to increase production capacity or meet legal 
requirements on environmental protection and animal welfare. While the project puts 
pressure on residents not to make such investments shortly before project 
implementation, the uncertainty about future options inside or outside the polder may 
induce residents to continue investing. Although other residents and the officials saw 
this as loss of capital (the new infrastructure will increase the sums needed to purchase
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these residents land), they also understand that some farmers cannot run the risk of 
their farm enterprises stagnating. Issues of property transfers from one generation to 
another and of the distribution of property among heirs may also influence decision­
making about farming. For example, uncertainty about long-term continuity of a farm 
due to the young age of the children and suddenly changing family circumstances may 
be an important source of doubt about staying or moving away. With the option of 
transferring the farm to the children still very unclear, changing family circumstances 
may put pressure on the family to sell all their property in Overdiep Polder and continue 
farming on another farm.
Inheritance conflict is a crucial factor in decision-making about the future. If a farmer 
has several children who want to take over the farm, this might complicate decision­
making. If there are no successors, buying a terp to continuing farming will be 
questioned by other residents. Moreover, conditions for succession laid down in a will 
may complicate a purchase. An example is a provision requiring the proceeds of selling 
the farm within a certain period of taking it over to be shared between all the 
beneficiaries of the will (Roth & Winnubst, 2009).
Emerging new objectives and procedures
New objectives and procedures emerged during the planning process. This is 
exemplified by the design of the terps made by the Q-team appointed by the 
government to ensure that landscape quality was properly addressed in the plan (see 
also government perspective). This team proposed a uniform terp design with a big 
farmhouse, without taking into account the residents’ views. The province’s response 
to this design proposal was to tell the Q-team to deal with the residents because they 
were responsible for the terps plan. The residents were clear: they could not afford such 
a farmhouse (‘this would cost an additional 1.5 million euros per farm’). The 
dimensions of the livestock shed proposed in the plan were not sufficient to meet the 
minimum legal animal welfare standards. Furthermore, the proposed location of the 
farmhouse was too far from the shed and 9-metre-high trees were proposed around 
the terp, which they did not prefer because they wanted to see their cows. Furthermore, 
this ‘green wall’ was designed without an opening at the back and a slanting slope to 
provide access for cows and machinery. Although the residents were not happy with 
this, they knew that a completely satisfactory solution was not realistic and so they 
accepted the planting around the terp, but they arranged for an opening to provide 
access for their cows and machines. In addition, they did manage to obtain a reduction 
in the size of the farmhouse and an entirely free hand to design their own yard.959
Cumbersome government bureaucracy
In October 2007 the vice chair of the residents’ organisation invited a journalist from 
a national newspaper to interview him about the slow progress being made with the 
project. ‘After seven years’, he said, ‘Overdiep Polder has become a sort of place of 
pilgrimage for the famous Dutch hydraulic engineering works. After French and Belgian
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television, we had journalists from Le Monde and The Guardian. Busloads of students 
from abroad have also come to look at Overdiep Polder, an area with grazing cows and 
a few geese.’ According to him the dominant style was now the characteristic Dutch 
bureaucracy: ‘We are up to our ears in memorandums, meetings, reports and 
procedures. The innovative approach to water management in the terps plan still 
depends on piles of paper and a scale model. That takes so much time; it is really 
unbelievable. After World War II half of Berlin was rebuilt in twelve years. What is the 
reason for waiting for more than 14 or 15 years to reconstruct our polder of 550 
hectares? The reason is that we are a front-runner project that stands for an innovative 
approach to reducing flood risk. Planning procedures used to be time consuming, but 
now it will take even more time because of the unique character of this front-runner
project.’960
In October 2008, a year after this interview, the state secretary gave the go-ahead to 
implement the project. The residents are now waiting to cut the first sod. They believe 
it might happen any time now.
The arguments
The chair of the residents’ organisation
Sjaak Broekmans is the chair of the residents’ organisation. ‘Most people in the polder 
were more afraid of the government than of the water. Since the provincial delegate, the 
mayor and even the state secretary really wanted to listen to our story, this distrust 
turned into a feeling that we were being taken seriously. Naturally we do not determine 
what will happen here, but without our cooperation nothing will happen. Although all 
the media reports might suggest that the project is a fairy tale, this is quite the wrong 
impression. It demands much of the residents, because cooperation with government 
authorities is difficult. They think in years and in paper, whereas we are concerned 
about the continuity of our farms each year, and for us paper is a necessary evil.’ (van 
Rooy et al., 2006). ‘At the beginning, the terps plan did not match Rijkswaterstaat’s 
objectives. I can imagine this, because they were used to making their own plans. 
Heaven and earth have been moved to get the terps plan through. We finally succeeded 
because Rijkswaterstaat backed down. Although the plan has been approved there is 
no reason for celebration. Seven years ago we made exactly the same plan that has now 
been offered to the state secretary [submission of plan study in spring 2008]. Why did 
it take so much time [to get it approved]? For the residents this is the main obstacle. 
Entrepreneurship, just getting things done, is what I miss in Rijkswaterstaat. The delay 
has cost a lot of money as real estate prices have risen by 30 to 40 per cent over the last 
two years. And how can we quickly buy a new farmhouse [in the current market]? It is 
the procedural prying that annoys me.’961
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The vice chair of the residents’ organisation
Nol Hooijmaijers plays an important part in his position as vice chair. In fact, he is the 
informal leader of the farmers as he prepared the residents’ standpoint, took on a 
leadership role in negotiations and developed strategies and follow-up steps in the 
project.962 ‘There is neither a NIMBY (not in my back yard) effect in Overdiep Polder 
nor the intention to lodge an objection with the Council of State. More than that, the 
residents have cooperated from the beginning on the redesign of their polder as a 
retention area and initiated a plan to rebuild their farms on terps. We thus collaborated 
in solving a public problem which is not ours. We contributed to the reduction of 
flooding upstream so that those people can keep their feet dry. If we fill our polder full 
of water, this might lower the water level near the city of Den Bosch by as much as 30 
cm in the event of flooding.963 The farmers who stay cannot use the land for arable 
farming, only dairy farming will be possible. The quality of the water from the Meuse 
is not good enough for arable land.’
He was well aware that Rijkswaterstaat hampered the planning process, particularly 
during the initial years. Apart from obstructive tactics used by government officials, 
including continuously altering drafts of the administrative agreement,964 he noticed the 
use of other tactics such as the high turnover of government officials involved (five 
representatives from Rijkswaterstaat were moved to another position in six or seven 
years), not turning up to project meetings, not adequately replying to emails and 
questions, not reading project documents and reports and not being sufficiently 
informed about the project.965 With regard to the question of the responsibility for 
implementing the project, his response was that if the decision to delegate the 
implementation of the terps plan to the province was revoked they would immediately 
contact the NOVA current affairs programme on television.966
So far the residents have been satisfied, but he admitted that lobbying is time 
consuming: ‘All that going to the province in Den Bosch, Rijkswaterstaat in The Hague, 
and Waalwijk municipal council. My son once even asked whether he was working 
alone.’967
A member of the residents’ organisation
Hans Verschure is a farmer with a farm near the river forelands in the north of the 
polder. When he heard about the government ideas for water storage he had just bought 
the farm from his father. He wanted to develop the farm but felt inhibited by the water 
plans. ‘My philosophy is that in the initial years you have to develop your business. But 
our future perspective became clouded. We intended to renovate the livestock shed, 
which dates from 1976. But is it sensible if you know that you have to leave within five 
years?’ He decided to make only minor repairs and postponed the renovation of the 
cubicle shed for eighteen months until summer 2002. ‘It was said that we would get a 
clear answer soon, but we have waited in vain. Since it is no longer sensible to wait we 
cut the knot. My situation is not that good. I have land in leasehold in the forelands. The
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contract states that the land can be used for water management at any time and then 
my contract expires, which means that half of my milk quota968 will be removed. My 
farm is therefore not attractive to buy. We cannot move out of the polder, whether we 
would like to or not.’969
Water expert, confidant, moderator, facilitator and mediator
Water expert Peter van Rooy,970 the confidant of the residents, was extremely critical of 
the role played by Rijkswaterstaat at the beginning of the project. He dealt with 
government officials in various roles, such as moderator, facilitator and mediator. 
‘Government officials felt ill at ease in their new role [of delegating responsibility]. For 
more than two hundred years Rijkswaterstaat had been in charge of planning for the 
people, but now the residents of Overdiep Polder had developed their own plan. After 
the provincial delegate had intensively lobbied the House of Representatives, the front- 
runner status of the terps plan was approved. Just before the vote Rijkswaterstaat 
officials visited the polder and asked the residents whether they really wanted to 
cooperate. Unseemly!’971
7.2 Case analysis of the terps plan in Overdiep Polder
The case analysis of the terps plan in Overdiep Polder follows the framework laid down 
in Chapter 3. The point of departure for this analysis is the interaction between the 
authorities and the local group. By focusing on what occurred in the relationship 
between these actors through their interaction outcomes, their interaction strategies, 
their power building and their potentials to act, we were able to analyse the government- 
citizen interaction. The authorities’ organisational culture and the local group’s cultural 
background and the impact of these on their action were also analysed. The case analysis 
ends with a summary and discussion.
In the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case the principal actors were the national 
government (Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency 
Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act), the provincial government (province of Noord- 
Brabant) and the local group Overdiepse Polder Interest Group (Vereniging 
Belangengroep Overdiepse polder). As different authorities, the national and provincial 
government, were involved, a distinction has been made between these authorities and 
the local group, and between the government authorities.
The terps plan was included in the national spatial planning instrument Spatial Planning 
Key Decision (SPKD) Room for the River, which meant that the plan would be decided 
at the national level. As the project was the first that the national government delegated 
to a lower-tier authority, the division of tasks between the authorities only became clear 
during the course of the planning process. Until the end of 2006, the national 
government was actively engaged in allocating tasks to the various government
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authorities, including determining the design discharge for the Rhine and Meuse, the 
budget and the project organisation (ten Heuvelhof et al., 2007). For the terps plan it was 
expected that Rijkswaterstaat would take on a central coordinating and supervisory role 
(regisseur) and the project planning would be delegated to the province (Noord-Brabant 
provincial government in this case). What this would actually mean in practice was left 
unclear, such as the responsibility for implementation the project after the planning 
stage was completed.
As mentioned earlier, the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study differs from the other 
case studies, the Dike Relocation in Lent (Chapter 5) and the Emergency Water Storage 
in Ooijpolder (Chapter 6), because of its bottom-up approach.
7.2.1 Interaction between authorities and local group
In the following, the interaction between the authorities and the local group is the object 
of analysis. Again, a distinction has been made between the national government 
(Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat has 
the mandate to act) and the local group on the one hand, and between the provincial 
government (province of Noord-Brabant) and the local group on the other. As the 
interaction between the authorities is considered important for the analysis of the 
interaction between the authorities and the local group, this has also been taken into 
account.
Two questions are addressed here. First, how did the key actors interact? We examine 
the interaction between the national and provincial governments and the local group, 
and between the national and provincial government. Second, how can these interactions 
be characterised according to the typology of conflict, debate, negotiation, dialogue and 
collaboration?
Interaction between national government and the local group: mutual resistance
Two types of interactions can be differentiated in the relationship between the national 
government and the local group:972 direct and indirect interaction. The forum for direct 
interaction was the official supervisory group (ambtelijke begeleidingsgroep, ABG), which 
contained representatives from government authorities and the local group since its 
inception at the beginning of 2005, but the national government and the local group 
hardly interacted directly with each other. Therefore, most interaction occurred 
indirectly via other parties, such as the local group’s water expert, who was also a member 
of the official supervisory group,973 the provincial delegate, the project manager and 
members of the House of Representatives.974 This indirect interaction started around 
2001, at the beginning of the project, and continued throughout the planning process.
Rijkswaterstaat officials were suspicious of the residents’ terps plan. As soon as the
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residents set out their plan in a report by the farmers’ organisation ZLTO they resisted 
it being incorporated into current policy by slowing down the process. During this 
process Rijkswaterstaat and the residents mainly interacted only indirectly. But also later 
in the planning process, when both were members of the official supervisory group, 
indirect interaction was prevalent.
This turned out to be a deliberate policy of Rijkswaterstaat. The standard procedure 
until then was to set up a traditional project organisation, with a project group whose 
membership was reserved for government officials of the authorities involved. As the 
province now had the responsibility for the project planning, it was the right institution 
to deal with project matters. (‘The formal line runs from Rijkswaterstaat to the province. 
And the province must organise the process... .It is the province’s responsibility.’)975 As 
a result, it was the province that agreed to the residents’ membership of the official 
supervisory group. Still, the Rijkswaterstaat official’s opinion about the residents’ 
involvement in the project organisation was also a factor. ‘Residents are not officials, so 
it is really ridiculous that they represented in the official supervisory group’.976
However, the residents played an important role in the background. For example, their 
water expert, who also participated in the official supervisory group, had authority in the 
policy field and access to a wide range of elected officials, government officials and MPs. 
He was thus able to raise issues.977 In the official supervisory group the province and the 
water expert were in charge of interacting with Rijkswaterstaat. There were some 
exceptions, for example when the issue of the visual appearance of the new polder 
landscape was discussed. The government-appointed landscape quality team (also 
referred to as the ‘Q-team’), which was charged with safeguarding the spatial quality of 
the landscape, prepared a design for the dike, the terps and the polder. The direct 
interaction between the Q-team and the residents occurred as a result of the province’s 
position: ‘They [Rijkswaterstaat] have to deal with the residents; they are in charge of the 
terps plan’.978 Although Rijkswaterstaat promised that the Q-team would visit the 
residents to make sure that their voice would be heard -  which did not happen -  the 
proposed spatial quality plan did not meet the residents’ expectations.979 The province 
then had to mediate and started negotiations on a design solution that both could
support.980
To summarise, the national government prevented direct interaction with the local 
group as much as possible and preferred to communicate via others, such as the 
provincial project manager. But the few times direct interaction did occur it resulted in 
debate and often escalated into conflict. With the help of the province this always ended 
in a negotiated solution.
Interaction between provincial government and the local group: an alliance
The first interaction between the province and the residents was positive. The provincial 
delegate was positively engaged with the residents’ initiative to come up with ideas on
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how to deal with the ‘blue spots’ in their polder on government maps. The province and 
the residents formed an alliance at the start of the process. They worked together to get 
the residents’ ideas approved by other government authorities. Despite their willingness 
to cooperate, disputes emerged, for example about the risk avoidance attitude of the 
first project manager, who concentrated too much on formal procedures and risk 
avoidance, and too little on experimentation and taking initiatives.981 It took time before 
the residents convinced the provincial delegate to replace him. They finally made sure 
that the province started a selection procedure for a new project manager in which the 
residents had a strong hand in drawing up the profile of the desired candidate. The newly 
appointed project manager proved to be the right man in the right job982 and gave a 
boost to the existing alliance. The renewed alliance continued their collaborative efforts, 
but now for the realisation of the terps plan. Both parties knew that they depended on 
each other’s input and both focused on the final objective. They were convinced that 
there were many pathways to achieve the objective and that new tensions were inevitable.
The alliance between the province and the residents was threatened by the tensions that 
emerged in their interaction. Illustrations of these tensions include the complexity of the 
rules and procedures the province had to negotiate to realise the terps plan,983 the 
‘collective approach’ taken by the local group versus the ‘rationality’ of the individual 
residents of Overdiep Polder, new regulations and objectives which emerged during the 
planning process, and the impact of the front-runner status of the project -  in other 
words, what has been called the dialectics of progress.984 As a new approach was being 
taken, it threw up new questions that needed to be adequately resolved. There was not 
previous experience to go on and this also proved to be a source of tension (for example, 
what is the best way to deal with the problem at issue? Do we follow a safe course while 
proposing our solution?). The tensions that occurred between the provincial government 
and the residents show that disputes were never far away, but these never led to conflicts. 
Disagreement between the provincial government and the local group remained limited 
mainly to specific approaches, but never escalated, because in tense situations the parties 
alerted each other to the possibility of a breakdown in communication.985 The project 
manager and the residents were crucial actors in preparing negotiated solutions in the 
province’s interaction with Rijkswaterstaat.
The alliance between the province and the local group persisted with regard to ‘group 
matters’, such as the design of the dike, terps and polder, and compensation. As 
negotiations concerning the buyout fees and land compensation for residents who 
wanted to stay had not taken place yet, it was not clear whether the alliance would 
endure. With regard to the ‘individual matters’, the alliance had a positive influence, 
because residents who already moved out were happy with the negotiated resolutions.
Although the interaction between the province and the local group can be characterised 
as an alliance, there was regular discord. Every relationship has its ups and downs, and 
disputes or even crises in a relationship may result in a stronger bond, depending on
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how partners deal with these disputes or crises. As Colson (1995:70-71) states, ‘the 
attention given to dispute settlement and its setting assumes that the appropriate 
outcome to negotiation is the restoration of good relationship’. Additionally, the very 
nature of a dispute leads the people involved to think about and formulate the points of 
tension between them.
To summarise, the interaction between the provincial government and the local group 
can be characterised as one of openness to debate, negotiation, dialogue and 
collaboration rather than conflict. Both were continuously in ‘dialogue mode’. If disputes 
emerged, they started negotiations and after arriving at a negotiated solution they 
cooperated until the next hurdle emerged, which usually arose in the dialogues between 
them.
Interaction between government authorities: perpetuating conflict
As soon as the farmers’ organisation ZLTO published the residents’ plan to redesign their 
polder as a water retention area, Rijkswaterstaat officials turned against it. This resistance 
was manifested in slowing down the process to incorporate the plan into current policy. 
This is illustrated by the production of eleven versions of the project proposal before it 
was finally approved, five of which were produced after the state secretary had agreed to 
the residents’ plan, and by the 16 months that elapsed (from July 2001 to October 2002 
before Habiforum’s986 contract to elaborate the residents’ plan was approved (Slootweg,
2004). While Rijkswaterstaat officials avoided taking any action and tried to thwart the 
terps plan, for example by doubting the usefulness of the terps plan and clearly but 
diplomatically stating how to reject it (Slootweg 2004), the province was pushing and 
pulling behind the scenes. In the meantime, the mayor of Waalwijk, to which Overdiep 
Polder mainly belongs, arranged a meeting with the chair of the Water Vision Group987 
to ascertain why the project was not making any progress. The chair then asked the state 
secretary for her opinion of the project, but this had not changed since her initial positive 
reaction to the residents’ initiative in 2000.988
The results of studies on climate change which indicated a considerable increase in the 
water level of the Meuse finally prompted Rijkswaterstaat officials to work on the terps 
plan (Slootweg, 2004). This led to approval of the contract with Habiforum, opening the 
way for a joint investigation of options. The provincial delegate, in his role as chair of 
the Downstream Rivers Steering Committee, then proposed the residents’ preferred 
option for water retention. It included artificial elevations along a new dike protecting 
the polder’s southern perimeter. The northern dike would be lowered and a water inlet 
and outlet constructed to allow floodwater from the Meuse to flow right through the 
polder. Before agreement could be given the Steering Committee asked for a feasibility 
study of the terps plan, which concluded that the plan was cost-effective.989
While it was close to being approved at the regional level, which meant that the terps plan 
had almost been accepted by the Downstream River Steering Committee, it was 
uncertain whether it would have the support of the lower-tier government authorities,
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such as the water board and the municipality of Waalwijk. Two side channels had been 
planned along the Bergsche Maas, one of which was in Overdiep Polder. The Wijde 
Biesbosch Area Commission, chaired by the mayor of Waalwijk, insisted on this option. 
After intervention by the province, which was unwilling to pay for this option as it 
proved to be an ineffective measure to lower the water level, the state secretary agreed to 
postpone the decision-making until the final outcome of the terps plan was available. In 
the end the chair of the Water Vision Group wrote a letter to the mayor in which he 
politely but firmly called him to account for his position and role in the process. Helped 
by the changed standpoint of the Area Commission, which decided to concur with the 
province’s standpoint, the mayor became an advocate of the residents’ plan once again 
(Slootweg, 2004). The terps plan could now be incorporated into the regional advice to 
the state secretary.
But then the state secretary gave low priority to the project. Prompted by the provincial 
delegate, who chaired the Downstream Rivers Steering Committee, the state secretary 
finally agreed to give the terps plan front-runner status. As soon as this became clear, 
Rijkswaterstaat officials renewed their tactic of slowing the process down. The 
administrative agreement between the national government and the province took six 
months to conclude after many meetings and telephone calls. ‘At least ten drafts were 
made; alterations included words, details. It was clear that some government officials 
had some difficulty with it.’990 Finally, on 14 December 2004, the administrative 
agreement, which filled just one page, was signed.991
Meanwhile the province’s proposal to prefinance the project to accelerate the process 
ahead of the SPKD became disputed. Other issues followed, such as getting the project 
through all the required procedures, the teething problems (such as the project auditing 
and deciding which variants would be studied) and the responsibility for the project 
implementation. The role of the provincial delegate was crucial, as she resolved many 
disputes with the Room for the River programme manager, often over dinner in a
restaurant.992
To summarise, the interaction between the national and provincial government was 
dominated by conflict, debate and negotiation rather than dialogue and collaboration. 
In the interaction between the authorities disputes often arose, which then either 
escalated into conflict followed by negotiation or were directly subject to negotiation. 
Negotiation between the government authorities mainly occurred at the managerial 
level in an atmosphere conducive to de-escalating the debate (often in restaurants). The 
provincial government was always the one to start negotiation, but this never developed 
further into dialogue and collaboration between the national and provincial 
government.
Table 7.2 presents an overview of the interactions between the government authorities 
and the local group. Although direct interaction between the national government and
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the local group was rare, when it did happen it often led to debate and conflict, which 
were resolved with the help of the provincial government. The prevailing outcomes of 
the interaction between the provincial government and the local group were debate, 
negotiation, dialogue and collaboration. The interaction between the national and 
provincial government was dominated by conflict, debate and negotiation.
Table 7.2 Interaction of national government (Nat), provincial government (Prov) 
and local group (Loc gr)
conflict debate negotiation dialogue collaboration
Nat
^  P ro v + + + o o
Nat /  
/ ^ L o c g r + + o o o
P ro v
/ ^ L o c  g r o + + + +
o = not occurring + = occurring
7.2.2 Interaction strategies of authorities and local group
In this section we analyse the interaction strategies of the authorities and the local group.
The interaction strategies of both authorities and the local group can be divided into 
framing, buffering and bridging strategies. As explained in Chapter 3, frames give 
meaning to events. As such, they can be viewed as an interpretation. Frames depend 
on context, usually not unequivocally. Often they are implicit. This analysis makes a 
distinction between four frames: a power frame, an identity frame, a conflict 
management frame, and a collaborative frame. A power frame is mainly used to show 
authority and to demonstrate who is in charge. It is accompanied by dominance or a 
sense of superiority. An identity frame includes ideas about who one is, what 
characteristics one shares with one or more groups and how one does and should relate 
to others. An identity frame is often used in situations in which people feel uncertain, 
threatened or challenged. A direct reaction to such feelings is to fall back on the group 
or organisation to which one belongs and position this group against others. When 
people make a distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ they are using an identify frame. In 
this analysis an identity frame is used when people adopt a specific identity or various 
identities and set themselves apart from others by referring to ‘us’ and ‘them’. A conflict 
management frame shows an open mind to the views and opinions of others, and 
involves a willingness to find commonalities rather than emphasising dissimilarities. A 
collaborative frame demonstrates joint action between actors against their opponent or 
to achieve a joint objective.
If actors interpret data, information and phenomena solely according to the logic of
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their own frame it becomes self-referential. This implies that they lose the ability to 
view their own arguments from different angles or to situate them (Eshuis & Stuiver,
2005). As a consequence, buffering strategies may be used to convince others in a 
persuasive manner. Usually, argumentation is based on one perspective, often of the 
group or organisation to which one belongs. The point of view is principally one­
dimensional: ‘all or nothing’. This type of strategy is directed at other actors in the arena 
to justify actions that may accompanied by drama and extreme use of language. 
Sometimes this ends in ‘frozen’ frames if an actor cannot move out of his or her 
assumed position, as a change would be interpreted as a loss of face. Buffering strategies 
may also contribute to reframing, that is, taking up another frame. For example, if a 
dispute arises in a collaborative relation, such as an alliance or coalition, and both actors 
do not want to give in, this may result in a change of frame; the collaborative frame 
may be replaced by an identity frame. Bridging strategies are directed at overcoming 
problems and finding joint solutions. This type of strategy includes a willingness to 
approach someone, to build a bridge to another person, being receptive to the views and 
opinions of others, trying to involve the other, and provoking discussions. Hence, 
bridging strategies may contribute to reframing. For example, if an actor is in conflict 
with another person they may decide to broaden the scope of the relationship and 
change its nature to try to negotiate a solution, which may result in replacing the 
identity frame with a conflict management frame.
Again, in the analysis of the interaction between authorities and the local group a 
distinction has been made between the national government (Department of Water 
Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act) 
and the provincial government (province of Noord-Brabant).
The analysis of the interaction strategies used by the authorities and the local group 
addresses two questions. First, which interaction strategies are used in the interaction 
between the authorities and the local group, and between the authorities? Here, a 
distinction can be made between the interaction strategies used by the national 
government when dealing with the local group and vice versa, the interaction strategies 
used by the provincial government when dealing with the local group and vice versa, 
and the interaction strategies used by the national government when dealing with the 
provincial government and vice versa. Second, do the interaction strategies used by the 
authorities and the local group explain the outcomes of the interaction between the 
authorities and the local group and between the authorities?
Interaction strategies of authorities when dealing with the local group
Interaction strategies of national government when dealing with the local group
Rijkswaterstaat used framing and buffering strategies when dealing with the local group. 
Since these were mostly used implicitly, illustrations of the interaction strategies include
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either quotes of what others said about Rijkswaterstaat or quotes by Rijkswaterstaat 
officials that can be interpreted as such.
Because the national government delegated the planning of the terps plan to the 
provincial government, it was considered a provincial government business to 
communicate with the residents. However, the residents and their water expert 
participated in the project organisation,993 which implied that Rijkswaterstaat was 
obliged to deal with them, although the government authority tried to limit this as 
much as possible. On the few occasions direct interaction occurred the organisation 
generally used an identity frame and sometimes a power frame. An illustration of 
Rijkswaterstaat’s identity frame is its dominance in tackling the problem of buying out 
residents. A resident: ‘Rijkswaterstaat thinks that we will be millionaires, but this is not 
the case. We offer a public service and that has to be paid for. We are not much better 
off.’994 Here, the government authority tried to position the residents in a way that would 
justify a lower purchase price for their land and property. In other words, the residents 
(‘them’) stood to gain a lot from the terps plan, while the government (‘us’ ) could use 
this money for other objectives. An example of its power frame is the government- 
appointed Q-team (landscape quality team). The team did not approve the design for 
the dike, terps and polder prepared by the province and the local group, and proposed 
a completely different design, without taking the residents’ views into account.995
During the start of the project planning in 2005 Rijkswaterstaat made particular use of 
buffering strategies towards the local group. Examples are the questioning of the 
residents’ membership of the official supervisory group (ambtelijke begeleidingsgroep, 
ABG) (‘I’ll be straightforward: residents are not officials....[their membership of the 
official supervisory group] is therefore really ridiculous’)996 and the negation of the 
residents’ role in the process (‘No, I do not have their telephone numbers, and they do 
not have mine’).997 Apart from a few bridging strategies (‘I try to be facilitating, and let 
me help them a bit’),998 buffering strategies were mostly used.
To summarise, when the national government interacted directly with the local group 
it used an identity frame or a power frame. Buffering strategies were the most 
commonly used strategies.
Interaction strategies of provincial government when the dealing with the local 
group
The provincial government used framing and bridging and buffering strategies in its 
interaction with the local group.
In its interaction with the local group the province rarely displayed an identity frame, 
and only when the first project manager was in charge. After the administrative 
agreement between the Department of Water Management and the province of Noord- 
Brabant was signed in December 2004, he used an identity frame by focusing on
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internal procedures and risk avoidance behaviour. Illustrations of this frame include not 
replying to residents’ questions during information meetings,999 which suggested that 
he was more committed to the provincial’s position in the process than to the project. 
In addition, he was not willing to adopt a proactive role in the project.1000 After the new 
project manager took over in March 2006, both the provincial delegate and the project 
manager used a collaborative frame and a conflict management frame. Their point of 
departure was to work with the residents on the realisation of the terps plan and so 
they were always disposed to hear the residents’ point of view and willing to take this 
into account. If disagreements arose they changed frame from a collaboration frame to 
a conflict management frame, which implies that they were looking for possible 
solutions and were willing to give in. Both used bridging strategies. Examples include 
the delegate inviting the residents to call her personally at difficult moments1001 and the 
project manager allocating 50 to 60 per cent of his time to the people in the polder.1002
In its interaction with the local group the provincial government used many bridging 
strategies. As the province also had to deal with individual residents in questions such 
as the purchase of their property and enforcement of the relevant regulations, the 
provincial government sometimes used buffering strategies.
To summarise, the provincial government rarely used an identity frame in its dealings 
with the local group. Throughout the planning process it generally used a collaborative 
frame, a conflict management frame and bridging strategies when dealing with the local 
group. The province’s conflict management frame and bridging strategies prevented 
many disputes and prevented disagreements from escalating.
Interaction strategies of the local group when dealing with authorities
Interaction strategies of the local group when dealing with the national government
The local group used framing and bridging strategies in its interaction with the national 
government.
At the very beginning of the terps plan in 2001 the residents used an identity frame 
when dealing with the national government. They used this frame to position themselves 
in the policy arena and made their involvement in the process conditional on their terps 
plan being the starting point of the planning process, which implied a key role for 
themselves. Rijkswaterstaat rejected this. Their attitude was that the terps plan was ‘not 
invented here’,1003 which in practice meant that it did not accept the terps plan and was 
not prepared to support a key role for the residents. An identity frame was employed in 
2006, for example during the dispute about spatial quality, when a resident asked 
ironically, ‘Does Rijkswaterstaat also look after spatial quality?’1004 However, the residents 
never presented a frozen frame. When the situation moved towards discord they soon 
adopted a conflict management frame by keeping an open mind and being receptive to
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signals, particularly from the provincial officials and provincial delegate who turned 
out to be mediators in the process, particularly in the relationship between the natinal 
government and the residents.
Throughout the planning process the residents generally used a conflict management 
frame in its dealings with the national government. Although they remained steadfast 
in their determination to get their terps plan approved, they were well aware that the 
route to achieve this objective would not be a linear one. Not only the approach but also 
the substantive issues, such as the design of the terps and the dike, would be subject to 
negotiation. The residents were always prepared to negotiation ( ‘you never can win 
everything’).1005 An illustration of the residents’ conflict management frame is that they 
were prepared to share ‘ownership’ of the terps plan. In other words, any government 
authority or consultant could be the owner of the project and work for its success.
The local group used a few bridging strategies when dealing with Rijkswaterstaat, 
including its attempts to start informal talks with Rijkswaterstaat officials.1006
To summarise, at the beginning of the planning process in 2001 the local group generally 
used a conflict management frame and sometimes it employed an identity frame in its 
dealings with the national government. On a few occasions the local group used bridging 
strategies and often used buffering strategies.
Interaction strategies of the local group when dealing with the provincial government
The local group used framing and bridging strategies in its dealings with the provincial 
government.
The residents started with an identity frame by positioning themselves in the policy 
arena as a group of residents with a plan, which was in the first instance directed at the 
provincial level. The residents made their involvement in the process conditional on 
their terps plan being the starting point of the planning process, which implied a key role 
for themselves. Furthermore, they expected a cooperative approach from the 
government authorities involved,1007 including the provincial government. The 
provincial delegate met the local group’s expectation by picking this up and bringing it 
to the attention of other government authorities and the state secretary.1008 The identity 
frame was also used when disputes could not be resolved, but this rarely occurred. An 
example is when the first project manager focused on internal rules and procedures 
rather than on substantive aspects of the project. The residents felt that he was not 
contributing much to the realisation of the terps plan. ‘We cannot realise the terps plan 
with someone who shows risk avoidance behaviour ’.1009 Here, they made a distinction 
between ‘us’ (proactive people) and ‘him’ (a provincial official with a risk avoidance 
attitude focused too much on internal rules). Still, the residents’ conflict management 
frame was predominant when dealing with the provincial government. Before an issue 
became disputed, the residents’ identity frame rapidly changed into a conflict
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management frame. The residents knew that good relations with the province were a 
prerequisite for realising their plan, and an identity frame would not be suited to 
achieving this goal. After the replacement of the project manager the residents 
particularly employed a collaborative frame, which implies a cooperative attitude, when 
dealing with the province.
The residents particularly used bridging strategies when dealing with the provincial 
government, for example during informal meetings (the so-called SNP meetings 
between two residents, the water expert and provincial officials) to align the expectations 
and demands of the residents with the provincial officials in advance of the formal 
meetings. Other bridging strategies included resolving specific problems, including how 
to deal with the land that became available when one of the farmers decided to sell up,1010 
contributing to negotiated solutions, such as the design of the terps, the dike and the 
polder,1011 and making suggestions for accelerating the process.1012 Buffering strategies 
were sometimes used by individual residents in their private negotiations with the 
provincial government.
To summarise, while the local group sometimes fell back on an identity frame, it mainly 
used a collaborative frame and a conflict management frame in its interaction with the 
provincial government. Reframing -  changing from an identity frame towards a conflict 
management frame -  was brought about by the local group aligning themselves with the 
provincial officials and the water expert. A collaborative frame came into being 
particularly after the first project manager was replaced, since when disputes between the 
local group and the province were rare because both employed bridging strategies. 
Buffering strategies were sometimes used by individual residents in their private 
negotiations with the provincial government.
Interaction strategies between authorities
Interaction strategies of national government when dealing with provincial 
government
Rijkswaterstaat used framing as well as buffering and bridging strategies in its interaction 
with the provincial government. As these were mostly used implicitly, the interaction 
strategies are sometimes illustrated by either quotes of what others said about 
Rijkswaterstaat or quotes by Rijkswaterstaat officials that can be interpreted as such.
The national government mainly employed an identity frame and occasionally a power 
frame when dealing with the province. Soon after the administrative agreement between 
the Department of Water Management and Noord-Brabant provincial government was 
signed at the end of 2004, Rijkswaterstaat identified itself as the key organisation for 
decision-making (identity frame) and proved to be dominant during the process (for 
example through the use of a power frame). Examples of the identity frame include the
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following statements by a government official. ‘Neither the province nor us decides, but 
the state secretary.’1013 At the same time, Rijkswaterstaat felt that, being close to the state 
secretary, it had an important position in the decision-making process. ‘Rijkswaterstaat 
is not able to work without controlling mechanisms, as we always have to be accountable 
to the state secretary’.1014 In other words, ‘you’ have to know what ‘our’ position is, so ‘you’ 
have to comply with ‘our’ procedures.
The power frame was used to demonstrate which government authority was in charge. 
When Rijkswaterstaat delegated the terps plan to Noord-Brabant provincial government 
the mandate was limited to the project planning; the project implementation was 
excluded. It then did not become an issue because the province was at time simply 
concerned with assuming responsibility for the terps plan. More than a year before the 
finalisation of the planning in October 2008, the province raised the question of 
responsibility and expressed its willingness to continue.1015 Once again Rijkswaterstaat 
showed its power frame by questioning this, then attaching conditions to giving 
responsibility for the implementation to the province, and finally delaying the decision 
on this issue to a late stage in the planning process.1016
Apart from an identity frame and a power frame, a third frame emerged with some 
regularity: a conflict management frame. This frame was particularly used by the Room 
for the River programme manager. He kept this frame in reserve, for use only if a dispute 
arose or if a disagreement was in danger of escalating. The provincial delegate knew by 
experience that ‘Rijkswaterstaat always started with a rigid attitude. They were guarding 
the process like a terrier [which often led to discord]. But Ingwer [the programme 
manager] could move; he is rather careful.’1017 In his field the manager is known for being 
verbally adept in the sense that he is open to other opinions and able to negotiate a joint 
solution.1018
In addition, Rijkswaterstaat officials displayed a conflict management frame by taking a 
constructive attitude in the official supervisory group. A government official: ‘I have a 
constructive role in a dispute. I will not say that it is not possible or not allowed, instead 
I say, “Prove me wrong. We are working on the same project; we have to find a 
compromise”.’1019 But underlying this was a power frame, as revealed by his remark, ‘I try 
to be involved in the project [in the official supervisory group] which the others 
sometimes experience as unpleasant. I also have an opinion and the supervisory group 
appears to be the appropriate platform to put that forward. And then Rijkswaterstaat has 
a substantial influence.’1020 This shows that Rijkswaterstaat’s opinion held more weight 
than the others. As Rijkswaterstaat officials were known to be strong defenders of the 
official line, they largely determined the outcome. This was especially the case for 
Rijkswaterstaat’s tasks, such as the calculations of the project costs and the effects of the 
proposed measure on the water level. The power frame was felt by the residents, the water 
expert (Slootweg, 2004) and the provincial delegate,1021 although no-one put a name to 
that feeling (see also section 7.2.3). The project manager, for example, put it this way: 
‘Concerning the daily wheeling and dealing, the relationship with Rijkswaterstaat turned
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out to be reasonable, but when it came to issues such as lowering the water level it was 
tough’.1022 A Rijkswaterstaat official confirmed this and at the same time revealed a conflict 
management frame: ‘We will disagree on many issues, but if you discuss them as early on 
in the process as possible they will not be consequential. They will be resolved.’1023 
However, besides discussing such issues, which actually proved to be rather difficult in 
practice,1024 resolving them was not always as easy as the government official suggested. 
Many, if not all, disputed issues were resolved via the programme manager. The provincial 
delegate said that what usually happened was that she would call the programme manager 
to say it was not working out and make an appointment for dinner, when the issue was 
resolved.1025
The government officials particularly used buffering strategies. An example is the focus 
on Rijkswaterstaat’s interests during the planning process (‘It is not our plan.’),1026 
resulting in a passive attitude at the beginning of the project, from 2001 until 2003, when 
the project made no progress. Other buffering strategies included the use of the take-it- 
or-leave-it principle in the discussion concerning the responsibility for the 
implementation of the terps plan. Although the province had indicated that it was willing 
to be responsible for the project implementation, Rijkswaterstaat did not want to decide 
at once. Rijkswaterstaat officials raised the question of responsibility in the discussion 
about how to economise on the project costs, a new issue. The project manager: ‘As the 
planning was a provincial responsibility it went without saying that the implementation 
would also be delegated to the province. Then the project costs increased significantly. 
Rijkswaterstaat officials said: “If you want to take the risk you may implement it”.’1027 The 
province refused to take the risk (‘Take the risk for a national project for which we are the 
executive agency? It is a national responsibility! We won’t do that.’1028). Rijkswaterstaat’s 
response: ‘Then we will delegate it to the water board’.1029
Apart from a few bridging strategies by government officials, such as ‘I could withdraw 
to my formal role in the planning process and wait until the quarterly progress reports 
are sent, leaving the official supervisory group for what it is. Well, that is not what I want. 
So I said: “Let’s talk” ’,1030 it was mainly the programme manager who used bridging 
strategies. After the provincial delegate and the programme manager met to discuss 
disputed issues the latter used bridging strategies and started reframing. This implied 
that the programme manager replaced his identity or power frame by a conflict 
management frame. This usually ended into a negotiated solution.
To summarise, in its interaction with the provincial government the national government 
showed two faces: one in the person of the Room for the River programme manager, who 
was more open to different views and ideas, and the other by government officials in 
charge of project matters, who strictly followed the official line. While the former mainly 
used a conflict management frame as he was often willing to find a joint resolution, the 
latter mainly employed an identity frame by positioning the government authority as the 
key party in decision-making and a power frame when the provincial government tried
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to adopt a position of authority. Buffering strategies were commonly used by government 
officials, while bridging strategies were sometimes used by the programme manager.
Interaction strategies of provincial government when dealing with national 
government
The provincial government used framing as well as bridging strategies when dealing with 
the national government.
The province particularly used a conflict management frame when dealing with 
Rijkswaterstaat and always put the project first. During the planning process the 
province had to convince Rijkswaterstaat of its approach to realising the project 
objectives. By using a conflict management frame the provincial officials and the 
provincial delegate were able to change their position according to the situation. This 
occurred regularly, as evidenced by their contributions to resolving various conflicts. 
The province was always open to other opinions and attempted to find joint solutions. 
However, most disputes could not be resolved at the level of the provincial officials as 
Rijkswaterstaat officials mainly used an identity frame or power frame followed by 
buffering strategies. This implies that they were not prepared to negotiate. Almost all 
disputed questions, therefore, had to be resolved at a senior management level, and it 
was always the province that took the initiative.
However, an identity frame emerged on a few occasions. For example when the ‘spatial 
quality’ objective of the Room for the River programme -  after safety the most 
important objective and thus a condition for the terps plan -  was put on the agenda, 
the provincial government’s response was ‘We have authority to act’.1031 What they 
meant was that this issue is part of the regional plan (streekplan) and therefore 
provincial government business, and so it had the responsibility to determine whether 
it should meet additional conditions and regulations. From Rijkswaterstaat’s point of 
view, this was a clear example that the province did not always use a conflict 
management frame.
The province was always willing to listen to the views and opinions of others. At all 
times it started from its own position and then took Rijkswaterstaat’s conditions into 
the equation. It tried to arrange joint negotiating positions as far as possible, but if a 
negotiated solution could not be achieved, alternative strategies were employed, such 
as the delegation of the responsibility for the project implementation to the province 
and the water board. The project manager: ‘We had already agreed an arrangement 
with the water board on managing external consultants to carry out the implementation 
of the project. It showed that we are willing to take the lead jointly’.1032 Another 
alternative strategy was the province’s use of its influence in the government hierarchy, 
but this was used as a last resort. In its regular meetings with the state secretary, with 
whom the province signed an administrative agreement, the provincial delegate used 
to go through the main issues concerning the terps plan.1033 Such contacts could be
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eventually used in negotiations with the director-general of Rijkswaterstaat, but this 
did not prove necessary.
Gender probably helped in the province’s attempts to connect with the national 
government. Empirical studies reveal that women tend to be more conflict averse than 
men and more willing to adapt their strategies and behaviour, usually by listening to 
external advice, more aware of social bonds and show greater reciprocity and altruism 
(Brown-Kruse & Hummels, 1993; Patt et al., 2007). The third provincial delegate 
involved in the planning process was a woman. She emphasised that ‘during 
negotiations it is good to understand each other’. She put down the positive results of 
the negotiations to her good understanding with the manager: ‘That is crucial’.1034 In 
addition to a cooperative attitude, the provincial delegate knew that atmosphere is an 
important factor in relationships. For example, she resolved disputes by meeting the 
relevant parties over dinner so that they could not use lack of time as an excuse. She also 
took the trouble to get to know the programme manager.1035
To summarise, in its interaction with the national government the provincial 
government was generally willing to work with the national government to find joint 
solutions, as evidenced by its preparations for coming to negotiated solutions and the 
development of alternative resolution strategies. The provincial government displayed 
a conflict management frame accompanied by bridging strategies. The provincial 
government rarely used an identity frame.
An overview of the interaction strategies used by the government authorities and the 
local group is presented in Table 7.3.
Table 7.3 Interactional strategies of national government (Nat), provincial government (Prov)
f r a m in g  b u f fe r in g  b r id g in g  
s t r a te g ie s  s t ra te g ie s
N at .  '
.  - P ro v
I  PCM  - '
- '  CM I
+
o
N at '
.  '  Lo c  g r I P - CM I
+  .
+
± ±
P rov .  - '
- Lo c  g r c c m i c c m i + + + +
and local group (Loc gr)
C = collaborative frame CM = conflict managem ent fram e I = identity frame P = power frame 
o = zero ± = l ow + = moderate ++ = high
The analysis of the interaction strategies between the authorities and the local group 
shows that buffering strategies are not useful when employing a conflict management 
frame. Bridging strategies were always present, particularly when a conflict management 
frame was used.
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It can be concluded that the provincial government’s conflict management frame and 
bridging strategies ensured that its interaction with the local group varied from debate, 
negotiation and dialogue to collaboration, the last due to the provincial government’s 
and local groups’ collaborative frame. Negotiation did not occur in the interaction 
between the local group and the national government. As a consequence, debate proved 
to be the ‘maximum’ outcome due to the fact that a conflict management frame was not 
included in the national government’s portfolio of interaction strategies when dealing 
with the residents. As the province’s conflict management frame and bridging strategies 
were needed for a negotiated solution, the interaction between national government 
and the local group always resulted in debate or conflict. As result of the provincial 
government’s conflict management frame and bridging strategies the interaction 
between the authorities always ended in a negotiated solution.
7.2.3 Power building by authorities and local group
In this section we analyse the building of power by the authorities and the local group. 
The following types of power building have been identified: direct and indirect coercive 
power, legitimate power, reward power, hindering power, knowledge power, media 
power and sociability. While direct coercive power is exercised through repression, such 
as a police action or imposing penalties, indirect coercive power may achieve the same 
result indirectly, for example explicitly through threats or by appealing to the law and 
hierarchical relationships, or implicitly through a high turnover rate of officials 
(frequently moving officials to different positions). In modern democracies the 
government exercises restraint when using direct coercive power because this is 
considered to be a last resource to produce a desired social result. Other options are 
used first to achieve the government’s objective, such as the use of indirect coercive 
power. Legitimate power denotes how actors legitimise their position towards others. 
They may refer to a social structure, such as a hierarchy, or to other social norms, such 
as reciprocity, equity and responsibility. Reward power signifies that an actor is 
rewarded in a material way, in the form of money or goods, or in an immaterial way, 
through an honourable mention, a decoration or an appointment as honorary member. 
Hindering power means that an action or progress has been hindered or prevented by 
obstruction or slowing down progress. Knowledge power uses knowledge to influence 
the position of actors in their interaction with others. Examples are calling in external 
experts, commissioning studies and having a numerical superiority of experts in 
meetings, which relays signals to others that things are serious. It may also involve the 
use of the specific knowledge of the parties involved. Media power signifies the use of 
media by actors to give meaning and interpretations to their values. Actors go to the 
media for various reasons, including mobilising support, validating the relevance of 
the actor concerned and expanding the field of influence of the actors involved, which 
offers an opportunity to get support. The sociability of an actor is considered a separate 
power source (Nesler et al., 1993) (see also Chapter 3) because it tends to call forth
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reciprocity. It is proper to give something back to a person who has always been helpful, 
or it may be a motivation for getting favours from others. Since respondents rarely said 
anything about the sociability of other people, I noted their opinions of other actors or 
quotes that can be interpreted as such.
In this analysis the authorities are differentiated into national government (Department 
of Water Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate 
to act) and provincial government (province of Noord-Brabant). Two questions about 
power building by the authorities and the local group are posited. First, which power 
types are built by the authorities and the local group? Here, a distinction can be made 
between the power exerted by the national government over the local groups and vice 
versa, the power exerted by the provincial government over the local group and vice 
versa, and the exertion of power by the national government over the provincial 
government and vice versa. Second, what are the consequences of power building by the 
authorities and the local group for their interaction strategies, and for the outcomes of 
the interaction between the authorities and the local group and between the national 
and provincial government authorities?
Power building by authorities with regard to the local group
National government’s power building with regard to the local group
The national government built indirect coercive power, legitimate power and hindering 
power when dealing with the local group.
The national government built indirect coercive power through its power of 
compulsory purchase,1036 which proved to be a threat to the local group. Another 
example is the high turnover of officials involved in the project. A resident: ‘In six or 
seven years I counted about five government officials who represented Rijkswaterstaat 
in the official supervisory group (ambtelijke begeleidingsgroep, ABG)’.1037
It built legitimate power by regularly referring to its mandate to take decisions (‘it is the 
state secretary who decides’1038).
The national government’s building of hindering power was often evident throughout 
the planning process. Rijkswaterstaat’s tactics included not showing up or arriving late 
during project meetings, not passing on information adequately, not adequately 
replying to emails and questions, not reading project documentation and reports, not 
being sufficiently informed about the project and answering evasively.1039
Provincial government’s power building with regard to the local group
In its interaction with the local group the provincial government built indirect coercive 
power, knowledge power and sociability.
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The province used indirect coercive power during the six-monthly information 
meetings for the residents. At each meeting the provincial delegate explained to the 
residents how she dealt with issues such as who would stay or have to move, irrespective 
of their own decision. She decided that residents who live near the planned locations 
of the terps would have the first option of staying in the polder. In spring 2008 a 
declaration of intent was drawn up stating clearly who would stay and who would move. 
In personal meetings with the first movers the province explained the implications: 
they had lost their right to claim a terp.1040 However, some of these residents did not take 
any action. In personal meetings with the residents the province told them about the 
consequences of not deciding whether to stay or move. They would then start 
proceedings for the compulsory purchase of farm buildings. Its expectation was that all 
but a few residents would come to an agreement.1041 Since the deadline for starting 
compulsory purchase proceedings had not yet been reached at the end of the research 
period (October 2008), the province had not yet taken any action at the time of writing.
When dealing with the local group the province often built knowledge power by asking 
agriculture and real estate consultants for advice. An illustration of this is the report 
known as ‘the regulations’ which sets out the legal instruments and regulations that 
could be used for the reconstruction of Overdiep Polder, including the financial 
arrangements for the farms and for land reallocation, the possibilities for those who 
stay and move, compulsory purchase and damage compensation.1042 Provincial officials 
built knowledge power by using their own knowledge of the procedures for the 
purchase of existing farms or farmland with a ‘building plot’ (permission to build a 
farmhouse and livestock shed) for those who intended to move, and the prohibition on 
new build in certain areas.1043
The provincial government sometimes built sociability. While the project manager was 
always open to suggestions and available to support the residents most of his time, the 
provincial delegate showed her sociability particularly during the information meetings 
for the residents. Both told the residents that the province was always ready to buy out 
those who want to move out the polder, if reasonable conditions could be agreed.
To summarise, in its interaction with the local group the provincial government built 
indirect coercive power to demonstrate who was in charge, knowledge power to remain 
informed about current issues, and sociability to show that a solution could always be 
found if reasonable conditions could be agreed
Power building by the local group with regard to authorities
Local group’s power building with regard to the national government
The local group built legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power, media 
power and sociability in its dealings with the national government.
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In its interaction with the national government the local group built legitimate power 
occasionally. An example is the residents’ reaction to the design for the terps proposed 
by the Q-team (landscape quality team), which included a screen of trees around the 
terp, a farmhouse with a size of 750 m3 (designed to be ‘icons’ in the landscape) and an 
inappropriately located livestock shed. The residents said that the government should 
provide 1.5 million euros compensation for the extra 100 m3 in the size of the 
farmhouse because the farmers could not afford such large accommodation. Moreover, 
the farms could not operate without an opening in the tree planting to provide access 
to their land. They also complained that the livestock shed was too far from the 
farmhouse and it also had to be relocated to meet animal welfare regulations.
Hindering power was built incidentally by individual members of the local group. For 
example, some did not allow Rijkswaterstaat officials onto their land.1044
Knowledge power was sometimes built, for example by asking experts from the farmers’ 
organisation ZLTO for legal advice and getting support from a property developer and 
an account manager from ZLTO.1045 In addition, they approached their bank for 
financial advice and a lawyer for expertise in the field of leasehold legislation.1046 The 
residents built knowledge power by using their knowledge of farming during 
discussions with the Q-team about the design of the terps, in particular their knowledge 
of current regulations on dairy farming and on farming practices in general, such as the 
distance between the farmhouse and the livestock shed, the location of the shed, the 
need for a shallow ramp to the terp to provide access for machinery and cows.1047
When dealing with the national government the local group built media power 
occasionally. This type of power was particularly built when no progress was being 
made with the project, either by actually using this power or just the threat of obtaining 
media exposure. However, the local group viewed this as a last resource after discussions, 
talks and meetings were not successful in moving the project forward. This is illustrated 
by the response of one resident to the decision not to delegate the implementation of 
the terps plan to the province: ‘If that is the case, in no time we will be on NOVA [a 
current affairs programme on national television].’1048 Another example is the use of 
media exposure to publicise the sluggish decision-making process. After the vice chair 
and the provincial delegate had given their views on the progress being made with the 
project on a current affairs programme on television, the issue was raised during a 
meeting of the steering group. The residents’ water expert said that they had received 
various requests from other television programmes. The Room for the River 
programme manager replied that more publicity would not be advantageous because 
it would be solely negative. The water expert’s response: ‘Then you will have to get the 
state secretary’s signature soon.’ As a result of this, the state secretary received the letter 
to sign at home on Friday and returned the signed letter on Monday.1049
The local group sometimes built sociability in its dealings with the national
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government. An illustration of this power type is the residents’ effort to start informal 
talks with government officials involved in the terps plan during the breaks in project 
meetings or afterwards.1050
To summarise, in the interaction with the national government the local group built 
legitimate power to let the national government know that its position has to be taken 
into account, knowledge power to get information on specific subjects or to bring their 
own knowledge into the process, hindering power to make the national government’s 
work more difficult, media power to get the planning process moving, and sociability 
to get acquainted with government officials.
Local group’s power building with regard to the provincial government
The local group built legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power, media 
power and sociability when dealing with the provincial government.
The local group sometimes built legitimate power in its interaction with the provincial 
government. An illustration of this power type is the residents’ disapproval of the first 
project manager’s performance. They exerted pressure on the provincial delegate to 
replace him, because he focused on internal procedures rather than the project. A 
resident: ‘He is not moving the terps plan forward’.1051 In doing so, the residents put 
their position as key players in the planning process to the test. By getting the project 
manager replaced they legitimised their role in the process.
Some residents built hindering power in its dealings with the province. This occurred 
incidentally, particularly in private negotiations between residents and the provincial 
government. The residents stipulated impossible conditions in the conviction that if 
they did not do so ‘it might be disadvantageous later’.1052 Another illustration of 
hindering power is the plan by some residents to go to court,1053 which would hinder 
the planning process considerably.
In their interaction with the provincial government the residents built knowledge power 
by regularly demanding a second opinion. The provincial delegate: ‘The residents 
arranged a second opinion for everything. They have right to do that, but to be honest, 
I get tired of it.’1054 The provincial delegate thus interpreted this knowledge power as 
hindering power. The residents also employed their own knowledge. Examples are their 
suggestions on how to deal with the land that the province bought from the first farmer 
to move, their ideas for accelerating the process and how to deal with procedures, and 
their proposals for the design of the terps.1055
The residents occasionally built media power by making public their dissatisfaction 
with the province about the lack of progress. A resident: ‘Although all the media reports 
might suggest that the project is a fairy tale, this is quite the wrong impression. It 
demands much of the residents, because cooperation with government authorities is
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difficult. They think in years and in paper, whereas we are concerned about the 
continuity of our farms each year, and for us paper is a necessary evil’ (van Rooy et al.,
2006).
The local group sometimes built sociability towards the provincial government by being 
friendly and engaging. The local group did its utmost to continue the alliance with the 
province. Sociability was particularly built to show appreciation of the project 
manager’s efforts in the project by complimenting him.1056
To summarise, in its interaction with the provincial government the local group built 
legitimate power to let the provincial government know that its conditions has to be 
taken into account, knowledge power to get information on specific subjects or to bring 
their own knowledge into the process, media power to get the planning process moving, 
and sociability to maintain the relationship with the provincial government.
Power building by authorities
National government’s power building with regard to the provincial government
In its interaction with the provincial government the national government built indirect 
coercive power, legitimate power, hindering power and knowledge power.
An example of indirect coercive power built by Rijkswaterstaat is the rumour that 
spread among its officials. It said that the government authority was not certain of the 
competence of the Noord-Brabant provincial government to lead a river project.1057 
The provincial government was consequently limited to the planning, which was laid 
down in an administrative agreement at a later stage. This agreement is another 
illustration of the use of indirect coercive power, as Rijkswaterstaat brought it up again 
more than a year after it was signed, claiming that it was a bad agreement and was 
irrelevant.1058 Rijkswaterstaat did not agree with the conditions listed in the agreement 
and called for rigorous auditing rules. A government official: ‘I can live with it if we 
make good arrangements. If these are not kept then the agreement is useless.’1059 
However, this was not easy. The Room for the River programme manager had to throw 
his authority into the fray to convince the province that adaptation of the agreement 
was an absolute necessity. ‘The SPKD Room for the River framework includes large 
projects and a vague agreement will not do. Large projects imply auditing obligations. 
The relationship between the national and the provincial government was not that clear. 
For other projects there are now agreements between the state secretary and the regional 
initiators which set out in detail what they will do....It took six months before the 
province saw that this was in its interest.’1060 The province had no choice but to comply 
with the current rules set by Rijkswaterstaat, but it took time before the organisation 
was convinced that there was no other option than compliance, which can be 
considered to be a case of indirect coercive power. Another illustration of indirect
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coercive power is the high turnover of Rijkswaterstaat officials involved in the project, 
which was a way of showing who was actually in charge.1061
Legitimate power was built by Rijkswaterstaat by substantiating its responsibility for 
the terps plan. An example is Rijkswaterstaat’s regular reference to its responsibility 
towards Parliament: ‘We are accountable to Parliament’.1062 Another example is the 
confirmation of its role in the process: the communication plan for the environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) had to be approved by Rijkswaterstaat. It approved the plan, 
but stated that it had to be consulted about all contacts with the media.1063 Besides, the 
national government pointed out how to deal with the residents: ‘Make it clear that the 
people will be consulted, but that the state secretary makes the decisions and the 
residents’ group can only give advice’.1064
Hindering power was built during the start of the terps plan in 2001, when 
Rijkswaterstaat slowed the process down. It took a long time before Rijkswaterstaat 
accepted the project proposal, signed the contract with Habiforum to develop the 
residents’ plan (Slootweg, 2004) and incorporated the terps plan in its regional 
advice.1065 Another illustration of hindering power is its refusal to provide the details 
of the cost calculations for the terps plan and its effect on the water level (Slootweg,
2004). Rijkswaterstaat also continued to use hindering power in the planning process 
until December 2004, when the administrative agreement between the Department of 
Water Management and Noord-Brabant provincial government was prepared. The 
agreement went through ten rounds of editing.1066
Rijkswaterstaat built knowledge power through its access to cost calculation methods 
(Slootweg, 2004), calculations of the effect of the proposed measures on the water level 
and experts who could interpret the results. This type of power was used as hindering 
power when Rijkswaterstaat was not willing to give the provincial government and the 
local group detailed information on the calculation method or to explain the evidence 
base underlying the outcomes (Slootweg, 2004). The numerical superiority of involved 
Rijkswaterstaat officials and experts in the planning process can also be considered to 
be a form of knowledge power. The project manager: ‘For the purchase of real estate 
Rijkswaterstaat established a commission ( Commissie Vastgoedteam) to ‘advise’, as it 
was called. But the government authority always wanted to say something about the 
content. As a consequence, the process acquired a life of its own. The first time we met 
the commission there were six people at the table, the next time it had increased to 
ten.’1067
To summarise, in its interaction with the provincial government the national 
government built indirect coercive power to let the provincial government know who 
is in charge, legitimate power to stress the rules and procedures for accountability, 
hindering power to slow down the planning process, and knowledge power to 
demonstrate its access to instruments and experts who could interpret the outcomes.
308
-Q-
Madelinde PHD zonder afbrekingen:Opmaak 1 15- -2011 14:44 Pagina 309
It used hindering power particularly from the beginning of the process until the 
voluntary agreement between the national and provincial government was signed.
Provincial government’s power building power with regard to the national 
government
In its interaction with the national government the provincial government built indirect 
coercive power, legitimate power and sociability.
The provincial government built indirect coercive power as a last resort on one 
occasion, when the dispute about the responsibility for the implementation of the terps 
plan reached a climax in a meeting with the state secretary. The provincial delegate 
pointed out that in an earlier meeting a promise was made that the province would be 
responsible for the implementation. She argued that although it was a verbal agreement, 
it was still valid. After the state secretary denied this, as she wanted to let it go, the 
provincial delegate played her last card: ‘If this is how it’s going to be, I’ll return the
assignment’.1068
Legitimate power was built, for example, in discussions with the national government 
about responsibility. The project manager: ‘Their [Rijkswaterstaat’s] focus is “we have 
to be in control because Parliament wants to know what is happening”. Our defence is 
“you are allowed to have control, that is OK, but we have an administrative agreement 
with you. This implies that the project has been decentralised and that we make our own 
administrative appraisal. There is no going back on this decision”.’1069
An illustration of sociability is the project manager’s attitude towards Rijkswaterstaat, 
which can be interpreted as one of accommodation. Regarding the presentation of the 
arguments for the terps plan he said, ‘My attitude is to just do it in the way they want’.1070 
He made a conscious decision to use this type of power because he expected it would 
yield a return: ‘So you will not run the risk of a delay in the planning process.’ 1071
To summarise, in its dealings with the national government the provincial government 
built indirect coercive power to show that making a fool of the province would not 
work, legitimate power to demonstrate its position in relation to the national 
government and sociability to put the national government in the right mood.
Table 7.4 contains an overview of the authorities’ and the local group’s power building.
309
-Q-
Madelinde PHD zonder afbrekingen:Opmaak 1 15- -2011 14:44 Pagina 310
Table 7.4 Building power by national government (Nat), provincial government (Prov) and local 
group (Loc gr)
direct coercive indirect coercive legitimate power reward power hindering power knowledge media power sociability 
power power power
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The most striking outcomes of the analysis of the power building by the authorities 
and the local group are the absence of ultimatums, the number of power types built by 
the local group and by the authorities, and the difficulties experienced by the 
government authorities in cooperating with each other.
The analysis shows that no ultimatums were issued by the authorities or the residents. 
It proves that influence was exerted indirectly rather than directly.
The local group proved to be rather powerful in its dealings with the authorities, 
particularly because it built more types of power than the authorities did. In its 
interaction with the national government the local group built five power types 
(legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power, media power and sociability), 
while the national government built three power types (indirect coercive power, 
legitimate power and hindering power) in its interaction with the local group. The use 
of knowledge power and media power by the local group proved to be determining 
factors in putting pressure on the national government. In its interaction with the 
provincial government the local group built the same five power types as it did in its 
interaction with the national government, whereas the province built three power types 
(indirect coercive power, knowledge power and sociability). As in its interaction with 
the national government, knowledge power and media power were the most important 
social power weapons in the local group’s interaction with the provincial government. 
The local group’s power building did not seem to have repercussions for its interaction 
with the provincial government because of the provincial government’s use of a conflict 
management frame and bridging strategies.
The power building in the interaction between the authorities was more or less 
balanced. The national government built four power types (indirect coercive power, 
legitimate power, hindering power and knowledge power), while the provincial 
government built three power types (indirect coercive power, legitimate power and 
sociability). The main reasons for this rough balance were the existence of the 
administrative agreement between the national and provincial government and the
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close cooperation between the provincial government and the local group. The presence 
of the local group in the official supervisory group (ambtelijke begeleidingsgroep, ABG) 
posed a threat to the national government because it did not follow accepted 
conventions in relations between government authorities: it questioned the 
performance of certain officials and used media power to bring disputes into the open.
Collaboration between the authorities did not happen. This type of interaction may 
occur if both authorities exercise restraint or even abandon their use of indirect coercive 
power and legitimate power. Although legitimate power is a less dominant type of 
power building than indirect coercive power, in this case it had an adverse effect on the 
development of an atmosphere of mutual understanding and tolerance in which trust 
may grow. This can be considered a prerequisite for collaboration, as was shown in the 
analysis of power building in the interaction between the provincial government and 
the local group.
7.2.4 Authorities' and local group's potential to act
In this section we analyse the authorities’ and the local group’s potential to act. Both 
potentials to act are broken down into capacity to act and motivation to act. With regard 
to the authorities a differentiation has been made between the national government 
(Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat 
has the mandate to act) and the provincial government (province of Noord-Brabant). 
Two questions were investigated: What are the authorities’ and the local group’s 
potentials to act? and To what extent do these potentials to act shape the authorities’ and 
the local group’s power building, their interaction strategies and the outcome of the 
interaction between the authorities and the local group?
National government’s potential to act
The national government’s potential to act consists of its capacity to act and motivation 
to act.
National government’s capacity to act
The national government’s capacity to act is based on its mandate, resources, 
coordinating mechanisms and consistency (the construction or adoption of a 
narrative).
Mandate
The national government’s mandate was to realise the Room for the River policy that 
was included in a national planning instrument, the Spatial Planning Key Decision 
(SPKD). This policy is to lower the water level of the rivers Rhine and Meuse in 2015 
to accommodate peak discharges in future. The mandate was in fact cut back in the 
political drive for a ‘leaner and meaner government’, leaving the target of realising 39
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projects beyond Rijkswaterstaat’s capacity.1072 The majority of these projects were 
therefore to be devolved to lower-tier authorities, which is why an administrative 
agreement was signed between the Department of Water Management and Noord- 
Brabant provincial government. Rijkswaterstaat’s mandate now included the overall 
management of the Room for the River policy and the final responsibility for the 
delegated river projects, which had to meet its requirements. This arrangement led to 
recurring disputes between Rijkswaterstaat and the province.
The national government’s mandate can thus be considered moderate.
Resources
The resources of the national government included budget and people.
The national government provided a budget (2.2 billion euros) for implementing 39 
Room for the River projects, including the terps plan. Considering the number and 
variety of the river projects, the budget was not that big. As the terps plan was one of 
the first river projects to be implemented, the national government wanted to keep the 
project costs as low as possible to set a precedent for subsequent projects.1073 This made 
the project costs a recurring point of contention between Rijkswaterstaat and the 
province. An example is the province’s budget proposal for the implementation of the 
terps plan, which was presented in the form of a package deal for meeting 80 to 90 per 
cent of all the project’s objectives. At the same time a discussion arose about the 
question of responsibility for the implementation. Rijkswaterstaat made the transfer 
of responsibility to the province conditional upon the province bearing the risk, but this 
was rejected by the province, which led to a dispute. The province then negotiated with 
Rijkswaterstaat and agreed to economise as much as possible and to share the 
responsibility for implementation with the water board.1074
The national government had ample staff to effectively manage the Room for the River 
project and exert its authority in the field of water management (Meijerink, 2004). 
Despite the number of staff available, the number of disciplines represented was limited 
and the spatial planning element of the project required a totally different set of skills 
than ‘traditional’ water management, which deals with projects such as the maintenance 
of the water infrastructure (see also 2.2). The government officials assigned to the 
project were therefore not adequately equipped to deal with collaborative planning 
processes and devolve responsibilities.
The resources of the national government can therefore be considered moderate.
Coordinating mechanisms
The internal coordination was strong and functioned fairly well, although it took some 
time for government officials to implement decisions made by the state secretary as 
they initially had difficulty with the residents’ plan. The coordination with the province,
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which was based on a brief administrative agreement, was a different matter. 
Rijkswaterstaat was unable to relinquish its authoritative attitude and relied mainly on 
the existing hierarchy to get things done, rather than embracing its new coordinating 
and supervisory role of first laying down the ground rules and monitoring condition 
compliance.
The coordinating mechanisms of the national government can therefore be described 
as weak.
Consistency
The consistency of the national government (the construction or adoption of a 
narrative) was weak. The construction and adoption of a project narrative for the terps 
plan proved to be problematic for the national government since the terps plan was 
delegated to the provincial government. This difficulty was rooted in the difference 
between the views of the government ministers (Department of Water Management) 
and departmental officials (Rijkswaterstaat). The successive state secretaries were 
convinced that the terps plan was a successful bottom-up initiative, but it took time 
before government officials understood that the project’s success would reflect on the 
department. The responsible politicians wanted to find a way to adopt the terps plan 
and added it to Rijkswaterstaat’s portfolio because of earlier experiences, such as the 
dike relocation in Lent (see Chapter 5). In that project the government plan had been 
approved by the Dutch Parliament, but it left an ill-feeling about the process in the 
community. In the Overdiep Polder project, however, the residents’ narrative became 
the project narrative. This was so strong that Rijkswaterstaat’s inability to adopt it had 
a negative influence on its capacity to act. What authority can afford to deny a successful 
project?
National government’s motivation to act
The national government’s motivation to act entails political priority, organisational 
ambition and personal vision.
Political priority
The political priority of the national government was to reduce flood risk, as stated in 
the Room for the River policy. The terps plan, initiated by residents, met the government 
conditions for lowering the water level in the river Meuse. As the state secretary was 
open to special initiatives that would meet the conditions of the Room for the River 
policy, she agreed to adopt the terps plan as a demonstration project, an experiment in 
which authorities work in close cooperation with residents on sustainable solutions for 
water management.1075
The political priority of the national government can therefore be considered high.
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Organisational ambition
While the overall organisational ambition of the national government was supportive of 
the political priority given to flood safety, delegating responsibility for the terps plan to 
the provincial government was not accepted by all officials. A government official: ‘The 
province has never directed such projects. But everybody with a bit of experience knows 
that some things can be done better by others’ [read: Rijkswaterstaat].1076 This led to 
various hindering tactics as described earlier (see section 7.2.3). The ambition of 
Rijkswaterstaat was strong as it was highly motivated to meet water management and 
flood safety objectives, but less enthusiastic about the terps plan in particular, which led 
to a slowing down of the planning process.
The organisational ambition of the national government can therefore be considered to 
be moderate.
Personal vision
The successive state secretaries for water management did not present a unified and 
explicit personal vision for the project. The first agreed to the experimental status of the 
terps plan, the second decided on the front-runner position of the plan and agreed to the 
delegation of the planning to the provincial government, while the third approved the 
start of the implementation of the terps plan.
However, realising the terps plan was for the most part a job for a government official. 
The viewpoint of the Room for the River programme manager was clear: all 39 projects 
had to be realised by 2015 and within the budget of 2.2 billion euros. He was open to 
negotiated solutions that would lead to achieving this objective. Government officials 
were somewhat reluctant to express their personal views on the terps plan. In a private 
talk it became clear that government officials did not have a positive feeling about the 
plan. Asked why not, the response was ‘It is not our project’.1077 Until the summer of 
2006 they did not support the terps plan. They expressed this in various ways, for 
example in statements like ‘I do not understand why residents have to participate in the 
official supervisory group (ambtelijke begeleidingsgroep, ABG)’, ‘They are not officials’ 
and ‘My opinion on whether Overdiep Polder is a sensible choice does not matter. As a 
government official it is my task to make choices that meet the required conditions. In 
the end it is society that has to come to an opinion based on something that is reasonable. 
Then the politicians decide’.1078 Their change of mind in mid 2006 was prompted more 
by their own experiences than encouragement from their superiors.
The personal vision of the state secretaries as well as government officials can therefore 
be considered to be moderate.
To summarise, the national government’s potential to act proved to be weak. This was 
based on a weak capacity to act and a moderate motivation to act. For an overview see 
Table 7.5.
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Table 7.5 Capacity, motivation and potential to act of national governm ent
N ationa l
go ve rn m e n t
capac ity  to  act m o tiva tion  to  act po ten tia l 
to  act
re s o u rc e s m a n d a te c o o r d in a t in g
m e c h a n is m s
c o n s is te n c y p o li t ic a l
p r io r i t y
o r g a n is a t io n a l
a m b it io n
p e rs o n a l
v is io n
+ + + ± ± + + + + + +
± = weak/low + = moderate ++ = strong/high
Provincial governm ent's potential to act
The provincial government’s potential to act consists of its capacity to act and 
motivation to act.
Provincial government’s capacity to act
The provincial government’s capacity to act encompasses its mandate, resources, 
coordinating mechanisms and consistency (the construction or adoption of a 
narrative).
M andate
The adoption of the Room for the River policy in 1996 introduced a new element into 
planning. The role of the region, including the provinces, water boards and 
municipalities, became crucial in elaborating policy. Until that point the provincial 
government was responsible for preparing and enforcing the regional plan (streekplan) 
and the competent authority for dike management, while its role in river management 
was not considered influential. Since the mid 1990s, however, the provinces wanted to 
play a more prominent role in river management, as Gelderland did after the peak 
discharges of 1993 and 1995 (see section 6.2.5). The terps plan in Overdiep Polder was 
the first plan the national government delegated to a lower-tier authority, in this case 
Noord-Brabant provincial government. The provincial government became responsible 
for the planning process, but Rijkswaterstaat was not used to devolving responsibility. 
This resulted in many disputes between the national and the provincial government.
The mandate of the provincial government can therefore be considered to be moderate.
Resources
The resources of the regional government included budget and people. The provincial 
government intended to use its budget of 10 million euros to prefinance the terps plan 
to get the ball rolling. Although this money was disputed,1079 as described earlier (see 
section 7.1), it proved to be a key factor in the province’s relationship with the national 
government as it gave the province more authority to act independently of 
Rijkswaterstaat, for example the way it dealt with the anticipatory purchases.1080 In this 
phase these funds were therefore sufficient and made a positive contribution.
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With regard to the people involved in the terps plan, there were two provincial officials 
working full-time on the project and one on a part-time basis. In addition, the province 
had many experts at its disposal.1081 The number of people was relatively low, but they 
had the right experience and knowledge of the relevant disciplines, which proved 
positive.
The resources of the provincial government can therefore be considered to be moderate.
Coordinating mechanisms
In contrast to the national government, the provincial government did not depend 
entirely on hierarchical coordinating mechanisms. The province was able to use the 
government hierarchy and informal networks and to bring together different 
government authorities in various fields. The provincial government’s internal 
coordinating mechanisms worked well. The provincial delegate, for example, was always 
available for questions from the project manager. Apart from a team dedicated to 
realising the terps plan, the province also had various experts at its disposal who could 
be called upon at any time.1082
The coordinating mechanisms can therefore be considered to be strong.
Consistency
The provincial government had a low-profile and took a supportive approach towards 
the local group. It therefore did not have to invent its own narrative and easily adopted 
the local group’s narrative.
The consistency of the provincial government (the adoption of a narrative) can 
therefore be considered to be strong.
Provincial government’s motivation to act
The provincial government’s motivation includes political priority, organisational 
ambition and personal vision.
Political priority
In recent decades the authority of the province has been limited by the creation of an 
administrative entity, the city-region (stadsregio). These were established to create an 
administrative structure for close cooperation between cities and the surrounding 
municipalities in the fields of spatial planning, housing, transport, employment and 
youth welfare.1083 This undermined the influence of the provincial governments in many 
fields. In this context, Noord-Brabant provincial government welcomed being given 
responsibility for the river project as it saw this as recognition of its legitimate role in 
the government hierarchy and an opportunity to build a more direct relationship with 
its citizens. The province used the terps plan as a vehicle to convince the national 
government that it has the capacity to implement a river project, and to show the
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residents that it is a dedicated, responsive, trustworthy and supportive organisation (see 
also 7.2.5). The political priority of the provincial government was to play a role in river 
management and take charge of the planning and implementation of the terps plan, 
which was in line with provincial policy.
The political priority of the provincial government can therefore be considered to be 
high.
Organisational ambition
The organisational ambition of the provincial government supported its political 
priority and the performance of the government officers supported the policy line that 
the province is competent to realise a river project.
The organisational ambition of the provincial government can therefore be considered 
to be strong.
Personal vision
The provincial delegates and the project managers provided the driving force behind 
the terps plan. Their motivation to act was particularly driven by their interest in 
making the province’s first river project a success. The personal motivation of the 
successive provincial delegates was to promote the terps plan to various government 
authorities. The various project managers were indispensable. The current project 
manager explained his drive as follows: ‘We want to show that the province is capable 
of implementing a river project. I am absolutely convinced that we can, despite the fact 
that we only have three people available for the project.’1084
The personal vision of the provincial delegates and officials can therefore be considered 
to be strong.
To summarise, with a moderate capacity to act and a strong motivation to act, the 
provincial government’s potential to act proved to be moderate. For an overview, see 
Table 7.6.
Table 7.6 Capacity, motivation and potential to act of provincial governm ent
Provincia l
go ve rn m e n t
capac ity  to  act m o tiva tion  to  act po ten tia l 
to  act
re s o u rc e s m a n d a te c o o r d in a t in g
m e c h a n is m s
c o n s is te n c y p o li t ic a l
p r io r i t y
o r g a n is a t io n a l
a m b it io n
p e rs o n a l
v is io n
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
± = weak/low + = moderate ++ = strong/high
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Local group's potential to act
The local group’s potential to act consists of its capacity to act and motivation to act. 
Local group’s capacity to act
The local groups’ capacity to act includes resources, trust and social identity.
Resources
The local group’s resources include dispositional force, bonding force, bridging force and 
linking force.
The local group’s dispositional force (skills, people, resources, available time) was strong. 
Two residents among the 17 families became the driving force of the local group. They 
had administrative skills acquired during their time as a member of Waalwijk Municipal 
Council and as a member of the water board and the farmers’ organisation, as well as 
negotiating skills and leadership skills, the vice chair having an informal leadership 
style.1085 Furthermore, they knew how to run an organisation and their media skills were 
excellent. The residents had land, which proved to be a strong asset in negotiations with 
the government authorities and one of the key factors during the process. The leaders of 
the residents managed to spend a lot of their time working on the project. The chair of 
the local group had just handed over the running of his farm to his son and the vice chair 
had a joint venture with his son. Other residents also devoted time to the local group’s 
activities.
The bonding force was strong and based on the closely knit social network of 17 farmers 
and an owner of a marina. This was manifested in close social relationships and networks 
of (reciprocal) cooperation that exist between farming families, especially between 
adjoining farms. Examples of this reciprocity were help with the harvest, occupation of 
the farm during holidays and helping with day-to-day farming activities. This bonding 
force is illustrated by the ability of the group to dispel the initial resistance of some 
farmers to the idea of water retention in their polder. They convinced their colleagues to 
see this idea as an opportunity to improve their farms rather than as a threat.1086 Apart 
from a few families the whole community relied on the two leaders during the planning 
process.1087
The bridging force of the residents was very strong. It started when some farmers 
approached the provincial delegate after an information meeting organised to inform 
the residents about the results of a study to identify ‘search areas’ for water retention, 
including Overdiep Polder. As they were member of various organisations, including 
Waalwijk Municipal Council, the water board and the farmers’ organisation ZLTO, they 
knew the area very well and had extensive networks. The local group also had direct access 
to the provincial delegate if they needed his advice on urgent issues. In their relationship 
with both the national government and the provincial government the residents opted for 
a critical but cooperative approach rather than a defensive attitude. ‘If something has to
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be done, it should be done quickly and on our terms’ was their attitude (Verhoeven 2006). 
The residents also used their bridging skills to engage the media. They knew when to use 
the media and when to use the threat of doing so would be sufficient. They were 
straightforward and authentic in their contacts with the media, using the right words 
and never blaming others or exaggerating.
Their linking force was also very strong. They were able to convince the government 
authorities that they wanted to take fully part in project decisions and arranged 
membership of the official supervisory group (ambtelijke begeleidingsgroep, ABG), usually 
not open to residents. The residents’ water expert was also appointed to the steering 
group, first as an observer and later as an adviser. However, as they were key players in the 
project and supported by the province, they knew their place. They discussed and aligned 
their decisions informally before formalising them in the official supervisory group.
In order to influence the outcome of decisions that would affect them, they exercised 
their bonding force (to operate as a group), bridging force (to take part in formal 
networks) and linking force (to negotiate with authorities and experts and take fully part 
in project decisions). An example is their ability to alter the design of the terps, dike and 
polder drawn up by the government-appointed Q-team. They employed all the types of 
forces: their bonding force, as all the residents relied on the leaders; their bridging force, 
because they were able to manage the conflict to reach a negotiated solution; and their 
linking force, because the province identified the residents as the key actors in the 
negotiation.
The local group’s resource basis can therefore be considered to be strong.
Trust
The local group had great faith in the water expert associated with Habiforum,1088 who 
became their confidant, moderator, facilitator and mediator,1089 and in the provincial 
delegate and the project manager. While the local group’s trust in the water expert was 
rapidly built up, their trust in the provincial delegate and the project manager took much 
longer to develop. As the chairs of the local group were members of various government 
authorities this did not prove to be a hard job because they were used to working with 
government decision-makers and government officials. The local group was very clear in 
what it expected from the province: a cooperative approach towards the terps plan.1090 The 
provincial delegate met the local group’s expectation by promoting the terps plan at 
various levels of government.1091 The provincial delegate’s willingness to be available to 
the residents in an emergency also increased their trust in him. This was boosted further 
after a dispute among the residents when the provincial delegate promised to visit the 
polder on a Saturday morning. When he confirmed his earlier statement that he would 
stick with options supported by all the residents, the foundation for a good understanding 
was finally laid.1092 The first project manager had built the sluice in Overdiep Polder, his 
first assignment for the province. ‘So he got our trust’.1093
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However, the residents’ trust in specific individuals proved to be dependent on those 
people’s abilities to resolve conflicts and find solutions and the relationship could easily 
change if the person in question was no longer be able to meet the residents’ demands, 
as the first project manager found out. The residents asked for him to be replaced because 
they viewed his inability to step outside the basic formal framework as a constraint on the 
prospects for getting the project implemented. The provincial delegate accepted the 
residents’ demand and replaced the project manager with someone whose profile 
matched the residents’ wishes.
In addition, from the beginning the residents had a strong belief in the ultimate success 
of the terps plan. This process trust was based mainly on their faith in individuals: their 
water expert, the provincial delegate and the project manager. The project manager: ‘The 
residents’ trust was mainly based on what they saw happening in practice.’1094
The local group’s trust can therefore be considered to be high.
Social identity
The residents had a strong social identity; they were a closely knit community attached 
to their land. This social identity goes back to the mid 1970s when the Overdiep Polder 
was protected from flooding. Previously, the farmers had used the land mainly for hay 
production. This bond first took shape when they met each other in the home of the vice 
chair to decide what to do after the government’s plan for water retention became public. 
The residents were motivated to act by the feeling of uncertainty about their future 
combined with their aversion to dependence on the government: ‘Most people are more 
afraid of the government than the water’ (van Rooy et al., 2006). This group feeling 
dominated during the whole planning process. An example is this statement by the local 
group chairman: ‘Naturally we do not determine what will happen here, but without our 
cooperation nothing will happen.’1095
The social identity of the local group can therefore be considered to be strong.
Local group’s motivation to act
The local group’s motivation to act encompasses common purpose and solidarity. 
Common purpose
The common purpose of the residents was clear: they wanted to reconstruct their polder 
to accommodate a one in 25 year flood in order to meet the public interest and secure an 
economically viable future for their farms. They conceived the terps plan to make water 
retention possible while providing for the continuation of eight to ten farms. Their shared 
purpose had a historical basis. A resident: ‘We arrived in Overdiep Polder in the 1970s to 
settle here for at least two generations. So, we really wanted to stay here.’1096
The common purpose of the local group can therefore be considered to be strong.
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Solidarity
Throughout the process the residents were able to act as a group, despite sometimes 
divergent personal interests. Although some residents put their personal interests above 
their common interests, most residents remained to support the local group. The local 
group chairman: ‘A 100 per cent support is not possible. A few residents left the group. 
That is quite a problem as we could not say that we represent the interests of about ten 
people, and those of the other four or five do not matter.’1097 The farmers demonstrated 
solidarity with their colleagues. The local group chairs, for example, provided confidential 
advice to other farmers on private matters, such as buying farms, deciding whether to 
stay or move, and on damage compensation.1098
The solidarity of the local group can therefore be considered to be strong.
To summarise, with a strong capacity to act and a strong motivation to act, the local 
group’s potential to act was strong. For an overview, see Table 7.7.
Table 7.7 Capacity, motivation and potential to act of local group
L o c a l  g r o u p  _EL
c a p a c i t y  t o  a c t m o t i v a t i o n  t o  a c t p o t e n t i a l  
t o  a c t
resources trust social identity common purpose solidarity
d bo br I
++ ++ ++
++ ++ ++ + ++ +
++ ++ ++ ++
- e -
± = weak/low + = moderate ++ = strong/high +++ = very strong/very high 
d = dispositional force bo = bonding force br = bridging force l = linking force
Table 7.8 summaries the potential to act of all the parties involved in the case study. 
The national government’s potential to act was weak, the provincial government’s 
potential to act was moderate and the local group’s potential to act was strong.
Table 7.8 Capacity, motivation and potential to act of national governm ent, provincial governm ent 
and local group
c a p a c ity  t o  a c t m o t iv a t io n  t o  a c t  p o te n t ia l t o  a c t
National governm ent + + +
Provincial governm ent + ++ +
Local group + + ++ ++
± = weak/low + = moderate ++ = strong/high
Note that ++ for the local group w ill not result in a better potential to act than the provincial 
governm ent's +. Here, two different standards are used, i.e. weak, moderate and strong in relation 
to what government or local group norm ally has when it comes to money, sk ills  etc. The outcomes 
thus are relative
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The analysis of the authorities’ and the local group’s potentiasl to act demonstrates that 
the national government fell short in the field of coordinating mechanisms and 
consistency (the construction or adoption of a narrative), which resulted in a weak 
capacity to act. The provincial government had a moderate mandate and resource base, 
combined with strong coordinating mechanisms and consistency, which resulted in a 
moderate capacity to act. While the national government had a moderate motivation 
to act, the provincial government’s motivation to act proved to be strong. Although the 
national government’s potential to act was weak, its influence in the planning process 
was considerable, partly due to its power building and interaction strategies. The 
national government’s weak potential to act, therefore, does not seem to have had much 
effect on its power building, its interaction strategies and interaction outcomes.
7.2.5 The authorities' organisational culture, 
the local group's cultural background and the impact 
of these on their action
In this section the authorities’ organisational culture and local group’s cultural 
background and the impact of these on their action is analysed. Object of analysis is the 
organisational culture of the national government and the impact of this on its action, 
the organisational culture of the provincial government and the impact of this on its 
action and the cultural background of the local group and the impact of this on its 
action respectively.
National government’s organisational culture and the impact of this on its action
From its inception Rijkswaterstaat had been a line-management agency at national 
government level with regional offices. As discussed in Chapter 2, throughout its history 
Rijkswaterstaat has rigorously defended and executed government policy. It was an 
exponent of an authoritative government style and enjoyed a dominant role in water 
management, preferably without interference or supervision by any other government 
body or office holders (Bosch & van der Ham, 1998). Over the centuries it has worked 
quietly on creating a new system of water management, new coastal defences and 
infrastructure works, all based on its own expertise and thinking. Indeed, many of its 
projects were only given a legislative basis when implementation had already started. 
However, Rijkswaterstaat was not a power unto itself as it was accountable to the 
Government and to Parliament, although it had a difficult relationship with both, and 
sometimes with its own minister. Many politicians found the closed nature of the 
organisation difficult to deal with, while Rijkswaterstaat officials, mostly engineers, had 
little patience with the limited responsiveness and decisiveness of politicians and 
preferred to fight internally rather than participate in a societal debate (Bosch & van der 
Ham, 1998).
322
-Q-
Madelinde PHD zonder afbrekingen:Opmaak 1 15- -2011 14:44 Pagina 323
Particularly after World War II, Rijkswaterstaat worked vigorously on the closure of 
many sea inlets, the construction of the national motorway network and the 
canalisation of the Rhine, Lek and Nederrijn (Bosch & van der Ham, 1998). Although 
from the 1960s parliamentary control increased and Rijkswaterstaat was obliged to 
follow legislative procedures in its daily practice, its authoritative attitude remained, 
including the limited openness and its preference for internal discussion over public 
debate. Its main opponents were no longer politicians, but citizens who were affected 
by the infrastructure it worked on and opposed the damage to the cultural landscape, 
supported by environmental groups in their defence of nature and the landscape 
(Wolsink, 2006; van Heezik, 2007). The clash between environmental groups and 
Rijkswaterstaat reached a climax in the conflict about the closing of the Eastern Scheldt 
in the mid 1970s, in which the government authority stood for flood safety and the 
environmental groups promoted a healthy ecosystem. Rijkswaterstaat had to accept 
partial defeat and were required to design the storm surge barrier with open 
compartments that can be closed when necessary, but it incorporated the ‘ecosystem 
values’ into its policies and adopted a green image. As a result, green engineers were 
now welcome at Rijkswaterstaat. It also adapted its policy and working style in an 
attempt to avoid public opposition to new infrastructure as much as possible and co­
opted environmental groups. At the same time, the ideas of integrated water 
management, including overcoming sectoral interests, found acceptance and were easily 
adopted by Rijkswaterstaat as the main water bodies, the rivers, were still ‘theirs’. 
However, the inclusion of citizens as stakeholders in the planning process and the 
devolution of responsibilities have so far been fraught with difficulties.
At the beginning of the 21st century a new actor entered Rijkswaterstaat’s theatre of 
operations: residents who came up with their own plan and demanded a key role in 
the planning process. Their plan was entirely compatible with national water policy; it 
met the conditions for flood safety and proved to be cost effective. However, dealing 
with residents who demand a key role in the planning process was a major challenge for 
Rijkswaterstaat. It went against the grain of the organisation’s engineering culture, in 
which government officials usually prepare a plan themselves and the role of residents 
is limited to giving their opinion during a public consultation round when the plan is 
almost ready (Winnubst & Ovaa, in prep.).
In addition, as part of the policy drive for a ‘meaner and leaner’ government 
Rijkswaterstaat was required to transform itself into an executive agency1099 by the end 
of 2006. With only fifteen years to complete the 39 projects in the Room for the River 
programme, which was launched in 2000, delegation to lower-tier authorities appeared 
to be the only option for achieving this organisational objective. This devolution of 
responsibilities was encapsulated in the motto ‘local where possible, central where 
necessary’.1100 However, Rijkswaterstaat officials saw this as a threat to their ‘natural’ 
mandate to prepare flood risk management plans for the country.1101 During the 
planning for the first delegated project, the terps plan in Overdiep Polder, they reacted
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accordingly. Until midway through the planning process in 2004, Rijkswaterstaat 
deliberately obstructed progress by failing to take decisions, exactly the attitude it 
disliked in politicians in the past.
Although this attitude faded during the course of the planning process, its authoritative 
stance and bureaucratic characteristics persisted. This became apparent in the disputes 
about the division of responsibilities between Rijkswaterstaat and the province. Bosch 
and van der Ham (1998) attributed this to the organisation’s military origins, which 
were manifested in its organisational culture.1102 Rijkswaterstaat’s organisational culture 
followed from the nature of its work. The operational management of the organisation 
is complex, from the maintenance of the water system and engineering works and the 
management of surface waters, motorways and shipping to the execution of public 
works. To make the organisation manageable many rules and regulations were 
formulated which continuously change in the light of alterations in demands and 
technological requirements. Apart from the question of whether this proved effective, 
the question of transparency arose. Furthermore, it led to bureaucracy and -  to a certain 
extent -  conservatism, which took shape in the relationship between Rijkswaterstaat 
and the province, as revealed by a statement by the project manager of the terps plan: 
‘Rijkswaterstaat has the tendency to fall back on its reflexes. The province is not part of 
Rijkswaterstaat.’1103
The impact of Rijkswaterstaat’s organisational culture on its action can therefore be 
considered to be strong, as it has a long tradition in water management.
Provincial government’s organisational culture and the impact of this on its action
The provincial government’s organisational culture is based on a multisectoral 
approach. As a lower-tier agency operating between the national and the local level, the 
province’s culture is distinctive. In its position in the middle of the government 
hierarchy it is used to dealing with different governmental tiers, styles and cultures. 
According to van Kemenade and Tetteroo (2007) the province fulfils the role of 
‘administrative gristle’. The province gives support, aligns and coordinates policy, and 
integrates and mediates in conflicts between authorities. It has a central coordinating 
and supervisory role in governmental and public networks, including business, 
transport, agriculture, nature and environmental organisations. Generally speaking, 
the province deals with issues that exceed the scope and capacity of local government, 
but are not important enough for the national government to take on.1104 One of the 
provinces major policy instruments is the regional plan (streekplan). The province 
determines where urban expansion can take place and where industrial estates and 
business parks can be built, and has various tasks in the field of water management.1105 
Apart from spatial planning and water management, the main tasks of the province 
include the environment, youth welfare, rural development, culture, cultural heritage, 
traffic and transport.
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Not only has the province been struggling for decades to overcome its negative image
-  often reflected in a poor turnout at the provincial elections (van Kemenade & 
Tetteroo, 2007) -  but the pressure to profile itself was increased by the appearance in 
1994 of a new regional authority, the city region. This administrative layer was 
established to ensure close cooperation between cities and the towns in the surrounding 
travel-to-work region and operate in the same policy areas as the province, such as 
spatial planning, housing, transport, employment and youth welfare.1106 In response the 
provinces have sought to raise their profile in policy areas such as the care of the elderly 
and disabled, nature conservation, recreation and tourism, regional archaeology and the 
preservation of historic buildings and monuments, but also by taking up other 
responsibilities (Peters, 2007), such as playing an active role in water management, like 
Noord-Brabant and Gelderland (see Chapter 6). Although some of these new tasks and 
roles have their basis in legislation (Arpad & Biermann, 2007), the province feels a need 
to restore or enhance its authority. It is still working on transforming itself from a 
modest and invisible provincial government with limited tasks and steering options 
into an important administrative layer involved in issues of public importance (Peters, 
2007). Van Kemenade and Tetteroo (2007) argue in favour of specialisation and 
developing in-depth expertise rather than broadening their range of duties, which is 
leading to ‘administrative confusion’ due to an overkill of intermunicipal cooperation 
networks. As a consequence, the province increasingly faces scale and coordination 
problems (trying to tackle major issues that properly require action at the national or 
local level) and conflicts of interest with national and local government in specific policy 
areas (van Kemenade & Tetteroo, 2007).
Although the provincial governments are recognised within government circles, the 
public know little about this tier of government, despite its wide range of duties (Peters, 
2007). Its activities are less visible to its residents than those of the national government 
and local authorities. Generally, the provincial government only comes into direct 
contact with residents when the law requires it, for example in public consultation 
procedures. Conversely, residents rarely seek direct contact with the province. Noord- 
Brabant provincial government set about bridging this distance to the public by 
earmarking a considerable annual budget to raise the profile and visibility of the 
organisation within the province (Peters, 2007).
When Jan Boelhouwer took office as a provincial delegate of Noord-Brabant in 1999, 
one of the policy areas in his portfolio was water. There was no political interest in this 
portfolio at that time, because the general opinion was that ‘we are finished with water; 
the Major Rivers Delta Plan was almost completed so the delegate’s role would be 
limited to cutting the tapes’, as Jan Boelhouwer remarked.1107 But it turned out 
otherwise. Jan Boelhouwer: ‘I received some signals that indicated that something was 
changing. In 1999 some Rijkswaterstaat officials visited me and presented several 
drawings, such as green rivers and retention areas, which put more blue areas on the 
map of the Netherlands. There was a discussion about opening the Haringvliet [a dam
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that closes off one of the sea inlets in the southwest of the Netherlands]. Then, in 2000 
in her Loevestein speech1108 the state secretary questioned the safety of the country as 
a result of climate change and problems like soil subsidence. I was informed about what 
the state secretary would say that very day, but for the residents it was a shock.’1109 
During a meeting in which the provincial delegate informed the region about the blue 
areas on the map, farmers in Overdiep Polder asked him if they could develop their 
own plan. The provincial delegate agreed to this and seized the opportunity to take the 
lead in the farmers’ initiative to redesign their polder as a water retention area in a way 
that would allow them to continue farming. This implied a new provincial responsibility 
as well as an opportunity to increase the province’s visibility.
The impact of the provincial government’s organisational culture on its action can 
therefore be considered to be moderate, in the sense that it is relatively flexible in its 
position towards other government authorities and citizens.
Local group’s cultural background and the impact o f this on its action
Since nearly all the residents of Overdiep Polder were farmers, they can be considered 
to have a farming culture. Apart from one pig farmer, all were dairy farmers. Except for 
their production system and farming practice, an important aspect of their culture is 
that most of the farms are family businesses. The farms are exposed to the vagaries of 
the weather, the volatility of the market and the influence of government regulations. 
While the farmers were used to living with the first variable, the second and third proved 
more difficult to live with as their impacts on the production system and farming 
practice had been increasing in recent decades. In the past, arable and dairy farmers in 
particular had had an almost free licence to produce and a nearly exclusive right to the 
land, but this changed as their importance in the food supply declined and their 
production process became increasingly associated with environmental degradation, 
animal diseases and adverse effects on animal welfare. In addition, as employment in 
the sector declined, so did its electoral and political significance. The overall trend is that 
the importance of the sector is decreasing relative to that of industry and the tertiary 
sectors. The once leading position of Dutch agriculture in Europe now seems to be 
falling behind as a result of increased productivity abroad, the ‘limits to growth’ 
imposed by overproduction measures (quota) and environmental regulations to 
prevent pollution and other adverse side-effects (Klijn et al., 2008).
As a result, specific characteristics of the farmers’ culture, such as their pro-active 
attitude and standing up for their interests, including polder management, and the 
establishment of cooperatives for their products and banking, also changed. Today, they 
are just one of many actors in a global economy, which implies that they can no longer 
rely on the national government for compensation for loss of income resulting from low 
market prices for their products. This means that their ‘traditional’ approach to 
defending their financial interests -  organising protest actions and asking for 
compensation measures, and using all possible means to overturn any negative
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government decisions -  is no longer a useful strategy. Nevertheless, in regional land use 
questions they still use this tactic, which means first responding negatively to regional 
developments, and if this is not successful in quashing the proposal, threatening to 
obstruct the planning process.
A few farmers in Overdiep Polder took this traditional approach in response to the 
news that their polder was a potential retention area. However, two other farmers in 
Overdiep Polder convinced their colleagues to develop a plan that would serve the 
public interest of flood protection as well as their private interest, a viable economic 
perspective. Based on their common identity as farmers, the residents of Overdiep 
Polder were able to form a group identity and used this to define a common purpose: 
to redesign their polder as a water retention area. What particularly stirred the residents 
was their aversion to the government (‘better soon and on our conditions, rather than 
uncertainty’1110). Instead of waiting until the national government came up with options 
for water retention and then fighting them in the courts right up to the Council of 
State, they drew up their own plan. As a group they took the lead, which proved to be 
a new phenomenon in Dutch river management since residents first started to oppose 
government plans for dike reinforcement in the 1960s and 1970s.
From their point of view, the farmers’ action was understandable. For centuries they had 
played a dominant role in water management in the polder and their dominant role in 
land consolidation schemes dates from the 1960s. But now they had to deal with other 
emergent issues. In agriculture a similar development to that in river management 
policy had taken place: the problem was no longer how to raise productivity in 
agriculture; the main task was to accommodate and regulate different and often 
conflicting claims on land (see Aarts & van Woerkum, 1996; Glasbergen, 2000). It was 
generally felt that the quality of the agricultural environment was poor and needed 
improvement in the short term. At the national level this led to a new and ambitious 
vision for governance. The policy sought to enhance the socioeconomic perspectives for 
agriculture while improving the quality of physical space and the environment. These 
elements were combined in what has been called the pursuit of sustainable development 
of the rural area. Key features of this policy were a process-oriented approach, regional 
differentiation and private participation (Glasbergen, 2000), including new institutional 
arrangements, such as environmental cooperatives, which usually have a noncommittal 
character.
While the first two key features are also characteristics of the SPKD Room for the River, 
the last is not. The farmers’ initiative can be viewed as private participation and in 
government terms as a form of self-governance. Although it was not part of the Room 
for the River programme, the farmers managed to get the authorities to accept their 
initiative. Unlike the noncommittal character of agricultural institutional arrangements, 
the farmers managed to play a full part in the project organisation, which resulted in 
both their and the authorities’ commitment to the realisation of the terps plan.
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The new role that the farmers had adopted was a matter of course in their common 
history of about 30 years of farming in the same polder, which they considered to be 
‘their’ polder and ‘their’ land. Although a small player in the field, the farmers felt 
capable of taking a risk for the sake of the continuation of their farms. The fact that it 
also served the public interest was a secondary consideration, but no less important. The 
basis for their interaction with government authorities was the long history of farming 
in their families, their knowledge of farming, their experience of various land 
consolidation schemes, and the support of the farmers’ organisation ZLTO, which they 
could fall back on at any time. The farmers were able to maintain their group identity 
during the planning process since it was based on kinship ties and bonds of friendship. 
These close bonds could withstand the distrust of some farmers who were mainly intent 
on getting the best out of it for themselves. Rather than using their identity in 
discussions with the authorities, the farmers emphasised their main interest: an 
economically viable future perspective for their farms.
The farmers’ ‘hands-on’ mentality and direct communication provided an incentive 
for the provincial government’s interaction, and indirectly for the national government’s 
responsiveness. While the provincial government was sensitive to accommodating the 
residents’ culture, the national government was not, but it was indirectly influenced by 
the local group’s interaction as the final goal -  the realisation of the terps plan -  fitted 
in perfectly with national policy.
The local group’s cultural background and the impact of this on its action can therefore 
be considered to be strong.
To summarise, the authorities’ organisational culture and local group’s cultural 
background and the impact of these on their action were manifested in different ways. 
The national government’s organisational culture and the impact of this on its action 
can be considered to be rather strong, particularly as result of Rijkswaterstaat’s 
engineering culture, which has existed since its inception in 1798. Rijkswaterstaat is a 
proponent of acting forcefully, as illustrated by its approach to water management by 
building and maintaining dikes and other infrastructure. To accommodate public 
criticism that the organisation was not taking nature and landscape values into account, 
it incorporated nature conservation into its policies. However, so far it has had difficulty 
in including citizens in the planning process and dealing with citizens who put forward 
their own plans to reduce flood risk. The provincial government’s organisational culture 
and the impact of this on its action can be considered moderate due to its position in 
the middle of the government hierarchy and its experience in dealing with different 
governmental styles and cultures. The local group’s cultural background and the impact 
of this on its action can be considered strong. The residents’ initiative to redesign their 
polder as a water retention area was based on their drive to continue their farms and 
trust in their own strength.
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The organisational culture of the government authorities and the cultural background 
of the local group have a limited explanatory power because they highlight the starting 
position of the actors and shed light on their position during the planning process 
rather than explaining the process of itself. Nevertheless, the analysis shows that the 
cultural factor had an impact on their potential to act, their power building, interaction 
strategies and interaction outcomes. The national government’s power building, its 
interaction strategies and its interaction outcomes can to a certain degree be considered 
as culturally determined in that it has been responsible for flood safety and reducing 
flood risks since 1798. The organisational culture of the provincial government -  
steering a middle course -  matched well with both the national government’s 
organisational culture and the local group’s cultural background and can partly explain 
its potential to act, its power building, its interaction strategies and its interaction 
outcomes. As the local group depended mainly on the provincial government to realise 
its plan, its cultural background only partly explains its potential to act, its power 
building, its interaction strategies and its interaction outcomes.
7.2.6 Sum m ary and discussion
The analysis of the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study can be summarised as 
follows.
-9-  -9-
The interaction between the authorities and the local group can be broken down into the 
interaction between the government authorities and the local group and between the two 
authorities: the national government (Department of Water Management, for which 
the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act) and the provincial 
government (province of Noord-Brabant).
The interaction between the national government and the local group always ended in 
debate and conflict, which in mist cases was resolved with the help of the province. The 
interaction between the provincial government and the local group resulted in debate, 
negotiation, dialogue and collaboration. If disputes emerged these always ended in a 
negotiated solution, but discord was generally prevented because the provincial 
government and the local group were continuously in ‘dialogue mode’. The interaction 
between the authorities led to debate and conflict as a result of recurring disputes in the 
area of responsibility. Thanks to the provincial government’s bridging strategies, these 
interaction outcomes always ended in a negotiated solution. Hence, negotiation was part 
of the interaction outcomes.
With regard to the interaction strategies, the national government generally used an 
identity frame and sometimes a power frame when dealing with the local group. The 
local group combined an identity frame and a conflict management frame in its
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interaction with the national government. Both occasionally used buffering and bridging 
strategies, which can be considered a conscious strategy. The local group alternated 
between a conflict management frame and an identity frame when dealing with the 
provincial government, while the provincial government mainly used a conflict 
management frame and a collaborative frame. The identity frame of the local group 
occurred incidentally. Under the influence of the provincial government’s bridging 
strategies and the local group’s open mind and receptive attitude to signals from others, 
the local group reframed and replaced its identity frame with a conflict management 
frame. After the first project manager was replaced the local group mainly employed a 
collaborative frame, but this did not mean that discord was absent. In addition, many 
potential disputes were resolved or even prevented, particularly by the provincial 
government’s attempts to bridge towards the local group. The provincial government 
and the local group used many bridging strategies and occasionally buffering strategies. 
The provincial government used buffering strategies particularly in private negotiations 
with residents, as did the residents. In its interaction with the provincial government 
the national government used a conflict management frame at the decision-making 
level, while government officials used an identity frame and sometimes a power frame. 
This power frame proved to be an important cause of disputes between the national and 
the provincial government, mostly in the area of responsibility. The provincial 
government generally used a conflict management frame when dealing with the national 
government. In a few cases, however, the province employed an identity frame, but this 
only emerged at the officer level. After the replacement of the project manager, the 
provincial government used only a conflict management frame. National government 
officials in particular used buffering strategies towards the provincial government, while 
bridging strategies were sometimes used at the decision-making level. This implied that 
at the decision-making level the national government was prepared to negotiate. 
However, negotiation only started with the help of the provincial government, which 
always took the first step. This was also the case when disputes emerged between the 
national government and the local group.
The national government built three power types in its interaction with the local group 
(indirect coercive power, legitimate power and hindering power), while the local group 
built five power types (legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power, media 
power and sociability). The local group built the same five power types in its dealings 
with the provincial government, which built three power types (indirect coercive power, 
knowledge power and sociability). The province built indirect coercive power as a last 
resort in its interaction with the farmers who were unwilling to negotiate about their 
land and real estate. The local group’s power building in its dealings with the provincial 
government did not have repercussions for their interaction outcomes, which varied 
from debate and negotiation to dialogue and collaboration due to the provincial 
government’s conflict management frame and bridging strategies. In the interaction 
between the authorities, the national government built four power types (indirect 
coercive power, legitimate power, hindering power and knowledge power) and the
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provincial government built three power types (indirect coercive power, knowledge 
power and sociability). As the power building of both authorities were more or less 
balanced, the provincial government’s use of a conflict management frame and bridging 
strategies were able to move the interaction outcomes of debate and conflict towards 
negotiation. In addition, when a government authority used indirect coercive power the 
other party, whether this was the other authority or the local group, was less willing to 
employ a conflict management frame and apply bridging strategies. The provincial 
government’s building of specific power types, particularly knowledge power and 
sociability, is understandable, since its interest in realising the terps plan demanded 
restraint in building indirect coercive power.
Despite the more or less balanced power building between the national and the 
provincial government, collaboration proved difficult for them to achieve. This type of 
interaction outcome might have occurred if both authorities restrained or abandoned 
the building of indirect coercive power (national and provincial government) and 
legitimate power (national government). Although legitimate power is a less dominant 
power type than indirect coercive power, it proved disadvantageous for the creation of 
mutual understanding and a tolerant atmosphere in which trust may grow. This can be 
considered a prerequisite for collaboration, as shown by the power building by the 
provincial government and the local group.
The national government’s potential to act was weak, the provincial government’s was 
moderate and the local group’s was strong. The national government failed in the field 
of coordinating mechanisms and consistency, which resulted in a weak capacity to act. 
Additionally, the national government had a moderate motivation to act. Despite its 
weak potential to act, the national government’s influence on the planning process was 
considerable, due partly to its power building, its interaction strategies and its 
organisational culture. The provincial government’s moderate potential to act was based 
on a moderate capacity to act and a strong motivation to act, and it proved a good basis 
for its interaction with the national government and the local group. The local group’s 
strong potential to act, which was based on its strong capacity and motivation to act, 
made it a forceful counterpart for both the national government and the provincial 
government.
The national government’s organisational culture and the local group’s cultural 
background and the impact of these on their action were strong, while this was moderate 
for the provincial government. The engineering culture that has dominated 
Rijkswaterstaat since its inception in 1798 still has a strong impact on its organisational 
culture. Rijkswaterstaat is a proponent of forceful action, as illustrated by its approach 
to water management by building and maintaining dikes and other infrastructure. To 
accommodate public criticism that the organisation was not taking nature and landscape 
values into account, it incorporated nature conservation into its policies. However, so far 
it has had difficulty in including citizens in the planning process and dealing with citizens
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who put forward their own plans to reduce flood risk. The provincial government’s 
organisational culture, which can be characterised as following a middle course, proved 
to be effective in its interaction with both the national government and the local group. 
Although the local group’s cultural background influenced its power building, 
interaction strategies and interaction outcomes strongly, it was very much dependent on 
the provincial government to achieve its objective. The organisational culture of the 
authorities and the local group’s cultural background therefore highlight their starting 
position and shed light on their position during the planning process rather than 
explaining the process.
Discussion
The question under discussion here is whether embedding a bottom-up initiative like the 
terps plan in national policy can be repeated elsewhere.
The Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study shows that a well organised group, assisted 
by the provincial government, can develop a plan that meets both its own interests and 
the wider public interest and get this plan adopted and implemented. In the Dutch 
situation, in which Rijkswaterstaat has for centuries played a dominant and authoritative 
role in water management, this can be considered a miracle. It was not only a result of 
the close cooperation between the provincial government and the local group, but also 
due to specific circumstances: it was a period in which the national government was 
open to experiments; Rijkswaterstaat was going through a reorganisation which obliged 
it to delegate river projects to lower-tier authorities; and the involvement of the 
independent organisation Habiforum was crucial in holding the government authorities 
together, particularly at the beginning of the process.
At first sight, it seems highly improbable that a similar initiative to the terps plan could 
be repeated elsewhere. During the planning process Rijkswaterstaat showed that 
devolving responsibility was not its strongest point. Instead of first laying down the 
ground rules and monitoring condition compliance, it wanted to have a strong finger in 
the pie. Furthermore, it did not publicise the terps plan as a success story at the national 
level, as it did internationally, probably because it did not have the lead; it was unable to 
deal with the fact that the residents came up with their own plan to reduce flood risk and 
was afraid to lose face. Citizen involvement like that in Overdiep Polder will therefore not 
become standard policy, at least not yet. Another argument is that the time for residents 
with ideas in the field of water management has past; now it is time to implement 
projects, at least along the main rivers. Although this is not the case for the small rivers, 
where there is room for new projects, the regional water problems are not that big and 
solutions are often found in combination with habitat restoration by buying out farmers.
It could also be argued that this experiment can well be repeated, because despite 
considerable opposition a residents’ plan that meets both the public interest and the 
residents’ interest will rise to the surface of its own accord. However, the Overdiep case
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study shows that some help is not only desirable but also necessary. Who then would help 
the residents? The national government is out of the question. What about the lower-tier 
authorities? The province is a likely candidate, but this is highly dependent on having a 
provincial delegate who wants to make a case for it, as in the Overdiep case study, and 
whether the residents’ ideas are compatible with the provincial water policy, which was 
the case for the emergency water storage in Ooijpolder (see Chapter 6). If we take the 
position of the municipality of Nijmegen into consideration (in the Dike Relocation in 
Lent case study, see Chapter 5), then the response is clear: one cannot expect any help. 
There are exceptions, such as the municipality of Ubbergen (see Chapter 6), but this 
depended on the mayor being willing to seize the opportunity to profile himself. Other 
options are the water boards and the Government Service for Land and Water 
Management (DLG),1111 but these authorities are not known for their inclusive approach. 
The last option is an independent organisation, such as Habiforum, that operates in a 
vacuum, waiting for an authority that will assume the responsibility to take the lead. In 
fact, it all comes down to the driving force of individuals who are willing to stick their 
neck out for the residents. The Overdiep case study showed that involving citizens during 
the planning process, from brainstorming to implementation, is not common practice 
for government authorities in the field of water management. In itself it is a rather 
strange phenomenon that government authorities that work for society are not willing 
or able to work with society to resolve public problems, especially because in the new 
Dutch style of governance citizens are seen as active participants and the government is 
working on a transformation into a more public-oriented organisation (see van den 
Brink, 2009). Apart from the fact that citizen inclusion is considered politically risky, a 
sense of urgency is missing. Although most projects in the Room for the River 
programme have passed the design phase and some are ready for implementation, this 
does not exonerate government authorities from the need to include residents in the 
implementation phase of the planning process and consider them as full actors. Their 
creativity, knowledge and values are needed to be able to cope with the complex 
problems facing society today. The Overdiep case study demonstrates that this input has 
value for government and residents alike. A vital condition is the willingness of both to 
search for solutions that meet the interests of society as a whole as well as the local 
residents.
The analytical framework and ideas for further research
The Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study demonstrates that some issues not 
included in the analytical framework, or only partially, had a considerable influence on 
the interaction between the authorities and the local group. First, relevant information, 
like the fact that the terps plan is a bottom-up initiative that was incorporated into 
current policy, but in a non-traditional manner as the residents were key players in the 
planning process, can only be obtained through the richness of citations used for 
analysing the case study. Second, a common discourse or ‘project narrative’ developed 
between the main participants -  the national government, the provincial government 
and the residents. The analytical framework was not adequate for answering the question
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of which arguments the key players used during the process and how the residents’ 
narrative developed into a dominant one. Third, the interaction between the authorities 
and the local group depended mainly on the personal drive of certain people, including 
the water expert. The dual basis of the analytical framework proved to be too small for 
the inclusion of ‘external people’. This was partially resolved by considering the water 
expert as one of the residents.
In the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study actors consciously and unconsciously 
used interaction strategies and power building. This would be an interesting subject for 
further research. Questions that could be addressed include: Why do the participants 
bring specific interaction strategies and power types into action? Do they have a 
particular objective in mind? Is this coincidental or is it an appropriate strategy? Another 
subject for research is the interaction patterns between the authorities and the local 
group and between the authorities. The question here is to what extent the interaction 
patterns are conscious or unconscious, and on which repertoires the actors rely.
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Chapter 8 Discussion
This chapter is a reflection on the Cross-Scale Interaction (CSI) framework and the study 
as a whole, and presents suggestions for further research.
8.1 Key characteristics of the CSI framework
Several remarks can be made about the practicability of the analytical framework used in 
this study, the CSI framework. The main characteristics of the CSI framework are 
described below.
Development of the CSI framework and its usefulness
To a large extent the CSI framework is an inductive outcome of the research project. In 
other words, the researcher and the framework ‘grew up together’ during the data 
gathering and the analysis of the case studies. This is particularly noticeable in the 
concepts. The analytical framework began with a few ideas about concepts, such as action 
potentials of actors, conflict and collaboration, and only took final shape after various 
concepts were added during the research period.
In general, as explained in Chapter 3, the framework provided useful information that 
otherwise would not have been obtained. In particular, it gave insight into the relationship 
between the actors, between the government authorities and the citizens and between 
different government authorities, and the power and interaction strategies they used from 
the start of their interaction until the final outcome. The framework unravelled many 
layers that are at work in government-citizen interaction, particularly concerning the 
actors’ potential to act, their building of social power, their use of interaction strategies and 
the outcomes of their interaction. Additionally, the framework gave insight into the actions 
of authorities in governance processes and how these processes are shaped. In other words, 
the CSI framework did its work quite well.
Based on its systematic and detailed character, its clarity of causal linkages, its well-defined 
relations with theory (see Chapter 3) and its proven workability in three complex cases, 
the framework seems to be a worthy basis for analytical research into cross-scale 
governance in general if used in combination with the researcher’s own insights, 
theoretical schemata and interests. This implies that the framework may also be a useful
335
-Q-
Madelinde PHD zonder afbrekingen:Opmaak 1 15- -2011 14:44 Pagina 336
analytical instrument for other researchers interested in the complexities of planning 
processes, particularly in the authorities’ and local group’s roles, their power and 
interaction strategies and the specific outcomes of the projects in which government 
authorities and local groups are involved. But the scope of the framework is by no means 
limited to the field of spatial planning. The SCI framework may also be useful in other 
areas, such as resource and environmental management, housing and infrastructure.
As the duality between authorities and citizens was the pillar of the CSI framework, it was 
difficult to incorporate third parties, such as water experts, businesses or external NGOs, 
into it. In other words, the framework as it stands would appear to be less useful for less 
dichotomous, more ‘round-table’ situations involving actors that fall outside the 
authority-citizen nexus.
Ease of use for analysis
The use of the SCI framework and the interpretation of the analysis require some 
explanation. The framework proved to be easy to use, but like many analytical tools it 
requires dedication on the part of the researcher. It takes some time to get to grips with 
the results of the analysis and determine which results are relevant. My experience with the 
SCI framework is that the analysis started with the interaction outcomes, then turned to 
the interaction strategies, the power building and the actors’ action potential, before finally 
addressing the organisational culture of the authorities and the cultural background of the 
local groups. Analysing government-citizen interaction implied that the relationship 
between the authorities also had to be taken into account. The assumption that this 
relationship might have an influence on the outcome of the government-citizen 
interaction led to another extensive analysis, this time of the authorities involved. The 
belief that relevant information would otherwise be lost was the driving force for this 
systematic, even ‘bureaucratic’ approach.
Such systematic comprehensiveness is good for the analysis. However, if this is reported 
without further structuring of the information, it burdens readers with too many 
unstructured details. Further work is needed to sift out the key actions, actors and events. 
This process makes the outcomes more stylised, but it can increase the level of insight and 
the reader will certainly be a lot happier.
The location of culture
When the analytical framework was near finalisation the concept of culture emerged. This 
seemed to be a factor that would be essential for interpreting the interaction outcomes. It 
was decided to call the concept of culture ‘culture and traditions’ when applied to the local 
groups and ‘organisational culture and traditions’ when applied to the government 
authorities. In addition, the concept was placed within dotted lines at the edge of the 
analytical framework to indicate its relevance in relation to the other concepts. This 
acknowledges culture as a potentially important background phenomenon, which may 
become more influential during the causal claim. The disadvantage of this structuring is
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that it does not invite the researcher to always look at cultural aspects of interactions.
8.2 Reflection on the study and the results
This section reflects on the study and the results. These are grouped under four questions: 
What worked? What turned out to be difficult? Which findings were unexpected? and 
What outcomes were expected?
What worked?
As mentioned earlier the SCI framework did its work quite well. The framework provided 
answers to the main research question (see Chapter 9) and gave insight in how and why 
the interaction between authorities and local group proceeded.
What turned out to be difficult?
At certain points difficulties were encountered in the development and application of the 
CSI framework. A few are described here.
While the properties of the local group’s potential to act were relatively easily derived from 
the literature, this was not the case for the authorities’ potential to act. A literature search 
with the terms ‘authorities’ capacity to act’ and ‘authorities’ motivation to act’ did not 
result in workable properties. The same was true for a search with more general terms. 
Therefore, the chosen research strategy was to formulate properties for the authorities’ 
potential to act and then to look for evidence of these properties in literature. This strategy 
proved to be useful, but the question of whether this subject had already been studied 
from this perspective or not remained unanswered.
The fact that the elements of the authorities’ and the local group’s potentials to act differed 
substantially made it difficult to compare their action potentials. Difficulties were also 
encountered during the assessment. How should action potentials, the use of building 
power and interaction strategies, and the interaction outcomes be assessed? I decided to 
base the estimation of the occurrence of these concepts on two, three or four moments in 
the planning process when, for example, evidence was found for a specific power that was 
built or an interaction strategy that was used. Nevertheless, prudence is called for when 
comparing the outcomes.
The inductive approach for constructing the CSI framework implied that the framework 
was subject to alteration until the last stage of the research. Accordingly, the empirical 
chapters had to be revised several times. Examples of these alterations of the framework 
include the types of social power. While analysing the building of social power it became 
clear that the difference between indirect coercive power and legitimate power was not 
that clear. However, it seemed important to distinguish between the two. The first was 
viewed as a more ‘forceful’ power, although indirect, whereas the second was seen as a
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demonstration or affirmation of being just and legitimate. While the first can be 
understood as serving an intention to coerce, the second shows that actors concerned are 
bound by rules and procedures, irrespective of whether or not they use these power types 
in practice. Therefore, indirect coercive power involves threat to use force or the law, or 
calling for the use of force or the law, whereas legitimate power can be interpreted as 
referring to one’s legitimate position. Although these types of power are essentially 
different expressions or degrees of the same thing and making a distinction between the 
two is rather analytical, this distinction proved to be useful. It was also difficult to 
distinguish between expert power and knowledge power. Expert power was conceived as 
originating from experts hired by citizens or authorities for contra-expertise or advisory 
work, or from experts working for the authorities, while knowledge power was viewed as 
the use of knowledge held by the citizens and officials themselves. The interpretation of 
knowledge power proved to be problematic: the boundaries between both types of power 
proved not to be clear cut because knowledge of a specific field or activity held by citizens 
can also be considered as expert knowledge. For example, farmers in Overdiep Polder are 
expert in farming, including land and water management in the polder. In contrast to 
indirect coercive power and legitimate power, distinguishing between expert power and 
knowledge power proved not to be important. It was not the owner of the knowledge that 
mattered, not whether or not it was bought in, but that the knowledge was used as an 
input to the discussion. I therefore decided to merge these two power types into one power 
type called ‘knowledge power’.
At first, the SCI framework included credibility because it was assumed to be a relevant 
type of power. Including credibility meant that the framework could account for the 
various faces of power, varying from coercion to trustworthiness. However, during the 
course of the research it became clear that this type of power throws up methodological 
problems. Credibility could be interpreted in different ways and some interpretations 
overlapped with other types of power (indirect coercive power and knowledge power). In 
addition, the exact meaning of credibility was not clear as the concept turned out to be 
multifaceted. The literature states that credibility is related to sociability, competence, 
character, composure and extraversion. I decided to use one of these meanings -  sociability
-  instead of credibility, for two reasons. First, a clear definition and a narrower scope would 
make the concept useful for analysis. Second, I considered the ‘human’ factor of social 
power to be too important to leave out.
It proved difficult to discriminate between the interaction outcomes ‘debate’ and ‘conflict’ 
and between the outcomes ‘dialogue’ and ‘collaboration’. Attempts to distinguish between 
these outcomes highlighted the difficulty of determining at what point debate changes 
into conflict and vice versa, and when dialogue changes into collaboration and vice versa. 
This study demonstrates that the area between conflict and debate and between dialogue 
and collaboration is rather complicated, and depends, among other things, on the actors’ 
own interpretations (see also etic-emic approaches below).
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Which findings were unexpected?
The unexpected findings are stated in the headings below, accompanied by a brief 
explanation.
Collaboration required the addition of a collaboration frame
Initially the frames used in this study were based on Gray’s (2003) conflict frames, three 
of which were included in this study: power frame, identity frame and conflict 
management frame. However, my empirical data revealed that collaboration, although 
uncommon, was a possible interaction outcome, which implied that a collaboration frame 
had to be added -  a logical step given that one of the interaction outcomes was 
collaboration. This development shows my bias as researcher: a focus on conflict rather 
than collaboration.
Media power had to be added to the set of power types
The analysis of the actors’ building of power indicated that one type of power was missing: 
media power. The media, whether television, newspapers or internet, provided an 
important platform that offered citizens and sometimes also government decision-makers 
of lower-tier authorities, including mayors and provincial delegates, the opportunity to 
influence decision-making. The question was whether media power actually existed. A 
literature search was carried out, after which media power was added to the set of types 
of power.
Evidence for the identity frame was hard to find
During the course of the research it proved to be difficult to find evidence for the identity 
frame as defined by Gray (2003). Instead of defining their own identities, the actors mainly 
described the characterisations they had of others. This did not correspond with Gray’s 
definition and typology of frames, which include a characterisation frame. Instead, I used 
Gray’s characterisation frame to obtain evidence for the identity frame.
Differences between the etic and emic view of the interaction process between the actors 
involved
A question that emerged during the last stage of the study was the difference between the 
etic and emic view: the outsider perspective and the insider perspective. I did not expect 
this, but it is understandable that the analysis of an interaction process by ‘insiders’ who 
were part of the process may be different from the analysis made by an external observer 
or researcher. In the Dike Relocation in Lent case study, for example, my assessment 
differed from the citizens’ and authorities’ (emic) judgement. Both were taken into account 
(see also section 8.3).
Situational factors may have an important impact on the planning process 
Situational factors and their influence on the planning process proved to be important. 
One type of situational factor is a political momentum, for example the maternity leave 
taken by the state secretary (which led to a political ‘vacuum’, at least in the short term, as
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the responsible minister who took over was not informed about all the details of the 
planning process), a majority in the House of Representatives, and the political skill of 
two MPs in avoiding loss of face by the state secretary. Another situational factor is a 
window of opportunity in policy terms, for example a period conducive to 
experimentation and a reorganisation of national government that entailed the delegation 
of responsibilities to lower-tier authorities. Situational factors may therefore be 
advantageous for one actor and disadvantageous for another. Although advantageous 
situational factors tend to lead to a good outcome for one of the parties, this does not 
have to be the case. If there is a ‘missing link’ somewhere, such as a failure to take 
appropriate action to exploit the advantageous situational factor, the outcome may 
nevertheless be disadvantageous for the same party.
Social identity and solidarity may also be different
From the literature I expected that social identity and solidarity would be similar, but this 
study shows that there may be a substantial difference between these two properties. The 
expectation that social identity is the same as solidarity was not borne out by my findings. 
An example is the Dike Relocation in Lent case study. The local groups had a strong social 
identity, but solidarity among the residents proved to be weak.
The number of power types depends on the interaction outcome
It turned out that the number of power types built by the actors depended on the 
interaction outcome. Where there was debate and conflict, the power strategy of 
authorities and local groups was based on the building of as many power types as possible. 
This was the other way round where there was dialogue and/or collaboration, in which 
case both parties built a minimum number of power types. When these interaction 
outcomes were extended to conflict management and debate the number of power types 
increased.
Both the authorities and the local groups built hindering power
Both the authorities and the local groups built hindering power during debate and conflict. 
Whereas authorities built hindering power covertly, local groups tended to be open in 
their hindering tactics. This made it difficult for local groups to deal with the hindering 
power exerted by the authorities, for example by invoking the freedom of information 
legislation, the Government Information (Public Access) Act (Wet openbaarheid van 
bestuur). Hindering power was also built between authorities during conflict and debate, 
mostly as a result of disputes in the field of responsibility.
Local groups’ use of the identity frame was based on interest; the authorities’ use of the identity 
frame was based on interest or institution
The identity frame of local groups was solely based on interest and not on locality (e.g. 
where they were based, or the places where people live or work) or both. However, it was 
expected that the local groups would not base their identities on characteristics of social 
stratification (e.g. class, race, gender or ethnicity), people’s roles (e.g. a carpenter or social
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reformer), or the institutions with which people are associated (e.g. a national government 
employee). Although citizens’ protests and plans were about the location where they lived 
(e.g. the village of Lent, Ooijpolder and Overdiep Polder), they never based their 
arguments on purely personal opinions or reasons, such as ‘we live in a beautiful area and 
want to keep it that way’, ‘we need to conserve this area for our grandchildren’ or ‘we have 
farmed this land for thirty years’. In all cases, the local groups emphasised their objections 
to the government’s arguments or plans, or the way they proposed to meet the public 
interest. In the Dike relocation in Lent case study, citizens showed that they had an 
alternative to the government plan to relocate the dike, which meant the demolition of 55 
houses. In the Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder case study, the polder residents 
argued that the assumption underlying the government plan, that there was a need for a 
‘calamity polder’, had not been properly substantiated. Furthermore, they emphasised the 
unequal treatment of people living in the outlying rural areas and those living in the core 
urban areas, questioning why their polder should be used as an emergency water storage 
area to protect the densely populated urban areas from flooding. In the Terps Plan in 
Overdiep Polder case study the farmers drew up their own plan to redesign the polder as 
a flood retention area with terps for their farms. They strived to combine the public 
interest of reducing the risk of flooding by the river Meuse with their own interest, a viable 
economic perspective for their farms. It was also unexpected that the identity frame of 
authorities would be based mainly on the interests at stake or the institution. The interest 
was always the public good, for example increasing flood safety. Sometimes government 
officials referred to their institution to motivate their actions (e.g. ‘the following 
procedures have to be followed’).
The identity frame was sometimes used interactionally
This study shows that identity frames could be used in different ways. This is illustrated 
by the use of the identity frame by the local government in the Dike Relocation in Lent case 
study in its dealings with the local groups and the national government. While it told the 
residents that it was not responsible for the decision-making, the local government let the 
national government know that it also had its own agenda. By deploying its identity frame 
strategically the local government used the identity frame interactionally.
Buffering and bridging strategies were always combined, except when the interaction outcome 
was collaboration
Buffering and bridging strategies were accompanied by the interaction outcomes of 
conflict, debate, negotiation and dialogue. Buffering strategies were not used only when 
the interaction outcome was collaboration. This indicates that the parties involved believed 
there was always an opportunity for a way out, even in situations of conflict or debate. 
The case studies show that both parties must use bridging strategies for there to be a 
realistic chance of moving from ‘conflictive’ interaction outcomes, e.g. conflict and debate, 
to ‘collaborative’ interaction outcomes, such as dialogue and collaboration.
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Citizens and authorities undergo a learning process
Although it was expected that the actors in the planning process would undergo some 
form of learning process, it was unexpected that they would adopt ‘third party’ roles 
themselves. Actors in the Terps Plan of Overdiep Polder case study recognised the ‘inner’ 
cycles of the planning process, such as the stages of debate. They were also able to 
determine the appropriate time to facilitate, when to use conflict, when resolution is 
needed, when to engage in dialogue and when it was necessary to moderate. Additionally, 
the actors were able to facilitate debate, to mediate conflict and to moderate dialogue 
themselves. Another form of learning in the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study was 
that citizens cooperating closely with the provincial government of Noord-Brabant knew 
exactly how far they could go when disputes arose. When necessary they reframed from 
an identity frame to a conflict management frame to make negotiation possible. The 
provincial government placed great importance on meeting the citizens’ wishes and knew 
what was acceptable to the citizens. As the provincial government always used a conflict 
management frame it was not difficult to start talks about resolving disputes. Both parties 
found that by using a give and take mechanism in their relationship they would finally 
achieve their common goal.
Government-citizen interaction is embedded in various relational ‘modes’
The context of government-citizen interaction proved to be important. However, the 
extent to which this influenced the government-citizen interaction was unexpected. By 
context I mean the set of facts and circumstances on which the relationship is based. When 
a relationship involves an alliance or coalition, in other words when it can be defined as a 
‘collaborative’ mode, it may be characterised by debate, negotiation, dialogue or 
collaboration. When a relationship involves conflict, in other words when it can be defined 
as a ‘conflictive’ mode, then it may be characterised by debate and conflict. Whereas a 
‘collaborative’ relationship may easily change into a ‘conflictive’ one, the reverse may be 
hard to achieve; the case studies show that it is difficult to escape from such a ‘conflictive’ 
mode. The relational ‘modes’ in which government-citizen interaction was embedded 
and the possibility or impossibility of changing from one mode to another mode were 
unexpected outcomes of this study.
Functional interdependencies between authorities and citizens only occurred when they shared 
a common goal
Functional interdependencies between authorities and citizens in Dutch river landscape 
planning only occurred when both parties were involved in a river project and jointly 
defined a common goal. The pathway to their joint objective was paved with disputes, 
which in fact were conflicts of interest. To collaborate, both parties need to be aware of 
their interdependency and they need to be able to look beyond their disputes of interest 
and the attraction of short-lived gains. If they are able to remaining focused on their 
common goal, they can create a constructive atmosphere in which they can work together 
to achieve it.
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Co-opting citizens is not needed if both the public interest and the citizens’ interest can be 
combined
Co-option of local interests by the national government is not needed if the authorities 
and the citizens are fully engaged in a planning process and both the public interest and 
the interests of the people directly affected can be combined.
Planning processes involving different spatial and temporal scales were successful when the 
leading authority was flexible in its actions
Planning processes that involve different spatial and temporal scales did not hamper the 
governance process as long as the leading authority was flexible in moving from one spatial 
scale to another and took account of the different timescales of the actors involved, 
whether these were citizens, government officers or government decision-makers. An 
example of this flexibility is the conduct of Noord-Brabant provincial government in the 
Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study. It was able to move from the national level (the 
national authority in charge of water management, Rijkswaterstaat) to the local level (the 
municipalities of Waalwijk and Geertruidenberg). At the same time the province took the 
timescales of the various actors into account. It had, for example, to comply with 
Rijkswaterstaat officials, who were bound to the project auditing scheme, and local 
government officials, who were responsible for the local land use plan. In addition, it tried 
to speed up the process as much as possible to meet the citizens’ wishes. The provincial 
government supported the national government and local government officials through 
linking procedures and by bringing them into a coherent time frame, which shortened 
the planning process. The provincial government provided a stable team of key players 
who supported their provincial delegate, who, as a politician, worked with a short time 
horizon and often changed position. For all the actors, particularly citizens who take part 
voluntarily, this process requires persistence, patience and dedication to achieving a 
satisfactory outcome.
What outcomes were expected?
The expected findings are stated in the headings below, accompanied by a brief 
explanation.
Some propositions stated a t the beginning were correct
This study demonstrated that some of the propositions stated at the beginning of the 
research were correct, such as history is an important factor in today’s government-citizen 
relationship, once a top-down approach by the government has been set in motion it is 
very hard to change, and collaboration is difficult to achieve in the government-citizen 
interaction while conflict is a more likely interaction outcome.
Conflict is difficult to resolve in a formal setting
The case studies confirmed the expectation that conflicts between authorities and local 
groups are difficult to resolve in a formal setting because it means one or more of the 
authorities involved will lose face.
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Authorities with a low and moderate potential to act are more willing to engage when the 
government-citizen relationship can be characterised as an alliance or coalition 
It was expected that authorities with a low and moderate potential to act are more willing 
to engage and that the resulting government-citizen interaction will generally end in 
dialogue or collaboration. However, this is conditional on the interaction taking place in 
a ‘collaborative’ mode in which the relationship between authorities and citizens can be 
characterised as an alliance or coalition.
Power is central in planning processes and mainly used in a pragmatic way 
As expected, power was central in the planning processes. This study confirmed that Dutch 
river landscape planning practice can be perceived as a battle between actors who 
continuously build power in their dealings with one another. Actors who opposed each 
other proved to be flexible in the type of power they built. This was not so much a conscious 
strategy, but rather it seemed a pragmatic estimation of their chances of gaining influence. 
In the case of the local groups this depended mainly on situational factors, like the presence 
of a water expert who was willing to support the groups (to build knowledge power), a 
journalist who was interested in following the local groups’ actions (to build media power), 
the reactions of the opponent, and their assessment of which type of power was most 
appropriate for the situation at hand. In the case of the government authorities, the 
government decision-makers often had different interests than the government officials, 
and therefore adopted different power strategies. The strategies used by government 
decision-makers were leading. Sometimes this led to a supporting strategy by government 
officials, particularly when they worked at the head office. Officials who worked at the 
regional office and had regular contacts with societal groups often chose a softening 
strategy. However, the position taken by their superiors finally determined the amount of 
leeway they had to operate in line with their own vision.
Dialogue and collaboration flourished best in an informal setting
Another expected outcome of this study was the fact that dialogue and collaboration 
flourished best in an informal setting. When authorities and citizens were interacting in an 
informal setting, reciprocity, such as give and take mechanisms and unwritten rules, proved 
to be the dominant form of interaction. In this informal setting actors worked on 
strengthening their relationship and building trust.
Lower-tier authorities were better equipped to maintain relationships with local groups than 
national government
An expectation that was borne out by the case studies was that a longstanding relationship 
between authorities and citizens was very helpful for governance practices. However, this 
study showed that lower-tier authorities, if they were willing to engage, proved to be better 
equipped to maintain a relationship with local groups than national government.
Social interaction takes place vertically
The expectation that social interaction in Dutch river landscape planning occurs vertically
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(across levels of organisations) was also borne out this study. Citizens who organised 
themselves into local groups did not have contacts with other groups from different places. 
Their attention was directed solely at the government authorities and their interaction with 
the authorities was locally based. This may be because Rijkswaterstaat is a very strong, 
outspoken government actor and the local groups had no knowledge of horizontal 
planning.
Citizens’ opposition is a demand for a say in the planning process
Another expected outcome of this study was that public opposition to government plans 
in Dutch river landscape planning occurs in the context of the public’s role as a source of 
policy ideas and the need for broader citizen engagement in making policy, rather than 
purely an expression of evasive or overt resistance. This study demonstrated that citizens’ 
opposition in Dutch river landscape planning has to be viewed as a demand for a say in the 
planning process.
The command and control approach by national government hampers the process of 
engagement and re-engagement of the authorities and citizens
Despite the internal changes within government and the existence of multilevel governance, 
the interaction between the national government and citizens can be characterised more by 
command and control than by dialogue and negotiation. When the national government 
takes a command and control approach rather than a governance approach, this hampers 
the process of engagement and re-engagement of partners. Interaction between authorities 
involves both command and control and dialogue and negotiation, which means that 
enduring conflict between authorities will hinder both in achieving their ends. Therefore, 
authorities are more or less obliged to include conflict management in their interaction 
portfolio.
Conflicts in Dutch river landscape planning are divisible rather than indivisible 
An expected outcome of this study was that the conflicts that occurred in the context of 
Dutch river landscape planning were ‘divisible’ conflicts about ‘getting more or less what you 
want’ rather than indivisible ones of an ‘either/or’ nature (e.g. when personal attachments 
to the river landscape is at stake and changes in the landscape are perceived as an attack on 
one’s identity). An example of a divisible conflict is the Dike Relocation in Lent case study. 
Here, authorities and citizens took opposing positions regarding the demolition of 55 
houses in the government plan. The local groups presented an alternative which would 
meet the national government’s aim of relieving the bottleneck in the river while retaining 
these 55 houses. The conflict in Ooijpolder (Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder case 
study) may be viewed as indivisible as far as the local group’s strategy is concerned. The 
residents attempted to get the government plan off the table by presenting themselves as 
people living in a polder near the Dutch/German border to be used as a calamity polder to 
prevent flooding in the densely populated areas of the country -  in other words, by 
highlighting the inequality between ‘us’ and ‘them’ regarding flood safety. However, a closer 
look at this conflict reveals that it is actually a divisible conflict, because the local group
345
-Q-
Madelinde PHD zonder afbrekingen:Opmaak 1 15- -2011 14:44 Pagina 346
stated that if the government plan was properly substantiated with clear evidence that the 
government plan for emergency water storage in their polder was needed, they would have 
accepted it. Moreover, the residents’ identity frame referred solely to their interest. Although 
their interest had much to do with their personal attachment to their locality, they never 
made a reference to their locality when arguing their case with the national government. 
Their pragmatic strategy towards the national government showed an initial willingness to 
comply with the government plan, rather than a response to a perceived attack on their 
identity. The conflict in Ooijpolder is therefore divisible rather than indivisible.
Dutch river landscape planning practice reflects a struggle between a representative model of 
democracy and a deliberative model of democracy
It was expected that the playing field of Dutch river landscape planning practice would 
involve a struggle between a representative model of democracy and a deliberative model 
of democracy. This study indicates that this conflict is indeed present. It also provides 
insights in how this can be dealt with. An illustration is the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder 
case study in which Noord-Brabant provincial government proved to be a skilful leader in 
dealing with citizens who initiated their own plan, which was going to be implemented, 
and Rijkswaterstaat, with its command and control approach.
Citizens need to meet certain conditions to be taken seriously by the authorities 
As Dutch government authorities do not feel comfortable when people are angry about 
their proposals, in planning processes they continue to discuss and negotiate with those 
involved in an attempt to accommodate the local population’s wishes. Therefore it was 
expected that the best way for citizens to be heard and taken seriously was to use the 
language of officialdom and expert jargon. The alternative, organising protest action to get 
public attention, possibly in an atmosphere of threat, would not be successful because 
government authorities do not view this type of protest as constructive and would not 
therefore feel obliged to involve the citizens in the planning process. Additionally, a 
constituency of people with various backgrounds was not decisive in getting the local group 
accepted by the authorities as a serious partner. In the Emergency Water Storage in 
Ooijpolder case study the local group consisted of people of various backgrounds, while in 
the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study all the members of the local group were 
farmers. However, in both case studies the residents were accepted by the authorities as a 
serious partner. A condition for success is that the spokesperson must be willing to adopt 
the communicative rules of the authorities.
8.3 Suggestions for further research
This study has generated new insights into the government-citizen interaction in Dutch 
river landscape planning. Five subjects are selected for further research: building power in 
the fine grain of people’s routines, policy discourse and governance practices; motivations 
for using bridging and buffering strategies and frames; integrating etic and emic into the
346
-Q-
Madelinde PHD zonder afbrekingen:Opmaak 1 15- -2011 14:44 Pagina 347
analytic framework; and horizontal planning in a vertical embedding: is it an incentive for 
collaborative planning or doomed to fail?
Building power in the fine grain of people’s routines, policy discourse and governance 
practice
A study area that would be of interest is the embedded dimension of power, Lukes’ third 
dimension of power that shapes and modifies people’s desires and beliefs (Lukes 1986:10) 
and which is found in the fine grain of the daily routines of people, policy discourses and 
governance practices (Healey 2003). This proposed research can be divided into three parts. 
The first part is a study at the micro level into the wishes and beliefs of government 
authorities and citizens. The topics to be investigated include the factors that influence the 
wishes and beliefs of government authorities and citizens, the effects of these factors on 
these wishes and beliefs, and the power mechanisms that are at work when making these 
wishes and beliefs explicit. The second part of the research is a study at the meso level. This 
research would seek to gain more understanding of the policy discourse. It would address 
questions such as how the policy discourse has been developed, who is in charge and who 
is not, how the actors influence the policy discourse to suit their own ends, what input the 
actors have, and which mechanisms underlie the policy discourse. The third part of the 
research is a study at the macro level. This research may be designed to understand 
governance practices from a power perspective at a more aggregate level. Questions that 
may be addressed include how governance practices evolve in terms of power relations 
between the actors involved, what are the most emergent factors that influence the power 
relations between the actors in these processes, and what patterns of power relations 
between actors in governance processes can be distinguished.
Motivations to use frames and bridging and buffering strategies
Another subject for further research is the motivations of authorities and citizens to use 
frames and bridging and buffering strategies. Topics that can be addressed include who has 
the decisive influence over the use of specific frames; who has the leading role in reframing; 
what motivates authorities and citizens to use buffering or bridging strategies in a conflict, 
debate, negotiation and dialogue; how they assess the effect of the use of these strategies; 
what their reasons are for continuing a conflict or debate; how they assess the opportunities 
to move from conflict to a more collaborative interaction outcome, such as debate, 
negotiation, dialogue and collaboration; what motivates them to be engaged in 
collaboration and dialogue; their reasons for falling back into debate and conflict; and their 
motives for accepting negotiation.
Integrating etic and emic into the analytic framework
Although the SCI framework is based on the authorities’ and citizens’ views on their 
interaction, it was essentially my idea to explore the meaning of social interaction. The 
main reason was that government-citizen interaction could be studied on an abstract level. 
During the application of the CSI framework two approaches to culture and society became 
apparent: the etic and emic approaches (Pike, 1967). This concept derives from linguistics,
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but has been extensively applied in anthropology and, to a certain degree, in other social 
sciences, such as behavioural psychology. The etic or outsider perspective draws on 
anthropological approaches that link cultural practices to external, antecedent factors, 
such as economic and ecological conditions, that may not be salient to cultural insiders 
(Harris, 1979) and it also draws on the tradition of behaviourist psychology that looks at 
the use of experimental procedures to study behaviour in relation to the environment 
(Skinner, 1938). The emic or insider perspective predominates in cultural anthropologist 
studies that seek to understand culture from the ‘native’s point of view’, such as 
Malinowski’s (1922) study of the Pacific and in the tradition of psychological studies of 
folk beliefs (Morris et al., 1999). The emic perspective on government-citizen interaction 
will not always correspond with the etic perspective. The difference between etic and emic 
became apparent after verifying the main results with the actors involved by asking them 
about their vision on the planning process. As a result, some outcomes of the government- 
citizen interaction had to be interpreted differently, such as the authorities’ and citizens’ 
action potential and their power building in the Dike Relocation in Lent case study. The 
actors’ assessment of their action potential was not the same as the results of my analysis, 
which were that the action potential of the local groups was weak and the action potential 
of the national government was strong. The expectation, therefore, was that the local 
groups would not have a strong basis to act, in contrast to the national government’s 
action potential. The citizens and authorities felt that the national government’s basis to 
act was less strong and the local groups’ basis to act was stronger. My assessment of power 
building in the Dike Relocation in Lent case study was that the authorities and citizens 
used a similar number of power types. The local groups built five types of power in their 
dealings with the national government and built four types of power in their dealings 
with the local government. The citizens’ and the authorities’ assessments of the authorities’ 
building of power were that it was less influential than the citizens’ building of power. 
How etic and emic can be integrated in an analytical framework remains a subject for 
further research.
Horizontal planning in a strong government environment: is it an incentive for 
collaborative planning or doomed to fail?
This study covered cross-scale (vertical) planning practice between authorities and 
citizens. I found that the vertical planning routines used in the case studies were not 
flexible enough to accommodate horizontal planning initiatives. This suggests that vertical 
planning practice and horizontal planning initiatives lead to complicated relationships. A 
subject for research may be horizontal planning initiatives in an environment of strong 
government like the Netherlands. Experiences with horizontal planning in countries with 
a weak government structure would be relevant to this research. Questions to be explored 
are: what would horizontal planning look like in these situations; what are the experiences 
with current horizontal projects; what are the main tensions horizontal projects would 
face in a vertical planning environment; are institutions flexible enough to include a 
horizontal project in their portfolio; and how do government decision-makers deal with 
differences between the vertical planning practice and horizontal planning projects?
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Chapter 9 Conclusion
This chapter focuses on the topics most closely related to the research question. The 
subject of this thesis is cross-scale interaction between government authorities and 
citizens in Dutch river landscape planning. The research question was What factors and 
mechanisms influence government-citizen interaction? I will answer this question by 
reviewing the emergent and underlying factors that influence government-citizen 
interaction and the mechanisms involved.
Emergent factors
The emergent factors that influence government-citizen interaction identified from 
the empirical data and analysis are: building trust, uncertainties, citizen exclusion, 
institutions with a focus on formal roles, authorities’ and citizens’ willingness to engage 
and situational factors. The headings below can be read as brief conclusions.
Building trust is difficult in government-citizen relationships
Trust turned out to be a crucial factor in government-citizen interaction. Without trust 
the government-citizen relationship will not evolve and will remain stuck in a 
‘conflictive’ mode (see below), resulting in ‘conflictive’ interaction outcomes, such as 
conflict and debate, at one end of a continuum on which dialogue and collaboration are 
considered ‘collaborative’ interaction outcomes. Building trust proved to be difficult 
for both authorities and citizens as both parties tended to distrust each other. 
Difficulties were experienced both when the authorities were leading in a planning 
project and when they were not, and both when citizens were affected by a government 
plan and when they were the initiators of their own plan. Building trust requires a 
continuous effort by both parties. Authorities and citizens need to know each other in 
order to be able to answer the question of whether the other party is trustworthy and 
so it generally takes time before parties trust each other. Building trust requires 
vigilance. As the Dutch saying goes, ‘trust comes by foot and leaves on horseback’.
A difficulty to build trust is that government authorities in particular operate in a 
formal setting, while trust is most easily built and maintained in an informal setting. An 
important obstacle to building trust in a formal setting is that contacts between people 
are based mainly on contracts, agreements, laws, procedures and rules. This is often 
referred to as ‘formalised distrust’, which is a characteristic of government in modern 
democratic societies. A key requirement for building trust is the exchange of
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information based on reciprocity, such as give and take mechanisms (‘If I do this for 
you, you do that for me’) and unwritten rules. This implies that authorities and citizens 
have to invest in dealing with each other in an informal way, which requires open 
communication about the parties’ wishes, their objectives, their views on how to achieve 
their ends, and a reflective attitude in which each party’s actions and behaviour are 
open to discussion.
Governance processes throw up new uncertainties
In essence, governance processes seek to deal with uncertainties, for example about the 
outcomes and the actors involved. However, they also create new uncertainties, for 
example about decision-making (how much influence do the actors have?) and creating 
precedents. Generally, in a traditional approach the process is relatively fixed and 
designed to exclude uncertainties as much as possible, while in a more interactive style 
the process is open, which implies there will be many uncertainties. Uncertainties 
proved to be problematic, particularly for the government authorities. Government 
decision-makers possess a survival instinct that drives them to choose pathways that 
involve less risk, and strategies that minimise risk often mean falling back on a 
traditional approach. This generally entails a ‘closed’ participation process using 
traditional participation instruments, such as consultation and information meetings, 
rather than instruments that foster deliberation, such as design workshops and round­
table meetings. Top-down approaches usually leave little room for government officials 
to pursue an open planning process. This often means that they are bound to 
procedures and are restricted to traditional pathways. Government decision-makers 
who are involved in an interactive planning process may perceive uncertainties as a 
threat to their legitimacy and their traditional role, or they may welcome them as 
offering an opportunity to emphasise other aspects of their portfolio (e.g. public 
participation) and raise their public profile.
Citizens generally consider uncertainties to be less problematic as they will always be 
present, whether they are opposing a government plan or involved in a joint initiative. 
When opposing a government plan, citizens face uncertainties about the process -  will 
their views be heard and will they be included in the planning process? -  and about the 
outcome -  will they win or lose? When they are involved in a joint initiative, the 
uncertainties regarding the process are about how they can ensure that they are part of 
the decision-making process and that the joint initiative will be continued throughout 
the process despite a high turnover of government officials. They will also not be certain 
that the joint initiative will be successful. Uncertainties are an important factor in 
government-citizen interaction because they increase the risk of a breakdown in trust 
between the actors involved.
Citizen exclusion is a  source o f conflict between authorities and citizens
Excluding citizens from the design process and/or follow-up phases of the planning
process creates distrust towards authorities. This study indicates that the exclusion of
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citizens in planning processes is a relevant factor that has far-reaching consequences 
for government-citizen interaction. If citizens are excluded the interaction will start in 
a ‘conflictive’ government-citizen relationship (see below), resulting in ‘conflictive’ 
interaction outcomes, such as conflict and debate. Moreover, as actors in a conflictive 
relationship tend to focus on their differences rather than their similarities or common 
goals, it is hard to normalise such relationships in an attempt to escape from this 
‘conflictive’ mode.
Institutions with a focus on formal roles cannot adequately support governance processes 
Many government institutions are solely embedded in the formal world where the 
foundation of actions is formalised distrust based on laws, procedures, rules and 
contracts. In contrast, most everyday social interactions are informal. This study shows 
that government institutions that are unable to link the formal with the informal world 
had a negative impact on government-citizen interaction, resulting in conflict and 
debate. Government institutions in which one or a few individuals could make a 
difference by switching from the formal to the informal world had a positive influence 
on the government-citizen interaction by stimulating dialogue and collaboration.
Authorities’ willingness to engage is a  condition for being responsive in governance processes 
Contracts and constitutional provisions are considered to limit government 
responsiveness, but if individual government officials are able to deal with the 
complexities and uncertainties in governance processes, these are viewed as palliative 
measures at best (Rodrik and Zeckhauser 1988). Although such individuals are 
courageous in the sense that they stick their neck out, their actions are in fact a stopgap 
because they will not solve the problems of government unresponsiveness unless, for 
example, all the officials involved have internalised strategies for dealing with the 
complexities and uncertainties in governance processes. This study shows that when 
government actions are under the control of individuals (as a result of their willingness 
to engage) the relevant authorities were more responsive. They were more willing to 
respond to citizens’ demands to be included in the planning process, among others, 
while policy-making (the Room for the River programme) determined the prerequisites 
for the authorities’ responsiveness. The most important factor, however, is a change in 
organisational culture. This enables the staff to internalise different cultural beliefs so 
that policy agreements are put into practice by all involved rather than just a few. The 
conclusion that can be drawn is that the authorities that were willing to engage had a 
positive effect on the government-citizen interaction, which often resulted in dialogue 
and collaboration. When the authorities were not willing to engage they had a negative 
impact on the government-citizen interaction, resulting in conflict and debate. The 
authorities’ willingness to engage is therefore an important factor in government- 
citizen interaction.
Citizens’ willingness to engage needs to be taken seriously by the authorities 
An emergent factor is the citizens’ willingness to engage, which influences the
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government-citizen interaction. The analysis indicates that citizens’ willingness to 
engage leads to a ‘conflictive’ government-citizen relationship when the authorities 
exclude citizens (see also the emergent factor concerning citizen exclusion). It may also 
result in a ‘collaborative’ government-citizen relationship, particularly when both the 
public interest and the local citizens’ interest can be met, which implies citizen 
involvement. While the former always has a negative impact on the government-citizen 
interaction because it will end in conflict and debate, the latter may influence the 
government-citizen interaction positively because it will result in either a mixture of 
debate, negotiation, dialogue and collaboration or a mixture of dialogue and 
collaboration.
Situational factors are crucial in governance processes
Situational factors, such as the opportunity to get the support of a water expert and the 
policy change in water management that allowed the national government to broaden 
the scope of its policy measures to include land outside the river dikes, have a large 
impact on government-citizen interaction. Such factors influenced the government- 
citizen interaction by opening up new opportunities. The context in which this occurred 
determined whether this impact could be described as negative, resulting in conflict 
and debate, or positive, resulting in debate, negotiation, dialogue and/or collaboration.
Underlying factors
The analysis of the empirical data identified three underlying factors. The first is related 
to the different ‘modes’ of relationship in which government-citizen interaction takes 
place and the dynamics of the interaction. The second and third are related to the 
rapidly changing societal configurations of state, civil society and the market.
Long-term modes and short-term dynamics are part o f government-citizen interaction 
This study shows that the relationship between authorities and citizens in Dutch river 
landscape planning was based on a stable pattern. A distinction can be made between 
a conflictive and collaborative mode. While the conflictive mode of the government- 
citizen relationship evolves in a conflictive situation, the collaborative mode originates 
in situations in which the partners have a positive attitude towards each other, which 
is reflected in the form of their relationship: an alliance or a coalition. Moving from 
one mode to another is difficult, but within the modes changes may occur in quick 
succession, which can be viewed as the short-term dynamics of the government-citizen 
relationship. This means that when the relationship is in a conflictive mode it is hard 
to find a way out and when it is in a collaborative mode this situation will continue. The 
latter by no means implies that no disputes will occur. However, partners operating in 
a collaborative mode are willing to solve the dispute, but this is not the case when 
partners are in a conflictive mode. Partners who are engaged in a conflictive mode of 
relationship may change their interaction from debate to conflict from one moment to 
the next. Partners engaged in a collaborative mode of relationship may change their 
interaction from debate to negotiation and subsequently to dialogue or collaboration.
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The dynamic may then evolve further from collaboration back to dialogue and then 
debate. It may also start from another interaction outcome and develop from debate via 
negotiation into dialogue and collaboration.
Institutional change determines whether a top-down approach may change towards a more 
collaborative approach
Institutional change has an effect on government-citizen interaction. The case studies 
show that it is hard to change from a top-down approach to a more collaborative 
approach, despite demands by citizens to be included in the process. This implies that 
a change from a state-centred mode of government to one that is less state-centred has 
to be realised at the start of a planning process, because the authorities will then not lose 
face. However, this does not mean that a collaborative approach will last, because it 
may be replaced by a top-down approach at any time. There is less chance of this 
happening when a lower-tier authority is responsible for the project management.
People’s demands for inclusion put increasing pressure on authorities to act as governance 
actors rather than government actors
The growing desire of people to have a say in changes to their living environment 
cannot be ignored by government authorities. They have to include them somehow in 
the planning process. This development can be viewed as a factor underlying 
government-citizen interaction. It influences the government-citizen interaction in 
such a way that it increasingly puts pressure on the authorities to take citizens’ values 
into account and include them in planning processes. This requires them to change 
their role from a government actor to a governance actor.
Mechanisms
Two mechanisms that influence government-citizen interaction can be identified from 
the empirical data and analysis: power and culture. The headings briefly describe the 
conclusions.
Power is the key mechanism in governance processes
Planning processes can be viewed as a battlefield in which power makes a difference. As 
such, power can be seen as a mechanism that influences government-citizen 
interaction. The analysis of the case studies shows that not only the authorities but also 
the citizens built power. In conflictive situations the authorities and citizens tried to 
build as much power as possible, but when they were engaged in an alliance or coalition 
power did not seem to be an overt issue. The authorities mainly built indirect coercive 
power, legitimate power, hindering power and knowledge power, whereas citizens 
mainly built legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power and media power. 
The authorities and citizens influenced their interaction through their power building. 
The authorities made a difference especially through the use of indirect coercive power 
and legitimate power, whereas citizens did so with knowledge power and media power. 
The authorities and citizens built hindering power. The authorities did this covertly 
while citizens did it openly. For citizens, however, it was difficult to bring the authorities’
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hindering power into the open, for example by appealing to the Government 
Information (Public Access) Act (Wet openbaarheid van bestuur). In addition, the 
authorities also built power in their relationship with other authorities. In these cases 
they often built hindering power in disputes in the area of responsibility.
The conclusion that can be drawn is that power prevails. Most often this means that the 
authority responsible for water management in the Netherlands, Rijkswaterstaat, is 
ruling. Does this mean that collaborative planning in Dutch river landscape planning 
is an ideal that is hard to reach? This study shows that if the configuration of actors is 
such that all actors are involved on the basis of respect and equality, collaborative 
planning may result in Rijkswaterstaat endorsing the collaborative outcome.
Culture is noticeable throughout the planning process
This study shows that culture is noticeable throughout the planning process. It can 
therefore be considered to be a mechanism that influences government-citizen 
interaction. Government authorities with a strong organisational culture, such as 
Rijkswaterstaat, always tried to change the planning process to suit their own ends, 
while government authorities with a less pronounced organisational culture, like the 
province of Noord-Brabant, proved to be flexible in their dealings with other authorities 
as well as citizens. Citizens with a strong cultural background were able to cope with all 
types of problems they encountered during a planning process, while citizens with a 
weak cultural background proved less capable of dealing with obstacles in the planning 
process. Culture was not an issue in government-citizen interaction. Instead, economic 
arguments played a role. However, culture is very important in the performance of local 
groups and is reflected in their capacity and motivation to act.
In the literature the change in Dutch water management policy is described as a 
transition (van der Brugge et al., 2005). However, from the results of this study and 
analysis I draw the conclusion that this is not the case with regard to the institutions. 
Although they have tried to accommodate these changes as much as possible and the 
manifestations of these accommodations differ from institution to institution, the 
cultural pattern on which the institutions are based remained unchanged.
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Summary
In this thesis the object of research is cross-scale interaction in Dutch river landscape 
planning. The aim of this research was to understand the relationship between 
government authorities and citizens in river landscape planning and whether this leads 
to conflict or collaboration. The research question was: What factors and mechanisms 
influence cross-scale interaction in Dutch river landscape planning? Government 
authorities are broken down into national, regional (provincial) and local government; 
citizens are viewed as one group.
Methods
The thesis is framework-led as well as based on empirical data from three case studies. 
The framework developed in this study is an operationalisation of social interaction, the 
central theme of this research. The properties of social interaction identified at the 
beginning of the study were used to construct a basic framework, which then evolved 
interactively during the course of the study using the results of the inductive analysis 
of empirical data from the three cases. Deductive analysis of the developed concepts 
was then used to give the framework its final shape, the CSI framework for cross-scale 
interaction.
The CSI framework consists of four properties of social interaction which provide 
insight in how social interaction between government and citizens proceeds and what 
factors and mechanisms influence this interaction.
The first property of social interaction is the actors’ potential to act comprising their 
capacity and motivation to act.
The second property of social interaction is the actors’ use of various types of social 
power: coercion, legitimacy, reward, hindering, knowledge, media exposure and 
sociability. Coercion may be used in the meaning of acting forcefully through police 
work and penalisation (defined as direct coercive power), but it may also used indirectly, 
for example explicitly through threats or by appealing to the law and hierarchical 
relationships, or implicitly through a high turnover rate of officials (frequently moving 
officials to different positions) (defined as indirect coercive power). In modern 
democracies the government exercises restraint when using direct coercive power 
because this is considered to be a last resource to produce a desired social result. Other
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options are used first to achieve the government’s objective, such as the use of indirect 
coercive power. Legitimate power denotes how actors legitimise their position towards 
others. They may refer to a social structure, such as a hierarchy, or to other social norms, 
such as reciprocity, equity and responsibility. Reward power signifies that an actor is 
rewarded in a material way, e.g. in the form of money or goods, or in an immaterial way, 
through a honourable mention, a decoration or an appointment to honorary member. 
Hindering power means that an action or progress has been hindered or prevented 
through obstruction or slowing down. Knowledge power entails the use of knowledge 
to influence the position of actors in their interaction. Examples are calling in external 
experts, commissioning studies and having a numerical superiority of experts in 
meetings, which relays signals to others that things are serious. It may also involve the 
use of the specific knowledge of the parties involved. Media power signifies the use of 
media by actors to give meaning and interpretations to their values. Actors go to the 
media for various reasons, including mobilising support, validating the relevance of 
the actor concerned and disseminating their message more widely. The sociability of an 
actor is considered a separate power source because it tends to call forth reciprocity. It 
is proper to give something back to a person who has always been helpful, or it may be 
a motivation for getting favours from others.
The third property of social interaction are interaction strategies comprising framing, 
buffering and bridging strategies. Framing gives meaning to events and therefore are an 
interpretation of government-citizen interaction. There are four frames distinguished: 
a power frame, an identity frame, a conflict management frame and a collaborative 
frame. A power frame is mainly used to show authority and to demonstrate who is in 
charge. It is accompanied by dominance or a sense of superiority. An identity frame is 
often used in situations in which people feel uncertain, threatened or challenged. A 
direct reaction to such feelings is to fall back on the group or organisation to which 
one belongs and position this group against others. When people make a distinction 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ they are using an identity frame. A conflict management frame 
shows an open mind to the views and opinions of others, and involves a willingness to 
find commonalities rather than emphasising dissimilarities. A collaborative frame 
demonstrates joint action between actors against their opponent or to reach a joint 
objective. Buffering strategies are directed at justifying actions. Usually, argumentation 
is based on one perspective, often of the group or organisation to which one belongs. 
This type of strategy may be used to convince others in a persuasive manner. Bridging 
strategies are directed at overcoming problems and finding joint solutions. This type of 
strategy includes a willingness to approach someone, to build a bridge to another 
person, being receptive to the views and opinions of others, trying to involve the other, 
and provoking discussions.
The fourth property of social interaction are the interaction outcomes which are broken 
down in conflict, debate, negotiation, dialogue and collaboration.
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Apart from these four properties also culture and traditions play a role in the 
government-citizen interaction; the organisational culture as far as authorities are 
concerned, and the cultural background with regard to citizens and the impact of these 
on their action.
The causal line runs from the four properties of social interaction between authorities 
and citizens and the culture and traditions of both: the culture and traditions influence 
the action potential which leads to the building of power. This creates the interaction 
strategies which finally results in the interaction outcomes. In the analysis the sequence 
of properties was the other way around which means that first the actors’ interaction 
was analysed, followed by their interaction strategies, their power building, their 
potential to act, and finally their culture and traditions. The analysis works against the 
causal line; first the consequences are subject of analysis, then the focus is on the causes. 
It is therefore an explaining route. As the interaction between the authorities is 
considered important for the analysis of the interaction between the authorities and 
the local group, this has also been taken into account.
The case studies which form the empirical basis of this study are the Dike Relocation 
in Lent, Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder and the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder. 
The case studies were selected according to specific criteria. First, the expected outcomes 
of the social interaction between government authorities and citizens in river projects 
should represent outcomes at both extremes of the continuum. This implies selecting 
a river project in which actors tended to collaborate with one another, and a project in 
which actors stood diametrically opposed one another. Second, the way citizens 
organised themselves in local groups to achieve their objective must be incorporated, 
which meant that a variety of local groups was needed, including a homogeneous group 
of citizens, a group of citizens with a heterogeneous constitution and various local 
groups pursuing their own interests. Third, the case studies should include diverse 
government agencies. Based on these criteria, the Dike Relocation in Lent was selected 
because of the involvement of several local groups, the involvement of national and 
local governments, and government authorities and citizens are in opposition to one 
another; the Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder because of the involvement of a 
heterogeneous group of citizens, the inclusion of national, provincial and local 
governments, and the interaction has been based on conflict; and the Terps Plan in 
Overdiep Polder because of the involvement of a homogeneous group of citizens, the 
involvement of national and provincial governments, and government authorities and 
citizens have the intention to collaborate.
The case studies relied solely on qualitative data, for which interviews and a desk study 
were the main research methods. The data gathered from these methods were 
consolidated to provide evidence that can be used to answer the research question.
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Setting the scene
The scene in which this thesis is embedded is Dutch water management. Like other 
European countries in north-western Europe, water policy in the Netherlands faced a 
similar shift in approach since the 1990s onwards. A traditional focus on defending 
against floods was gradually replaced by a focus on managing flood risk. In the Dutch 
Room for the River policy spatial planning is key to water management which includes 
taking measures outside the dikes, such as lowering groynes, as well as inside the dikes, 
including dike relocations, bypasses and ‘green’ side channels.
Due to developments in society in the last decades the role of government authorities 
and citizens in river landscape planning changed. While the command and control 
approach of the national authority in charge of water management, Rijkswaterstaat, 
was still present the last decades it has been regularly pushed to the background 
resulting in attempts to a more adaptive approach. On the part of the citizens, citizens’ 
protest from 1960s and 1970s onwards showed the agency of citizens as ‘makers and 
shapers’ who set agendas rather than as ‘users and choosers’ (a clientelist, consumer 
model) of interventions or services designed by the government. This active citizenship 
fits in the new design of the Dutch government in which citizens are seen as active 
participants.
Analysis  of the case studies 
Dike Relocation in Lent case study
In the Dike Relocation in Lent case study the main actors were the national government 
(Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat 
has the mandate to act), the local government (municipality of Nijmegen) and three 
active local groups. The plan for a dike relocation in Lent was a state initiative to reduce 
flood risk by widening the bottleneck in the river Waal between the village of Lent and 
the city of Nijmegen. The government plan was incorporated in the national spatial 
planning instrument Spatial Planning Key Decision (SPKD) Room for the River for 
finding space for the rivers. The plan which involves to relocate the dike 350 m. land 
inwards and a side channel, was planned at the same location of the Waalsprong 
housing development of the municipality of Nijmegen. The dike relocation in Lent was 
the first river project in the Room for the River programme that was steered by the 
ministry and devolved to a regional office of Rijkswaterstaat for the execution of the 
environment impact analysis (EIA) studies. A new phenomenon was the involvement 
of the municipality of Nijmegen. Relocating the dike land inwards implied that 
Rijkswaterstaat had to deal with the municipality of Nijmegen authority for this area. 
It thus had to cede responsibility. After the launch of the plan fierce citizens’ protest 
followed which mainly focused on the demolition of 55 houses. With the help of a water 
expert the local groups developed an alternative which consisted of excavating the flood 
plain including a ‘green’ channel and a land reservation for a dike relocation in future.
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The interaction between the national government and the local groups led to debate and 
conflict. Although the national government attempted to acknowledge the residents’ 
concerns to prevent escalation, this never ended in negotiation. Most issues, however, 
escalated into conflict, which remained unresolved. The interaction between the local 
government and the local groups evolved in a similar way: issues were disputed and 
then often escalated into conflicts which also remained unresolved. The interaction 
between the authorities resulted in debate and negotiation. Most debates were about the 
division of responsibilities. Negotiation took place once, when the national government 
decided to contribute to the cost of a second bridge over the river Waal in order to get 
the support of the local government.
With regard to the interaction strategies, the national government used a power frame 
throughout the planning process. The most striking examples are the launch of the 
government plan without first discussing it with its own officials and the local 
government, and the way it dealt with the residents’ alternative, which was considered 
to be the ‘second best’ right from the start. The local government and the local groups 
employed an identity frame. The local government used its identity frame 
interactionally. In its dealings with the national government it emphasised that 
‘conforming to the national interest is our legitimate role, but under certain conditions’, 
but to the residents its position was that ‘it is the state secretary who decides’ to avoid 
being blamed by the residents for its non-responsiveness. Neither the national 
government nor the local government changed their frame from an identity frame to 
a conflict management frame. In its interaction with the local groups the national 
government used buffering strategies very often, while the local groups employed this 
type of strategy regularly. Both used bridging strategies occasionally. The local 
government and the local groups both used buffering strategies moderately in the 
interaction with each other, and bridging strategies incidentally. The government 
authorities occasionally used buffering and bridging strategies when interacting with 
each other.
Concerning the power building by authorities and the local groups, both the national 
government and the local groups built five types of power in their interaction. The 
national government built indirect coercive power, legitimate power, hindering power, 
knowledge power and sociability. The local groups built legitimate power, hindering 
power, knowledge power, media power and sociability. The local government and the 
local groups both built four power types in their interaction. The local government 
built indirect coercive power, legitimate power, hindering power and knowledge power, 
whereas the local groups built legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power 
and media power. The national government built four power types in its dealings with 
the local government (indirect coercive power, legitimate power, reward power and 
hindering power), whereas the local government built two power types (legitimate 
power and hindering power). The most important use of power was the national 
government’s use of reward power when dealing with the local government, in the form
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of a contribution to the cost of the second Waal bridge.
The power building by the government authorities and local groups gives insight into 
both the use of interaction strategies and the interaction outcomes. The building of 
indirect coercive power and legitimate power hampered the development of the 
interaction outcomes negotiation, dialogue and collaboration. The authorities chose to 
enforce rather than negotiate. The analysis therefore demonstrates that neither a power 
frame nor an identity frame are conducive to dialogue and collaboration. The latter 
requires a common understanding and an atmosphere of tolerance in which trust may 
grow. This will not happen as long as the parties are convinced that their own interests 
are the most important.
The analysis of the authorities’ and local groups’ potentials to act shows that the 
national government’s potential to act proved to be strong, whereas the local 
government’s and the local groups’ potential to act proved to be moderate and weak 
respectively. While the national government’s potential to act was powerful and the 
local groups’ potential to act appeared to be less influential, this was viewed differently 
by the actors involved. The national government’s potential to act was weakened by its 
inability to adopt a conflict management frame as a result of its excessive concern with 
presenting the government plan in a positive manner, its difficulty in dealing with 
opposing views, and the lack of transparency of its actions. In addition, it did not have 
an answer to the local groups’ building of knowledge power and media power. The 
local groups, however, turned out to be more influential than their potential to act 
would suggest, which indicates that their lack of ‘in-house’ experts, a broad network of 
active people, a united front, a thorough strategy for dealing with the authorities and 
their inability to adopt a conflict management frame as a result of their fixation on 
their own interests were not as significant or consequential as expected. The ‘weak’ 
potential to act of the national government and the ‘strong’ potential to act of the local 
groups, from the viewpoint of the actors involved, was mainly a result of the local 
groups building various power types, in particular knowledge power and media power. 
This implies that the action potential of the actors better explains their position in the 
planning process than the process of interaction. Therefore, the power building and 
interaction strategies have to be taken into account. Additionally, the outcomes of the 
analysis need to be discussed with the actors involved in order to assess the influence 
of the power building and interaction strategies on the government-citizen interaction 
from their point of view. As this case study shows, the actors may have a different 
interpretation of the outcome than my analysis.
Concerning the authorities’ organisational culture and the citizens’ cultural background 
and the impact of these on their action, the analysis shows that culture had a strong 
impact on the national government’s action, a moderate influence on the local 
government’s action and a weak influence on the local groups’ action. The 
organisational culture of Rijkswaterstaat was largely an authoritarian style of
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governance. In practice this meant that Rijkswaterstaat took a technical approach to 
water management and tended to reinforce formal, top-down competencies in spatial 
planning. The Room for the River programme resulted in new forms of governance, 
including cooperation with lower-tier authorities, but the organisation did not change 
its style of operation. The Room for the River programme was set up in such a way that 
a command and control approach operated in the background. Examples are the 
presentation of national projects, such as the dike relocation in Lent, the emphasis on 
procedures and the focus on flood safety which meant that other river values and 
functions, such as landscape and biodiversity, were given a lower priority. The 
municipality of Nijmegen pursued its own course independently of the public interest 
which the national government defended, and the residents’ interest. In the past the 
local community in Lent had been unable to change the authorities’ mind when 
infrastructure works were planned in their village and this has not changed.
Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder case study
In the Emergency Water Storage in Ooijpolder case study the main actors were the 
national government (Department of Water Management, for which the executive 
agency Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act), the provincial government (province of 
Gelderland), the local government (municipality of Ubbergen) and the local group. 
The government plan for emergency water storage was considered additional to 
measures to be taken in the Room for the River programme for finding space for the 
rivers. The measure was presented as an option in the event of an extreme Rhine 
discharge of 18,000 m3/s. Of the three locations provisionally designated as ‘calamity 
polders’, Ooijpolder is the first polder on the south bank of the Rhine after it enters the 
Netherlands from Germany. The residents in the Ooijpolder protested fiercely against 
the designation of their polder as an area for emergency water storage. The government 
plan was originally classified as a security issue, which meant it followed a ‘security 
chain’ directly from the ministry to the responsible government officers. Instead, it was 
decided to widely publicising the government plan for emergency water storage as the 
miracle cure for the country’s water problems.
The interaction between the national government and the local group can be 
characterised as conflict and debate, while the interaction between the lower-tier 
authorities and the local group can be characterised as collaboration. The interaction 
between authorities had various outcomes. The interaction between the national 
government and the provincial government resulted in debate, negotiation and 
dialogue, the interaction between the national government and the local government 
ended in conflict and debate, and the interaction between the provincial government 
and the local government led to dialogue and collaboration.
With regard to the interaction strategies, the national government used two frames in 
its interaction with the local group and the lower-tier authorities. It exercised a power 
frame and an identity frame towards the local group. The power frame was employed
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by the head of Rijkswaterstaat, particularly through the person of the successive state 
secretaries; the identity frame was generally employed by government officials. The use 
of a power frame by the state secretaries left the officials little room to taking up another 
frame, such as a conflict management frame. The use of an identity frame by 
government officials was therefore understandable as they had to deal with local and 
regional authorities and the residents. The use of the conflict management frame and 
bridging strategies by the provincial government changed the interaction between the 
national and provincial government from debate towards negotiation and dialogue. 
The interaction between the national and local government remained one of debate as 
a result of the national government’s use of a power frame and an identity frame and 
the local government’s use of an identity frame. In its interaction with the national 
government, the local government did not change its identity frame towards a conflict 
management frame, which had a negative impact on the interaction outcome, which 
was debate. In its interaction with the lower-tier authorities the local group employed 
a collaborative frame.
Concerning the power building by the authorities and the local group, the national 
government built five types of power in its dealings with the local group (indirect 
coercive power, legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power and sociability), 
while the local group built three power types (hindering power, knowledge power and 
media power; the latter two very often). The lower-tier authorities built two types of 
power in its dealings with the local group. The provincial government built knowledge 
power and sociability; the local government built legitimate power and sociability. The 
local group built one power type in its interaction with the local-tier authorities: 
sociability. The national government built three power types in its interaction with the 
lower-tier authorities (indirect coercive power, legitimate power and knowledge power), 
while the lower-tier authorities built four types of power in their interaction with the 
national government (legitimate power, knowledge power, media power and 
sociability).The power building in the interaction between the national government 
and the local group had a considerable effect on their interaction outcomes: debate and 
conflict. The building of indirect coercive power and legitimate power by the national 
government and the local group’s building of knowledge power and media power 
proved to be influential. The provincial government’s building of knowledge power, 
media power and sociability in its interaction with the national government influenced 
the interaction outcomes, with substantial shifts towards debate, negotiation and 
dialogue. Its interaction strategies also contributed to these interaction outcomes. The 
interaction between the national and local government, which never reached a 
negotiated solution and remained stuck in debate, cannot be explained by their power 
building. These actors’ interaction strategies therefore also needed to be taken into 
account (see above).
The analysis of the authorities’ and local group’s potentials to act shows that the national 
and local government’s potential to act was weak, while the provincial government’s
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potential to act proved to be moderate. The local group’s potential to act can be 
considered strong. The national government failed in the field of coordinating 
mechanisms, consistency (the construction of a narrative) and organisational and 
personal motivation, resulting in a failure to provide sufficient substantiation for the 
proposed plan. The provincial government’s potential to act was moderate due to its 
extensive use of coordinating mechanisms and its consistency (to construct a narrative 
that a design discharge for the Rhine of 18,000 m3/s cannot enter the Netherlands 
smoothly, which was partly adopted by the national government) and organisational 
and personal motivation. The local government’s weak potential to act was a result of 
its weak mandate and resource base and the absence of organisational ambition. The 
local group’s strong potential to act was based on a strong capacity and motivation to 
act.
Concerning the authorities’ organisational culture and local group’s cultural 
background and the impact of these on their action, the analysis shows that the 
influence of the national government’s organisational culture on its action can be 
viewed as rather strong, and respectively moderate and weak for the provincial 
government’s and the local government’s organisational culture, while the local group’s 
cultural background had a strong impact on its action. The national government’s 
engineering culture had a considerable influence on flood risk management practice. 
Rijkswaterstaat has a mandate for safety, which is incorporated in its mission: ensuring 
that everyone has ‘dry feet’ and protecting the country from floods, but this cannot be 
guaranteed. Rijkswaterstaat views water safety as government business and not 
something the public should necessarily be involved in. The impact of the provincial 
government’s organisational culture on its action proved to be moderate. It is used to 
getting its message across, in the past in its interaction with other provinces and Charles 
V, and today in its interaction with Rijkswaterstaat. Although the impact of the local 
government’s organisational culture on its action was weak, its position in public debate 
clearly reflected the solidarity between the lower-tier authorities and the local group in 
opposing the national government. Nevertheless, the local government’s aim was to 
remain on speaking terms with the national government. For centuries the residents of 
Ooijpolder were used to opposing government authorities, whether on water 
management or other issues, and were not afraid to defend their own interests. In the 
20th century they had successfully opposed various government plans and when 
Ooijpolder became a search area for emergency water storage in 2000 the polder 
residents succeeded once again. Their cultural background therefore had a strong 
impact on their action.
Terps plan in Overdiep Polder case study
In the Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder case study the main actors were the national 
government (Department of Water Management, for which the executive agency 
Rijkswaterstaat has the mandate to act), the provincial government (province of Noord- 
Brabant) and a local group. The Terps Plan in Overdiep Polder is a residents’ initiative
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for a spatial redesign of their polder to make flood peak discharge possible in the Meuse. 
The terps plan was included in the national spatial planning instrument Spatial 
Planning Key Decision (SPKD) Room for the River for finding space for the rivers. As 
the project was the first that the national government delegated to a lower-tier authority, 
the division of tasks between the authorities only became clear during the course of 
the planning process. Due to its favourable location on the Meuse, its earlier function 
as a retention area and the small number of residents, in the late 1990s the polder was 
designated as a ‘search area’ for river widening projects. Some citizens in Overdiep 
polder initiated a terps plan in their polder. They wanted to reconstruct their polder to 
accommodate a one in 25 year flood in order to meet the public interest and secure an 
economically viable future for their farms.
The interaction between the national government and the local group always led to 
debate and conflict, which in most cases was resolved with the help of the province. 
The interaction between the provincial government and the local group resulted in 
debate, negotiation, dialogue and collaboration. If disputes emerged these always ended 
in a negotiated solution, but discord was generally prevented because the provincial 
government and the local group were continuously in ‘dialogue mode’. The interaction 
between the authorities led to debate and conflict as a result of recurring disputes in the 
area of responsibility. Thanks to the provincial government’s bridging strategies, these 
interaction outcomes always ended in a negotiated solution. Hence, negotiation was 
part of the interaction outcomes.
With regard to the interaction strategies, the national government generally used an 
identity frame and sometimes a power frame when dealing with the local group. The 
local group combined an identity frame and a conflict management frame in its 
interaction with the national government. Both occasionally used buffering and 
bridging strategies, which can be considered a conscious strategy. The local group 
alternated between a conflict management frame and an identity frame when dealing 
with the provincial government, while the provincial government mainly used a conflict 
management frame and a collaborative frame. The identity frame of the local group 
occurred incidentally. Under the influence of the provincial government’s bridging 
strategies and the local group’s open mind and receptive attitude to signals from others, 
the local group reframed and replaced its identity frame with a conflict management 
frame. After the first project manager was replaced the local group mainly employed a 
collaborative frame, but this did not mean that discord was absent. In addition, many 
potential disputes were resolved or even prevented, particularly by the provincial 
government’s attempts to bridge towards the local group. The provincial government 
and the local group used many bridging strategies and occasionally buffering strategies. 
The provincial government used buffering strategies particularly in private negotiations 
with residents, as did the residents. In its interaction with the provincial government the 
national government used a conflict management frame at the decision-making level, 
while government officials used an identity frame and sometimes a power frame. This
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power frame proved to be an important cause of disputes between the national and 
the provincial government, mostly in the area of responsibility. The provincial 
government generally used a conflict management frame when dealing with the 
national government. In a few cases, however, the province employed an identity frame, 
but this only emerged at the officer level. After the replacement of the project manager, 
the provincial government used only a conflict management frame. National 
government officials in particular used buffering strategies towards the provincial 
government, while bridging strategies were sometimes used at the decision-making 
level. This implied that at the decision-making level the national government was 
prepared to negotiate. However, negotiation only started with the help of the provincial 
government, which always took the first step. This was also the case when disputes 
emerged between the national government and the local group.
Concerning the power building by the authorities and the local group, the national 
government built three power types in its interaction with the local group (indirect 
coercive power, legitimate power and hindering power), while the local group built five 
power types (legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power, media power and 
sociability). The local group built the same five power types in its dealings with the 
provincial government, which built three power types (indirect coercive power, 
knowledge power and sociability). The province built indirect coercive power as a last 
resort in its interaction with the farmers who were unwilling to negotiate about their 
land and real estate. The local group’s power building in its dealings with the provincial 
government did not have repercussions for their interaction outcomes, which varied 
from debate and negotiation to dialogue and collaboration due to the provincial 
government’s conflict management frame and bridging strategies. In the interaction 
between the authorities, the national government built four power types (indirect 
coercive power, legitimate power, hindering power and knowledge power) and the 
provincial government built three power types (indirect coercive power, knowledge 
power and sociability). As the power building of both authorities were more or less 
balanced, the provincial government’s use of a conflict management frame and bridging 
strategies were able to move the interaction outcomes of debate and conflict towards 
negotiation. In addition, when a government authority used indirect coercive power the 
other party, whether this was the other authority or the local group, was less willing to 
employ a conflict management frame and apply bridging strategies. The provincial 
government’s building of specific power types, particularly knowledge power and 
sociability, is understandable, since its interest in realising its first river project 
demanded restraint in building indirect coercive power. Despite the more or less 
balanced power building between the national and the provincial government, 
collaboration proved difficult for them to achieve. This type of interaction outcome 
might have occurred if both authorities restrained or abandoned the building of 
indirect coercive power (national and provincial government) and legitimate power 
(national government). Although legitimate power is a less dominant power type than 
indirect coercive power, it proved disadvantageous for the creation of mutual
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understanding and a tolerant atmosphere in which trust may grow. This can be 
considered a prerequisite for collaboration, as shown by the power building by the 
provincial government and the local group.
The analysis of the authorities’ and local group’s potentials to act shows that the 
national government’s potential to act was weak, the provincial government’s was 
moderate and the local group’s was strong. The national government failed in the field 
of coordinating mechanisms and consistency (the construction or adoption of a 
narrative), which resulted in a weak capacity to act. Additionally, the national 
government had a moderate motivation to act. Despite its weak potential to act, the 
national government’s influence on the planning process was considerable, due partly 
to its power building and its interaction strategies. The provincial government’s 
moderate potential to act was based on a moderate capacity to act and a strong 
motivation to act, and it proved a good basis for its interaction with the national 
government and the local group. The local group’s strong potential to act, which was 
based on its strong capacity and motivation to act, made it a forceful counterpart for 
both the national government and the provincial government.
Concerning the authorities’ organisational culture and the local group’s cultural 
background, the analysis shows that the national government’s organisational culture 
and the local group’s cultural background and the impact of these on their action were 
strong, while this was moderate for the provincial government. The engineering culture 
that has dominated Rijkswaterstaat since its inception in 1798 still has a strong impact 
on its organisational culture. Rijkswaterstaat is a proponent of forceful action, as 
illustrated by its approach to water management by building and maintaining dikes 
and other infrastructure. To accommodate public criticism that the organisation was 
not taking nature and landscape values into account, it incorporated nature 
conservation into its policies. However, so far it has had difficulty in including citizens 
in the planning process and dealing with citizens who put forward their own plans to 
reduce flood risk. The provincial government’s organisational culture, which can be 
characterised as following a middle course, proved to be effective in its interaction with 
both the national government and the local group. Although the local group’s cultural 
background influenced its power building, interaction strategies and interaction 
outcomes strongly, it was very much dependent on the provincial government to 
achieve its objective. The organisational culture of the authorities and the local group’s 
cultural background therefore highlight their starting position and shed light on their 
position during the planning process rather than explaining the process.
Discussion
In general the CSI framework provided useful information that otherwise would not 
have been obtained. In particular, it gave insight into the relationship between the 
actors, between the government authorities and the citizens and between different 
government authorities, and the power and interaction strategies they used from the
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start of their interaction until the final outcome. The framework unravelled many layers 
that are at work in government-citizen interaction, particularly concerning the actors’ 
potential to act, their building of social power, their use of interaction strategies and the 
outcomes of their interaction. Additionally, the framework gave insight into the actions 
of authorities in governance processes and how these processes are shaped. In other 
words, the CSI framework did its work quite well.
During the case analysis several methodological problems occurred. These varied from 
simple ones, e.g. the inclusion of culture and traditions in the framework, to more 
complex questions, e.g. the replacement of credibility by sociability as a type of social 
power, as these required for example a new literature search and a consideration 
whether replacement would be worth wile.
Conclusion
The research question was What factors and mechanisms influence cross-scale 
interaction in Dutch river landscape planning? This question will be answered by 
reviewing the emergent and underlying factors that influence government-citizen 
interaction in Dutch river landscape planning and the mechanisms involved.
Emergent factors
The emergent factors that influence government-citizen interaction identified from 
the empirical data and analysis are: building trust, uncertainties, citizen exclusion, 
institutions with a focus on formal roles, authorities’ and citizens’ willingness to engage 
and situational factors. The headings below can be read as brief conclusions.
Building trust is difficult in government-citizen relationships
Trust turned out to be a crucial factor in government-citizen interaction. Without trust 
the government-citizen relationship will not evolve and will remain stuck in a 
‘conflictive’ mode (see below), resulting in ‘conflictive’ interaction outcomes, such as 
conflict and debate, at one end of a continuum on which dialogue and collaboration are 
considered ‘collaborative’ interaction outcomes. Building trust proved to be difficult 
for both authorities and citizens as both parties tended to distrust each other. 
Difficulties were experienced both when the authorities were leading in a planning 
project and when they were not, and both when citizens were affected by a government 
plan and when they were the initiators of their own plan. Building trust requires a 
continuous effort by both parties. Authorities and citizens need to know each other in 
order to be able to answer the question of whether the other party is trustworthy and 
so it generally takes time before parties trust each other. Building trust requires 
vigilance. As the Dutch saying goes, ‘trust comes by foot and leaves on horseback’.
A difficulty to build trust is that government authorities in particular operate in a 
formal setting, while trust is most easily built and maintained in an informal setting. An 
important obstacle to building trust in a formal setting is that contacts between people
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are based mainly on contracts, agreements, laws, procedures and rules. This is often 
referred to as ‘formalised distrust’, which is a characteristic of government in modern 
democratic societies. A key requirement for building trust is the exchange of 
information based on reciprocity, such as give and take mechanisms (‘If I do this for 
you, you do that for me’) and unwritten rules. This implies that authorities and citizens 
have to invest in dealing with each other in an informal way, which requires open 
communication about the parties’ wishes, their objectives, their views on how to achieve 
their ends, and a reflective attitude in which each party’s actions and behaviour are 
open to discussion.
Governance processes throw up new uncertainties
In essence, governance processes seek to deal with uncertainties, for example about the 
outcomes and the actors involved. However, they also create new uncertainties, for 
example about decision-making (how much influence do the actors have?) and creating 
precedents. Generally, in a traditional approach the process is relatively fixed and 
designed to exclude uncertainties as much as possible, while in a more interactive style 
the process is open, which implies there will be many uncertainties. Uncertainties 
proved to be problematic, particularly for the government authorities. Government 
decision-makers may perceive uncertainties as a threat to their legitimacy and their 
traditional role. Generally, government decision-makers possess a survival instinct that 
drives them to choose pathways that involve less risk, and strategies that minimise risk 
often mean falling back on a traditional approach. This entails a ‘closed’ participation 
process using traditional participation instruments, such as consultation and 
information meetings, rather than instruments that foster deliberation, such as design 
workshops and round-table meetings. Traditional approaches usually leave little room 
for government officials to pursue an open planning process. This means that they are 
bound to procedures and are restricted to traditional pathways.
Citizens generally consider uncertainties to be less problematic as they will always be 
present, whether they are opposing a government plan or involved in a joint initiative. 
When opposing a government plan, citizens face uncertainties about the process -  will 
their views be heard and will they be included in the planning process? -  and about the 
outcome -  will they win or lose? When they are involved in a joint initiative, the 
uncertainties regarding the process are about how they can ensure that they are part of 
the decision-making process and that the joint initiative will be continued throughout 
the process despite a high turnover of government officials. They will also not be certain 
that the joint initiative will be successful. Uncertainties are an important factor in 
government-citizen interaction because they increase the risk of a breakdown in trust 
between the actors involved.
Citizen exclusion is a  source o f conflict between authorities and citizens
Excluding citizens from the design process and/or follow-up phases of the planning
process creates distrust towards authorities. This study indicates that the exclusion of
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citizens in planning processes is a relevant factor that has far-reaching consequences 
for government-citizen interaction. If citizens are excluded the interaction will start in 
a ‘conflictive’ government-citizen relationship (see below), resulting in ‘conflictive’ 
interaction outcomes, such as conflict and debate. Moreover, as actors in a conflictive 
relationship tend to focus on their differences rather than their similarities or common 
goals, it is hard to normalise such relationships in an attempt to escape from this 
conflictive mode.
Institutions with a focus on formal roles cannot adequately support governance processes 
Many government institutions are solely embedded in the formal world where the 
foundation of actions is formalised distrust based on laws, procedures, rules and 
contracts. In contrast, most everyday social interactions are informal. This study shows 
that government institutions that are unable to link the formal with the informal world 
had a negative impact on government-citizen interaction, resulting in conflict and 
debate. Government institutions in which one or a few individuals could make a 
difference by switching from the formal to the informal world had a positive influence 
on the government-citizen interaction by stimulating dialogue and collaboration.
Authorities’ willingness to engage is a  condition for being responsive in governance processes 
Contracts and constitutional provisions are considered to limit government 
responsiveness, but if individual government officials are able to deal with the 
complexities and uncertainties in governance processes, these are viewed as palliative 
measures at best (Rodrik and Zeckhauser 1988). Although such individuals are 
courageous in the sense that they stick their neck out, their actions are in fact a stopgap 
because they will not solve the problems of government unresponsiveness unless, for 
example, all the officials involved have internalised strategies for dealing with the 
complexities and uncertainties in governance processes. This study shows that when 
government actions are under the control of individuals (as a result of their willingness 
to engage) the relevant authorities were more responsive. They were more willing to 
respond to citizens’ demands to be included in the planning process, among others. 
The most important factor, however, is a change in the authorities’ organisational 
culture. This enables the staff to internalise different cultural beliefs so that policy 
agreements are put into practice by all involved rather than just a few. The conclusion 
that can be drawn is that the authorities that were willing to engage had a positive effect 
on the government-citizen interaction, which often resulted in dialogue and 
collaboration. When the authorities were not willing to engage they had a negative 
impact on the government-citizen interaction, resulting in conflict and debate. The 
authorities’ willingness to engage is therefore an important factor in government- 
citizen interaction.
Citizens’ willingness to engage needs to be taken seriously by the authorities 
An emergent factor is the citizens’ willingness to engage, which influences the 
government-citizen interaction. The analysis indicates that citizens’ willingness to
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engage leads to a ‘conflictive’ government-citizen relationship when the authorities 
exclude citizens (see also the emergent factor concerning citizen exclusion). It may also 
result in a ‘collaborative’ government-citizen relationship, particularly when both the 
public interest and the local citizens’ interest can be met, which implies citizen 
involvement. While the former always has a negative impact on the government-citizen 
interaction because it will end in conflict and debate, the latter may influence the 
government-citizen interaction positively because it will result in either a mixture of 
debate, negotiation, dialogue and collaboration or a mixture of dialogue and 
collaboration.
Situational factors are crucial in governance processes
Situational factors, such as the opportunity to get the support of a water expert and the 
policy change in water management that allowed the national government to broaden 
the scope of its policy measures to include land outside the river dikes, have a large 
impact on government-citizen interaction. Such factors influenced the government- 
citizen interaction by opening up new opportunities. The context in which this occurred 
determined whether this impact could be described as negative, resulting in conflict 
and debate, or positive, resulting in debate, negotiation, dialogue and/or collaboration.
Underlying factors
The analysis of the empirical data identified three underlying factors. The first is related 
to the different ‘modes’ of relationship in which government-citizen interaction takes 
place and the dynamics of the interaction. The second and third are related to the 
rapidly changing societal configurations of state, civil society and the market.
Long-term modes and short-term dynamics are part o f government-citizen interaction 
This study shows that the relationship between authorities and citizens in Dutch river 
landscape planning was based on a stable pattern. A distinction can be made between 
a conflictive and collaborative mode. While the conflictive mode of the government- 
citizen relationship evolves in a conflictive situation, the collaborative mode of the 
government-citizen relationship originates in situations in which the partners have a 
positive attitude towards each other, which is reflected in the form of their relationship: 
an alliance or a coalition. Moving from one mode to another is difficult, but within the 
modes changes may occur in quick succession, which can be viewed as the short-term 
dynamics of the government-citizen relationship. This means that when the 
relationship is in a conflictive mode it is hard to find a way out and when it is in a 
collaborative mode this situation will continue. The latter by no means implies that no 
disputes will occur. However, partners operating in a collaborative mode are willing to 
solve the dispute, but this is not the case when partners are in a conflictive mode. 
Partners who are engaged in a conflictive mode of relationship may change their 
interaction from debate to conflict from one moment to the next. Partners engaged in 
a collaborative mode of relationship may change their interaction from debate to 
negotiation and subsequently to dialogue or collaboration. The dynamic may then
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evolve further from collaboration back to dialogue and then debate. It may also start 
from another interaction outcome and develop from dialogue to debate via negotiation 
into dialogue and collaboration.
Institutional change determines whether a top-down approach may change towards a more 
collaborative approach
Institutional change has an effect on government-citizen interaction. The case studies 
show that it is hard to change from a top-down approach to a more collaborative 
approach, despite demands by citizens to be included in the process. This implies that 
a change from a state-centred mode of government to one that is less state-centred has 
to be realised at the start of a planning process, because the authorities will then not lose 
face. However, this does not mean that a collaborative approach will last, because it 
may be replaced by a top-down approach at any time. There is less chance of this 
happening when a lower-tier authority is responsible for the project management.
People’s demands for inclusion put increasing pressure on authorities to act as governance 
actors rather than government actors
The growing desire of people to have a say in changes to their living environment 
cannot be ignored by government authorities. They have to include them somehow in 
the planning process. This development can be viewed as a factor underlying 
government-citizen interaction. It influences the government-citizen interaction in 
such a way that it increasingly puts pressure on the authorities to take citizens’ values 
into account and include them in planning processes. This requires them to change 
their role from a government actor to a governance actor.
Mechanisms
Two mechanisms that influence government-citizen interaction can be identified from 
the empirical data and analysis: power and culture. The headings briefly describe the 
conclusions.
Power is the key mechanism in governance processes
Planning processes can be viewed as a battlefield in which power makes a difference. As 
such, power can be seen as a mechanism that influences government-citizen 
interaction. The analysis of the case studies shows that not only the authorities but also 
the citizens built power. In conflictive situations the authorities and citizens tried to 
build as much power as possible, but when they were engaged in an alliance or coalition 
power did not seem to be an overt issue. The authorities mainly built indirect coercive 
power, legitimate power, hindering power and knowledge power, whereas citizens 
mainly built legitimate power, hindering power, knowledge power and media power. 
The authorities and citizens influenced their interaction through their power building. 
The authorities made a difference especially through the use of indirect coercive power 
and legitimate power, whereas citizens did so with knowledge power and media power. 
The authorities and citizens built hindering power. The authorities did this covertly
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while citizens did it openly. For citizens, however, it was difficult to bring the authorities’ 
hindering power into the open, for example by appealing to the Government 
Information (Public Access) Act (Wet openbaarheid van bestuur). In addition, the 
authorities also built power in their relationship with other authorities. In these cases 
they often built hindering power in disputes in the area of responsibility.
The conclusion that can be drawn is that power prevails in Dutch river landscape 
planning. Most often this means that the authority responsible for water management 
in the Netherlands, Rijkswaterstaat, is ruling. Does this mean that collaborative 
planning in Dutch river landscape planning is an ideal that is hard to reach? This study 
shows that if the configuration of actors is such that all actors are involved on the basis 
of respect and equality, collaborative planning may result in Rijkswaterstaat endorsing 
the collaborative outcome.
Culture is noticeable throughout the planning process
This study shows that culture is noticeable throughout the planning process. It can 
therefore be considered to be a mechanism that influences government-citizen 
interaction. Government authorities with a strong organisational culture, such as 
Rijkswaterstaat, always tried to change the planning process to suit their own ends, 
while government authorities with a less pronounced organisational culture, like the 
province of Noord-Brabant, proved to be flexible in their dealings with other authorities 
as well as citizens. Citizens with a strong cultural background were able to cope with all 
types of problems they encountered during a planning process, while citizens with a 
weak cultural background proved less capable of dealing with obstacles in the planning 
process. Culture was not an issue in government-citizen interaction. Instead, economic 
arguments played a role. However, culture is very important in the performance of local 
groups and is reflected in their capacity and motivation to act.
In the literature the change in Dutch water management policy is described as a 
transition (van der Brugge et al., 2005). However, from the results of this study and 
analysis I draw the conclusion that this is not the case with regard to the institutions. 
Although they have tried to accommodate these changes as much as possible and the 
manifestations of these accommodations differ from institution to institution, the 
cultural pattern on which the institutions are based remained unchanged.
372
-Q-
Madelinde PHD zonder afbrekingen:Opmaak 1 15- -2011 14:45 Pagina 373
Samenvatting
Deze studie gaat over sociale interactie tussen overheid en burgers in rivierprojecten. 
Het doel van de studie is het verkrijgen van inzicht in de relatie tussen overheid en bur­
gers als het gaat om ruimtelijke planning in het rivierengebied en in de uitkomst: in 
hoeverre mondt deze relatie uit in conflict of samenwerking? De onderzoeksvraag is: 
Welke factoren en mechanismen beïnvloeden de interactie tussen overheid en burgers 
in planningsprocessen in het rivierengebied? Onder overheid wordt verstaan de rijks­
overheid, de provincies en de gemeenten. Burgers worden als groep gezien.
Methoden
In deze studie is gebruik gemaakt van een analytisch kader en gegevens die verzameld 
zijn aan de hand van drie case studies. Het theoretisch kader dat ontwikkeld is voor het 
analyseren van de interactie tussen overheid en burgers, het Cross-Scale Interaction 
(CSI) raamwerk, is een operationalisatie van sociale interactie. In het begin was het 
analysekader vrij beperkt maar in de loop van het onderzoek werd het uitgebreid aan 
de hand van inductieve analyse van empirische gegevens van drie case studies. Door 
deductieve analyse van de ontwikkelde concepten kreeg het analysekader zijn uitein­
delijke vorm.
Het analytisch kader bestaat uit vier kenmerken van sociale interactie die inzicht geven 
in de manier waarop sociale interactie plaatsvindt en welke factoren en mechanismen 
hierop van invloed zijn.
Het eerste kenmerk van sociale interactie is het actiepotentieel van actoren (potential 
to act) dat bestaat uit hun capaciteit (capacity to act) en motivatie (motivation to act) 
voor het ondernemen van actie.
Het tweede kenmerk van sociale interactie is het opbouwen van macht (social power) 
waarbij zeven machtsbronnen worden onderscheiden: dwang, legitimatie, beloning, 
hinderen, kennis, media-optreden en ‘een sociaal gezicht’. Dwang kan betekenen met 
machtsvertoon optreden, bijvoorbeeld door de politie of het geven van straf. Dit wordt 
directe dwang genoemd. Het kan ook zijn dat dwang op indirecte wijze wordt uitgeoe­
fend. Dat kan op een expliciet manier door te dreigen met of te appelleren aan dwang­
maatregelen of de wet, of impliciet door medewerkers vaak van baan te laten 
veranderen; dit valt onder indirecte dwang. In moderne samenlevingen is de overheid 
doorgaans terughoudend met het uitoefenen van directe dwang omdat het beschouwd 
wordt als een laatste redmiddel om een gewenst maatschappelijk resultaat te bereiken. 
Eerst wordt gebruik gemaakt van andere opties om het overheidsdoel te bereiken, zoals 
het gebruik van indirecte dwang. Legitimatie is aan de orde als actoren refereren aan 
hun positie in een sociale structuur, bijvoorbeeld hiërarchie, of verwijzen naar andere 
sociale normen, zoals reciprociteit, gelijkheid en verantwoordelijkheid. Beloning houdt 
in dat een actor wordt beloond op een materiële manier, bijvoorbeeld in de vorm van
373
-Q-
Madelinde PHD zonder afbrekingen:Opmaak 1 15- 2011 14:45 Pagina 374
geld of goederen, of op een immateriële manier, bijvoorbeeld door middel van een eer­
volle vermelding, een lintje of een benoeming tot erelid. Hinderen betekent dat een 
actie wordt belemmerd of voorkomen door obstructie of vertraging. Kennis wordt ge­
bruikt om de positie van actoren te beïnvloeden. Voorbeelden zijn het inhuren van ex­
perts, het laten uitvoeren van onderzoek of het regelen dat een groot aantal experts aan 
tafel zit waar het signaal van uit gaat dat het onderwerp serieus wordt genomen. Het kan 
ook gaan om specifieke kennis van de betrokken partijen. Het optreden van actoren in 
de media geeft betekenis aan hun waarden en interpreteert deze. Actoren gaan naar de 
media om bijvoorbeeld draagvlak te organiseren, het belang van hun zaak te onder­
strepen en hun boodschap te verspreiden. ‘Een sociaal gezicht’ van een actor wordt be­
schouwd als een afzonderlijke machtsbron omdat het te maken heeft met reciprociteit. 
Het is gepast om iets terug te doen voor iemand die altijd behulpzaam is of een luiste­
rend oor heeft. Men kan ook sociaal zijn in de verwachting dat dit een keer wordt be­
antwoord.
Het derde kenmerk van sociale interactie zijn interactiestrategieën die worden onder­
scheiden in framing en beschermende- en overbruggingsstrategieën. Framing geeft be­
tekenis aan gebeurtenissen waardoor de interactie tussen overheid en burgers 
geïnterpreteerd kan worden. In deze studie wordt onderscheid gemaakt in vier frames: 
een machtsframe, een identiteitsframe, een conflicthanteringsframe en een samenwer- 
kingsframe. Een machtsframe wordt hoofdzakelijk gebruikt om te laten zien wie auto­
riteit heeft en wie bepaalt wat er gebeurt. Het gaat gepaard met dominantie of 
superioriteitsgevoel. Een identiteitsframe wordt vaak gebruikt in situaties waarin m en­
sen zich onzeker voelen, zich bedreigd voelen of worden uitgedaagd. Bij dergelijke ge­
voelens reageert men direct door terug te vallen op de groep waar men toe behoort en 
deze te positioneren tegenover anderen. Als mensen het onderscheid maken tussen ‘wij’ 
en ‘zij’ maken zij gebruik van een identiteitsframe. Een conflicthanteringsframe laat 
zien dat men open staat voor denkbeelden en meningen van anderen. Het geeft aan dat 
men de wil heeft om naar overeenkomsten te kijken in plaats van naar verschillen. Een 
samenwerkingsframe duidt op een gezamenlijke actie tussen actoren tegen een oppo­
nent of voor het bereiken van een gezamenlijk doel. Beschermende strategieën worden 
gebruikt om de eigen acties te rechtvaardigen. De argumentatie die daarbij wordt ge­
bruikt gaat vaak uit van het eigen perspectief, in veel gevallen van de groep of organi­
satie waartoe men behoort. Dit type strategie kan worden gebruikt om anderen op een 
persuasieve manier te overtuigen. Overbruggingsstrategieën zijn bedoeld om proble­
men op te lossen en gezamenlijke oplossingen te vinden. Dit type strategie wordt ge­
bruikt om te laten zien dat men bereid is een brug te slaan naar een ander, ontvankelijk 
is voor denkbeelden en meningen van anderen en de discussie aan wil gaan.
Het vierde kenmerk van sociale interactie zijn de uitkomsten van sociale interactie. Er 
is onderscheid gemaakt in conflict, debat, onderhandeling, dialoog en samenwerking.
Naast deze vier kenmerken spelen ook cultuur en tradities van de actoren een rol in de
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interactie tussen overheid en burgers. Bij de overheid gaat het om de organisatiecultuur 
en de impact hiervan op haar handelen, bij de burgers om hun culturele achtergrond 
en de impact hiervan op hun handelen.
De causale lijn loopt via de vier kenmerken van sociale interactie tussen overheid en 
burgers en de cultuur en tradities van beide actoren: de cultuur en tradities beïnvloedt 
het actiepotentieel dat vervolgens leidt tot het opbouwen van macht, die de interactie- 
strategieën creëert en uiteindelijk resulteert in de interactie uitkomsten. Tijdens de ana­
lyse werd een omgekeerde volgorde aangehouden. Eerst werden de uitkomsten van de 
interactie geanalyseerd, vervolgens de interactiestrategieën, dan het opbouwen van 
macht en het actiepotentieel van de actoren, en tenslotte hun cultuur en tradities. De 
analyse gaat dus tegen de causale stroom in: eerst worden de gevolgen geanalyseerd en 
daarna de oorzaken. Het is daardoor een verklarende route.
De case studies die in deze studie zijn geanalyseerd zijn de dijkteruglegging in Lent, het 
noodoverloopgebied in de Ooijpolder en het terpenplan in de Overdiepse polder. De 
keuze voor deze drie case studies was gebaseerd op specifieke criteria. Ten eerste, de 
verwachte uitkomsten van sociale interactie tussen overheden en burgers in rivierpro- 
jecten zou de uitkomsten op beide extremen van het continuum moeten representeren. 
Dit betekent de selectie van een rivierproject waarin actoren de intentie hebben tot sa­
menwerking en een project waarin de actoren diametriaal tegenover elkaar staan. Ten 
tweede, de manier waarop burgers zich organiseren in lokale groepen om hun doelen 
te bereiken zou moeten worden meegenomen in de selectieprocedure. Dit betekent een 
selectie van lokale groepen op basis van verscheidenheid, variërend van een homogene 
groep van burgers, een groep die heterogeen van samenstelling is en verschillende lo­
kale groepen die hun eigen belangen behartigen. Ten derde, in de case studies zouden 
verschillende overheden moeten figureren. Op basis van deze criteria was de case study 
Dijkteruglegging in Lent gekozen vanwege de verschillende lokale groepen die betrok­
ken waren, de betrokkenheid van de rijksoverheid en de lokale overheid en dat over­
heden en burgers tegenover elkaar stonden. De case study Noodoverloopgebied in de 
Ooijpolder was geselecteerd omdat een heterogene groep burgers was betrokken, de 
rijksoverheid, de provinciale overheid en de lokale overheid waren betrokken en de in ­
teractie tussen overheid en burgers gebaseerd was op conflict. De case study Terpenplan 
in de Overdiepse polder was gekozen vanwege de betrokkenheid van een homogene 
groep burgers, de rijksoverheid en de provinciale overheid die waren betrokken en de 
overheid en burgers hadden de intentie tot samenwerken. Aangezien in deze case stu­
dies meerdere overheden waren betrokken betekende dit dat naast de relatie tussen 
overheid en burgers ook de relatie tussen de overheden moest worden geanalyseerd.
Setting
De setting waarin deze studie zich afspeelt is het Nederlandse waterbeheer. Evenals in 
andere Europese landen in Noordwest-Europa vond in het Nederlandse waterbeleid 
sinds 1990 een verandering van aanpak plaats. De traditionele aanpak gericht op de
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verdediging tegen overstromingen werd vervangen door een werkwijze die zich con­
centreerde op het beheer van overstromingsrisico’s. In het Nederlandse Ruimte voor 
de Rivier beleid is ruimtelijke ordening een belangrijke sleutel. Dit betekent dat m aat­
regelen zowel tussen de dijken (het verlagen van kribben) als achter de dijken (dijkver- 
leggingen, bypasses en nevengeulen) genomen kunnen worden.
Als gevolg van maatschappelijke ontwikkelingen in de afgelopen decennia is de rol van 
overheden en burgers in het rivierbeheer veranderd. Hoewel de laatste decennia de au­
toritaire bestuursstijl van Rijkswaterstaat steeds aanwezig was, raakte deze regelmatig op 
de achtergrond door pogingen van de organisatie om haar werkwijze aan te passen. 
Het burgerprotest in de jaren ’60 en ’70 tegen dijkverzwaringen laat eerder de agency 
van burgers als ‘makers and shapers’ zien die in staat zijn de politieke agenda te bepa­
len dan dat zij zich gedragen als ‘users and choosers’ (volgens een klanten- of consu- 
mentenmodel) van interventies of diensten van de overheid. Dit actieve burgerschap 
past in de nieuwe werkwijze van de rijksoverheid waarin burgers als actieve deelnemers 
aan de besluitvorming worden beschouwd.
Analyse case studies 
Dijkteruglegging in Lent
In de case study Dijkteruglegging in Lent waren de belangrijkste actoren de rijksover­
heid (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat waarvoor Rijkswaterstaat als uitvoerings­
organisatie het mandaat heeft op te treden namens het ministerie), de lokale overheid 
(de gemeente Nijmegen) en drie actieve lokale groepen. Het plan voor de dijkterug- 
legging in Lent was een intiatief van de rijksoverheid om het overstromingsrisico te 
verminderen door de flessenhals in de Waal tussen het dorp Lent en de stad Nijmegen 
op te lossen. Het plan maakte deel uit van de Planologische Kernbeslissing (PKB) 
Ruimte voor de Rivier. De dijkteruglegging in Lent was het eerste rivierproject in het 
program m a Ruimte voor de Rivier dat de rijksoverheid lanceerde en een regionale 
dienst van Rijkswaterstaat verantwoordelijk was voor de milieueffectrapportage (m.e.r.). 
Het project omvatte een dijkteruglegging, de dijk bij Lent zou 350 meter teruggelegd 
worden, en de aanleg van een nevengeul in de uiterwaard. Het rivierproject was ge­
pland in hetzelfde gebied als de vinex-wijk de Waalsprong, een stadsuitbreiding van de 
gemeente Nijmegen. Na de lancering van het overheidsplan volgden felle protesten van 
burgers die zich keerden tegen de afbraak van 55 huizen die weg zouden moeten van­
wege de geplande dijkteruglegging. Met behulp van een water-expert -  die alleen in het 
begin van het planningsproces betrokken was -  ontwikkelden de lokale groepen een 
alternatief plan dat voorzag in een verlaging van de uiterwaard voor een ‘groene’ ne­
vengeul en een mogelijke dijkteruglegging in de toekomst.
De interactie tussen de rijksoverheid en de lokale groepen leidde tot debat en conflict.
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Hoewel de rijksoverheid probeerde aan de wensen van de bewoners tegemoet te komen 
om escalatie te voorkomen, eindigde de interactie nooit in onderhandeling. De meeste 
onenigheden escaleerden en leidden tot een conflict dat vervolgens onopgelost bleef. De 
interactie tussen de gemeente en de lokale groepen ontwikkelde zich op eenzelfde m a­
nier: zaken werden onderwerp van discussie en escaleerden vaak tot conflicten die niet 
opgelost werden. De interactie tussen de overheden resulteerde in debat en onderhan­
deling. Onenigheden waren in essentie een competentiestrijd tussen beide overheden. 
Onderhandeling kwam één keer voor toen de rijksoverheid besloot bij te dragen aan de 
kosten van de tweede Waalbrug en akkoord ging met de compensatie voor de huizen die 
niet gebouwd konden worden in de vinex-wijk de Waalsprong. Hierdoor verzekerde zij 
zich van de steun van de gemeente voor het dijkterugleggingsplan.
In hun interactie gebruikten de overheden en lokale groepen verschillende interactie- 
strategieën. De rijksoverheid gebruikte in de interactie met de lokale groepen en de ge­
meente gedurende het hele planningsproces een machtsframe. De belangrijkste 
voorbeelden waren de lancering van het plan zonder afstemming met de eigen ambte­
naren en de gemeente in kwestie en de manier waarop het omging met het alternatief 
van de burgers dat op voorhand als ‘tweede keus’ werd bestempeld. De gemeente en de 
lokale groepen gebruikten een identiteitsframe. De gemeente zette haar identiteitsframe 
interactioneel in. Terwijl de gemeente de bewoners liet weten dat het geen rol had in de 
besluitvorming zodat zij niet kon worden aangesproken op het feit dat zij niet thuis gaf 
voor de bewoners, gebruikte ze het in de interactie met de rijksoverheid om haar posi­
tie te benadrukken in de overheidshiërarchie: “het is onze legitieme rol om het alge­
meen belang te ondersteunen maar onder bepaalde voorwaarden”. Noch de 
rijksoverheid, noch de gemeente verving het identiteitsframe door een conflicthante- 
ringsframe. In de interactie met de lokale groepen zette de rijksoverheid heel vaak be­
schermende strategieën in en weinig overbruggingsstrategieën. De lokale groepen 
gebruikten vaak beschermende strategieën en weinig overbruggingsstrategieën. In de 
interactie tussen de gemeente en de lokale groepen zetten beide vaak beschermende 
strategieën in. Zij maakten weinig gebruik van overbruggingstrategieën. In de interac­
tie tussen de overheden zetten beide af en toe beschermende strategieën en overbrug- 
gingsstrategieën in.
Als het gaat om het opbouwen van macht gebruikten de overheden en de lokale groe­
pen hetzelfde aantal machtstypen. In de interactie tussen de rijksoverheid en de lokale 
groepen zetten beide vijf machtstypen in. De rijksoverheid gebruikte indirecte dwang, 
legitimatiemacht, hindermacht, kennismacht en ‘een sociaal gezicht’. De lokale groe­
pen gebruikten legitimatiemacht, hindermacht, kennismacht, mediamacht en ‘een so­
ciaal gezicht’. De gemeente en de lokale groepen gebruikten beide vier machtstypen in 
hun interactie. De machtstypen die de gemeente inzette waren indirecte dwang, legiti- 
matiemacht, hindermacht en kennismacht terwijl de lokale groepen legitimatiemacht, 
hindermacht, kennismacht en mediamacht gebruikten. Door het gebruik van uiteen­
lopende machtstypen waren de lokale groepen invloedrijk. In de interactie tussen de
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overheden zette de rijksoverheid vier machtstypen in (indirecte dwang, legitimatie- 
macht, beloningsmacht en hindermacht) terwijl de gemeente gebruik maakte van twee 
machtstypen (legitimatiemacht en hindermacht). Het gebruik van beloningsmacht 
door de rijksoverheid (de bijdrage aan de kosten van de tweede Waalbrug) was bepa­
lend voor de steun van de gemeente aan het dijkterugleggingsplan. Het gebruik van 
macht door de overheden en de lokale groepen geeft inzicht in zowel de gebruikte in- 
teractiestrategieën als de interactie uitkomsten. Het gebruik van indirecte dwang en le- 
gitimatiemacht verhinderde de ontwikkeling van de interactieuitkomsten in de richting 
van onderhandeling, dialoog en samenwerking. De overheden gaven de voorkeur aan 
forceren boven onderhandeling. De analyse laat zien dat noch een machtsframe, noch 
een identiteitsframe bevordelijk is voor dialoog en samenwerking. De laatste vereist een 
goede verstandhouding en een atmosfeer van tolerantie waarin vertrouwen kan groeien. 
Dit zal niet gebeuren zolang partijen ervan overtuigd zijn dat hun eigen belangen de be­
langrijkste zijn.
De analyse van het actiepotentieel van de overheden en de lokale groep laat zien dat het 
actiepotentieel van de rijksoverheid gekenschetst kan worden als sterk terwijl het ac- 
tiepotentieel van de gemeente en de lokale groepen als respectievelijk gemiddeld en 
zwak getypeerd kunnen worden. Terwijl het actiepotentieel van de rijksoverheid als 
machtig kan worden beschouwd en het actiepotentieel van de lokale groepen als m in­
der invloedrijk, hadden beide actoren daarvan een ander beeld tijdens het plannings­
proces. De rijksoverheid leek m inder machtig mede door het onvermogen om een 
conflicthanteringsframe te gebruiken als gevolg van het overmatig profileren van het 
overheidsplan op een zo positief mogelijke manier, het ondervinden van moeilijkheden 
bij het omgaan met andere meningen en het gebrek aan transparantie in haar hande­
len. De lokale groepen hadden daarentegen meer invloed dan op grond van hun actie- 
potentieel verwacht kon worden waardoor hun gebrek aan experts die hen pro-deo 
advies konden geven gedurende het hele planningsproces, een breed netwerk van actieve 
leden, een gemeenschappelijke profilering, een doordachte strategie voor de overhe­
den en hun onvermogen om een conflicthanteringsframe te gebruiken als gevolg van 
hun fixatie op het eigen belang minder negatief leek uit te pakken. Het ‘zwakke’ actie- 
potentieel van de rijksoverheid en het ‘sterke’ actiepotentieel van de lokale groepen in 
de beeldvorming van beide partijen had vooral te maken met de inzet van verschillende 
machtstypen door de lokale groepen, met name kennismacht en mediamacht. Dit be­
tekent dat het actiepotentieel van de actoren eerder hun positie tijdens het plannings­
proces verklaart dan dat het iets zegt over het proces. Daarvoor moeten de opbouw van 
macht door beide actoren en hun interactiestrategieën in de analyse worden betrok­
ken. Van belang is dat de uitkomsten van de analyse vervolgens worden voorgelegd aan 
de actoren om een oordeel te kunnen geven over de invloed van het gebruik van macht 
en interactiestrategieën op de interactie tussen overheden en burgers. Zoals deze case 
study laat zien, kunnen actoren een andere interpretatie van de uitkomsten hebben dan 
mijn analyse.
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Met betrekking tot de organisatiecultuur van de overheden en de culturele achtergrond 
van de lokale groepen en de invloed hiervan op hun acties, had de organisatiecultuur 
van de rijksoverheid en de gemeente respectievelijk een sterke en gemiddelde invloed 
op hun handelen en had de culturele achtergrond van de lokale groep een zwakke in ­
vloed op zijn handelen. De organisatiecultuur van Rijkswaterstaat was voornamelijk 
gebaseerd op een autoritaire bestuursstijl. Dit vertaalde zich in een technische aanpak 
in waterbeheer en de tendens om van bovenaf maatregelen door te voeren. Het pro­
gramma Ruimte voor de Rivier resulteerde weliswaar in nieuwe vormen van gover­
nance, waaronder samenwerking met lagere overheden, maar niet in een andere 
bestuursstijl. Het karakter van het programma was zodanig van opzet dat een ‘com­
mand and control’ stijl altijd op de achtergrond aanwezig was. Voorbeelden hiervan 
waren het presenteren van nationale projecten, zoals de dijkteruglegging in Lent, de 
nadruk op procedures en de gerichtheid op het vergroten van de waterveiligheid waar­
door andere rivierwaarden en -functies, zoals landschap en biodiversiteit, minder pri­
oriteit hadden. De gemeente Nijmegen voer een eigen koers voornamelijk gericht op de 
realisatie van de vinex-wijk de Waalsprong, los van het algemene belang en het belang 
van de burgers van Lent. De gemeenschap in Lent was in het verleden niet in staat om 
de overheid op andere gedachten te brengen toen deze plannen had voor de aanleg van 
infrastructurele werken in haar dorp. Dat is tot op de dag van vandaag niet veranderd.
Noodoverloopgebied in de Ooijpolder
In de case study Noodoverloopgebied in de Ooijpolder waren de belangrijkste actoren 
de rijksoverheid (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat waarvoor Rijkswaterstaat als 
uitvoeringsorganisatie het mandaat heeft op te treden namens het ministerie), de pro­
vincie (Gelderland), de gemeente (Ubbergen) en de lokale groep. Het plan voor nood- 
overloopgebieden had tot doel om het restrisico op overstromingen te verminderen. 
Het was als een noodmaatregel aangekondigd aanvullend op de PKB Ruimte voor de 
Rivier in het geval maatregelen die in dit kader worden genomen niet afdoende zouden 
blijken om een waterhoeveelheid van 18,000 m3/s van de Rijn het hoofd te bieden. 
Nadat de Commissie Noodoverloopgebieden een rapport publiceerde waarin drie lo­
caties voor gecontroleerd overstromen waren opgenomen, waaronder de Ooijpolder, 
protesteerden de bewoners in de Ooijpolder tegen de aanwijzing van hun polder als ca- 
lamiteitenpolder. Het plan voor noodoverloopgebieden zou in eerste instantie als een 
nationale veiligheidskwestie worden behandeld. Dit betekent dat alleen het verant­
woordelijke ministerie en betrokken ambtenaren hier weet van hebben. In plaats daar­
van werd besloten het overheidsplan te presenteren als de ultieme oplossing voor ’s 
land’s waterproblemen.
De uitkomsten van de interactie tussen de rijksoverheid en de lokale groep kunnen aan­
geduid worden als debat en conflict, en samenwerking als het ging om de interactie tus­
sen de lagere overheden en de lokale groep. De interactie tussen de overheden had 
uiteenlopende uitkomsten. Terwijl de interactie tussen de rijksoverheid en de provin­
cie resulteerde in debat, onderhandeling en dialoog, de interactie tussen de rijksover-
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heid en de gemeente uitmondde in debat, leidde de interactie tussen de provincie en de 
gemeente tot dialoog en samenwerking.
Met betrekking tot interactiestrategieën gebruikte de rijksoverheid twee frames in de in­
teractie met de lokale groep en de lagere overheden: een machtsframe en een identi- 
teitsframe. Het eerste frame werd vooral ingezet door de verschillende staatssecretarissen, 
terwijl het tweede frame werd gebruikt door rijksambtenaren. Het gebruik van een 
machtsframe door de staatssecretarissen liet de ambtenaren weinig ruimte om van frame 
te wisselen, bijvoorbeeld van een identiteitsframe naar een conflicthanteringsframe. Het 
gebruik van een identiteitsframe door rijksambtenaren was begrijpelijk omdat zij met 
zowel de lagere en provinciale overheden als bewoners te maken hadden. Als gevolg van 
het gebruik van een conflicthanteringsframe en overbruggingsstrategieën door de pro­
vincie veranderde de interactie tussen de rijksoverheid en de provincie van debat naar 
onderhandeling en dialoog. De interactie tussen de rijksoverheid en de gemeente bleef 
steken in debat als gevolg van het gebruik van een machtsframe door de rijksoverheid 
en een identiteitsframe door de gemeente. In de interactie met de rijksoverheid veran­
derde de gemeente niet van frame, het bleef een identiteitsframe hanteren. Dit had een 
negatieve invloed op de interactie uitkomst die eindigde in debat. In de interactie met 
de lagere overheden gebruikte de lokale groep een samenwerkingsframe.
Als het gaat om het opbouwen van macht maakte de rijksoverheid in de interactie met 
de lokale groep gebruik van vijf machtstypen: indirecte dwang, legitimiteitsmacht, hin­
dermacht, kennismacht en ‘een sociaal gezicht’. De lokale groep daarentegen gebruikte 
drie machtstypen: hindermacht, kennismacht en mediamacht waarbij de laatste twee 
zeer vaak werden ingezet. De lagere overheden gebruikten twee machtstypen in hun in ­
teractie met de lokale groep. De provincie zette kennismacht en ‘een sociaal gezicht’ in, 
de gemeente gebruikte legitimatiemacht en ‘een sociaal gezicht’. De lokale groep ge­
bruikte één machtstype in de interactie met de lagere overheden: ‘een sociaal gezicht’. In 
de interactie tussen de rijksoverheid en de lagere overheden gebruikte de rijksoverheid 
drie machtstypen: indirecte dwang, legitimatiemacht en kennismacht. Zowel de pro­
vincie als de gemeente zetten vier machtstypen in: legitimatiemacht, kennismacht, m e­
diamacht en ‘een sociaal gezicht’. De opbouw van macht in de interactie tussen de 
rijksoverheid en de lokale groep had een aanzienlijk effect op de interactieuitkomsten: 
debat en conflict. Het gebruik van indirecte dwang en legitimatiemacht door de rijks­
overheid en de inzet van kennismacht en mediamacht door de lokale groep bleek in ­
vloedrijk. Het gebruik van kennismacht, mediamacht en ‘een sociaal gezicht’ door de 
provincie in de interactie met de rijksoverheid beïnvloedde de interactieuitkomsten zo­
danig dat deze uitm ondden in debat, onderhandeling en dialoog. De interactiestrate- 
gieën die de provincie gebruikte droegen ook bij aan deze interactieuitkomsten. De 
interactie tussen de rijksoverheid en de gemeente eindigde nooit in een oplossing maar 
bleven steken in debat. Dit kan niet verklaard worden door het gebruik van macht door 
beide actoren. De interactiestrategieën van beide actoren moeten hierbij betrokken wor­
den (zie boven).
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De analyse van het actiepotentieel van de overheden en de lokale groep laat zien dat het 
actiepotentieel van de overheden en de lokale groep gekenschetst kan worden als res­
pectievelijk zwak en gemiddeld als het om de rijksoverheid en de provincie ging en 
sterk als het de lokale groep betrof. De rijksoverheid schoot tekort op het gebied van 
coördinerende mechanismen en consistentie (het opbouwen van een verhaallijn), en de 
motivatie van zowel de organisatie als de ambtenaren. De provincie dankte haar ge­
middelde actiepotentieel vooral aan het vermogen om gebruik te maken van coördi­
nerende mechanismen en consistentie (het opbouwen van een verhaallijn dat een 
waterafvoer van 18,000 m3/s van de Rijn in Nederland niet realistisch is, die later in 
het proces gedeeltelijk werd overgenomen door de rijksoverheid) en de motivatie van 
de bestuurder, de organisatie en de ambtenaren. Het zwakke actiepotentieel van de ge­
meente was voornamelijk het gevolg van een zwak mandaat op het gebied van water­
beheer en middelen, en de afwezigheid van een ambtelijke ambitie op dit gebied. Het 
sterke actiepotentieel van de lokale groep was gebaseerd op een sterke capaciteit en m o­
tivatie voor het ondernemen van actie.
De organisatiecultuur van de overheden en de culturele achtergrond van de lokale groep 
en de invloed hiervan op hun handelen was sterk, gemiddeld en zwak als het ging om 
de organisatiecultuur van respectievelijk de rijksoverheid, de provincie en de gemeente 
en sterk als het de culturele achtergrond van de lokale groep betrof. De ingenieurscul- 
tuur van Rijkswaterstaat beïnvloedt in hoge mate de dagelijkse praktijk van het tegen­
woordige waterbeheer. Rijkswaterstaat heeft een mandaat voor waterveiligheid, hetgeen 
de organisatie vertaalt in zijn missie: het streven naar ‘droge voeten’ en het land be­
hoeden voor overstromingen, maar dat kan niet gegarandeerd worden. In de optiek 
van Rijkswaterstaat is waterveiligheid een overheidstaak. Het betrekken van burgers bij 
dit vraagstuk wordt niet gezien als vanzelfsprekend. De invloed van de organisatiecul­
tuur van de provincie op haar handelen was gemiddeld. Was Gelderland vroeger ge­
wend haar invloed te laten gelden, tegenwoordig probeert de provincie Rijkswaterstaat 
te overtuigen van haar ideeën op het gebied van waterbeheer. De invloed van de orga­
nisatiecultuur van de gemeente op haar handelen was zwak. Als gevolg van haar plaats 
in de overheidshiërarchie is zij vooral volgend. In de discussie over noodoverloopge- 
bieden kwam de gemeente Ubbergen op voor de belangen van haar bewoners maar 
zorgde zij er tevens voor dat zij on speaking terms bleef met de rijksoverheid. De be­
woners in de Ooijpolder zijn door de eeuwen heen regelmatig in opstand gekomen 
tegen overheden. Of het nu ging om waterbeheer of andere zaken, zij waren niet bang 
op te komen voor hun eigen belang. In de 20e eeuw voerden zij verschillende keren met 
succes oppositie tegen overheidsplannen. Ook toen de Ooijpolder in 2000 zoekgebied 
voor noodoverloop werd slaagden de bewoners erin het overheidsplan tegen te houden. 
Hun culturele achtergrond had daarom een sterke invloed op hun handelen.
Terpenplan in de Overdiepse polder
In de case study Terpenplan in de Overdiepse polder waren de belangrijkste actoren de 
rijksoverheid (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat waarvoor Rijkswaterstaat als uit-
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voeringsorganisatie het mandaat heeft op te treden namens het ministerie), de provin­
cie (Noord-Brabant) en de lokale groep. Het Terpenplan is een bewoners’ initiatief om 
de polder geschikt te maken voor piekafVoeren in de Bergsche Maas. Het Terpenplan 
was onderdeel van de PKB Ruimte voor de Rivier. Het Terpenplan was het eerste ri- 
vierproject dat de rijksoverheid delegeerde naar een lagere overheid waardoor de taak­
verdeling gedurende het planningsproces duidelijk zou worden. Vanwege zijn geschikte 
lokatie langs de Maas, zijn vroegere functie als retentiegebied en het kleine aantal be­
woners werd de Overdiepse polder eind jaren ’90 zoekgebied voor waterberging. Enkele 
bewoners van de Overdiepse polder initieerde een terpenplan waarbij hun polder een 
keer in de 25 jaar volstroomt, ook wel stromende berging genoemd. Het doel dat hen 
voor ogen stond was om het algemeen belang van een verlaagde waterstand in de Berg- 
sche Maas bij hoogwater te combineren met een duurzaam economisch bedrijfsper- 
spectief voor hun boerenbedrijven.
De interactie tussen de rijksoverheid en de lokale groep mondde uit in debat en con­
flict. Vaak werden conflicten opgelost met behulp van de provincie. De interactie tus­
sen de provincie en de lokale groep resulteerde in debat, onderhandeling, dialoog en 
samenwerking. Als onenigheden voorkwamen werden deze altijd opgelost. Vaak wer­
den deze voorkomen omdat zowel de provincie als de lokale groep voortdurend in de 
‘dialoog-modus’ stonden. De interactie tussen de overheden leidde tot debat en conflict 
als gevolg van onenigheden over competenties. Dankzij overbruggingsstrategieën van 
de provincie eindigden conflicten altijd in een voor beide acceptabele oplossing. Dit 
betekende dat onderhandeling ook deel uitmaakte van de interactie uitkomsten.
Met betrekking tot interactiestrategieën zette de rijksoverheid in de interactie met de lo­
kale groep doorgaans een identiteitsframe in en af en toe een machtsframe, terwijl de 
lokale groep gebruik maakte van een identiteitsframe en conflicthanteringsframe. Beide 
actoren gebruikten vaak beschermende strategieën en soms overbruggingsstrategieën. 
De inzet van beschermende en overbruggingsstrategieën kan gezien worden als een be­
wuste strategie. In de interactie tussen de provincie en de lokale groep combineerde de 
lokale groep een conflicthanteringsframe en een identiteitsframe, terwijl de provincie 
hoofdzakelijk een conflicthanteringsframe en een samenwerkingsframe gebruikte. De 
lokale groep gebruikte een identiteitsframe incidenteel. Dankzij de overbruggingsstra- 
tegieën van de provincie en de open houding van de lokale groep en het openstaan voor 
signalen van anderen, veranderde de lokale groep van frame en verving het identiteits- 
frame voor een conflicthanteringsframe. Na het aantreden van een andere projectlei­
der gebruikte de lokale groep hoofdzakelijk een samenwerkingsframe. Dit betekende 
niet dat er geen onenigheden waren. Onderwerpen of situaties die hiervoor aanleiding 
gaven werden besproken waardoor meningsverschillen werden opgelost of zelfs voor­
komen, vooral door pogingen van de provincie om de verschillen met de lokale groep 
te overbruggen. De provincie en de lokale groep gebruikten veel overbruggingsstrate- 
gieën en af en toe beschermende strategieën. De provincie zette beschermende strate­
gieën alleen in bij onderhandelingen met bewoners over de aankoop van hun land en
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onroerend goed. Hetzelfde deden de bewoners. In de interactie met de provincie maakte 
de rijksoverheid gebruik van een machtsframe, een conflicthanteringsframe en een 
identiteitsframe. Terwijl op management niveau af en toe gebruik werd gemaakt van een 
conflicthanteringsframe, werd op ambtelijk niveau gewoonlijk een identiteitsframe en 
soms een machtsframe ingezet. Het machtsframe bleek een belangrijke voedingsbo­
dem te zijn voor onenigheden tussen de rijksoverheid en de provincie waarbij het vaak 
ging om een competentiestrijd. De provincie zette meestal een conflicthanteringsframe 
in. Incidenteel gebruikte de provincie een identiteitsframe, maar dit kwam alleen voor 
op ambtelijk niveau. In de interactie met de provincie werd op ambtelijk niveau vaak 
gebruik gemaakt van beschermende strategieën terwijl op management niveau af en 
toe overbruggingsstrategieën werden gebruikt. Dit hield in dat de rijksoverheid op m a­
nagementniveau in was voor onderhandeling. Onderhandeling startte echter alleen 
door toedoen van de provincie die daarvoor altijd de eerste stap zette. Dit was ook het 
geval wanneer sprake was van onenigheden in de interactie tussen de rijksoverheid en 
de lokale groep.
Als het gaat om het opbouwen van macht maakte de rijksoverheid in de interactie met 
de lokale groep gebruik van drie machtstypen (indirecte dwang, legitimatiemacht en 
hindermacht), terwijl de lokale groep vijf machtstypen hanteerde (legitimatiemacht, 
hindermacht, kennismacht, mediamacht en ‘een sociaal gezicht’). De lokale groep ge­
bruikte dezelfde machtstypen in de interactie met de provincie. De provincie zette drie 
machtstypen in: indirecte dwang, kennismacht en ‘een sociaal gezicht’. Het gebruik van 
vijf machtstypen door de lokale groep in de interactie met de provincie had geen re­
percussies voor de interactieuitkomsten die varieerden van debat, onderhandeling, dia­
loog tot samenwerking dankzij het conflicthanteringsframe dat de provincie gebruikte 
in combinatie met overbruggingsstrategieën. In de interactie tussen de rijksoverheid 
en de provincie gebruikte de rijksoverheid vier machtstypen (indirecte dwang, legiti- 
matiemacht, hindermacht en kennismacht) en de provincie gebruikte drie machtsty­
pen (indirecte dwang, kennismacht en ‘een sociaal gezicht’). Omdat de machtsbalans 
tussen beide overheden enigszins in evenwicht was, en dankzij het door de provincie ge­
bruikte conflicthanteringsframe in combinatie met overbruggingsstrategieën veran­
derden de interactieuitkomsten van debat en conflict naar onderhandeling. Wanneer 
een overheidsorganisatie gebruik maakt van indirecte dwang zal een andere partij, of 
dit nu een andere overheidsorganisatie is of een lokale groep, minder geneigd zijn om 
een conflicthanteringsframe en overbruggingsstrategieën te gebruiken. Het gebruik van 
specifieke machtstypen door de provincie, vooral kennismacht en ‘een sociaal gezicht’, 
is begrijpelijk omdat de provincie zijn eerste rivierproject wilde realiseren en dit vraagt 
terughoudendheid in het gebruik van indirecte dwang als machtstype. Ondanks het 
feit dat de machtsbalans tussen de rijksoverheid en de provincie enigszins in balans was 
bleek dat samenwerking moeilijk bereikbaar was (zie onder).
De analyse van het actiepotentieel van de overheden en de lokale groep laat zien dat het 
actiepotentieel van de rijksoverheid en de provincie gekenmerkt kan worden als res-
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pectievelijk zwak en gemiddeld, terwijl het actiepotentieel van de lokale groep kan wor­
den getypeerd als sterk. De rijksoverheid schoot tekort op het gebied van coördine­
rende mechanismen en consistentie (het opbouwen of overnemen van een verhaallijn) 
hetgeen resulteerde in een zwakke capaciteit. Daarbij had de rijksoverheid een middel­
matige motivatie. Ondanks haar zwakke actiepotentieel had de rijksoverheid aanzien­
lijke invloed op het planningsproces dankzij het gebruik van sociale macht en de inzet 
van interactiestrategieën. Het gemiddelde actiepotentieel van de provincie was een ge­
volg van een gemiddelde capaciteit en een sterke motivatie om te handelen, dat een 
goede basis bleek voor de interactie met de rijksoverheid en de lokale groep. Het sterke 
actiepotentieel van de lokale groep, dat gebaseerd was op een sterke capaciteit en m o­
tivatie voor het ondernemen van actie, zorgde ervoor dat de lokale groep een sterke 
partij was zowel in de interactie met de rijksoverheid als de provincie.
De organisatiecultuur van de overheden en de culturele achtergrond van de lokale groep 
en de invloed op hun handelen was sterk als het ging om de organisatiecultuur van de 
rijksoverheid en de culturele achtergrond van de lokale groep en gemiddeld als het de 
organisatiecultuur van de provincie betrof. De ingenieurscultuur die Rijkswaterstaat 
kenmerkt sinds zijn oprichting in 1798 heeft een sterke invloed op zijn werkwijze. De 
organisatie staat voor krachtdadig overheidsoptreden. In de praktijk van het waterbe­
heer heeft Rijkswaterstaat dit laten zien door de aanleg van infrastructuur en het beheer 
ervan. Om tegemoet te komen aan maatschappelijke kritiek dat de organisatie geen re­
kening hield met natuur- en landschapswaarden, heeft het natuur geïncorporeerd in 
haar beleid. Rijkswaterstaat heeft echter moeite met het betrekken van burgers bij plan­
ningsprocessen en met het omgaan met burgers die een eigen plan hebben ontwikkeld, 
zoals in de Overdiepse polder, dat zowel het algemeen belang dient, het verlagen van het 
overstromingsrisico bij hoogwater, als het belang van de burgers, een duurzaam eco­
nomisch perspectief voor hun boerenbedrijven. De organisatiecultuur van de provin­
cie die gekarakteriseerd kan worden als een middenweg volgend, bleek effectief in de 
interactie met de rijksoverheid en de lokale groep. Hoewel de culturele achtergrond van 
de lokale groep de machtsopbouw, de interactiestrategieën en de interactieuitkomsten 
sterk beïnvloedde was de lokale groep erg afhankelijk van de provincie om zijn doel te 
bereiken. De oganisatiecultuur van de overheden en de culturele achtergrond van de lo­
kale groep geeft inzicht in hun positie tijdens het planningsproces maar kan niet het 
proces verklaren.
Een algemene conclusie uit deze case is dat samenwerking tussen overheden alleen kan 
voorkomen in het geval beide overheden terughoudend zijn of afzien van indirecte 
dwang en legitimatiemacht. Hoewel legitimatiemacht een minder dominant machts­
type is dan indirecte dwang bleek het nadelig voor een goede verstandhouding en het 
creëren van een atmosfeer van tolerantie waarin vertrouwen de kans krijgt te groeien. 
Een goede verstandhouding kan als voorwaarde worden beschouwd voor samenwerking 
zoals het gebruik van macht door de provincie en de lokale groep laat zien.
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Discussie
Tijdens het analyseren van de case studies bleek het Cross Scale Interaction (CSI) kader 
bruikbaar voor het verkrijgen van inzicht in de sociale interactie tussen overheid en 
burgers. Het gaf in het bijzonder inzicht in de relatie tussen de actoren, tussen de over­
heden en de burgers en tussen de verschillende overheden, en de macht- en interactie- 
strategieën die zij gebruikten vanaf het begin van hun interactie tot de uiteindelijke 
uitkomst van hun interactie. Het voldeed dus precies aan de doelstelling. Het CSI kader 
ontrafelde de vele lagen van de interactie tussen overheid en burgers, vooral als het ging 
om de cultuur en tradities van de actoren, hun actiepotentieel, het opbouwen van 
macht, de interactiestrategieën die actoren gebruiken en de interactieuitkomsten. Het 
analytisch kader gaf ook inzicht in hoe overheden optreden in governance processen 
and hoe deze processen vorm krijgen in de praktijk.
Tijdens de analyse van de case studies kwamen verschillende methodologische proble­
men naar voren. Deze varieerden van eenvoudige kwesties, zoals het invoegen van cul­
tuur en tradities in het CSI kader tot meer complexe vraagstukken, waaronder de 
vervanging van credibility (geloofwaardigheid) door sociability (het laten zien van ‘een 
sociaal gezicht’) hetgeen bijvoorbeeld een literatuurstudie vereiste en de afweging ge­
maakt moest worden of vervanging zinvol was.
Conclusie
De onderzoeksvraag was: Welke factoren en mechanismen beïnvloeden de interactie 
tussen overheid en burgers in planningsprocessen in het Nederlandse rivierengebied? 
Bij de beantwoording van deze onderzoeksvraag wordt onderscheid gemaakt tussen 
factoren die in het oog springen en onderliggende factoren, en mechanismen die de in­
teractie tussen overheid en burgers beïnvloeden.
Deze studie laat zien dat er zeven factoren zijn die direct invloed hebben op de inter­
actie tussen overheid en burgers.De eerste factor is vertrouwen. Het opbouwen van ver­
trouwen is moeilijk in interacties tussen overheid en burgers om dat beide partijen 
elkaar doorgaans wantrouwen. Zonder vertrouwen zal de relatie tussen overheid en 
burgers zich niet ontwikkelen en in een ‘conflict’ modus belanden (zie onder) die in- 
teractieuitkomsten tot gevolg heeft, waaronder conflict en debat, op een schaal waarbij 
dialoog en samenwerking beschouwd worden als ‘samenwerkings’ interactieuitkom- 
sten. Vertrouwen krijgen in elkaar blijkt moeilijk voor zowel overheden als burgers 
omdat beide partijen elkaar neigen te wantrouwen. Dit gebeurt in het geval overheden 
de leiding hebben in een planningsproces en wanneer zij dat niet hebben, in het geval 
burgers de negatieve gevolgen van een overheidsplan ondervinden en wanneer zij hun 
eigen plan initiëren. Vertrouwen krijgen in elkaar vraagt van beide partijen een conti­
nue inspanning. Overheden en burgers moeten elkaar eerst leren kennen om de vraag 
te kunnen beantwoorden of de andere partij betrouwbaar is en daarom vergt het tijd 
voordat partijen elkaar vertrouwen.
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Een moeilijkheid hierbij is dat de overheid vooral werkt in een formele setting terwijl 
vertrouwen het beste gedijt in een informele omgeving. Een belangrijk obstakel bij het 
opbouwen van vertrouwen is dat in een formele setting de contacten tussen mensen 
hoofdzakelijk gebaseerd zijn op contracten, overeenkomsten, wetten, procedures en re­
gels. Dit wordt vaak ‘geformaliseerd wantrouwen’ genoemd, een kenmerk van overhe­
den in moderne samenlevingen. Wat nodig is bij het opbouwen van vertrouwen is 
uitwisseling van informatie op basis van reciprociteit, zoals mechanismen voor geven 
en nemen (‘Als ik dit voor jou doe, dan doe jij dit voor mij’) en ongeschreven regels. Het 
opbouwen van vertrouwen betekent dus dat de overheid en burgers op een informele 
manier moeten investeren in elkaar. Dit vereist open communicatie over de wensen van 
beide partijen, hun doelen en opinies en gezichtspunten op welke manier zij hun doel 
willen bereiken, en het kunnen reflecteren op elkaar zodat beider gedrag onderwerp 
van discussie kan worden.
De tweede factor zijn onzekerheden. Governance processen hebben in essentie tot doel 
met onzekerheden om te gaan, bijvoorbeeld als het gaat om de uitkomsten van het 
planningsproces of de actoren die betrokken moeten worden. Governance processen le­
veren echter ook onzekerheden op, zoals de besluitvorming (in hoeverre hebben be­
trokken burgers invloed?) en het creëren van precedenten. Over het algemeen zijn 
traditionele processen redelijk vastomlijnd en gericht op het zoveel mogelijk uitsluiten 
van risico’s terwijl bij een meer interactieve aanpak het proces open is hetgeen leidt tot 
meer onderzekerheden. Onzekerheden blijken vooral een issue voor bestuurders. Be­
stuurders kunnen een interactief proces zien als een bedreiging van hun legitimiteit en 
hun traditionele rol als bestuurder. Zij willen dan zo min mogelijk risico lopen om in 
politiek opzicht te kunnen overleven. Het gevolg is dat zij veelal kiezen voor een tradi­
tionele benadering waarin weinig ruimte is voor publieke participatie omdat die de uit­
komst onzeker maakt en/of het proces vertraagt. Een traditionele aanpak van 
planningsprocessen betekent in de regel een gesloten proces waarbij traditionele parti- 
cipatie-instrumenten worden gebruikt, zoals consultatie en informatiebijeenkomsten in 
plaats van instrumenten waarvoor een actieve inbreng van burgers nodig is, zoals wer­
kateliers en rondetafelbijeenkomsten. De traditionele aanpak van participatieproces- 
sen laat ambtenaren in veel gevallen weinig ruimte om deze te veranderen in een open 
planningsproces aangezien zij gebonden zijn aan regels en procedures en gehouden zijn 
aan het bewandelen van de gebaande paden. Burgers worden geconfronteerd met on­
zekerheden in planningsprocessen, of zij nu tegen een overheidsplan zijn of betrokken 
zijn bij een gezamenlijk initiatief. Wat betreft het eerste, onzekerheden met betrekking 
tot het proces zijn: Wordt hun stem gehoord; worden zij betrokken in het plannings­
proces? En inzake de uitkomst: Zullen ze winnen of verliezen? Wat betreft het tweede, 
onzekerheden aangaande het proces zijn: Hoe bewerkstelligen burgers dat zij deel uit­
maken van het besluitvormingsproces; hoe krijgen ze het voor elkaar dat het geza­
menlijke initiatief centraal blijft staan gedurende het planningsproces ondanks de 
voortdurende wisselingen van bestuurders en ambtenaren? Als het gaat om de uitkomst: 
Zal het gezamenlijk doel behaald worden? Dit betekent dat onzekerheden een belang-
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rijke factor zijn in de interactie tussen overheid en burgers aangezien het risico altijd 
aanwezig is dat het vertrouwen van de betrokken partijen geschaad wordt.
De derde factor is uitsluiting van burgers. Het uitsluiten van burgers in planningspro­
cessen is een bron van conflict in de interactie tussen overheid en burgers. Als burgers 
niet worden betrokken in de ontwerpfase of in een vervolg van een planningsproces 
wordt het wantrouwen van burgers jegens de overheid versterkt. Het gevolg is dat het 
moeilijk is om de relatie tussen overheid en burgers te normaliseren omdat een uitweg 
vinden uit een ‘conflict’ modus waarin de interactie plaatsvindt (zie onder), bijvoor­
beeld een conflictueuze relatie, niet eenvoudig is. Partners die in een conflictueuze re­
latie verwikkeld zijn zullen eerder de verschillen tussen hen benadrukken dan dat zij het 
accent leggen op overeenkomsten of gezamenlijke doelen.
De vierde factor betreffen instituties die vooral gericht zijn op formele rollen waardoor 
zij niet in staat zijn om governance processen adequaat te ondersteunen. Sociale inter­
acties zijn hoofdzakelijk informeel terwijl veel overheidsorganisaties ingebed zijn in de 
formele wereld waar de basis van handelen voortkomt uit geformaliseerd wantrouwen. 
Overheidsorganisaties waarin een of meerdere individuen het verschil weten te maken 
door te switchen van de formele naar de informele wereld bleken een positieve invloed 
te hebben op de interactie tussen overheid en burgers, dat wil zeggen dat deze dialoog 
en samenwerking stimuleerden.
De vijfde factor is de wil van de overheid om zich te engageren hetgeen een voorwaarde 
is voor hun responsiviteit in governance processen. Contracten en het maken van wet­
telijke voorbehouden worden beschouwd als het beperken van de responsiviteit van 
overheden. Individuen binnen de overheid die in staat zijn om te gaan met de com­
plexiteit en onzekerheden die gepaard gaan met governance processen kunnen volgens 
Rodrik & Zeckhauser (1988) beschouwd worden als ‘palliatieve maatregelen’. Hoewel 
deze individuen moedig zijn omdat zij hun nek uitsteken, is hun handelen in feite geen 
oplossing voor het probleem van de responsiviteit van overheden, tenzij alle ambtena­
ren de strategieën om om te gaan met complexiteit en onzekerheden in governance 
processen hebben geïnternaliseerd. Deze studie laat zien dat wanneer het handelen van 
de overheid voortkomt uit acties van individuen omdat zij zich engageren dit de res- 
ponsiviteit van de betrokken overheid verhoogde. De betrokken overheid bleek bij­
voorbeeld meer genegen tegemoet te komen aan behoeften van burgers om een rol te 
spelen in het planningsproces. De belangrijkste factor is echter een verandering van or­
ganisatiecultuur van de overheden. Dit geeft ambtenaren de gelegenheid om verschil­
lende culturele overtuigingen te internaliseren waardoor beleidsovereenkomsten in 
praktijk kunnen worden gebracht door alle betrokkenen in plaats van een paar geën­
gageerde individuen. De conclusie die hieruit kan worden getrokken is dat overheden 
die zich engageerden een positief effect hadden op de interactie tussen overheid en bur­
gers; met andere woorden: het resulteerde vaak in dialoog en samenwerking. Overhe­
den die zich niet engageerden hadden een negatief effect op de interactie tussen
387
- Q -
Madelinde PHD zonder afbrekingen:Opmaak 1 15- 2011 14:45 Pagina 388
overheid en burgers, met als gevolg dat het uitmondde in debat en conflict. De wil van 
overheden om zich te engageren is dus een belangrijke factor in de relatie tussen over­
heid en burger.
De zesde factor is de wil van burgers om zich te engageren die door de overheid serieus 
genomen dient te worden. Als de overheid burgers die zich willen engageren uitsluit 
zal dat ertoe leiden dat de relatie tussen overheid en burgers in een conflict modus raakt 
(zie onder), bijvoorbeeld een conflictueuze relatie (zie ook de derde factor die uitslui­
ting van burgers betreft). Wanneer het algemeen belang en het burgerbelang kan wor­
den meegenomen, hetgeen betekent dat burgers betrokken worden, dan kan de relatie 
tussen overheid en burgers in een positieve modus komen, bijvoorbeeld een alliantie of 
coalitie. Terwijl de eerstgenoemde de interactie tussen overheid en burgers altijd nega­
tief zal beïnvloeden, omdat het zal eindigen in debat en conflict, heeft de laatstgenoemde 
een positief effect op de interactie tussen overheid en burgers aangezien het zal leiden 
tot een mix van dialoog, onderhandeling, dialoog en samenwerking, of een mix van 
dialoog en samenwerking.
Tenslotte beïnvloeden situationele factoren de interactie tussen overheid en burgers, 
zoals de gelegenheid die zich voordoet dat bewoners ondersteuning krijgen van een 
water-expert of dat er een beleidswijziging in het waterbeheer plaatsvindt waardoor de 
rijksoverheid haar werkterrein voor het nemen van maatregelen verbreedt en niet al­
leen kijkt naar opties tussen de dijken, zoals kribverlaging, maar ook achter de dijken, 
waaronder dijkterugleggingen, bypasses en nevengeulen. Hoewel situationele factoren 
cruciaal zijn in governance processen is het afhankelijk van de context of deze een po­
sitieve of negatieve invloed hebben op de relatie tussen overheid en burgers. Bij de eerst­
genoemde zal de interactie uitm onden in debat, onderhandeling, dialoog en/of 
samenwerking, bij de laatstgenoemde zal de interactie eindigen in debat en conflict.
De onderliggende factoren die de interactie tussen overheid en burgers beïnvloeden 
zijn respectievelijk de verschillende modi en dynamieken die deel uitmaken van de in ­
teractie tussen overheid en burgers, en twee andere factoren die te maken hebben met 
de snel veranderende maatschappelijke configuraties van staat, civil society en markt.
De eerste onderliggende factor is dat de relatie tussen overheid en burgers in plan­
ningsprocessen in het Nederlandse rivierlandschap gebaseerd is op een stabiel patroon. 
Hierbij kan een onderscheid gemaakt worden in een conflict- en samenwerkingsmodus. 
Terwijl de conflictmodus van de relatie tussen overheid en burgers zich ontwikkelt in 
een conflictueuze situatie, is een samenwerkingsmodus terug te voeren tot een situatie 
waarin partners een positieve houding hebben tot elkaar, hetgeen gerelateerd is aan de 
vorm van hun relatie: een alliantie of coalitie. Het bewegen van de ene modus naar de 
andere is moeilijk maar binnen de modi kunnen veranderingen in rap tempo optreden. 
Deze veranderingen kunnen gezien worden als korte termijn dynamieken van de rela­
tie tussen overheid en burgers. Dit betekent dat als actoren eenmaal in een conflict-
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modus belanden het heel moeilijk is om er uit te komen, en eenmaal in een samen- 
werkingsmodus is dat voor de lange duur, maar dat wil geenszins zeggen dat er geen 
sprake is van onenigheden. De analyse van de case studies laat zien dat partners in een 
samenwerkingsmodus bereid waren om onenigheden op te lossen terwijl dit niet gold 
voor partners die in een conflictmodus zitten. Partners in een conflictmodus van de 
relatie tussen overheid en burgers kunnen hun interactie van het ene op het andere 
moment veranderen van debat naar conflict. Partners in een samenwerkingsmodus van 
de relatie tussen overheid en burgers kunnen hun interactie veranderen van debat naar 
onderhandeling en vervolgens naar dialoog en samenwerking. De interactie kan zich 
verder ontwikkelen van samenwerking terug naar dialoog en debat. Het kan ook star­
ten bij een andere interactieuitkomst, en zich ontwikkelen van dialoog naar debat, via 
onderhandeling naar dialoog en samenwerking.
De tweede onderliggende factor is institutionele verandering die een effect heeft op de 
relatie tussen overheid en burgers. Deze studie laat zien dat het moeilijk is om een top- 
down benadering te veranderen in een richting waarbij de koers gezamenlijk wordt be­
paald ondanks het feit dat burgers aangaven dat zij betrokken wilden zijn. Dit betekent 
dat een institutionele verandering van een overheid die alle touwtjes in handen heeft 
(government) naar een die meer in een netwerk van actoren opereert (governance) 
plaats moet vinden vanaf het begin van een planningsproces ter voorkoming van ge­
zichtsverlies voor de overheid (in casu: de betrokken minister of staatssecretaris). Dit 
betekent echter niet dat een gezamenlijke benadering altijd zal voortduren omdat deze 
op elk moment vervangen kan worden door een top-down aanpak. De kans dat dit zal 
gebeuren vermindert als een lagere overheid betrokken is en verantwoordelijk is voor 
het project management.
De derde onderliggende factor is de vraag van burgers om betrokken te worden in toe­
nemende mate druk uitoefent op de overheid om zich op te stellen als governance actor 
en niet als government actor. De wens van burgers om een stem te krijgen bij verande­
ringen in hun leefomgeving kunnen niet door de overheid genegeerd worden. Zij moet 
burgers op de een of andere wijze betrekken in het planningsproces. Deze ontwikkeling 
kan gezien worden als een onderliggende factor in de relatie tussen overheid en burgers. 
Het beïnvloedt de interactie tussen overheid en burgers zodanig dat het de druk op de 
overheid vergroot om rekening te houden met de wensen van de burgers en hen te be­
trekken bij het planningsproces. Dit vereist een verandering van de rol van de overheid: 
van government actor naar governance actor.
Twee mechanismen die de interactie tussen overheid en burgers beïnvloeden zijn macht 
en cultuur.
Deze studie laat zien dat macht het zwaarst telt in governance processen. Plannings­
processen kunnen worden beschouwd als een arena waarin macht het verschil maakt. 
Macht kan worden gezien als een mechanisme dat de interactie tussen overheid en bur-
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gers beïnvloedt. De analyse van de case studies laat zien dat niet alleen overheden maar 
ook burgers macht opbouwen. In conflictsituaties proberen overheden en burgers zo­
veel mogelijk macht op te bouwen, maar wanneer zij partner zijn in een alliantie of co­
alitie lijkt macht geen issue. De overheden gebruiken vooral indirecte dwang, 
legitimatiemacht, hindermacht en kennismacht, terwijl burgers gebruik maken van le- 
gitimatiemacht, hindermacht, kennismacht en mediamacht. Zowel de overheid als de 
burgers beïnvloeden hun interactie door het gebruik van macht. De overheid maakt 
het verschil met indirecte dwang en legitimatiemacht, burgers doen dit door de inzet 
van kennismacht en mediamacht. Beide partijen gebruiken hindermacht. De overheid 
doet dit in het verborgene, de burgers in alle openheid. Uit de case studies blijkt dat 
het voor burgers moeilijk is om een vinger te leggen op de hindermacht van de over­
heid, bijvoorbeeld door gebruik te maken van de Wet openbaar bestuur. Overheden 
gebruiken hindermacht ook in hun relatie met andere overheden. Hindermacht wordt 
vaak ingezet als er sprake is van een competentiestrijd tussen de overheden.
De conclusie kan worden getrokken dat macht prevaleert in planningsprocessen in het 
Nederlandse rivierengebied. Dit houdt in dat Rijkswaterstaat meestal bepaalt. Betekent 
dit dat een gezamenlijke aanpak in het Nederlandse rivierenlandschap een ideaal is dat 
moeilijk te verwezenlijken is? Deze studie laat zien dat als de configuratie van actoren 
zodanig is dat de actoren betrokken zijn op basis van respect en gelijkwaardigheid, een 
gezamenlijke aanpak ertoe kan leiden dat Rijkswaterstaat de gezamenlijke uitkomst 
goedkeurt.
Deze studie laat zien dat cultuur waarneembaar is gedurende het hele planningsproces. 
Het kan worden beschouwd als een mechanisme dat de interactie tussen overheid en 
burgers beïnvloedt. Een overheid met een sterke organisatiecultuur, zoals Rijkswater­
staat, probeerde altijd het planningsproces in haar richting te bewegen terwijl een over­
heid met een minder uitgesproken organisatiecultuur, zoals provincie Noord-Brabant, 
flexibel was in de interactie met andere overheden en burgers. Burgers met een sterke 
culturele achtergrond bleken in staat om tegenslagen tijdens het planningsproces te 
overwinnen terwijl burgers met een zwakke culturele achtergrond m inder capabel 
waren om met obstakels in het planningsproces om te gaan. In de interactie tussen 
overheid en burgers is cultuur geen issue; dan wordt alleen de economische kaart ge­
speeld. Cultuur speelt echter een belangrijke rol in de lokale groepen hetgeen zowel in 
de capaciteit als motivatie voor het ondernemen van actie tot uiting komt.
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NOTES
I For a def in i tion of governance see Ch ap te r 2.
2With regional  author i t ies  is meant  the provinces. The terms  
provincial  and regional  author i t ies  are used interchangeably.
3 Here governance is taken to be about the state learning tc 
steer society in new ways as w e l l  as the development of c o m ­
plex networks and the rise of more bo t tom-u p  approaches 
to decis ion making (Pierre & Peters,  2000).
4 Ri j ks wa te rs taat  is the Di rec to ra te -G ene ra l  fo r  W a ter Ma ­
nagem en t in the Nether lands , and as such responsible for  
the m anagem en t  of the  main r ivers:  the Rhine, Meuse anc 
Scheldt.
5 Interview with  W. Silva, W. ten B r ink  and C. Beekmans , 30 
June  2005.
6 w ww .r i j kswa te rs ta a t. n l / over_ ons /m iss ie ke rn taken , acces­
sed on 23 July  2010.
7 S tatement  by E. van Lith,  f o r m e r  M e m b e r  of Par l ia ment  for  
the Chr is t ian Democra t ic  Par ty (CDA), De Water,  October  
2006 -  ital ics in the or ig inal  text.
8 Interview with  H.B.A.M. Sanders,  30 June 2005.
9 In th is study government  author i t ies  are v iewed as part  of a 
plural ist  state st ruc ture,  a highly f ragm en ted  set of o rgani ­
sat ions tha t are not mo nol i th ic  (see Etzioni-Halevy, 1 985).
10 According to Etzioni, 'potent ia l '  refers to the latent energy 
and 'actual'  capaci ty refers to the  energising i tself  (Etzioni, 
1968:110-111).
II Putnam (1995) v iews social  capi ta l  as 'features of social  life 
-  networks ,  norms , and t ru s t  -  tha t  enable par t i c ipan ts  to 
act t og e th e r  more effect ively to pu rsue  shared object ives' .  
Rudd (2000:133) v iews social  capi ta l  as 'general ised trust ' ,  
formed largely as a by-p roduc t of the act ivi t ies of individuals 
interact ing w i th  each o ther w i th in  vo lun ta ry  o r in fo rmal  as­
sociat ions.
12 The explanat ion of Luke's power dimens ions  is based on 
h t t p : / / w w w . s c r i b d . c o m / f u l l / 4 8 5 0 4 5 2 ? a c c e s s _ k e y = k e y -  
izfk9x9kobzyjq7nubs, accessed on 7 Februa ry 2010, Gaventa 
(2006) and Veneklassen and M i l le r  (2007).
13 Civi l society can be descr ibed as interest  groups trying to 
divert  publ ic sources to t h e i r  favoured causes. It serves to 
balance the power of the state and to protect  individuals f rom 
the state 's power (Fukuyama, 2001). These interest  groups 
are ma in ly hor izon ta l  networks ,  as opposed to the  ver t i ca l  
re lat ionship between local groups and government  au thor i ­
ties analysed in this study.
14 Governance is considered to be dynamic and seeks to un ­
ders tand how actors,  publ ic and private,  cont ro l  economic 
activi t ies and produce desired outcomes, wh i le  government  
is viewed as having a central  role in producing economic ou t ­
comes and helping to manage  the tensions of modern  eco­
nomies  in the globa l  env ironment (Pierre & Peters,  2000:23).
15 The di f f icul ty wi th  the ter m 'potent ia l '  (= the possibi l i ty for  
coming into being) is that  it me ans  much the  same as capa­
city. In spi te of this I use this t e rm  unt i l  I have found a better 
one.
16 Organisat iona l  cu l tu re  can be def ined as the specif ic  co l­
lect ion of va lues and n orm s  tha t are shared by people anc 
groups in an organizat ion and tha t in f luences the  way they 
interact  w i th  each o th e r and w ith  stakeholders  outside the 
organisat ion (Hill & Jones, 2001).
17 Pierre and Pete rs (2000) v iew governance as emerg ing  
through the development of complex networks and the rise of 
more bo t tom -u p  approaches to dec is ion-making . According 
to S toke r (1 998), the essence of governance is its focus or 
governing mechan isms  wh ich  do not rest  on recourse to the 
author i ty and sanct ions of government.
8
1 Sol idar i ty may be di rect ly related to social  ident ity,  but  this 
is not always the case. W h e th e r a strong social  ident i ty leads 
to strong sol idar i ty  o r we ak  so l idar i ty depends on the c o m ­
mun ity  (see Ch ap te r 5).
19 Prof. T  Tai ll ieu,  De pa rtmen t  Labou r & Organisat ion Psy­
chology, Kathol ieke Universite it  Leuven, pers. comm. , 5 June 
2009.
20 Ri jkswaterstaat  is the executive agency of the Minis try  of 
Transport,  Public Works and Water Managem en t and as such 
considered as the nat ional  government.
21 This study was part  of the Boundar ies of Space research 
p rogra m m e commissi oned  by the executive board of Wage- 
ningen University Research Centre,  wh ich  ran from 2004 tc 
2006. It resul ted in va r ious  pub l ica t io ns  (Roth & Warner,  
2007; Roth et al., 2006a, 2006b; Warner,  2008; W a rn e r et al., 
2008) which  are used fo r  descr ib ing the case
22 Loevestein cast le wh ich  is s ituated on the r iver Meuse was 
the  place w h ere  the  state secre ta ry  launched her White 
Paper on Room fo r  the River This meet ing is also referred 
to as the  'Loevestein meet ing' .
23 Safety along the rivers in the Rhine es tuary -  the Nederri jn,  
Lek,  Me rwede and Waal -  and the dow ns t re am part  of the 
Meuse has to meet the legal ly required standard in 2015. For 
the Rhine this means a design discharge of 16,000 m3/s near 
Lobith,  wh ere  the  Rhine ente rs the Ne ther lands  f ro m Ger ­
many, and fo r the Meuse a design discharge of 3,800 m3/s 
nea r Borgharen on the Belgian /Dutch  border
24 An executive co unc i l lo r  is a port fo l io holde r in the m u n ic i­
pal  execut ive,  a s m a l l  tea m headed by the ma yo r
25 R i j kswate rs taat  is the D irec to ra te -G ene ra l  f o r  Publ ic 
Works and W ate r Managem en t,  the executive agency res­
ponsible fo r  the  managem en t  of the Dutch main rivers.
26 This histor ical  part  of the case descr ipt ion is based on Jan ­
sen (1998), Verhalen van Lent. Een veranderend  landschap 
(H is to ry  o f Lent. A landscape in  c h a n g e ), Lent:  Municipal t ies 
of Elst  and Ni jmegen; Schenkels (1 986), Lent lang vervlogen 
t i jden  [L e n t in fo rm e r  tim e s ]: www .n o v io m ag u s .n l /  
Len t/001.htm , accessed on 6 February  2009; Mulder,  Spaan 
& de Wolf  (2001), In de ban van de B etuwse  di jken; deel  2 
Oos te rhout  [U n d e r de s p e ll o f  the d ikes in the Betuwe, pant
2  Oostenhout], A l ter ra  report  311; Terugb l ik 'Tegen de stroom
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in', zeven eeuwen w a te rb e h e e r  in de B etuwe [ 'A g a in s t the  
cunnent'; A re tro spe c tive  -  Seven c e n tu rie s  o f w a te r m a ­
n a g e m e n t in  the B e tu w e ), Ja a rbo ek  S t icht ing Batavorum 
[2008); G.P. van de Ven [Ed.), [1995), Niets is bestendig;  de 
gesch ieden is  van de r i v ie rovers tromingen  in Nede r land  , 
[N o th in g  is e nd u rin g ; the  h is tony o f r iv e r f loods  in the  N e ­
then lands ), Utrecht.
27 Derived from 'street interviews' held by the author  in March
2005. Of 32 responden ts,  fo u r  backed dike relocat ion [one 
lived in Lent, two we re  new residents of the Waalsprong hou­
sing development,  and one was a resident of Ni jmegen anc 
wo rked  in Lent),  fou r  did not have an opinion, and 24 were 
proponen ts of the residents '  a l ternat ive Lentse Warande.
28 Street interview with  H. van Vorsselen, m e m b e r  of the local 
vo lun ta ry  f ire brigade, 15 March 2005.
29 Room fo r the Rhine Branches [R u im te  voor R ijn takken ) and 
Integrated Studies of the Downstream Rivers ['in tegra le  Ver­
kenn ingen  Benedenriv ienen ).
30 The Room fo r the River pol icy was publ ished in 1996.
31 Interview with  M.E.F. Leewis,  18 Novem ber 2005.
32 nterview with  D. van der Graaf, 3 June 2005.
33 'River w a te r  obs tru cts new development ;  Housing devel­
opm en t  nea r N i jmegen  in the r i sk  zone dur ing  high wa ter '
[R iv ie rw a te r fn u ik t n ieu w b o uw ; V IN EX-locatie  b ij N ijm e ge n  
l ig t  in gevarenzone b ij hoogw ater), NRC Hande lsb lad  14 
March 2000.
34Pers.  co mm.  D. van d er Graaf, 10 Decem ber 2004.
35 Interview with  H.T.C. van Stokkom, 12 De cem ber 2005.
36 Interview with  P.F.G. Depla,  19 Januar y  2005.
37 Proposal  by the mun ic ip a l  execut ive to approve the v o lu n ­
ta ry  agreements  on the dike relocat ion V eur-Lent  [Voorste l 
B & W in  te  s tem m e n  m e t overeenkom sten  over d ijk te ru g le g -  
g in g  V eu r-Len t), 12 June  2003.
38 Interview with  P.F.G. Depla,  19 Januar y  2005.
39The mun ic ipal i t y  of N i jmegen  was an 'ar t ic le 12 mun ic ip a ­
lity', wh ich  means  tha t it's f inances we re  control led by nat io­
nal  government ;  interview H. Berg,  15 June 2005.
40Interview with  H. Berg,  15 June  2005; interview with  M.J.M. 
Bro ekman , 27 June 2005.
41 Interview with  H. Berg,  15 June 2005.
42 'River w a te r  obs tru cts new development ;  Housing devel­
opm en t  nea r N i jmegen  in the r i sk  zone dur ing  high wa ter '  
[R iv ierwate r f nu ik t  n ieuwb ouw; VINEX-locat ie bij N jm e g e r  
l igt in gevarenzone bij hoogwater) ,  NRC Handelsb lad , 14 
March 2000.
43 'River w a te r  obs tru cts new development ;  Housing devel­
opm en t  nea r N i jmegen  in the r i sk  zone dur ing  high wa ter '  
[R iv ie rw a te r fn u ik t n ieu w b o uw ; V IN EX-locatie  b ij N ijm e ge n  
l ig t  in  gevarenzone b ij hoogw ater), NRC Handelsb lad , 14 
March 2000.
Representat ives, 30 January 2001; The Quick Scan included 
the study of the dike relocat ion,  two by pass al ternat ives [a 
green r iver along nor th of Lent and a green r i ve r in the 
midd le of Lent) and a comb ina t ion al ternat ive aiming at w i ­
dening the r iver channel .
45 Let te r f rom the state secreta ry to the chai r  of the House of 
Representat ives, 30 January 2001.
46 h t t p : / / n i jm e g en .sp .n l / op in ie /o p 1 /s tm  accessed on 7 De­
c e m b er  2007.
47 'The Waalsprong Ni jmegen w i l l  go ahead'  [De Waalspnong  
N ijm e g e n g a a td o o r), press release by the mun icipa l i ty of Ni j ­
megen, 20 Sep tem ber 2000.
48 Interview w ith  G.N. Kok, 10 Januar y 2005.
49 Proposal  by N i jmegen  City Council ,  no. 2.1 7050/date m e e ­
t ing City Counci l  12 June 2003, 9 A p r i l  2002.
50 Interview w ith  H. Berg,  15 June 2005.
51 'Confo rmat ion  of agreement concerning Waalsprong m e a ­
sures'  [B evestig ing a fspraken over m aa trege len  Waalspnong), 
press release by the  mun ic ip a l i ty  of N i jmegen, 13 October
2000.
52Van Ellen side channe l  was la ter  included in the residents'  
a l ternat ive, Lentse Warande.
53 'State secre tary De Vries answers ques t ions  f rom the m u ­
nic ipal i ty of N i j m egen '  [S ta a ts s e c re ta r is  De Vnies b e a n t­
w o o rd t vnagen g em ee n te  N ijm e g e n ), press release by the 
mun ic ipal i t y  of Ni jmegen, 22 De cem ber 2000.
54'N jm e g e n  t r ips us up' [N ijm egen  lic h t ons een pootje], Gel­
der lander,  22 Decem ber 2000.
55 Let te r f rom the state secretary to the cha ir  of House of Re­
presentat ives,  30 January 2001.
56 P roposal  by Ni jm egen  City Counci l  [R a ad svoo rs te l N ij­
m eegse  g e m ee n te ra ad ), 12 June  2002.
57 The Brokx Adv isory Commission  consisted of represe n ta ­
t ives f rom the Minis try  of Transport ,  Publ ic Works  and Water 
Ma nag em en t  [V&W), the Minis try  of Housing, Spat ia l  P lan­
ning and the  Envi ronment  [VROM), Rijkswaterstaat,  province 
of Gelder land, the  mun ic ip a l i ty  of N i jmegen, Rivierenland 
w a t e r  board, and A r n h e m - N jm e g e n  reg iona l  author i ty  
[KAN).
58 Let te r f rom the state secreta ry to the chai r  of the House of 
Representat ives, 30 January 2001.
59 'De Vries acknowledges that the Van Ellen plan for the Waal 
has some qual i t ies'  [De Vries e rk e n t paan k w a lite ite n  in  p lan  
Van E llen voor Waall, Gelder lande r,  31 January 2001.
60 P roposal  by Ni jm egen  City Counci l  [R a ad svoo rs te l N ij­
m eegse  g e m ee n te ra ad ), 12 June  2002.
61 'Waalsprong Ni jmegen w i l l  go ahead'  [W aalspnong N ijm e ­
g en  g a a t door), press release by the mun icipal i t y of N i j m e ­
gen, 20 Sep tem ber 2000, ww w .n ie uw sba n k .n l , accessed on
12 De cem ber 2007.
4 L et te r f ro m the state sec re tary to the cha ir  of the House of 62 Interview w ith  G.N. Kok, 10 Januar y 2005.
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63 This report  in the for m of a M em ora ndum  concerning the 
bott leneck  at Ni jmegen, dated 18 Januar y  2001, was presen­
ted to the counc i l  co m m it te e  on the  Waa lsprong  by Royal 
Haskoning, 12 February  2001; a copy of the repor t  had not 
been publ ished officially. Source: 'Haskoning did not see the 
good of a l te rna t ive '  [H a skon in g  z ie t w e in ig  in  a lte rn a t ie f ,  
Gelder lander,  n.d.
64 ' Depla:  No f u r th e r  research into Van El len'  [D epla : Geen 
n a d e r o nd erzoe k  Van E lle n ), Gelde r lande r,  Fe bruary 2001, 
n.d.
65 Draft  Co mmun ica t io n  Strategy fo r the  Dike Relocat ion i r 
Lent Plan [C oncept A an p ak C o m m un ica tie  P la ns tu d ie  D ijk- 
te rug le gg in g  L e n t , 29 No ve m ber 2002.
66 Draft  Co mmun ica t io n  Strategy fo r the  Dike Relocat ion m 
Lent Plan [C oncept A an p ak C o m m un ica tie  P la ns tu d ie  D ijk- 
te rug le gg in g  L e n t , 29 No ve m ber 2002.
67 P roposal  by Ni jm egen  City Counc i l  [R a ad svoo rs te l N ij­
m eegse g e m ee n te ra ad ), 12 June 2002.
68 0N-1  420 A g ree m e n t  new cross r i ver  connec t ion  on the 
r iver Waal [O ve re e nko m stn ieu w e  W aaloevervenbmdmg) and 
ON-1421 A gree m e nt  Dike relocat ion in Lent [Overeenkomst 
d i jkte ruglegging Lent).
69 This cont r ibut ion  was not extracted f ro m the budget of the 
Room fo r  the River p rogramm e.
70 Interview w ith  A. van der Hoek, 20 January  2006.
71 Draft  Co mmun ica t io n  Strategy fo r the  Dike Relocat ion m 
Lent Plan [C oncept A an p ak C o m m un ica tie  P la ns tu d ie  D ijk- 
te rug le gg in g  Lent), 29 No ve m ber 2002.
72 Interview w ith  D. van der Graaf, 3 June  2005.
73As the residents we re  the spokesmen of the advisory group, 
the a u thor of ten refers to the residents.
74 Informat ion bul let in Spronglevend, February 2003; report  of 
the advisory group meet ing,  20 J anuar y  2003; Memora ndum 
of D. van d er Graaf, 3 Decem ber 2002; Draf t  le t te r  f rom pro­
ject  man ag e r to invited member s ,  2 De cem ber 2002; Agenda 
advisory group, 19 Decem ber 2002. Invi tees we re  Lentse Fe­
derat ie, S t icht ing Dorpsraad Lent,  P la t f o rm  Waalsprong, 
K a m e r  van Koophande l,  Len tse  O nde rn em ersvere n ig ing , 
Gelderse Mi l ieu Federatie,  Lent 800 /Werkgroep BOOM, His­
tor isch e  Vereniging Mari t ha im e ,  KSCC S ch ipperscen t ru m,  
KSV S chuttevaer  afd. Gelder land,  S t icht ing Ce n t rum  Ma ­
nagem en t  N i jmegen, Voge lwerkgroep  'Ri jk van N i jmegen 
e.o.', and Fietsersbond afd. Nijmegen.
75 Interview w ith  D. van der Graaf, 3 June  2005.
76 Interview w ith  D. van der Graaf, 3 June  2005.
77 Interview w ith  G.N. Kok, 10 January  2005.
78 Interview w ith  A. A u g u s t jn ,  7 February  2005.
79 Residents,  staf f  and gove rn ment  dec is ion -m ake rs  of the 
government  author i t ies  involved did not assess these condi­
t ions in the same  way.
80 During this per iod people may make wr i t te n  o r ora l  repre­
sentat ions to the Provincial  Execut ive,  wh ich  is the co m p e ­
tent author i ty fo r  the env ironme nta l  impact assessment  (EIA)
procedure.  The res idents are solely al lowed to respond on 
w hat  should  be studied in addi t ion to w hat  is stated in the 
Not i f icat ion of Intent.
81 Interview with  D. van d er Graaf, 3 June  2005.
82 Interview with  D. van d er Graaf, 3 June  2005.
83 Compar ison  of the  two plans reveals di f ferent premises. 
The government  plan [Plan Brokx) was designed fo r  16,000 
m 3/s  w i th  a m ax im u m  of about 18,000 m3/s,  wh i le  the resi­
dents ' a l ternat ive [Lentse Warande) could meet the  design 
discharge of 16,000 m 3/s. Source: Pro jectnota /M.e .r  Dike re­
locat ion Lent, Rijkswaterstaat East Nether lands, March 2005, 
page 43, 48.
84 News bul let in Room fo r the Waal, room fo r safety [N ie u w s­
b u lle tin  R u im te  voon de Waal, nuim te voon ve ilighe id ), no. 2, 
No vem ber 2003.
85 L et te r f ro m M.J.M. Broekman  to the d irector fo r  w a te r  m a ­
nagem en t  of R i j kswate rs taat  East Ne ther lands , H.T.C. van 
Stokkom, 28 A p r i l  2003.
86 Ema i l  f rom C.Th. Smit  of Royal Haskoning to M.C. de Vriend 
and others,  19 May 2003
87 L e t te r  f ro m  the c h a ir  of the  adviso ry g roup to executive 
coun c i l l o r  P.F.G. Depla,  29 June  2004.
88 Report of the advisory group meeting,  17 June 2004.
89 News bul let in Room fo r the Waal, room fo r safety [N ie u w s­
b u lle tin  R u im te  voonde Waal, nuim te voon ve ilighe id ), no. 3, 
A p r i l  2004.
90 These we re  showed in News bul let in Room fo r the  Waal, 
room fo r safety [N ie u w sb u lle tin  R u im te  voon de Waal, nuim te  
voon veiligheid), no. 3, A p r i l  2004.
91 This opt ion was developed by landscape arch i tec t  Ashok 
Bhalotra.
92 Interview with  D. van d er Graaf, 3 June  2005.
93 Interview with  G.N. Kok, 10 Januar y 2005.
94 News bul let in Room fo r the Waal, room fo r safety [N ie u w s­
b u lle tin  R u im te  voon de Waal, nuim te voon ve ilighe id ), no. 3, 
A p r i l  2004.
95 L et te r f rom the chai r  of the advisory group to the Provincial  
Execut ive of province of Gelder land, 10 February  2004.
96 Interview with  M.C. de Vr iend, 17 March 2008.
97 Report of the advisory group meeting,  20 A p r i l  2004.
98 Emai l  f ro m G.J.M. Verstappen to J. Tielen, 26 March 2004; 
Letter f rom M.J.M. Broekman  'React ion 28 March 2004' , n.d..
99 Interview with  D. van d er Graaf, 3 June  2005.
100 Interview with  PF.G. Depla,  19 January 2005.
101 Interview with  M.J.M. Broekman, 27 June  2005; News  bul ­
let in Room fo r  the  Waal, room fo r  safety [N ie u w s b u lle tin  
R u im te  voon de Waal, nu im te  voon ve ilighe id ), no. 4, Decem ­
ber 2004.
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102The costs of both plans we re  not included in the table pu ­
blished in News Bul let in Room fo r the  Waal,  room fo r safety
(N ieu ivsb u lle tin  R u im te  voorde  Waal, ru im te  voor ve ilighe id ), 
no. 4, Decem ber 2004.
103 Report  of the project  group meet ing,  2 Decem ber 2004.
104 Report  of the project  group meet ing,  4 Novem ber 2004.
105 React ions adviso ry group on env ir on m e n ta l  impact as­
se ssment (EIA) (Projectnota/M.e.r. ),  14 Sep tem ber 2004.
106 Interview with  O. Fei tsma, 11 Januar y  2005.
107 Report  of the project  group meet ing,  4 Novem ber 2004.
108 Interview with  M.J.M. Broekm an,  27 June  2005.
109A rn h e m -N i jm e g e n  regional  author i ty (KAN) and Ministry 
of Housing did not play a key role in the  steer ing group. The ­
refore,  t h e i r  role has not been elaborated here.
110 Report of the steer ing group meet ing,  19 Novem ber 2004.
111 Interview with  G.N. Kok, 10 Januar y  2005.
112 Interview with  P.F.G. Depla,  19 Januar y  2005.
113 Interview with  G.N. Kok, 10 Januar y  2005
114 Pers.  co mm.  J. van Dussen, 10 Decem ber 2004.
115 Let te r f ro m the project ma n ag e r to the residents of Lent,
19 Novem ber 2004.
116 Pers.  co mm.  D. van der Graaf, 10 Decem ber 2004.
117This is laid down in the f reedom of info rmat ion  legis lat ion 
(Wet Openbaarheid van Bestuur) .
118A draf t  version that  has not been adopted was not though t 
to be legal. Unl ike roads, w a te r  projects do not have a prel i ­
mina ry  design decision (voorontwerp beslui t) that  is available 
to the  publ ic;  pers.  comm.  D. van d e r  Graaf, 10 De cem ber
2004.
119 Pers.  co mm.  D. van der Graaf, 10 Decem ber 2004. 
120Report  of the project  group meet ing,  13 Januar y  2005.
121 Pers.  co mm.  D. van der Graaf, 20 Decem ber 2004.
122 It w as  intended to make the f inal  version of the EIA avai­
lable to the public.  The fo rm a l public consul tat ion on the final  
EIA would take place in au tumn  2005.
123 Report  of the advisory group meet ing,  25 Januar y  2005; 
L e t te r  f ro m the  project  group conce rn ing  stee r ing  group 
meet ing on 1 Februa ry 2005, 7 Januar y  2005.
124 L et te r f rom the project  m a n ag e r  to the project  group, 7 
Januar y  2005.
125 This advisory report  was  an input to the 'SNIP 2a advice' 
regarding the  choice fo r the preferred al ternat ive and draf t 
plan.  The advice is f rom Ri j kswa te rs taat  East Ne ther lands  
and it goes via the d ir e c to r- ge n e ra l  of Ri jkswate rstaat  and 
the  d i re c to r- genera l  fo r  Wate r Affairs to the state secretary.  
SNIP 3 and 4 is the project decis ion;  SNIP 5 is the decis ion for
implementa t ion.
126 The long ter m costs covered the real isat ion of a dike re lo ­
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABG
CDA
CPB
CSI
DLG
EIA
EIS
EU
Flotust
GeWaLent
GLTO
IPO
KAN
LBOW
LPF
LTO
ME
MP
NAP
NGO
NIMBY
NIMFABY
NIMTOO
NOVA
PDR
PIMBY
PKB
PvdA
SP
SPKD
Veur-Lent
TAW
VVD
ZLTO
O fficial superv isory group (A m bte iijke  Bege ie id ings Groep)
C hristian D em ocrats (C hristen D em ocratisch Appel)
N etherlands Bureau of Econom ic Policy Analysis (Centraa l Plan Bureau) 
Cross-Scale Interaction
Governm ent service fo r land and w a te r m anagem ent (D ienst LandeHjk Gebied) 
E nvironm enta l Impact Assessm ent (m ilieue ffec trapportage  -  m.e.r.) 
E nvironm enta l Impact S tatem ent 
European Union (Europese Unie)
residents of three s tree ts  F loralaan, Tu instraat and S te ltsestraa t (organ isatie  van 
bewoners van F loralaan, Tu instraat en S teltsestraat) 
the affected residents of the Waal river bend cu t-o ff (Gedupeerden van de 
W aaibochtverlegging Lent)
Farm ers' organisa tion (GewesteUjke Land- en Tuinbouw Organisatie)
Association of P rovincia l A u tho rities  (In te rp rov inc iaa l Overleg)
A rnhem -N ijm egen  regional au tho rity  (Knooppunt A rnhem -N ijm egen)
N ational A dm in is tra tive  Agreem ent on W ater (LandeHjk B estuu rs  Overleg Wateij 
N ationa lis t party (L ijs t P im  Fortuyn)
Farm ers' organisa tion (Land- en Tuinbouw O rganisatie Nederland)
Riod Police (IMobiele Eenheid)
M em ber of P arliam ent (lid  van de Tweede Kamer)
A m sterdam  Ordnance Datum (N orm aa l A m ste rdam s P e il
Non G overnm enta l Organisation (N ie t-G ouvernem ente le  Organisatie)
Not in my backyard
Not in my front and backyard (N ie t in m ijn  voor- en ach tertu in , NIVEA)
Not in my tu rn  of office
C urrent a ffa irs  p rogram m e on the television (ac tua lite itenp rogram m a op televisie) 
Project D epartm ent Room fo r the River (P ro ject D irectie  Ruim te voor de Rivier) 
Please in my backyard
Spatia l P lanning Key Decision -  SPKD (P lanologische Kern Bestissing)
Social D em ocrats (P artij van de Arbeid)
Socia list party (Sociatistische Partij)
Spatia l P lanning Key Decision (P lanologische Kern Beslissing, PKB) 
residents who are living near the dike of the v illage of Lent 
(inw oners van Lent die aan de d ijk  wonen)
Technical Advisory C om m ittee on Flood Defence 
( Technische Adviescom m iss ie  W aterkeringen)
Conservatives (V otkspartij voor V rijheid en Democratie)
Farm ers' organisa tion (ZuideUjke Land- en Tuinbouw Organisatie)
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